BCW16 v Minister for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 2769
•12 October 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BCW16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 2769 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – International Treaties Obligations Assessment - unauthorised maritime arrival – non-refoulement obligations - a necessary and foreseeable consequence of returning to country of origin - real risk of significant harm – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 417. Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka) |
| Cases cited: AUX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 103 CDY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 175 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 |
| Applicant: | BCW16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ITOA DECISION MAKER |
| File Number: | MLG 988 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Mercuri |
| Hearing date: | 17 August 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 August 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 12 October 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Mr Kenneally |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Russell Kennedy |
| Counsel for the respondents: | Mr Mosley |
| Solicitors for the respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The applicant’s amended application filed on 13 December 2019 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 988 of 2016
| BCW16 |
Applicant
and
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ITOA DECISION MAKER |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In this application, the applicant seeks a declaration that an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (‘ITOA’) dated 29 April 2016 was not made according to law.[1]
[1] Applicant’s amended application filed 13 December 2019 at page 3; see also applicant’s contentions of fact and law filed 16 December 2019 at page 1, paragraph 1.
The applicant raises one ground of review, namely that the ITOA failed to consider the applicant’s claim that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of returning to Sri Lanka, he was at real risk of significant harm within the meaning of section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act (Cth) (‘the Act’).[2]
[2] Applicant’s amended application filed 13 December 2019 at page 3.
For the reasons which follow I find that the applicant’s ground of review is not made out. I therefore dismiss the applicant’s application and order that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed if not agreed.
Background
The applicant is a 35 year old citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity. He arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 10 May 2010.[3]
[3] First respondent’s outline of submissions at page 2, paragraph 2.
There is a lengthy procedural history to this application. The applicant has been the subject of a Refugee Status Assessment process and an Independent Merits Review process in respect of his Refugees Convention claims which were ultimately unsuccessful.[4] The applicant also sought Ministerial intervention pursuant to section 417 of the Act on 5 November 2012.[5]
[4] Applicant’s contentions of fact and law filed 13 December 2019 at page 2, paragraph 4; see also court book at pages 90 to 103.
[5] Court book at pages 151 to 154.
The applicant’s claims were then assessed against Australia’s non- refoulement obligations and again, the applicant was found not to engage these obligations. The applicant’s application was subject to a Post Review Protection Check which also found that no obligations were engaged.
Ultimately, the ITOA process currently under review was commenced on 12 June 2015.[6]The applicant provided submissions as part of the ITOA process[7] and he appeared at an interview with an assessor on 4 March 2016.[8]
[6] Court book at page 170 and at pages 435 to 436.
[7] Court book at pages 349 to 385 and at pages 429 to 431.
[8] Court book at pages 395 to 408.
The ITOA was finalised on 29 April 2016 and the assessment concluded that the applicant did not engage Australian’s non-refoulement obligations.[9]
[9] Court book at pages 435 to 470.
This application was commenced on 12 May 2016.[10]
[10] Court book at page 1.
The applicant’s claims
The applicant claimed to fear harm if he returned to Sri Lanka on the basis of his Tamil race, his religion, his imputed political opinion in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (‘LTTE’) and as a member of the following particular social groups:
a)Tamil males from the north; and
b)failed asylum seekers who had departed Sri Lanka illegally and spent a lengthy period in a Western country.[11]
[11] First respondent’s written submissions filed 21 January 2020 at page 2, paragraph 7.
The applicant submits that for the purpose of this application, the only relevant claim is his claim that he faced a ‘real risk of significant harm due to having departed Sri Lanka illegally.’[12]
[12] Applicant’s written submissions filed 13 December 2019 at paragraph 16.
The applicant submits that this claim was articulated in a legal submission provided by the applicant’s lawyer to the assessor on 12 January 2016[13] in which it was argued that:
a)the applicant would be charged for having departed Sri Lanka unlawfully;[14]
b)the applicant was at real risk of suffering significant harm while held in police custody, either during remand due to the prison conditions, or during police interrogations;[15]and
c)the applicant’s written submission cited country information to support the inference that torture occurs in Sri Lankan prisons or being held in the facilities amount to degrading treatment or punishment.[16]
[13] Court book at pages 381 to 383.
[14] Court book at page 382.
[15] Court book at page 382.
[16] Court book at pages 383 to 384.
