Berry v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Berry v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1244

Citation: Berry v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1244
Parties: RUSSELL BERRY v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 237 of 2015
Judge: DAVIES J
Date of judgment: 19 November 2015
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – competency of appeal brought under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – whether question of law raised by Notice of Appeal – relevant principles

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – decision to dismiss application for review under s 42A(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – whether the decision was legally unreasonable – relevant principles

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – relevant and irrelevant considerations – consideration of scope and purpose of s 42A(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether procedural fairness denied – where Tribunal acted on its own motion – whether obligation to identify facts considered to be adverse to applicant – no denial of procedural fairness

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether reasonable apprehension of bias – pre-judgment

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 33 42A(5), 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 33.12(2)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1 s 340-5
Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290; [2003] FCAFC 244
Cabcharge Australia Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576; [1994] FCA 1074
Guse v Comcare (1997) 49 ALD 288; [1997] FCA 140
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) (2010) 241 CLR 320; [2010] HCA 24
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
Date of hearing: 19 October 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Applicant: D Crennan with A Wilson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mills Oakley Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: M Baker
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 237 of 2015

BETWEEN:

RUSSELL BERRY
Applicant

AND:
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1244
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Berry v Commissioner of Taxation involved Mr Berry's appeal against the Tribunal's decision to dismiss his application for review of the Commissioner's disallowance of his objection against the refusal to grant him a release from his tax liabilities. The appeal raised questions about the competency of the appeal and whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable, without procedural fairness, or biased. The Federal Court assessed the correctness of the Tribunal's decision under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

The primary legal issues involved whether the appeal was competent, whether the Tribunal's exercise of the power under section 42A(5) was legally unreasonable, whether procedural fairness was denied, and if there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court examined the principles governing these issues, including the standard of unreasonableness in administrative decision-making and the obligations of procedural fairness.

The court found that the appeal was competent as it raised a question of law, and there was no legal error in the Tribunal's dismissal of the application. The Tribunal did not pre-judge the case and had a tentative view on the matter, which did not indicate a closed mind. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application was not unreasonable given the circumstances and the medical evidence provided. The court also rejected claims of procedural unfairness and apprehended bias.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and the applications under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B, as they relied on the same grounds of legal error. The court also dismissed the objection to competency filed by the Commissioner. The applicant was ordered to pay the Commissioner's costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the application under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B be dismissed.

