Bentley Capital Limited v Keybridge Capital Limited (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bentley Capital Limited v Keybridge Capital Limited (No 3) [2024] FCA 1139

File number: WAD 475 of 2019
Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 30 September 2024
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS - directors - indemnity for legal costs incurred - where competing deeds of indemnity on same terms - carve out where indemnity provided by insurer or other indemnifier - whether advances by one insurer constituted payments by way of indemnity - where neither indemnifier has moved first to indemnify - contribution
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 54A

Cases cited:

Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1969) 121 CLR 342

AMP Bank Limited v Brown and Kavanagh [2017] NSWSC 313

Bentley Capital Limited v Keybridge Capital Limited [2019] FCA 1675

Bentley Capital Limited v Keybridge Capital Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 1318

Haider v Gudelj [2021] ACTCA 9; (2021) 16 ACTLR 1

Lavin v Toppi [2015] HCA 4; (2015) 254 CLR 459

Leckenby v Note Printing Australia Limited [2014] VSC 538

Note Printing Australia Ltd v Leckenby [2015] VSCA 105; (2015) 50 VR 44

William John Jefferies v Indigenous Land Corporation [2015] NSWSC 1616

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access
Number of paragraphs: 93
Date of hearing: 7 December 2023
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Mr GM Slattery with Mr JFC Baker
Solicitor for the Plaintiffs: Squire Patton Boggs
Counsel for the First Defendant: Mr K de Kerloy
Solicitor for the First Defendant: A&O Shearman
Counsel for the Second, Third and Fourth Defendants: The second, third and fourth defendants did not appear

ORDERS

WAD 475 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BENTLEY CAPITAL LIMITED (ACN 008 108 218)

First Plaintiff

WILLIAM MATTHEW JOHNSON

Second Plaintiff

AND:

KEYBRIDGE CAPITAL LIMITED (ACN 088 267 190)

First Defendant

AUSTRALIAN STYLE GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 108 841 103)

Second Defendant

JOHN DEAN PATTON

Third Defendant

JEREMY MARTIN KRIEWALDT
Fourth Defendant

ORDER MADE BY:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 SEPTEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within a time to be fixed, the plaintiffs and the first defendant provide to Chambers an agreed minute of proposed orders or declarations (or failing agreement, competing minutes) that reflect these reasons and propose the questions to be answered by the proposed referee.

2.Costs of this application are reserved.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

  1. This proceeding initially concerned a deadlock between two camps of directors of a listed company, Keybridge Capital Limited.  The Court having resolved that deadlock by trial (Bentley Capital Limited v Keybridge Capital Limited [2019] FCA 1675 (Bentley (No 1)), it is now necessary to resolve an apparent stand-off as to which competing indemnifier should meet certain legal costs.

  2. The initial trial proceeded as an urgent hearing on 8 October 2019, with judgment delivered on 11…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bentley Capital Limited, as the plaintiff, sought a declaration from the court in relation to legal costs incurred by its former director, Mr Johnson, against Keybridge Capital Limited, the first defendant. The dispute centred around competing deeds of indemnity between the two companies, both of which sought to indemnify Mr Johnson for legal costs, but which contained carve-outs where indemnity was provided by an insurer or other indemnifier. The court was required to determine whether the advances made by Bentley constituted payments by way of indemnity, and if so, whether Keybridge was entitled to contribution from Bentley. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether either company had moved first to indemnify Mr Johnson.

The court found that the payments made by Bentley to Mr Johnson were not payments by way of indemnity, but were deliberately provided as advances that Mr Johnson was obliged to repay. The court held that Keybridge would not have indemnified Mr Johnson unless it had been satisfied that he was not otherwise indemnified or covered for those costs, including being satisfied that he was not indemnified or covered by either the Keybridge D&O policy or any other insurance. The court also held that neither company had moved first to indemnify Mr Johnson. Therefore, the court found that Keybridge was not entitled to contribution from Bentley.

The court ordered that within a time to be fixed, the plaintiffs and the first defendant provide to Chambers an agreed minute of proposed orders or declarations (or failing agreement, competing minutes) that reflect these reasons and propose the questions to be answered by the proposed referee. The costs of this application were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within a time to be fixed, the plaintiffs and the first defendant provide to Chambers an agreed minute of proposed orders or declarations (or failing agreement, competing minutes) that reflect these reasons and propose the questions to be answered by the proposed referee.

2. Costs of this application are reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

By way of important context, I infer having regard to the terms of the Keybridge Deed made with Mr Patton and the Constitution, and to the duties of its directors at the time indemnity was granted, that Keybridge would not have indemnified Mr Patton unless it had been satisfied that Mr Patton was not otherwise indemnified or covered for those costs, including being satisfied that Mr Patton was not indemnified or covered by either the Keybridge D&O policy or any other insurance.ConsiderationWhat is the nature of the payments by Bentley? I do not consider on balance that the payments by Bentley pursuant to the resolutions constituted payments to indemnify Mr Johnson. It follows that Mr Johnson has not been indemnified by Bentley as yet, although, as addressed below, he is entitled to be so indemnified. There are number of matters that have led me to the view that the payments were not made in order to indemnify Mr Johnson, but were deliberately provided by way of advances that Mr Johnson was obliged to repay. Having regard to the context, the payments were made at a time when the position in relation to Chubb's obligations to indemnify Mr Johnson remained unclear, and when questions as to which insurer/entity was obliged to indemnify Mr Johnson were live. For example, it is apparent from the board paper prepared by Mr Ho for the purpose of the 6 February 2020 resolution that Bentley understood that:Bentley's/William Johnson's claim in respect of these legal costs vis a vis Bentley's Insurance Policy is subject to and contingent on William Johnson not obtaining relief from Keybridge/Keybridge's Insurer. Mr Ho referred in the same paper to the capacity for Bentley to make advances to Johnson under the Bentley Deed. Some difficulty arises from the reference in the resolutions to payments being made 'pursuant to' the Bentley Deed. The parties proceeded on the basis that this refers to clause 6 of the Bentley Deed, which permits advances to directors. I agree this is the sensible reading of the resolutions. It can be accepted that clause 6 is intended to address statutory restrictions on a company indemnifying its officers, such as under s 199A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). There is no doubt that companies can structure payments by agreement so as to avoid conduct in contravention of provisions such as s 199A. See, for example, Note Printing Australia Ltd v Leckenby [2015] VSCA 105; (2015) 50 VR 44 at [62]-[65]; Leckenby v Note Printing Australia Limited [2014] VSC 538 at [59], [63] (Sifris J); and William John Jefferies v Indigenous Land Corporation [2015] NSWSC 1616 at [49]-[50] (Rein J). These cases highlight the fact that an indemnity is normally understood as a payment that cannot be recovered from the recipient. A payment by way of an advance or loan but with an obligation to repay does not constitute a traditional indemnity. It is apparent that clause 6 of the Bentley Deed is framed in a manner that permits payments to be made to a director so that they may meet their personal obligation to pay legal fees but is coupled with an obligation to repay those amounts. If the company is obliged to indemnify the director then it must do so, but in turn the director is to apply the funds upon receipt towards repayment to the company of the advances and any interest.