Grounds of review
The applicant’s amended application raises one ground of review, namely:
The ITOA is affected by jurisdictional error as the assessment failed to consider the applicant’s claim that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of returning to Sri Lanka he was at real risk of significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958(Cth)(Act) due to having departed Sri Lanka illegally.
a. The ITOA was conducted to assess if Australia owed any international non-refoulement obligations in relation to the applicant.
b. In making its assessment the ITOA relied on the codification of Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations in the Act: the refugee criterion in s36(2)(a), and the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa).
c. The ITOA was required to afford the applicant procedural fairness, this included considering the applicant’s claims to face a real risk of significant harm under the complementary protection criteria (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZZSJ (2016) HCA 29; 259 CLR 180 [75]-[79]).
d. In a submission dated 12 January 2016 the applicant claimed that upon return to Sri Lanka he would face a real risk of significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act due to having departed Sri Lanka illegally. The relevant components of the claim were:
i.It is a criminal offence to depart Sri Lanka illegally, the applicant would be arrested for the offence of illegal departure on return to Sri Lanka (CB 382);
ii.The applicant would be held in custody and then remand (sic) prior to being brought before a magistrate )CB 382);
iii.The applicant would face a real risk of torture and physical assault during any interrogation while in police custody (CB 383 -384); and
iv.The applicant would face a real risk of torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment during the period he was held on remand due to poor prison conditions (CB 383 – 383).
e. The ITOA found that the applicant would not face a real chance of persecution within the meaning of s 36(2)(a) of the Act for having departed illegally because the prohibition on illegal departure is a law of general application.
f. The ITOA failed to consider if the applicant would be at real risk of significant harm while being held in police custody or remand for having departed illegally.[17]
[17] Applicant’s amended application filed 16 December 2019.
Consideration
Although the application for review does not take issue with the assessor’s consideration in relation to the refugee criterion in section 36(2)(a), in considering the ground of review raised it is necessary to have regard to the assessor’s reasons in their entirety.
In written submissions filed on the applicant’s behalf on 12 January 2016, the applicant identifies his protection claims, including that ‘he will be a failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally’.[18] His representative further stated, ‘the applicant fears returning to Sri Lanka on account that he will be detained indefinitely and tortured because he is perceived of having links to the LTTE … Upon being detained he will be at risk of physical assault and torture during his interrogation by the security services.’[19]
[18] Court book at page 350.
[19] Court book at page 350.
The applicant’s representative went on to refer to the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka) (the ‘I & E Act’) under which it is an offence to depart from Sri Lanka other than via an approved port.[20] As such, it was submitted for the applicant that on his return to Sri Lanka he would be considered to have committed an offence under the I & E Act and would be questioned at the airport.[21] If released, he would also face a real chance of being detained indefinitely and tortured by the police, Sri Lankan Police Criminal Investigation Division (‘CID’) or military.[22]
[20] Court book at page 377.
[21] Court book at page 378.
[22] Court book at page 381.
These submissions were made in the context of the applicant’s claim for protection under section 36(2)(a) of the Act.
The applicant’s representative further submitted that if the conclusion was reached that the applicant did not meet the criterion in section 36(2)(a), that ‘the information regarding the ongoing commission of human rights and other abuses towards persons in his circumstances supports a conclusion that he may fall within the complementary protection criterion included under section 36(2)(aa).’[23]The applicant’s representative referred to country information provided regarding reports of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of those held in police custody or in prison.[24] Relevantly, the applicant’s representative stated:
We submit that it is highly likely that upon return to Sri Lanka the Applicant will be detailed and questioned under the I & E Act. The Applicant faces an increased risk of indefinite detention on account of his perceived links to the LTTE and his past activities in Sri Lanka, during which time the Sri Lankan authorities will interrogate him. During this period of indefinite detention, the Applicant will be at serious risk of physical assault and torture as the authorities attempt to extract information from him.[25]
[23] Court book at page 381.
[24] Court book at pages 381 to 382.
[25] Court book at pages 383 to 384.
The applicant was invited to and attended an interview on 4 March 2016 to consider whether his case engaged Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. The applicant was represented at that interview and was supported by a Tamil interpreter.[26]
[26] Court book at pages 395 to 408.
On 1 April 2016, the applicant, via his representative was invited to comment on country information relevant to the applicant’s claims.[27] In particular, in relation to the applicant’s claim to fear harm as a failed asylum seeker who had left Sri Lanka illegally, the assessor set out Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) country information from December 2015 which relevantly stated:
[27] Court book at pages 418 to 427.
…no returnee who was merely a passenger on a people smuggling venture had been given a custodial sentence for departing Sri Lanka illegally.
