BBV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BBV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1227   

Appeal from: BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674
File number(s): NSD 351 of 2020
Judgment of: RAPER J
Date of judgment: 18 October 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeal Tribunal to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to disaggregate application of paragraphs 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness – held: appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(d), 27

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 65, 91R(1)(b), 91R(1)(c), 424AA, 424A, 425(1)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 866.221

Cases cited:

BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674

BVZ21 v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 122

DKV16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 716

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 388 ALR 363

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541

SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; 138 ALD 26

SZUYK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 216; 151 ALD 360

SZUYK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCASL 172

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 50
Date of hearing: 26 September 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S Lloyd of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 351 of 2020
BETWEEN:

BBV17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RAPER J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 OCTOBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RAPER J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) made on 11 March 2020: BBV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 674 (J). In that decision, the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (AAT), made on 23 February 2017. The AAT had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister), made on 5 June 2015, refusing to grant the…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1227
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to affirm the Minister’s decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant contended that the AAT failed to properly consider the statutory criteria under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and that it denied him procedural fairness. The appellant argued that the AAT did not sufficiently separate the criteria under s 36(2)(aa) from those under s 36(2)(a) and that it did not allow him to respond to the Minister's case adequately.

The court examined whether the AAT had erred in its application of the statutory criteria and whether it had denied the appellant procedural fairness. The court found that the AAT had correctly applied the statutory criteria and had not denied the appellant procedural fairness. The AAT had considered the appellant's claims under both s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and it was not required to make detailed findings for each statutory provision separately. The court noted that there may be some overlap in the findings made under these sections, as accepted by the Full Court and the High Court. The AAT’s reasons were sufficient to enable meaningful review.

The court rejected the appellant's application to rely on fresh evidence, such as medical certificates and school attendance records, as these documents did not address the criteria the AAT was required to consider in the original decision-making process. The court held that the fresh evidence, while revealing unfortunate circumstances in the appellant’s personal life, was not relevant to the judicial review function of the court.

