Bhnan v Micheletto & Carrafa (Trustees)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bhnan v Micheletto & Carrafa (Trustees) [2022] FCA 846

Appeal from: Micheletto & Carrafa as Joint and Several Trustees of the property of Aid Eshi (Bankrupt) v Bhnan [2021] FCCA 1248
File number: NSD 648 of 2021
Judgment of: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 20 July 2022
Catchwords:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – apprehended bias – where primary judge intervened extensively in cross-examination of respondent below – where primary judge made obvious his profound disbelief in defence being advanced – where primary judge put his own case to the respondent – where primary judge decided on the case he advanced that was not advanced by the applicant – where respondent below did not apply for primary judge’s disqualification, but did object to a misleading question by the primary judge – whether respondent waived right to rely on apprehended bias as a ground of appeal

COSTS – certificate under s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) – whether there is a basis for the requisite opinion

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 120, 121

Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth)

Federal Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 2018 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 393 ALR 389

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577

Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 236; 272 FCR 343

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Gambarov Mobycom Mobile Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 114; 271 FCR 530

Jajoo v Micheletto [2021] FCA 1238

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

Jorgensen v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCAFC 113; 271 FCR 461

Manly Fast Ferry Pty Ltd v Wehbe [2021] NSWCA 67

Michel v The Queen [2009] UKPC 41; [2010] 1 WLR 879

Micheletto & Carrafa as Joint and Several Trustees of the property of Aid Eshi (Bankrupt) v Bhnan [2021] FCCA 1248

Navarro and Navarro [2019] FamCAFC 32

R v T, WA [2014] SASCFC 3; 118 SASR 382

Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen [2016] NSWCA 88; 332 ALR 128

Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23; [2020] 1 WLR 2455

Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; 167 CLR 568

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 64
Date of hearing: 5 May 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: D J Edney
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sachs Gerace Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: D C Harrison
Solicitor for the Respondent: SLF Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 648 of 2021
BETWEEN:

STEPHANIE BHNAN

Appellant

AND:

FABIAN KANE MICHELETTO & MICHAEL CARRAFA (AS JOINT AND SEVERAL TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF AID ESHI, A BANKRUPT)

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JULY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge made on 4 June 2021 be set…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 846
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bhnan v Micheletto & Carrafa (Trustees), the appellant, Ms Bhnan, sought to appeal against the primary judge's decision on the basis of apprehended bias and sought a new trial. The primary judge's extensive intervention in the cross-examination of the respondents and his expression of profound disbelief in the defence being advanced raised concerns about the judge's impartiality. The respondents argued that Ms Bhnan had waived her right to rely on apprehended bias as a ground of appeal by failing to raise it at the hearing below. The court had to determine whether the primary judge's interventions gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and whether Ms Bhnan had waived her right to rely on this ground of appeal.

The court considered the interventions in the context of the trial as a whole, noting that the primary judge's conduct during the first day of the hearing was not objectionable. However, during the second day of the hearing, the primary judge made several interventions during the cross-examination of Ms Bhnan and other witnesses, expressing a seemingly concluded view as to her case. The court held that the primary judge's interventions gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that Ms Bhnan had not waived her right to rely on this ground of appeal. The court also considered the issue of costs, noting that there was a basis for the requisite opinion under s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth).

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and remitted the matter to Division 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for rehearing before a different judge in a new trial. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed, and certificates were granted to both parties under s 8(1) of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) in respect of any costs incurred by them in relation to the new trial. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 4 June 2021 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to Division 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for rehearing before a different judge of that Court in a new trial.

4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.

5. Certificates be granted to the appellant and the respondent under s 8(1) of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) in respect of any costs incurred by them in relation to the new trial.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, as explained by the Full Court in Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 236; 272 FCR 343 at [32], it is not a predisposition for a particular outcome that engages the rule but rather a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment. Prejudgment? Ms Bhnan submits that a critical factual question the primary judge was required to determine was whether any or all of the shortfall was paid. She submits that in respect of that issue, the primary judge evinced by his interventions a “strident” and “seemingly concluded” view that Ms Bhnan’s case was all a fraud, and that a fair-minded observer of those interventions might conclude that his Honour’s mind was so made up that he might not be open to changing it. The Trustees’ submissions do not expressly contend that the primary judge’s interventions did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Rather, they say only that Ms Bhnan waived her right to rely on this ground on appeal because of a failure to raise it, or to adequately raise it, at the hearing below. I will return to the question of waiver below. In order to determine whether the appellant’s submissions are made good, it will be necessary for the appellate court to consider the interventions in the context of the trial as a whole: Jorgensen at [104]. The relevant context includes that the hearing occurred over two days and judgment was delivered ex tempore at the conclusion of closing submissions on the second day. However, in substance, the hearing occurred only on the second day. The written reasons were not published until some six weeks later. The first day of the hearing was 23 April 2021. Shortly after the hearing commenced, the primary judge indicated to counsel that he had read all the affidavits (T4.5) and that his initial impression was that there were inconsistencies between the case advanced by Ms Bhnan (ie, that the shortfall was paid) and the evidence of payments (T9.25ff). His Honour encouraged the parties to settle the matter and adjourned briefly for discussions to take place. However, upon resuming, his Honour informed the parties that he had to deal with a family emergency and adjourned the matter to 4 June 2021. Nothing objectionable occurred in the first day of the hearing and Ms Bhnan makes no complaint of the primary judge’s conduct in relation to it. The hearing was resumed on 4 June 2021. The apprehension of prejudgment arises from interventions not only during Ms Bhnan’s cross-examination, of which there were many, but also from interventions during the cross-examination of other witnesses. The first witness cross-examined was Mr Micheletto, one of the respondent Trustees. Mr DeBuse was conducting a line of enquiry in relation to Mr Micheletto’s conversations with Mr Bhnan when the primary judge objected to the relevance of the questions and remarked, inter alia, that Mr Bhnan “wasn’t a party to the transactions” or the proceeding (T26.41, T27.10). His Honour then expressed a seemingly concluded view as to Ms Bhnan’s case in relation to the receipts being incorrect and that she had misrepresented her equity in the property to the incoming mortgagee, as follows:HIS HONOUR: … The proceedings involve what occurred by Stephanie Bhnan in proceeding with a transaction in respect of which, as I’ve identified earlier, there are patently incorrect receipts that have been created and maybe not by her or by her husband. There are patently disconnects between the PEXA settlement amount and the amount on the contract. And there’s patently a disconnect between what must have been the represented equity in respect of the property at the time that there was approval from the lenders. (T27.10-16, emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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