…
Although DFAT does not routinely monitor the situation of returnees, DFAT assesses that the risk of torture or mistreatment for the majority of returnees is low, including those suspected of offences under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act…
…
DFAT assess that returnees are treated according to these standard procedures, regardless of their ethnicity and religion. DFAT further assesses that detainees are not subject to mistreatment during their processing at the airport …[28]
[28] Court book at page 425.
The assessor then specifically invited the applicant to comment at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16.[29]
[29] Court book at page 426.
The applicant’s representative responded by letter dated 19 April 2016.[30] In particular, he addressed the situation of a returning failed asylum seeker with a political profile, but did not specifically address any concern that he was at risk of harm during any period he might be in detention on his return.[31]
[30] Court book at pages 429 to 431.
[31] Court book at page 430.
By letter dated 29 April 2016, the applicant was advised that the ITOA concluded that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations were not engaged in his case.[32] The ITOA report, sets out:
a)a summary of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations;
b)the material before the officer conducting the ITOA;
c)a summary of the applicant’s claims/information to be assessed in the ITOA; and
d)a summary of the various claims made by the applicant both in written documentation and also in the various interviews attended by the applicant.
[32] Court book at pages 433 to 470.
The basis of the applicant’s claim is that although the assessor considered the claim that the applicant feared harm, as part of his refugee claim, as a result of being a member of a particular social group, namely, a failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally and spent a lengthy period in a western country, the assessor did not properly consider the applicant’s complementary protection claim under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The applicant concedes that in considering the applicant’s general protections claim, the assessor was entitled to rely upon factual findings made in relation to the applicant’s claim under section 36(2)(a). However, it was further submitted that where a decision maker disposes of a refugee claim on the basis of a matter peculiar to the refugee claim then the decision maker needs to address the complementary protection separately.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant’s claim relevant to this application for review are set out at pages 382 to 383 of the court book. This forms part of the submission filed with the assessor on behalf of the applicant on 12 January 2016, which addresses the applicant’s claims. In submissions in this court, the applicant seeks to rely upon this section of that submission as the basis on which the applicant argued that even if he was not owed protection under section 36(2)(a) on refugee grounds, he was owed protection under Australia’s complementary protection obligations, under section 36(2)(aa). It is submitted that the applicant’s claims for complementary protection arise are set out in the dot points at the bottom of pages 382 to 383 of the court book.
Relevantly, those matters go to allegations of the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of suspects in custody, overcrowding and other poor standards and conditions of prisons in Sri Lanka. It is submitted that the assessor in dealing with the complementary protection claims, does not address these particular claims, but rather focusses on the claim that the applicant would suffer harm on his return because of a convention reason. It is accepted that the applicant’s claims relating to his race, religious beliefs and political activities (imputed or otherwise) were all rejected by the assessor.
The applicant points to the assessor’s reasons[33] as evidence that the assessor was considering the claim that the applicant would suffer harm as a result of having departed Sri Lanka illegally, but did not consider the claim that the applicant would suffer harm because of the prison system itself in Sri Lanka.
[33] Supplementary court book filed 21 January 2020 at pages 34 to 35.
Moreover, it is submitted for the applicant that when one has regard to the assessor’s reasons in totality, the court ought not to infer that the assessor in fact did have regard to these claims. It is said that no such inference ought to be drawn for the following reasons:
a)there are no express findings, although it was properly conceded that this is not the end of the matter;
b)there is no reference to the country information which relates to prison conditions and there is nothing in the assessor’s reasons which could be said to be an analysis of or consideration of prison conditions;
c)the assessor makes no reference to the country information to which the applicant had referred it at pages 382 to 383 of the court book; again, whilst conceding that there is no obligation on the assessor to refer to every piece of evidence before it, the applicant submits that the absence of any such reference to country information relied upon by the applicant adds, to the rubric which supports the finding that the assessor did not consider that claim;
d)to the extent that the assessor does refer to the risk of harm to the applicant on return, it is considered in the context of determining whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion, not in the context of the complementary protection claim; and
e)finally in so far as the first respondent relies upon the procedural fairness letter sent to the applicant on 1 April 2016,[34] that letter, whilst it can provide context, does not form part of the assessor’s reasons.[35] Moreover, the extracts of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the procedural fairness letter,[36] does not address the claim that the applicant would suffer harm on remand.[37]
[34] Court book at pages 425 to 426.
[35] AUX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 103 at [57] – [59].
