BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 276

File number(s): SAD 316 of 2013
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 9 March 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to reopen appeal – where Full Court delivered judgment in March 2014 – alleged denial of procedural fairness – alleged failure by Tribunal to consider 13 year delay in processing visa application – alleged failure to have regard to prospect of indefinite detention – grounds for reopening not made out – motion to vary or set aside judgment dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.04

Cases cited:

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562

Ashby v Slipper (No. 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; (2014) 314 ALR 84

Australian Fisheries Management Authority v PW Adams Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 349

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300

De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No. 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207

Dib Group Pty Ltd v Coolabah Tree Aust-Wide Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 57

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1

Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security [2012] HCA 46; (2012) 251 CLR 1

Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] HCA 53; (2013) 251 CLR 322

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286

Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256

Venus Adult Shops Pty Ltd v Fraserside Holding Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 41; (2007) 239 ALR 724

Date of hearing: 14 February 2018
Date of last submissions: 19 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr P D’Assumpcao of the Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SAD 316 of 2013
BETWEEN:

BHFC

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave under rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to re-open the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.                 INTRODUCTION

  1. By an interlocutory application filed on 5 December 2017, the applicant seeks leave to reopen the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 in BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BHFC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Iran, sought to reopen an appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal related to the applicant's visa application which was lodged in 1994 and rejected in 2009, following which the applicant's criminal conduct became relevant. The key legal issues the Court had to decide were whether there was a denial of procedural fairness and whether the Tribunal failed to consider the 13-year delay in processing the visa application and the prospect of indefinite detention.

The Court found that the grounds for reopening the judgment were not made out. The Court considered that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the applicant's criminal conduct despite the delay in processing his visa application. The Court held that to hold otherwise would have meant the Tribunal would have been required to ignore a primary consideration in Ministerial Direction No. 55, which is the protection of the Australian public. Additionally, the Court found that the prospect of indefinite detention was not foreign to the operation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the Tribunal had expressly taken into account the fact that the appellant might be exposed to indefinite detention.

