FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BHT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1021
File number: PEG 67 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 9 November 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the first applicant’s complementary protection claims – jurisdictional error established – writs issued. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36 & 476 Cases cited: DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17
MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26
SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 81 Date of hearing: 24 July 2023 Place: Perth Counsel for the Applicants: Mr H Glenister Solicitor for the Applicants: William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Lettenmaier Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
PEG 67 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BHT22
First Applicant
BHU22
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
9 NOVEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 4 March 2022.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
The first applicant is a citizen of Nigeria (Court Book (“CB”) 14). The second applicant is a citizen of The Bahamas (CB 40).
In January 1998 the first applicant moved to The Bahamas (CB 27).
In June 1998, the first and second applicant commenced a relationship. They were married in The Bahamas in May 2001 (CB 16). They now have two children (neither of whom are the subject of this judgment) (CB 64).
The second applicant and the applicants’ children arrived in Australia in June 2012 as the holders of visitor visas (CB 64).
The second applicant applied for an Australian student visa. That visa was ultimately granted (CB 64).
In January 2015, the first applicant arrived…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 1021
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The AAT had noted the first applicant's claims, including an armed attack in 2011 and a belief that he was targeted because he was a foreigner. The AAT accepted that the first applicant was owed protection in Nigeria, his country of birth, but focused on whether he could obtain safe third country protection in The Bahamas, where he had lived for approximately 17 years and held permanent residency. The AAT concluded that the first applicant had not been specifically targeted and did not establish a real risk of significant harm. The applicants argued that the AAT did not adequately address their claim that the first applicant's status as a foreigner and business owner put him at a higher risk of harm than the general population.
The Court examined whether the AAT made a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the first applicant's complementary protection claims. The applicants argued that the AAT did not sufficiently engage with the claim that the first applicant was at a greater risk due to his status as a foreigner and entrepreneur. The Court noted that while the AAT had considered the general risk of violence in The Bahamas, it did not adequately address the first applicant's specific risk due to his status. The Court found that the AAT's decision was flawed because it did not properly consider the first applicant's complementary protection claims, which constituted a jurisdictional error.
The Court determined that the AAT's failure to properly consider the first applicant's claims was a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court issued writs to quash the AAT's decision and remit the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration. This decision ensures that the AAT properly considers all relevant claims in future proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In oral submissions in reply before this Court, Mr Glenister (on behalf of the applicants) submitted that:(a)the statistical analysis may well be correct (and is not challenged). However, it is clearly a general analysis of data taken over a population. It is not data specific to the first applicant’s circumstances as a foreigner or a business owner;(b)a business owner or a person with a shopfront (as the first applicant was) obviously engages more with the public than someone who rarely leaves his or her house. It does not follow then that the statistics provide a basis to “knock out the claim”. Further, the Tribunal really only referred to the statistics in the context of determining whether there was an issue with generalised violence (which is a separate statutory test than that applicable here);(c)while it is accepted that the first applicant’s claim was not put as precisely as it has been in the application before this Court, that is not unusual and the claim was squarely put that the first applicant was at risk due to racially motivated violence;(d)the Tribunal made findings of fact on the basis of those claims on the material before it and decided that the first applicant had not been specifically targeted; and(e)there still remained the claim (as was expressly put by the first applicant in his representations) that he would be at risk of a worse outcome when it came to that sort of general or incidental violence because of the fact that he was a business owner and a foreigner.CONSIDERATION The applicants’ core concern relates to whether the Tribunal overlooked or did not properly engage with the first applicant’s claim that he was at a greater risk of significant harm than the general population in The Bahamas on the basis that he is a foreigner and an entrepreneur/business owner. As set out above, s 36 of the Act deals with protection visas. Section 36(2)(a) of the Act contains what is known as the refugee criterion. The High Court in DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10 (“DQU16”) set out the relevant test in determining whether an applicant has a “well-founded fear of persecution” as required by s 36(2)(a) of the Act and relevantly provides as follows (footnotes omitted):10.Section 36(2)(a) was amended in 2014. At the same time, ss 5H and 5J were inserted: s 5H provides a definition of “refugee” and s 5J provides a definition of "well‑founded fear of persecution", largely codifying the definition of "refugee" under the Convention. The question that s 36(2)(a) asks is whether a person is owed protection obligations because they are a refugee. The statutory definition of “refugee” in s 5H directs attention to whether a person is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of nationality, or unable or unwilling to return to the country of his or her former habitual residence, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in s 5J(1) (which in turn correspond to the five grounds for refugee status listed in Art 1A(2) of the Convention: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). A fear of persecution will be “well‑founded” if there is a “real chance” that the person will suffer the feared persecution if returned. A “real chance” is a prospect that is not “remote” or “far‑fetched”: it does not require a likelihood of persecution on the balance of probabilities…