3. The objection to competency filed by the first respondent on 21 May 2015 be dismissed.

4. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I find that the appeal is competent but no legal error has been demonstrated in the Tribunal’s exercise of the s 42A(5) power. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the objection to competency of the ADJR Act application. BACKGROUND On 18 July 2014, Mr Berry applied to the Tribunal for review of the Commissioner’s decision to disallow Mr Berry’s objection against the Commissioner’s refusal to grant him a release from his tax liabilities. On 25 August 2014, the Tribunal made a direction that Mr Berry give the Tribunal and the Commissioner a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions and all reports, records or other documents on which he intended to rely at the hearing by 6 October 2014. On 8 October 2014, an amended direction was made by the Tribunal extending the date by which those documents were to be furnished to 3 November 2014. The amended direction was made at the request of the parties, as they had agreed to pursue without prejudice discussions. On 5 November 2014, the Tribunal further amended the direction by extending the date for the provision of documents by Mr Berry to 27 January 2015. Mr Berry did not comply with the directions made on 5 November 2014 and a directions hearing was held before Senior Member Fice on 27 February 2015. At that directions hearing, Mr Berry was represented by his solicitor, Mr Jepson, who applied for an adjournment of the proceeding for at least six months on medical grounds. The adjournment application was supported by a medical report dated 8 February 2015 from Mr Berry’s treating psychiatrist, Dr Vickers. In his report, Dr Vickers stated that he had been treating Mr Berry fortnightly “for over the past 6 years” for depression and anxiety, that Mr Berry’s psychiatric treatment was enabling him “to continue as a high profile partner in a legal firm dealing with extremely high profile matters” but that “Mr Berry has had exacerbations of depression and anxiety”. Dr Vickers expressed the opinion that the AAT proceeding was causing the exacerbation of Mr Berry’s depression and panic attacks and that a delay of at least 6 months for the hearing of his AAT tax case would allow Mr Berry to cope with all the added pressures of his family and work issues and prepare adequately for his appeal. The Commissioner did not oppose Mr Berry’s request for an adjournment but took the position that he would be “guided by the [Tribunal] with regard to the length of the adjournment if granted.” Mr Jepson gave the following unchallenged account of the directions hearing in an affidavit sworn on 6 May 2015 in this proceeding:When this matter came before the Tribunal on 27 February 2015, Senior Member Fice said he had difficulty in accepting that Mr Berry was unable to proceed with hisApplication and provide the necessary evidence. Senior Member Fice said that in view of Mr Berry's ability to conduct the business of a Legal Practitioner he had grave concerns in granting any adjournment.Senior Member Fice ordered that I provide the Tribunal with a copy of Dr Vickers[’] report and that he would indicate whether he would then allow an extension but not for the 6 months and that he would respond shortly.Senior Member Fice repeated that he was really troubled in granting any extension and he wanted the application to be brought on for hearing without any further delays.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is well-established that a reasonable bystander does not necessarily entertain a reasonable fear that the decision-maker might have pre-judged an issue merely because the decision-maker has expressed a tentative view on the matter on an earlier occasion: Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48 at 493 (CLR) [12]–[13]. Furthermore, there is nothing in the account of the earlier directions hearing on 27 February 2015 that indicates that the Senior Member had a closed mind on the question of whether to dismiss the application under s 42A(5), irrespective of what further evidence or arguments might be presented to him. At most, on 27 February 2015 the Senior Member expressed a tentative view on the difficulty that Mr Berry might face in reconciling his explanation for his failures with respect to his application with his ongoing work as a partner in a law firm. Finally, the reference to the notes of the Tribunal does not advance this argument. The note does no more than record the decision that was made that day and provides no foundation for a claim of apprehended bias.CONCLUSION No legal error has been demonstrated in the decision made by the Tribunal to dismiss Mr Berry’s application for review under s 42A(5) of the AAT Act. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed, and both applications should also be dismissed as they rely on the same grounds of legal error raised by the appeal. In the circumstance there is no need to consider the objection to the competency of the ADJR Act application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I now turn to the merits of each of the questions.CONSIDERATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAWQuestion 1: Whether no reasonable person could have made the decision This question was particularised as follows:The learned Senior Member, in dismissing the application, deprived the Applicant of a hearing before the Tribunal to determine the issues in dispute in circumstances where the Applicant was seeking an extension of time to comply with interlocutory orders, the uncontested evidence before the Tribunal was that the Applicant was unable to comply with the interlocutory timetable that had been set because of medical conditions, including a period when he was in hospital, and the [Commissioner] was not opposed to an extension of time. The application was made to the Tribunal on 18 July 2014 and the application was dismissed on 9 April 2015. This length of time is not an unreasonable amount of time or alternatively is not an unreasonable amount of time having regard to the circumstances of the applicant. It was submitted that the decision to dismiss Mr Berry’s application to the Tribunal was unreasonable in the legal sense because:(1)it closed all avenues of review of the objection decision to Mr Berry;(2)the Tribunal had other options open to it that would not have denied Mr Berry a hearing;(3)the Commissioner was not seeking dismissal of the application and was amenable to an extension of the interlocutory timetable;(4)the Tribunal had evidence before it of significant and substantive reasons why Mr Berry had been unable to comply with the interlocutory timetable; (5)the uncontested medical evidence was that Mr Berry required at least six months to be able to comply with the Tribunal’s interlocutory timetable in the face of the extra personal, family and professional responsibilities that had manifested since making the application to the Tribunal;(6)the Tribunal elided previous medical conditions with Mr Berry’s “new and significant” medical condition;(7)the decision was made in circumstances where Mr Berry was seeking an extension of time to comply with the interlocutory orders;(8)there was evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Berry had been in communication with the Commissioner about progressing the application before the Tribunal; and (9)Mr Berry had not failed within a reasonable time to proceed with the application and comply with the Tribunal’s directions. It was submitted that the period of time between making the application to the Tribunal and its dismissal was less than nine months which was not an unreasonable amount of time, or alternatively, was not an unreasonable amount of time having regard to the circumstances of Mr Berry. The most recent consideration by the High Court of the judicial review ground of “unreasonableness” in administrative decision making is in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18. In Li, the High Court held that a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal to refuse an application for an adjournment of a merits review hearing was so unreasonable as to constitute jurisdictional error. At [68], the plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) stated that:The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. Further at [76] the plurality said:As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion “if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust”. The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.The requirement of reasonableness flows from, or is connected with, an implied legislative intention that a discretionary power that is statutorily conferred must be exercised reasonably: Li at [29], [63] and [88]. Thus the issue is whether the exercise of discretion itself, in its outcome, can be said to be unreasonable in a legal sense having regard to the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory power exercised. In considering whether the power was exercised in a way that is legally unreasonable, it is not the function of the Court to substitute its own decision for that of the Tribunal or to conduct a merits review and determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was right or wrong in a substantive sense. Where there are reasons, the question is whether the reasons given for the exercise of the discretion lacked an “evident and intelligible justification” for the decision.