In light of the Court's findings, the application to reopen the judgment was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave under rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to re-open the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 24 March 2014 is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the application must be dismissed. 2. BACKGROUND The background to the appeal in BHFC (FCAFC) is set out in the reasons of Marshall and Perry JJ at [2]-[11] and can be summarised briefly for present purposes as follows. The applicant is a citizen of Iran. In August 1993, a delegate of the Minister found that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. By an application dated 30 May 1994, the applicant applied for a Protection (Permanent) Entry Permit (817) Visa. At that time he was granted a bridging visa. As a result of amendments to the legislative scheme, his application was converted on 1 September 1994 into an application for a Transitional (Permanent) (Class BF) Visa (Class BF visa). No decision was made on the applicant’s application for the visa until 21 August 2009, some 13 years later, when it was rejected by a delegate of the Minister. That decision was later set aside by the then Refugee Review Tribunal. Subsequently on 7 January 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a Class BF Visa in the exercise of his discretion, having found that the applicant failed the character test in s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (the second delegate decision). The delegate found that the applicant did not pass the character test for the purposes of s 501 because the applicant had a “substantial criminal record” as defined in ss 501(6) and (7)(c), having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. By a decision given on 25 March 2013, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed the second delegate’s decision. Having found that the applicant did not pass the character test, the Tribunal had regard in the exercise of discretion to the considerations identified in “Ministerial Direction No 55 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501” (Direction No 55) which commenced on 1 September 2012: see s 499 of the Act. While the Tribunal considered that Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations to the appellant (being a primary consideration under Direction No 55) favoured the granting of the Class BF visa, it considered that those obligations were outweighed by the need to protect the Australian community from the appellant. The appellant’s criminal history in Australia spanned from January 1996 to September 2010. Before the Tribunal, he submitted that, if his 1 June 1994 application for a visa had been dealt with expeditiously in 1994, his extensive criminal conduct would not have been relevant as he would have become an Australian citizen. The Tribunal, however, found that it was bound by Direction No. 55 and Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 to consider the appellant’s substantial criminal record at the time it made its decision. In BHFC (FCA), Besanko J among other things accepted that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the applicant’s criminal conduct which occurred up to the date of its decision, despite the delay by the Department in processing his application for the Class BF Visa: BHFC (FCA) at [36] to [38]. On appeal, the Full Court held that the primary judge did not err in so holding and that “[t]o hold otherwise would have meant the Tribunal would have been required to ignore a primary consideration in Direction No. 55, being the protection of the Australian public.” (BHFC (FCAFC) at [14] (Marshall and Perry JJ)).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Similarly, Buchanan J held that:31 Accordingly, despite having lived in this country for over 20 years and been treated in most respects as a lawful resident during that time subject to the laws of Australia, the appellant faces a situation not faced by any Australian citizen when he completes his sentence. He is liable, by reason of the criminal conduct for which he has already been punished, to indefinite deprivation of his liberty. 32 However, this Court is bound to conclude that the prospect of indefinite detention is not foreign to the operation of the Act (see Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562). 33 Moreover, no argument is reasonably available in the present case that the AAT failed to have regard to the very serious consequences for the appellant of refusing a visa. On the contrary, the AAT expressly took into account the fact that the appellant might be exposed to indefinite detention and concluded, nevertheless, at [46], that: it does not outweigh the seriousness of the long pattern of criminal offending involved in the present matter. 3. EVIDENCE In support of his application, the applicant relies upon his affidavit affirmed on 30 November 2017 which annexes: (1)a report of a medical examination of the applicant, as a visa applicant, dated 25 May 1994; (2)a “radiological report on chest x-ray of an applicant for Visa” dated 26 May 1994;(3)a freedom of information (FOI) request for access to documents held by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) for all of the documents provided in relation to the applicant’s car accident in November 1988, and the Department’s decision made on 30 October 2017 allowing in full that FOI request;(4)a decision made by the Department on an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) dated 26 August 2015 finding that non-refoulement obligations are not engaged in the applicant’s case; and(5)a decision made by the Department on an ITOA dated 3 March 2016 finding that the applicant did engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations and, as a consequence, the Department will not make arrangements to remove him from Australia for so long as those obligations continue. The decision record also advised that the applicant’s case would be referred to the Minister for him to consider exercising his public interest powers under the Act to grant the applicant a visa. In addition, the applicant relied upon his affidavit affirmed 1 February 2018 which annexed a copy of a snapshot of an email sent to him from the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office advising that, as the matter was before the Federal Court, the Ombudsman declined to take any action in relation to his complaint. The parties also relied upon the appeal book before the Full Court, together with the joint application book which included the transcript of the hearing before the Full Court and the parties’ written submissions filed in the appeal.4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Principles governing when a judgment not yet entered may be varied or revoked

