BHT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BHT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1021

File number: PEG 67 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 9 November 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the first applicant’s complementary protection claims – jurisdictional error established – writs issued.   
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36 & 476
Cases cited:

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17

MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZTPK v Minister For Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2259

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 81
Date of hearing: 24 July 2023
Place: Perth
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr H Glenister
Solicitor for the Applicants: William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Lettenmaier
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

PEG 67 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BHT22

First Applicant

BHU22

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KENDALL

DATE OF ORDER:

9 NOVEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 4 March 2022.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE KENDALL:

BACKGROUND

  1. The first applicant is a citizen of Nigeria (Court Book (“CB”) 14). The second applicant is a citizen of The Bahamas (CB 40).

  2. In January 1998 the first applicant moved to The Bahamas (CB 27).

  3. In June 1998, the first and second applicant commenced a relationship. They were married in The Bahamas in May 2001 (CB 16). They now have two children (neither of whom are the subject of this judgment) (CB 64).

  4. The second applicant and the applicants’ children arrived in Australia in June 2012 as the holders of visitor visas (CB 64).

  5. The second applicant applied for an Australian student visa.  That visa was ultimately granted (CB 64).

  6. In January 2015, the first applicant arrived…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 1021
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants in this case, BHT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding their protection visa application. They argued that the AAT did not properly consider the first applicant's claims of being at a greater risk of harm due to his status as a foreigner and entrepreneur in The Bahamas. This dispute was heard by the Court on 24 July 2023, with the applicants represented by Mr Hamish Glenister and the Minister represented by Mr Tom Lettenmaier. The applicants' central contention was that the AAT either overlooked or failed to properly engage with the first applicant's complementary protection claims.

The AAT had noted the first applicant's claims, including an armed attack in 2011 and a belief that he was targeted because he was a foreigner. The AAT accepted that the first applicant was owed protection in Nigeria, his country of birth, but focused on whether he could obtain safe third country protection in The Bahamas, where he had lived for approximately 17 years and held permanent residency. The AAT concluded that the first applicant had not been specifically targeted and did not establish a real risk of significant harm. The applicants argued that the AAT did not adequately address their claim that the first applicant's status as a foreigner and business owner put him at a higher risk of harm than the general population.

The Court examined whether the AAT made a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the first applicant's complementary protection claims. The applicants argued that the AAT did not sufficiently engage with the claim that the first applicant was at a greater risk due to his status as a foreigner and entrepreneur. The Court noted that while the AAT had considered the general risk of violence in The Bahamas, it did not adequately address the first applicant's specific risk due to his status. The Court found that the AAT's decision was flawed because it did not properly consider the first applicant's complementary protection claims, which constituted a jurisdictional error.