[36] Court book at page 426.
[37] Court book at page 426.
For each of these reasons, it is submitted that the assessor’s reasons are affected by jurisdictional error.
In response, the first respondent, stated that in order to properly and fairly understand the assessor’s reasoning, the assessor’s reasons need to be considered in their entirety and in context. That is, it is submitted that it is important to have regard to the fact that the assessor has rejected all of the substantial grounds raised by the applicant for protection under section 36(2)(a) and importantly, has made adverse credibility findings.
Moreover, the claims made by the applicant must also be viewed in context. In the applicant’s submissions to the assessor in January 2016, the applicant makes claims of fearing harm on return as a returned failed asylum seeker.[38] The applicant’s representative refers to DFAT country information which relates to allegations of torture and mistreatment raised by returned asylum seekers. The applicant’s representative then goes on to refer to ‘a number of credible reports of failed asylum seekers, particularly young men of Tamil ethnicity, who have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention and various forms of harm (including torture) amounting to persecution upon their return to Sri Lanka…’.[39] The submission goes on to identify a number of specific incidents and in doing so reference is made to poor conditions in prisons in Sri Lanka.
[38] Court book at page 376.
[39] Court book at page 377.
There is further reference to a Human Rights Law centre report which again refers to increased reports of ‘torture, rape and other ill-treatment in custody of Sri Lankans who return home from a period abroad, whether the return is voluntary or not’ with specific examples given.[40] Further, there is further discussion that detention in Sri Lanka poses a significant risk of torture.[41] Similarly, there is further reference to the US Department of State report which again refers to torture and abuse of detainees and poor prison conditions.[42]
[40] Court book at page 369.
[41] Court book at page 370.
[42] Court book at page 370.
It was submitted that this information was put forward by the applicant’s representative in the context of the applicant’s convention claims and the mistreatment in detention and prison conditions in support of those convention claims.
Moreover, the applicant’s representatives went on to say:
The available information supports a conclusion that the Applicant is at risk of encountering serious harm during the screening process, irrespective of the likely outcome of that process. The available information supports a conclusion that the Applicant is at risk of encountering serious harm during the ‘standard’ screening process even if he is ultimately able to convince the authorities that he does not have an association with the LTTE and is released.[43]
[43] Court book at page 376.
It is against this background, that the applicant’s claims in relation to complementary protection are then made.[44] Relevantly, the applicant’s representative say, under the heading ‘Complementary Protection’:
Whilst it is our submission that the Applicant is owed protection under the Refugee criterion contained in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, if you are minded to conclude that he is not a refugee, the information regarding the ongoing commission of human rights and other abuses towards persons in his circumstances supports a conclusion that he may fall within the complementary protection criterion included under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
In this regard, we submit that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk he may suffer significant harm.[45]
[44] Court book at page 381.
[45] Court book at page 381.
The applicant’s representatives then refer to ‘information provided’,[46] namely the information identified above ‘which outlines the reports of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment faced by those held in police custody or in prison’.[47] It is in this context that the claims to which the applicant’s counsel refer at pages 382 to 383 of the court book are made.
[46] Court book at page 382.
[47] Court book at page 382.
Moreover, the applicant representative said:
We submit that it is highly likely that upon return to Sri Lanka the Applicant will be detained and questioned under the I & E Act. The Applicant faces an increased risk of indefinite detention on account of his perceived links to the LTTE and his past activities in Sri Lanka, during which time the Sri Lankan authorities will interrogate him. During this period of indefinite detention, the Applicant will be at serious risk of physical assault and torture as the authorities attempt to extract information from him.[48]
[48] Court book at pages 383 to 384.
It is therefore in clear that:
a)the applicant relied upon the same country information to make out both his refugee claim and his complementary protection claim; and
b)the applicant maintained, in his complementary protection claim that he would be targeted on his return because of his imputed supporter of the LTTE, past employment and past involvement in the shooting of a Sri Lankan army soldier.
The assessor then considers the applicant’s claims. Relevantly, the structure of the reasons show that the assessor considered first the applicant’s refugee claims and then considered the applicant’s complementary protection claims. In the context of the applicant’s refugee claims, the assessor accepted that the applicant claimed to fear harm on the basis of race, religion and imputed political opinion. The assessor also accepted that Tamil asylum seekers returned involuntarily to Sri Lanka are particular social group and that the applicant claims to fear persecution on this basis.
