Beijing Be Green Import and Export Co Ltd v Elders International Australia Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 50 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Beijing Be Green Import & Export Co Ltd v Elders International Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1375

Citation: Beijing Be Green Import & Export Co Ltd v Elders International Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1375
Parties: BEIJING BE GREEN IMPORT & EXPORT CO LTD v ELDERS INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 007 735 168)
File number: NSD 1088 of 2014
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of Orders: 24 November 2014
Date of Publication of Reasons:  15 December 2014
Catchwords: ARBITRATION – International arbitration – whether the Court should stay a judgment of the Court ordered by way of recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award which was obtained and entered regularly and without any opposition from the judgment debtor until such time as a tribunal constituted by a foreign arbitral body (CIETAC) has determined an unrelated claim between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor  
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459G and s 459H
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), ss 2D, 3, 8, 9, 10, 10A and 39
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 41.03 and r 41.11
Cases cited:

Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd [2013] FCA 882
Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd v Coeclerici Asia (PTE) Ltd [2013] FCA 918
Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] 4 All ER 951; [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 1053
State Bank of Victoria v Parry [1989] WAR 240
TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533
TC Trustees Ltd v JS Darwen (Successors) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 295
Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry Pvt Ltd (No 2) (2012) 201 FCR 535
Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335
Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 277 ALR 441

Berger B and Kellerhals F, International and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland, 2nd Ed, Thomson Reuters  

Date of hearing: 24 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 83
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Carter and Ms N Dewan
Solicitor for the Applicant: King & Wood Mallesons
Solicitor/Advocate for the Respondent: Mr JGF Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1088 of 2014

BETWEEN:

BEIJING BE GREEN IMPORT & EXPORT CO LTD
Applicant

AND:

ELDERS INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 007 735 168)
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 8(3) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), the applicant is entitled to enforce the award dated 7 July 2014 (as corrected on 29 August 2014) (CIETACBJA [2014] No 0543) made by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the auspices of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (Case File No G20130311) in Beijing,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Beijing Be Green Import and Export Co Ltd v Elders Internati... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1375
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Beijing Be Green Import and Export Co Ltd v Elders International Australia Pty Ltd involved a dispute over the recognition and enforcement of an international arbitral award. The applicant, Beijing Be Green Import and Export Co Ltd, sought to enforce a foreign arbitral award against the respondent, Elders International Australia Pty Ltd. The parties had agreed to arbitrate their disputes in accordance with the rules of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). The primary issue before the court was whether the judgment should be stayed until a separate claim between the parties was determined by CIETAC.

The court considered the arguments presented by both parties and concluded that the respondent had not relied upon any of the grounds specified in the International Arbitration Act (IAA) for resisting enforcement of the arbitral award. The court emphasised that the only grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in Australia are those set out in the IAA. Furthermore, the court found that the respondent's application for a stay ran counter to its contractual obligations to arbitrate disputes with the applicant according to the rules of CIETAC.

The court held that the arbitral award was the result of an arbitral process into which the parties had freely and voluntarily entered. The court found that there was no reason to deny the applicant the benefit of its judgment. The court dismissed the respondent's application for a stay and ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding.

The court's decision was based on the principle that the enforcement of arbitral awards is an essential underpinning of international commerce. The court noted that the recognition of the importance of international commercial arbitration and the enforcement of the bilateral bargain of commercial parties in their agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration was reflected in both the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The court found that the respondent's application for a stay was not supported by the law and was therefore dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. There be judgment in favour of the applicant against the respondent in the following amounts:

(a) USD 2,820,902.48; and

(b) RMB 675,854.31

which sums include pre-judgment interest up to and including 24 November 2014 and certain costs, expenses and fees of and in relation to the said arbitration and award.

3. The respondent have leave to file an Interlocutory Application returnable instanter in which it seeks a stay of execution of the said judgment.

4. Service of the said Interlocutory Application and affidavits in support be dispensed with.

5. The said Interlocutory Application to be filed by the respondent pursuant to the leave granted in par 3 above be dismissed.

6. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

7. The respondent undertakes to the Court to file its Interlocutory Application, all affidavits in support and a copy of its Written Submissions dated 21 November 2014 electronically and to do so by 12 noon on 25 November 2014.

