SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCI 2021 0077
| JOEL LORENSZ BELING | Applicant |
| v | |
| VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | KAYE and NIALL JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 3 September 2021 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 September 2021 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSCA 257 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2021] VSC 390 (Ginnane J); [2021] VSC 466 (Ginnane J) |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether judge erred in refusing leave to join VCAT as a party – Whether applicant should have been permitted to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT – Whether judge erred in refusing leave to allow the applicant to amend his notice of appeal – Leave to appeal refused.
COSTS – Whether Court erred in granting respondent’s costs – Whether costs should have followed the event.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | In person | |
| For the Respondent | Mr M G McNamara | White Cleland Pty Ltd |
KAYE JA
NIALL JA:
The applicant (‘Beling’ or ‘the applicant’) commenced two proceedings in the Supreme Court arising from an investigation into his professional conduct as a legal practitioner undertaken by the respondent, the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’). The background circumstances are more fully set out in the reasons for judgment given in appeal number S EAPCI 2021 0076 (‘the first appeal’), which concerns two decisions of Judge Cosgrave, and two decisions of Judge Ryan. They need not be repeated.
On 17 November 2014, during the course of the investigation, Beling commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court against the Commissioner seeking judicial review of aspects of the investigation (‘the first Supreme Court proceeding’). The Commissioner sought summary dismissal of the proceeding. Beling sought leave to discontinue the proceeding. On 22 April 2016, Derham AsJ dismissed the proceeding and ordered that Beling pay the Commissioner’s costs.[1] Early in his reasons, the Associate Justice observed that it was ‘clear therefore that the proceeding must come to an end. The question is on whose application and on what terms?’[2]
[1]Beling v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] VSC 180 (‘Derham AsJ Reasons’).
[2]Ibid [3].
Arising from the first Supreme Court proceeding, the applicant sought leave to appeal the decision of Derham AsJ made on 22 April 2016. That application was sought to be made some four years out of time.
In the meantime, on 23 December 2014, the Commissioner decided under s 4.4.13 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 that she was satisfied there was a reasonable likelihood that Beling would be found guilty of professional misconduct. As a consequence, the Commissioner was obliged to apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’ or ‘Tribunal’) for an order in relation to Beling. The proceeding against Beling in VCAT comprised two charges of professional misconduct at common law, and two charges of statutory professional misconduct. The charges were heard on various dates before Senior Member Smithers between November 2016 and 8 May 2017. On 12 July 2017, Senior Member Smithers found Beling guilty of one charge of…
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- Case
- [2021] VSCA 257
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the judge had erred in refusing the applicant leave to join VCAT as a party, in refusing the applicant leave to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT, and in refusing the applicant leave to amend his notice of appeal. Additionally, the Court considered whether it had erred in ordering that the respondent’s costs be paid by the applicant.
The Court of Appeal held that the judge had not erred in any of the decisions appealed from. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the joinder of VCAT as a party was necessary or desirable. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the interrogatories and notice to admit were necessary or desirable. The Court held that the application to amend the notice of appeal was an attempt to raise new grounds of appeal and that the application should have been made in the first instance. The Court held that the order for costs was appropriate and that the costs should follow the event.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Supreme Court. The Court held that the costs of the appeal were to be paid by the applicant.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in the Supreme Court of Victoria where Mr Beling sought judicial review of his dismissal from employment by the VLSC. During the proceedings, Mr Beling applied to join VCAT as a party, to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT, and to amend his notice of appeal. The VLSC opposed these applications. The judge in the Supreme Court heard submissions from both parties and subsequently refused Mr Beling's applications. Mr Beling then appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court who dismissed the appeal. Mr Beling subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, which was refused.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge erred in refusing leave to join VCAT as a party.
2. Whether Mr Beling should have been permitted to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT.
3. Whether the judge erred in refusing leave to allow the applicant to amend his notice of appeal.
Held
1. The court concluded that the judge did not err in refusing leave to join VCAT as a party. The application to join VCAT was dismissed.
2. The court determined that Mr Beling should not have been permitted to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT. This aspect of the application was dismissed.
3. The court found that the judge did not err in refusing leave to allow the applicant to amend his notice of appeal. The application to amend the notice of appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the application to join VCAT as a party and held that the decision was within the sound discretion of the judge, considering the circumstances and the nature of the proceedings. The court found no error in the judge's refusal to allow VCAT to be joined, as it did not consider VCAT's involvement necessary for a fair determination of the issues. In relation to the second issue, the court considered that the applicant's attempt to serve interrogatories and a notice to admit on VCAT was inappropriate, given that VCAT was not a party to the proceedings and the court had already set a trial date. This decision was also upheld as within the judge's discretion. Regarding the third issue, the court held that the judge's refusal to allow the applicant to amend his notice of appeal was not an error. The amendment proposed would have significantly altered the scope of the appeal, and the court found that the application to amend the notice of appeal was made too late, after the trial had commenced. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the courts' adherence to procedural fairness and the exercise of discretion in allowing parties to join, serve documents, and amend notices of appeal, ensuring that such actions are taken at appropriate stages of the litigation process. The court did not depart from any prior authority and followed established principles of judicial discretion and procedural fairness.