FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BBV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1227
Appeal from: BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674 File number(s): NSD 351 of 2020 Judgment of: RAPER J Date of judgment: 18 October 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeal Tribunal to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to disaggregate application of paragraphs 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness – held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(d), 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 65, 91R(1)(b), 91R(1)(c), 424AA, 424A, 425(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 866.221
Cases cited: BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674
BVZ21 v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 122
DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 388 ALR 363
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541
SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; 138 ALD 26
SZUYK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 216; 151 ALD 360
SZUYK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCASL 172
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 50 Date of hearing: 26 September 2022 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S Lloyd of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs. ORDERS
NSD 351 of 2020 BETWEEN: BBV17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RAPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 OCTOBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RAPER J:
Introduction
This is an appeal from a decision of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) made on 11 March 2020: BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674 (J). In that decision, the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (AAT), made on 23 February 2017. The AAT had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister), made on 5 June 2015, refusing to grant the…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the AAT had erred in its application of the statutory criteria and whether it had denied the appellant procedural fairness. The court found that the AAT had correctly applied the statutory criteria and had not denied the appellant procedural fairness. The AAT had considered the appellant's claims under both s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and it was not required to make detailed findings for each statutory provision separately. The court noted that there may be some overlap in the findings made under these sections, as accepted by the Full Court and the High Court. The AAT’s reasons were sufficient to enable meaningful review.
The court rejected the appellant's application to rely on fresh evidence, such as medical certificates and school attendance records, as these documents did not address the criteria the AAT was required to consider in the original decision-making process. The court held that the fresh evidence, while revealing unfortunate circumstances in the appellant’s personal life, was not relevant to the judicial review function of the court.
For the reasons set out above, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On appeal, the appellant provided the following written submission which is extracted in full:I am from Bangladesh. I am unable to return to my country, as I have threats on my life and due to this I am suffering from mental health. I have attached my medical documents. I say, my wife is battling with cancer and has three young children. If I have to return to Bangladesh, I will not be able to support my family and will have financial difficulty. I therefore say to the honourable judge that if I am given an opportunity to stay in Australia, I will be able to work harder and contribute to Australia. I will not rely upon any centrelink or some other social services. Please consider my limitations and I have attached my medical documents. Thank You.ConsiderationGround 1 By ground 1, the appellant contends that the AAT failed to apply the correct test pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, namely that it failed to disaggregate the statutory formulae under s 36(2)(aa) from its consideration under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The appellant relied on his written submissions. I am not persuaded that the AAT failed to apply the correct test. The AAT considered each of the criteria which must be satisfied under s 36(2)(a) of the Act (at [17]–[65]) and made its concluding findings: at [66]–[75]. The AAT then turned to consider the appellant’s claims for complementary protection paraphrasing in the section’s title the statutory test under s 36(2)(aa). At [77]–[78], the AAT did consider separately the s 36(2)(aa) criteria and referred to the bases for the establishment of “significant harm” under s 36(2A). Whilst the AAT’s reasons with respect to s 36(2)(aa) are short and only refer in general terms to findings made with respect to s 36(2)(a) as forming the basis for the findings with respect to this claim, this is understandable. As referred to by the primary judge, at J[21], the Full Court has accepted that there may be overlap in the findings that “no harm… was suffered” (under s 36(2)(a)) and whether the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm (under s 36(2)(aa)): SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; 138 ALD 26 at [32]. More recently the High Court in DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 388 ALR 363 at [27]:Although the statutory questions posed by s 36(2)(a) and (aa) are different, it has long been recognised that, to the extent that the factual bases for claims under s 36(2)(a) and (aa) overlap, a decision-maker, when considering the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa), is entitled to refer to and rely on any relevant findings the decision-maker made when considering the refugee criterion under s 36(2)(a). The question under s 36(2)(aa) then is whether, in light of those and any other relevant findings, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non‑citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm of the kind prescribed in s 36(2A), subject to s 36(2B) and (2C). And, as will be seen, that is what the Authority did in this case.(Footnotes omitted).