8. The applicant undertakes to the Court to file all affidavits relied upon by it in the proceeding and a copy of its Written Submissions dated 23 November 2014 electronically and to do so by 12 noon on 25 November 2014.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, I give no weight to the respondent’s offer to put up security as a condition upon which any stay should be granted. Were the grant of a stay otherwise justified, such a condition would be imposed. It is a given. But the offer of security should not be taken into account as a factor in favour of the grant of a stay. CONCLUSION For all of the above reasons, I came to the conclusion that there was no reason for the Court to deny to the applicant the benefit of the Award or the benefit of this Court’s judgment by which the Award has been recognised and enforced. The grounds and arguments advanced by the respondent did not warrant the grant of a stay. When appropriate weight is given to the circumstance that the Award was the result of an arbitral process into which the parties had freely and voluntarily entered through their commercial agreements, the refusal of the stay became inevitable. The respondent lost its application. It should pay the applicant’s costs of that application and of the proceeding generally.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant made the following submissions:(a)The respondent has not relied upon and could not rely upon any of the grounds specified in s 8(5), s 8(7) (as explained by s 8(7A) of the IAA) for resisting enforcement of the Award.(b)The C90 arbitration concerns a different contract and different factual matrix from those involved in the disputes which were determined by the Award. The only common feature is that the parties to all three disputes are the same.(c)The respondent’s stay application runs directly counter to its contractual obligations under all three contracts which require that disputes thereunder be arbitrated by CIETAC according to the substantive law of China, International Customs and Public International Law and the rules and procedures of CIETAC. It is also outside the available grounds for refusing to enforce or delaying or suspending the enforcement of a foreign award under the IAA. (d)Even if the Court retains a general discretion to order a stay, it should not do so in the circumstances of the present case. There is no reason to deny to the applicant the benefit of its judgment. Consideration and Decision In TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533 (TCL), the High Court rejected a constitutional challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award under Art 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law which is Sch 2 to the IAA. Although the case concerned the Model Law and the enforcement of an award made in an international arbitration conducted in Australia, the reasoning of the High Court has significance for the interpretation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in 1958 by the United Nations Conference on International Arbitration at its twenty-fourth meeting (the Convention) which is set out in Sch 1 to the IAA. Part II of the IAA is intended to give effect to the Convention. As I have held in a number of cases, the enforcement provisions set out in Pt II of the IAA should be interpreted by not only paying appropriate regard to s 2D and s 39 of the IAA itself but also by bearing in mind the objects and purposes of Arts 1 to VI of the Convention. In particular, I have repeatedly held that the only grounds upon which an award debtor can resist enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in Australia are those set out in ss 8(5), 8(7) and 8(7A) of the IAA (see, by way of example, Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd [2013] FCA 882 at [30]). An adjournment of an enforcement proceeding may be granted if the conditions specified in s 8(8) and s 8(11) of the IAA are met. However, such an adjournment is subject to reconsideration under s 8(9) and s 8(10). In TCL, at 545–549 [9]–[13], the Chief Justice and Gageler J said: 9In common with the New York Convention, the Model Law nevertheless proceeds on a conception of the nature of an arbitral award, and a conception of the relationship of an arbitral award to an arbitration agreement, identical in substance to the conception that has for centuries underpinned the understanding of an arbitral award at common law as “a satisfaction pursuant to [the parties’] prior accord of the causes of action awarded upon” and as thereby “precluding recourse to the original rights the determination of which had been referred to arbitration” (Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 at 653-654). That conception, in short, is that “the foundation of arbitration is the determination of the parties’ rights by the agreed arbitrators pursuant to the authority given to them by the parties” (Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 1041 at 1046 [9]). The English law of arbitration, which has combined statute law with common law since the seventeenth century, has at “every stage” of its development “approached the relationships between the parties and the arbitrator, and between the parties and each other, unequivocally in terms of private law” (Mustill and Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, 2nd ed (1989), p 4. See also Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 5th ed (2009), para [1.02]). The same approach has been evident in the historical development of the statute law and the common law governing arbitration in Australia (Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Report on Commercial Arbitration, Report No 27 (1976), paras [1.6], [9.1.1]). That is so notwithstanding the truth of the observation that performance of the arbitral function is not “purely a private matter of contract, in which the parties have given up their rights to engage judicial power” and is not “wholly divorced from the exercise of public authority” (Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 239 at 261-262 [20]). 