FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BFR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 1057
Appeal from: BFR15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1043
AMJ15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1035
File numbers: NTD 26 of 2017
NTD 28 of 2017
NTD 32 of 2017
NTD 34 of 2017Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 15 June 2018 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from Federal Circuit Court decision refusing Constitutional writ relief – unauthorised disclosure on internet by Department of personal information of protection visa applicants in immigration detention – whether primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error by Departmental officers in conducting International Treaties Obligation Assessments to assess effect of disclosure on non-refoulement obligations – where officers failed to act on instruction to assume that personal information may have been accessed by authorities in countries where protection visa applicants claimed fear of persecution or harm in accordance with decision in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180 Legislation: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Refugee’s Convention
Cases cited: AMJ15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1035
BFP15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1048
BFR15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1043
BIG15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1051
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 27 November 2017 (NTD 28 of 2017)
15 June 2018 (NTD 26 of 2017, NTD 28 of 2017, NTD 32 of 2017, NTD 34 of 2017)Date of orders: 28 June 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Appellants: Ms U Okereke-Fisher Counsel for the Respondents in NTD 26 of 2017, NTD 32 of 2017, NTD 34 of 2017: Mr C Lenehan Solicitor for the Respondents in NTD 26 of 2017, NTD 32 of 2017, NTD 34 of 2017: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent in NTD 28 of 2017: Mr C Lenehan Solicitor for the First Respondent in NTD 28 of 2017: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents in NTD 28 of 2017: The Second and Third Respondents filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
NTD 26 of 2017 BETWEEN: BFR15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent
THOMAS MARWICK, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 JUNE 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 11 May 2017, including as to costs, be set aside, and in lieu thereof:
THE…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1057
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court in SZSSJ had held that the assumption obviated the need to provide any detainee with detailed information about the extent of access to their personal information. The court reasoned that the true extent of access was unknowable once the document was downloaded from the Department's website. The assumption that all personal information had been accessed by all relevant authorities was sensible and necessary for assessing non-refoulement obligations. The trial judge misunderstood this, failing to appreciate how each assessor ignored the High Court's interpretation of the assumption. The court concluded that the assessors did not properly apply the assumption, thereby leading to a flawed assessment of the non-refoulement obligations.
The High Court's decision was misapplied by the trial judge, resulting in an incorrect finding that no jurisdictional error occurred. Consequently, the appeals were allowed with costs, and the decisions of the trial judge were set aside. The parties were directed to prepare appropriate orders to give effect to these reasons. The Minister's argument regarding the 2006 DFAT advice was also considered, but it did not alter the outcome. The court held that the reasons provided in each ITOA indicated that the assessors had ignored the High Court's interpretation of the assumption, leading to a flawed assessment.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister also argued that the 2006 DFAT advice, to which the assessor referred in AMJ15’s ITOA, properly read, conveyed that the dossier on every Chinese citizen that Chinese authorities maintained about relevantly, AMJ15, conceivably could, but need not necessarily, be used to impede that person’s employment.Consideration In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ said:the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. (footnote omitted) Nonetheless, I am of opinion that the way in which the reasons in each ITOA are expressed indicates that the assessor ignored the High Court’s interpretation of the assumption he had been directed to make. That is because, the High Court in SZSSJ 259 CLR at 209 [91] held that sensibly interpreted and applied the assumption required the assessor to assume that “all of their personal information had been accessed by all of the persons or entities from whom they feared persecution or other relevant harm”. The High Court explained (at 259 CLR 209 [90]) that that sensible interpretation of the assumption was necessary because it would be a hopeless endeavour to attempt to make a finding about precisely who had obtained access to the personal information of any of 9,258 persons affected by the data breach. As their Honours explained, the substantive benefit of interpreting the assumption in the plenary way in which they did, would ensure that the assessor could consider Australian’s non-refoulement obligations in respect of each individual affected by the data breach on the basis that every person or entity from whom he or she feared harm, in fact, had accessed that information. In that context, an assessment could be made on the basis the person or entities from whom that individual feared harm would have accessed the particular information revealed by the data breach about the individual so that the assessor could evaluate whether the person or entity would have acted in the way that the appellant feared, arrived with the information about the detainee revealed by that access, as opposed to in some other way. In these four appeals, the assessor never approached a consideration of whether the potential employer in China would know the personal information revealed in the data breach, when considering whether or not to employ the relevant appellant in whatever role he or she sought, in order to assess how that knowledge would have affected the appellant’s employment prospects. Rather, the assessor eschewed that task saying that it would be “implausible” that a person or entity considering the relevant appellant for employment would bother to make him or herself familiar with the circumstances or to look for what might be known from the data breach about the appellant, and then use that information as a reason not to employ him or her.