FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 276
ORDERS
SAD 316 of 2013 BETWEEN: BHFC
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave under rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to re-open the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
By an interlocutory application filed on 5 December 2017, the applicant seeks leave to reopen the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 in BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 276
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the grounds for reopening the judgment were not made out. The Court considered that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the applicant's criminal conduct despite the delay in processing his visa application. The Court held that to hold otherwise would have meant the Tribunal would have been required to ignore a primary consideration in Ministerial Direction No. 55, which is the protection of the Australian public. Additionally, the Court found that the prospect of indefinite detention was not foreign to the operation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the Tribunal had expressly taken into account the fact that the appellant might be exposed to indefinite detention.
In light of the Court's findings, the application to reopen the judgment was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave under rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to re-open the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The parties also relied upon the appeal book before the Full Court, together with the joint application book which included the transcript of the hearing before the Full Court and the parties’ written submissions filed in the appeal.4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Principles governing when a judgment not yet entered may be varied or revoked The Court has jurisdiction to reopen a case where the orders on the appeal have not been entered: see FCR rule 39.04; see also e.g. Australian Fisheries Management Authority v PW Adams Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 349 (Australian Fisheries) at 354-355 (Sheppard, Tamberlin and Lehane JJ); Dib Group Pty Ltd v Coolabah Tree Aust-Wide Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 57 (Dib) at [80]-[84] (Gray, Lander and Katzmann JJ). As the High Court explained in De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No. 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207 (De L) at 215 (Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ):On the one hand, there is the principle of finality of litigation which reinforces the respect that should be shown to orders, final on their face, addressed to the world at large and upon which conduct may be ordered reliant upon their binding authority. On the other hand, courts recognise that accidents and oversights can sometimes occur which, unrepaired, will occasion an injustice. The Court emphasised the caution with which this power must be exercised in Dib with respect to Order 35 r 7(1) (being the predecessor to R 39.04 which was expressed in the same terms): 80 On the face of it, O 35 r 7(1) is a power which may be exercised at any time before the judgment or order which is to be varied or set aside is entered, and does not require proof of any of the matters in O 35 r 7(2) or any evidence of a clerical mistake or slip as is contemplated in O 35 r 7(3). On its face, it is in the widest possible terms.81 However, the authorities are clear that the exercise of the jurisdiction given under O 35 r 7(1) ought only to be exercised with great caution because of the public interest in the finality of litigation: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 (“Autodesk”). 82 If a judgment is pronounced or an order is made upon the Court giving reasons, the power to vary or set aside the judgment or order which follows the reasons would only be exercised “if there is some matter calling for review”: Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 265.83 Where a judge after publishing reasons and giving judgment and making orders realises that he or she has proceeded on a misapprehension either in relation to the facts or the law, that judge may recall those reasons and make orders under O 35 r 7(1) to vary or set aside the orders made on those reasons. This is no more than an example of a court acting to prevent a miscarriage of justice and in furtherance of the administration of justice.84 However, the jurisdiction is given to the Court only for the furtherance of the administration of justice and not to allow a party after the Court’s reasons have been given and orders made to reagitate the matters upon which the Court has opined. In Autodesk Mason CJ said of the circumstances in which the jurisdiction should be exercised at 303:What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue their cases.