The Court determined that the AAT's failure to properly consider the first applicant's claims was a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court issued writs to quash the AAT's decision and remit the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration. This decision ensures that the AAT properly considers all relevant claims in future proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The matter came before this Court for hearing on 24 July 2023. The applicants were represented at that hearing by Mr Hamish Glenister from William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd (“Mr Glenister”). The Minister was represented by Mr Tom Lettenmaier of counsel (“Mr Lettenmaier”). THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND RELEVANT FINDINGS As will be discussed further below, the applicants’ core contention is that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider the first applicant’s complementary protection claims. In particular, the applicants contend that the Tribunal either overlooked, or failed to actively engage in an intellectual process with, the first applicant’s claim that he would be at greater risk of real or significant harm than the general population because he was a foreigner and an entrepreneur/business owner. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in detail. The Tribunal’s decision in this matter is 24 pages in length and spans 112 paragraphs. The Tribunal outlined information contained in the first applicant’s statutory declaration (dated 26 November 2016) and noted the applicants’ protection claims as follows (at [16]):(a)the first applicant applied for a protection visa because he cannot return to The Bahamas;(b)in June 2011, the first applicant was shot by an armed gunman whilst at work. The gunman demanded money, yelled “such foreigners deserve to die” and shot the applicant in the chest;(c)the first applicant fears for his life as victims are commonly killed in The Bahamas to “do away with vital evidence”;(d)in mid-2012, the applicants’ house was broken into and a gunman attempted to sexually assault the second applicant;(e)in 2013, the first applicant’s car was broken into by a man. When the first applicant confronted him, he said “you came by plane you will leave in a bag”; and(f)the first applicant believes he was targeted because he was a foreigner and is afraid to return to The Bahamas because of the hatred for foreigners there. The Tribunal also noted that the applicants’ representative had provided submissions stating that “attacks on foreigners in The Bahamas are rampant and that the crimes committed against [the first applicant] were racially motivated”. The Tribunal noted a number of media articles regarding crime (including crime against tourists and foreigners) were cited in that regard (at [18]). The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant was owed protection in respect of his country of birth, Nigeria. The Tribunal then explained that it needed to consider whether the first applicant, who was a permanent resident of The Bahamas, could “obtain safe third country protection there”. The Tribunal also set out the relevant legislative provisions and case law in that regard (at [67]-[71]). The Tribunal noted that the first applicant had lived in The Bahamas for approximately 17 years prior to coming to Australia and that he held permanent residency on the basis of his spousal relationship with the second applicant (who was a citizen of The Bahamas). The Tribunal noted that the first applicant claimed to fear harm from persecution on the basis that Bahamians hate foreigners and the first applicant, being Nigerian, is seen as a foreigner. The Tribunal identified that the issue before it was whether s 36(4) of the Act applied to the first applicant and whether there were “substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of him availing himself of the right to enter and reside in The Bahamas, there would be a real risk that he [would] suffer significant harm there” (at [72]-[73]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions in reply before this Court, Mr Glenister (on behalf of the applicants) submitted that:(a)the statistical analysis may well be correct (and is not challenged). However, it is clearly a general analysis of data taken over a population. It is not data specific to the first applicant’s circumstances as a foreigner or a business owner;(b)a business owner or a person with a shopfront (as the first applicant was) obviously engages more with the public than someone who rarely leaves his or her house. It does not follow then that the statistics provide a basis to “knock out the claim”. Further, the Tribunal really only referred to the statistics in the context of determining whether there was an issue with generalised violence (which is a separate statutory test than that applicable here);(c)while it is accepted that the first applicant’s claim was not put as precisely as it has been in the application before this Court, that is not unusual and the claim was squarely put that the first applicant was at risk due to racially motivated violence;(d)the Tribunal made findings of fact on the basis of those claims on the material before it and decided that the first applicant had not been specifically targeted; and(e)there still remained the claim (as was expressly put by the first applicant in his representations) that he would be at risk of a worse outcome when it came to that sort of general or incidental violence because of the fact that he was a business owner and a foreigner.CONSIDERATION The applicants’ core concern relates to whether the Tribunal overlooked or did not properly engage with the first applicant’s claim that he was at a greater risk of significant harm than the general population in The Bahamas on the basis that he is a foreigner and an entrepreneur/business owner. As set out above, s 36 of the Act deals with protection visas. Section 36(2)(a) of the Act contains what is known as the refugee criterion. The High Court in DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10 (“DQU16”) set out the relevant test in determining whether an applicant has a “well-founded fear of persecution” as required by s 36(2)(a) of the Act and relevantly provides as follows (footnotes omitted):10.Section 36(2)(a) was amended in 2014. At the same time, ss 5H and 5J were inserted: s 5H provides a definition of “refugee” and s 5J provides a definition of "well‑founded fear of persecution", largely codifying the definition of "refugee" under the Convention. The question that s 36(2)(a) asks is whether a person is owed protection obligations because they are a refugee. The statutory definition of “refugee” in s 5H directs attention to whether a person is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of nationality, or unable or unwilling to return to the country of his or her former habitual residence, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in s 5J(1) (which in turn correspond to the five grounds for refugee status listed in Art 1A(2) of the Convention: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). A fear of persecution will be “well‑founded” if there is a “real chance” that the person will suffer the feared persecution if returned. A “real chance” is a prospect that is not “remote” or “far‑fetched”: it does not require a likelihood of persecution on the balance of probabilities…