The assessor also accepted that the harm feared would amount to persecution and therefore went on to consider whether the fear was well founded. Relevantly for present purposes, the assessor considers this question in the context of the applicant’s claim to be a member of a particular social group, namely, a ‘failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally and spent a lengthy period in a Western country’.[49]
[49] Supplementary court book at page 34
In this context, the assessor considered the evidence as to what would happen to the applicant if he were to return to Sri Lanka. The assessor considered the Immigration and Emigration Act and its application to a returnee in the applicant’s position. Relevantly it noted:
Reports indicate that those found to have departed Sri Lanka illegally should appear before a magistrate within 24 to 48 hours and that ’99.999 percent’ were released almost immediately. These laws appear to be targeting smugglers and the smuggling industry and discouraging irregular migration. DFAT advised in December 2015 that ‘no returnee who was merely a passenger on a people smuggling venture had been given a custodial sentence for departing Sri Lanka illegally.[50]
[50] Supplementary court book at page 34.
It is the case that the assessor also found that the I & E Act was a law of general application and therefore as its enforcement was not discriminatory, any prosecution under that Act would not be persecution for a ‘convention’ reason. However, this is not the only finding which the assessor made in relation to this aspect of the applicant’s claims.
Rather, the assessor then considered relevant country information and whether the applicant’s fear of persecution on this basis was well founded. Relevantly, it stated:
Overall, on the basis of the information before me, I am not satisfied that the claimant faces a real chance of serious harm on the basis of being a ‘failed Tamil asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally and spent a lengthy period in a Western country.’ The evidence before me indicates that the claimant is likely to be fined for departing the country illegally in 2007, but will not face further sanction or serious harm. … He may experience some monitoring by state officials, but I am satisfied that this will not result in serious harm to the claimant.[51] (emphasis added)
[51] Supplementary court book at page 36.
The assessor further concluded that they were satisfied that ‘on the basis of the information before me that a cumulative assessment of his profile does not result in real chance that the claimant will experience serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka.’[52]
[52] Supplementary court book at page 36.
The assessor then goes on to consider the applicant’s complementary protection claims. The assessor sets out the relevant statutory provision, the circumstances in which section 36(2)(aa) would apply. The assessor sets out the applicant’s feared harm and goes on to consider whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of harm.[53]
[53] Supplementary court book at page 37.
In this context, the assessor says:
As outline previously in this decision record, I have assessed the claimant’s claims and have found that there is not a real chance of the claimant being harmed by Sri Lankan authorities.
…
I have relied upon the same evidence to find that there is not a real risk of the claimant being significantly harmed or arrested by Sri Lankan authorities. As such I am not satisfied that there is a real risk that the claimant will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, will suffer torture, suffer cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, or suffer degrading treatment or punishment by Sri Lankan authorities (for the purposes of paragraph 36(2)(aa) of the Act).[54]
[54] Supplementary court book at page 37.
A fair reading of the assessor’s reasoning in the sense discussed in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 leads to conclude that the assessor’s findings in this regard, must be read in the context of the assessor’s reasoning overall and findings in relation to the refugee claims. It is clear that in considering both the applicant’s refugee claims and complementary protections claims, the assessor considered whether the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm or a real chance of serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka, including as a result of being tortured, or being exposed to poor prison conditions generally.
As in CDY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 175,[55] here the assessor has correctly identified the criteria necessary to satisfy the complementary protection provisions of the Act, as compared to the refugee criterion. Moreover, the assessor has considered the evidence in detail and has made factual findings in relation to the claims advanced. In this case, like in CDY15, ‘the factual foundation of each claim was the same.’[56]
[55] CDY15 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 175.
[56] CDY15 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 175 at [41].
The assessor, clearly was aware of the claim that the applicant feared being detained, tortured and subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment during any such detention. The factual findings made by the assessor namely that on the evidence before the assessor the applicant was ‘likely to be fined for departing the country illegally in 2007, but will not face further sanction or serious harm’ and that ‘he will be permitted to return to his home region and resume his life in Sri Lanka’ and that he ‘may experience some monitoring by state officials but … this will not result in serious harm to the claimant’[57] were factual findings which supported both the finding made that the claimant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of section 36(2)(a) and the finding that there was no real risk of the claimant being significantly harmed or arrested by Sri Lankan authorities.
[57] Supplementary court book at page 36.
For each of these reasons, the ground of review is not made out.
Conclusion
I therefore order that:
a)the application’s application as amended be dismissed; and
b)the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Mercuri
Associate:
Date: 12 October 2020
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