TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Bencom s.r.l to registration of trade mark application 912346(25) - KILLER INSTINCT - filed in the name of Peter Loccisano and Matthew Rooke.
Delegate: Terry Williams Representation: Opponent: Bencom s.r.l
Applicants: Peter Loccisano and Matthew RookeDecision: S 52 opposition: s 44 etc, KILLER INSTINCT not deceptively similar to KILLER LOOP; lack of case for s 59 ground. Registration proceeding Background
Peter Loccisano and Matthew Rooke have applied to register the trade mark KILLER INSTINCT in relation to “footwear, clothing and headwear”. The application, number 912346, has been examined and accepted for possible registration but the latter is now opposed by Bencom s.r.l. (Bencom). Both parties have filed evidence to support their positions and the matter was set down for hearing.
At the hearing, James Maxwell appeared for the applicant and Simon Williams for Bencom. Mr Williams directed argument to grounds of opposition under sections 41, 42, 44, 59 and 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995..
Grounds considered
Deceptive similarity issues
Leaving aside the ground under s 59, Mr Williams argued that all of the other grounds have a common hinge, deception and/or confusion brought on by the resemblance alleged to exist between the trade mark sought to be registered and that relied on by Bencom[1]. The conflict is said to be between the applicants’ trade mark KILLER INSTINCT and Bencom’s, both used and registered, KILLER LOOP.
[1] Mr Williams argued that, for the purposes of s 41, a deceptive trade mark is not capable of distinguishing. This is an interesting proposition but I do not think that it is correct. In brief, a trade mark such as COCA COLA does not lose its cabability of distinguishing goods simply because it is being used by some fraudulent misappropriator. As matters transpire below I will not need to draw the matter out by considering this issue further.
The hearing of this matter took place a considerable time ago, and I stress that I have carefully reviewed the tape of the hearing, the written submissions of the parties and my notes. However, it seems to me that the opposition has little merit and, on all grounds where the question of deception or confusion is at issue, it must fail.
At its strongest, Bencom’s argument is that s 10, which deals with deceptive similarity, is triggered. The section in question provides that:
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
There is no need to set out the full provisions of sections 44 and 60. Their terms are such that deceptive similarity is the key issue in both. If s 10 is not triggered, s 42 (which is said to be enlivened because of the fair-trading legislation of the various States) must also fail[2].
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- Case
- [2006] ATMO 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Hearing Officer was whether the applicants, Mr Loccisano and Mr Rooke, had established sufficient use of their trade mark in Australia to justify its registration, or whether there was a lack of intention to use the mark as contemplated by section 59 of the relevant legislation. Bencom Srl contended that the evidence provided by the applicants was insufficient to demonstrate genuine use or intention to use the trade mark.
The Hearing Officer found that while the evidence presented by the applicants, particularly concerning the distinction between their business and a subsequent company, was not entirely clear and contained inconsistencies, it did not collectively rise to a level that would support an inference of a lack of intention to use the trade mark. The Hearing Officer noted that the applicants had provided evidence of use of the trade mark on t-shirts, although the quality of the evidence served on the opponent was defective. Applying the principles from *Aston v Harlee*, the Hearing Officer concluded that the evidentiary onus rested on Bencom Srl to establish grounds for opposition, and this onus had not been met.
Consequently, no ground of opposition was established, and the trade mark application was permitted to proceed to registration one month from the date of the decision, subject to any notice of appeal. Bencom Srl was ordered to pay the applicants' costs.
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