Decision

Reasons for decision

No decision was made on the applicant’s application for the visa until 21 August 2009, some 13 years later, when it was rejected by a delegate of the Minister. That decision was later set aside by the then Refugee Review Tribunal. Subsequently on 7 January 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a Class BF Visa in the exercise of his discretion, having found that the applicant failed the character test in s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (the second delegate decision). The delegate found that the applicant did not pass the character test for the purposes of s 501 because the applicant had a “substantial criminal record” as defined in ss 501(6) and (7)(c), having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. By a decision given on 25 March 2013, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed the second delegate’s decision. Having found that the applicant did not pass the character test, the Tribunal had regard in the exercise of discretion to the considerations identified in “Ministerial Direction No 55 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501” (Direction No 55) which commenced on 1 September 2012: see s 499 of the Act. While the Tribunal considered that Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations to the appellant (being a primary consideration under Direction No 55) favoured the granting of the Class BF visa, it considered that those obligations were outweighed by the need to protect the Australian community from the appellant. The appellant’s criminal history in Australia spanned from January 1996 to September 2010. Before the Tribunal, he submitted that, if his 1 June 1994 application for a visa had been dealt with expeditiously in 1994, his extensive criminal conduct would not have been relevant as he would have become an Australian citizen. The Tribunal, however, found that it was bound by Direction No. 55 and Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 to consider the appellant’s substantial criminal record at the time it made its decision. In BHFC (FCA), Besanko J among other things accepted that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the applicant’s criminal conduct which occurred up to the date of its decision, despite the delay by the Department in processing his application for the Class BF Visa: BHFC (FCA) at [36] to [38]. On appeal, the Full Court held that the primary judge did not err in so holding and that “[t]o hold otherwise would have meant the Tribunal would have been required to ignore a primary consideration in Direction No. 55, being the protection of the Australian public.” (BHFC (FCAFC) at [14] (Marshall and Perry JJ)). On the appeal, the appellant also referred to the “Ruling in the High Court of Australia on an Immigration matter in relation to Indefinite Detention” (BHFC (FCAFC) at [12] (Marshall and Perry JJ)). In this regard, Marshall and Perry JJ held that: 15 The appellant did not raise the issue of his potential indefinite detention in the proceeding below. He is currently being held in Mt Gambier Prison as a consequence of his criminal conduct. He is due to be released on 1 July 2014. He currently holds a Bridging visa which is due to expire on 30 June 2014. Upon the appellant’s release, unless his Bridging visa is extended, he will be an unlawful non-citizen who is liable to be held in detention pending his removal from Australia. That is the effect of Al-Kateb. Nothing in the application before the Tribunal required it to consider the appellant’s indefinite detention as an element of a valid decision (although we do not suggest that it was an error for the Tribunal to do so). The position the appellant finds himself in is a consequence of the fact of the Tribunal’s decision, rather than from any issue decided by the Tribunal. The critical issue before the primary judge was whether jurisdictional error infected the Tribunal’s consideration of the appellant’s application for a review of the delegate’s decision. The possible indefinite detention of the appellant, arising from the result of the Tribunal’s deliberations, was not a matter about which Direction No. 55 required any consideration.16 The appellant finds himself in an extremely unfortunate situation. Although not technically stateless as was the case for the appellant in Al-Kateb and the respondent in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54, he faces the same consequence of potential indefinite detention as an unlawful non-citizen, pending any “change in international circumstances” (Al-Kateb at 576 [18] per Gleeson CJ). Had he committed his crimes as an Australian citizen, he would have been released from prison after completing his sentence. It would not be inappropriate for the respondent Minister to give active consideration to the appropriateness of the grant of a Bridging visa to the appellant upon his release from prison, with the proviso that he demonstrates a bona fide commitment to his ongoing rehabilitation pending such release.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The parties also relied upon the appeal book before the Full Court, together with the joint application book which included the transcript of the hearing before the Full Court and the parties’ written submissions filed in the appeal.4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Principles governing when a judgment not yet entered may be varied or revoked The Court has jurisdiction to reopen a case where the orders on the appeal have not been entered: see FCR rule 39.04; see also e.g. Australian Fisheries Management Authority v PW Adams Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 349 (Australian Fisheries) at 354-355 (Sheppard, Tamberlin and Lehane JJ); Dib Group Pty Ltd v Coolabah Tree Aust-Wide Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 57 (Dib) at [80]-[84] (Gray, Lander and Katzmann JJ). As the High Court explained in De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No. 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207 (De L) at 215 (Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ):On the one hand, there is the principle of finality of litigation which reinforces the respect that should be shown to orders, final on their face, addressed to the world at large and upon which conduct may be ordered reliant upon their binding authority. On the other hand, courts recognise that accidents and oversights can sometimes occur which, unrepaired, will occasion an injustice. The Court emphasised the caution with which this power must be exercised in Dib with respect to Order 35 r 7(1) (being the predecessor to R 39.04 which was expressed in the same terms): 80 On the face of it, O 35 r 7(1) is a power which may be exercised at any time before the judgment or order which is to be varied or set aside is entered, and does not require proof of any of the matters in O 35 r 7(2) or any evidence of a clerical mistake or slip as is contemplated in O 35 r 7(3). On its face, it is in the widest possible terms.81 However, the authorities are clear that the exercise of the jurisdiction given under O 35 r 7(1) ought only to be exercised with great caution because of the public interest in the finality of litigation: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 (“Autodesk”). 82 If a judgment is pronounced or an order is made upon the Court giving reasons, the power to vary or set aside the judgment or order which follows the reasons would only be exercised “if there is some matter calling for review”: Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 265.83 Where a judge after publishing reasons and giving judgment and making orders realises that he or she has proceeded on a misapprehension either in relation to the facts or the law, that judge may recall those reasons and make orders under O 35 r 7(1) to vary or set aside the orders made on those reasons. This is no more than an example of a court acting to prevent a miscarriage of justice and in furtherance of the administration of justice.84 However, the jurisdiction is given to the Court only for the furtherance of the administration of justice and not to allow a party after the Court’s reasons have been given and orders made to reagitate the matters upon which the Court has opined. In Autodesk Mason CJ said of the circumstances in which the jurisdiction should be exercised at 303:What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue their cases.