10The conception is captured, and its international commercial significance is explained, in the following observation (Comandate Marine Corporation v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45 at 94-95 [192]-[193]): “The New York Convention and the [UNCITRAL] Model Law deal with one of the most important aspects of international commerce – the resolution of disputes between commercial parties in an international or multinational context, where those parties, in the formation of their contract or legal relationship, have, by their own bargain, chosen arbitration as their agreed method of dispute resolution. The chosen arbitral method or forum may or may not be the optimally preferred method or forum for each party; but it is the contractually bargained method or forum, often between parties who come from very different legal systems. An ordered efficient dispute resolution mechanism leading to an enforceable award or judgment by the adjudicator, is an essential underpinning of commerce … The recognition of the importance of international commercial arbitration to the smooth working of international commerce and of the importance of enforcement of the bilateral bargain of commercial parties in their agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration was reflected in both the New York Convention and the [UNCITRAL] Model Law.” 11The analytical commentary published by the UNCITRAL Secretariat to accompany the 1985 draft of the UNCITRAL Model Law (the UNCITRAL analytical commentary) spelt out that the UNCITRAL Model Law was “designed for consensual arbitration”, which the UNCITRAL analytical commentary explained to mean “arbitration based on voluntary agreement of the parties” (UNCITRAL analytical commentary, Art 1 [15]). That design is reflected in the definition in the Model Law of an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes … between them in respect of a defined legal relationship” (Article 7 of the Model Law) and in the freedom that the Model Law gives to the parties both to determine the composition of the arbitral tribunal (Articles 10(1) and 11 of the Model Law) and to determine the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal (Article 19(1) of the Model Law). The design is not inconsistent with default provisions within the Model Law which fill gaps in the agreement between the parties (See, eg, Arts 10(2), 11(3), 13(2), 17, 17B, 19(2), 20(1), 21, 22(1), 23, 24(1), 25, 26, 28(2) and 29 of the Model Law.), and which provide for court assistance to facilitate the process of arbitration (Articles 17J and 27 of the Model Law. See also ss 23 and 23A of the IAA). Nor is the design inconsistent with provisions of the Model Law incapable of derogation by the agreement of the parties, directed primarily to ensuring equality and fairness in the arbitral process (Article 18 of the Model Law) and to the form and correction of an arbitral award (Articles 31 and 33(2) of the Model Law). 12The design is followed through in Art 36 of the Model Law in providing, in common with Art V of the New York Convention, for recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award to be refused at the request of a party against whom the arbitral award is invoked, if and to the extent that the party can furnish proof to the competent court of one or more specified grounds of refusal. Those grounds include: that the arbitration agreement is not valid under its governing law (Article 36(1)(a)(i) of the Model Law and Art V.1(a) of the New York Convention); that the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration (Article 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law and Art V.1(c) of the New York Convention); and that the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties (Article 36(1)(a)(iv) of the Model Law and Art V.1(d) of the New York Convention). Whether one or more of those grounds is established is an objective question to be determined by the competent court on the evidence and submissions before it, unaffected by the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction under Art 16 of the Model Law (Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763 at 808-813 [20]-[30]). Arbitration in this way remains “the manifestation of parties’ choice to submit present or future issues between them to arbitration” in that, without “specific authority” to do so, arbitrators “cannot by their own decision … create or extend the authority conferred upon them” (Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763 at 810 [24]). 13The requirement of Art 28 of the Model Law, that the arbitral tribunal “decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute”, is a further manifestation of the same design. Article 28 was described in the UNCITRAL analytical commentary as a “recognition or guarantee of the parties’ autonomy” (UNCITRAL analytical commentary, Art 28[3]) and as allowing the parties to an arbitration agreement “to designate as applicable to their case rules of more than one legal system, including rules of law which have been elaborated on the international level” (UNCITRAL analytical commentary, Art 28[4]). Its dual significance was elaborated in an explanatory note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UNCITRAL Model Law as amended in 2006 (the UNCITRAL Explanatory Note) as follows (UNCITRAL Explanatory Note, para [39]): “It grants the parties the freedom to choose the applicable substantive law, which is important where the national law does not clearly or fully recognize that right. In addition, by referring to the choice of ‘rules of law’ instead of ‘law’, the Model Law broadens the range of options available to the parties as regards the designation of the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. For example, parties may agree on rules of law that have been elaborated by an international forum but have not yet been incorporated into any national legal system. Parties could also choose directly an instrument such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as the body of substantive law governing the arbitration, without having to refer to the national law of any State party to that Convention.”