For the reasons set out above, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal concerned whether the AAT had erred in purportedly failing to disaggregate the statutory formulae under s 36(2)(aa) from its consideration of the protection visa application under s 36(2)(a) and whether the AAT had denied the appellant procedural fairness. For the reasons set out below, I dismiss the appeal. Background The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He last arrived in Australia on 6 August 2014. The appellant lodged an application for a protection visa on 30 October 2014, claiming he feared persecution in his home country because of his political opinion. The appellant claims that he was a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and stood for election on 22 May 2011. As a result of his political involvement, the appellant claims he and his family have been threatened, that he has been implicated in a murder by his political opponents and that a false charge was filed against him. The appellant claims that he fears that if he returns to Bangladesh, members of the Awami League (AL) would harass and attack him. The delegate’s decision The appellant attended an interview with the delegate on 2 June 2015. On 5 June 2015, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The delegate found that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36 of the Act and cl 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) and refused his application. The delegate summarised the appellant’s claims for protection as follows (at Part A, [8]):•He is a Muslim from Joynagar, Sunamganj district; he is married with two children.•From 2009 until 2014 he was the owner/manager of his own business, M/S Suhag Enterprise, located at Patantula, Madina market.•In September 2013 he visited Singapore and Malaysia on business. He visited Malaysia a second time on business in October – November 2013. In April-May 2014 he visited Saudi Arabia for two weeks for Umrah (a Muslim pilgrimage).•He left Bangladesh due to his fear of persecution there and to avoid death threats from his political opponents – members of the ruling Awami League (AL) – who will harass and attack him if they find him.•He was actively involved in the politics of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) for a long time. His involvement increased when he started his business. He became even more active when the BNP decided that he should stand in a union council election.•During the election campaign there were incidents between the opposing political parties in his locality. His opponents stalked, harassed and sometimes attacked his activists and followers. On election day some of his supporters were beaten by his opponents. •He lost the election after his opponents used election committee members and law enforcement agencies to falsify the election result.•Following the election his opponents threatened him a couple of times and also came to his home and threatened his family. The officer in charge of the local police station also turned against him and political opponents included the applicant’s name as a criminal and miscreant and filed a false charge against him.•His political opponents are looking for him. If he returns to Bangladesh they will start proceedings against him that may result in extra-judicial murder, e.g. crossfire, at the hands of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) or the police. He also fears that the false murder charge against him could result in him being imprisoned indefinitely, as is common in politically motivated cases in Bangladesh.•His political opponents are strong and have full government support. They consider him a big threat to their illegal activities in his locality. He opposed such activities. He was an exemplary figure in his locality and considered a threat to his opponents’ election prospects hence they want to destroy him.•His political opponents – the AL – are in power and law enforcement agencies such as the police and the RAB follow the AL’s instructions. Those agencies will never protect him or his interests.(Emphasis in original).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I therefore reject the basis for this ground of appeal.Application to rely on fresh evidence To assist his argument the appellant sought leave pursuant to s 27 of the FCA Act to rely on fresh evidence on appeal, namely:(a)two letters, dated 8 March 2020, from the appellant’s sons’ school, confirming the appellant’s sons’ attendance at that school;(b)a letter, dated 8 March 2020, from a different school confirming the attendance of another of the appellant’s sons at the school;(c)a medical certificate, dated 29 July 2022, from an Australian general practitioner referring to the appellant’s current health conditions;(d)a histopathology report, dated 1 November 2020, and an Medical Services review report dated, 16 January 2021, from Bangladesh, with respect to the appellant’s wife’s health conditions; and(e)a letter, dated 12 September 2022, from an Australian psychologist, regarding the appellant’s current mental health. None of the documents were before the delegate of the Minister nor the AAT. They all post-date those processes. The Court has the remedial power, under s 27 of the FCA Act, to admit fresh evidence, so as to ensure proceedings do not miscarry. Rule 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) sets out the requirements for an application, however, no formal application was made here. As recently observed by the Full Court in BVZ21 v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 122 (Markovic, Thomas and Halley JJ) at [12]:The Court has the power to admit fresh affidavit evidence on an appeal pursuant to s 27(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The power to admit further evidence is remedial and its primary purpose is to ensure that proceedings do not miscarry. In exercising the discretion, the Court will normally need to be satisfied that the further evidence, had it been adduced at trial, would very probably have meant that the result would have been different, and further that the party seeking to adduce the evidence was, at trial, unaware of the evidence and could not have been, with reasonable diligence, made aware of the evidence: Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2 at [15]–[16] (Griffiths, Mortimer and White JJ).(Emphasis in original). I refuse the application on the basis that even accepting the providence and admissibility of documents, none of those documents deal with matters which the AAT was required to consider – namely whether the appellant satisfied the criteria under either ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act. No claim was made to the delegate of the Minister for which the documents could be relevant. Whilst the Court accepted that they reveal the very unfortunate circumstances in the appellant’s personal life, they are unfortunately not matters which are relevant to the Court’s confined judicial review functions. Conclusion For these reasons, I dismiss the appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant lodged an application for a protection visa on 30 October 2014, claiming he feared persecution in his home country because of his political opinion. The appellant claims that he was a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and stood for election on 22 May 2011. As a result of his political involvement, the appellant claims he and his family have been threatened, that he has been implicated in a murder by his political opponents and that a false charge was filed against him. The appellant claims that he fears that if he returns to Bangladesh, members of the Awami League (AL) would harass and attack him. The delegate’s decision The appellant attended an interview with the delegate on 2 June 2015. On 5 June 2015, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The delegate found that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36 of the Act and cl 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) and refused his application. The delegate summarised the appellant’s claims for protection as follows (at Part A, [8]):•He is a Muslim from Joynagar, Sunamganj district; he is married with two children.•From 2009 until 2014 he was the owner/manager of his own business, M/S Suhag Enterprise, located at Patantula, Madina market.•In September 2013 he visited Singapore and Malaysia on business. He visited Malaysia a second time on business in October – November 2013. In April-May 2014 he visited Saudi Arabia for two weeks for Umrah (a Muslim pilgrimage).•He left Bangladesh due to his fear of persecution there and to avoid death threats from his political opponents – members of the ruling Awami League (AL) – who will harass and attack him if they find him.•He was actively involved in the politics of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) for a long time. His involvement increased when he started his business. He became even more active when the BNP decided that he should stand in a union council election.•During the election campaign there were incidents between the opposing political parties in his locality. His opponents stalked, harassed and sometimes attacked his activists and followers. On election day some of his supporters were beaten by his opponents. •He lost the election after his opponents used election committee members and law enforcement agencies to falsify the election result.•Following the election his opponents threatened him a couple of times and also came to his home and threatened his family. The officer in charge of the local police station also turned against him and political opponents included the applicant’s name as a criminal and miscreant and filed a false charge against him.•His political opponents are looking for him. If he returns to Bangladesh they will start proceedings against him that may result in extra-judicial murder, e.g. crossfire, at the hands of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) or the police. He also fears that the false murder charge against him could result in him being imprisoned indefinitely, as is common in politically motivated cases in Bangladesh.•His political opponents are strong and have full government support. They consider him a big threat to their illegal activities in his locality. He opposed such activities. He was an exemplary figure in his locality and considered a threat to his opponents’ election prospects hence they want to destroy him.•His political opponents – the AL – are in power and law enforcement agencies such as the police and the RAB follow the AL’s instructions. Those agencies will never protect him or his interests.(Emphasis in original).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On appeal, the appellant provided the following written submission which is extracted in full:I am from Bangladesh. I am unable to return to my country, as I have threats on my life and due to this I am suffering from mental health. I have attached my medical documents. I say, my wife is battling with cancer and has three young children. If I have to return to Bangladesh, I will not be able to support my family and will have financial difficulty. I therefore say to the honourable judge that if I am given an opportunity to stay in Australia, I will be able to work harder and contribute to Australia. I will not rely upon any centrelink or some other social services. Please consider my limitations and I have attached my medical documents. Thank You.ConsiderationGround 1 By ground 1, the appellant contends that the AAT failed to apply the correct test pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, namely that it failed to disaggregate the statutory formulae under s 36(2)(aa) from its consideration under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The appellant relied on his written submissions. I am not persuaded that the AAT failed to apply the correct test. The AAT considered each of the criteria which must be satisfied under s 36(2)(a) of the Act (at [17]–[65]) and made its concluding findings: at [66]–[75]. The AAT then turned to consider the appellant’s claims for complementary protection paraphrasing in the section’s title the statutory test under s 36(2)(aa). At [77]–[78], the AAT did consider separately the s 36(2)(aa) criteria and referred to the bases for the establishment of “significant harm” under s 36(2A). Whilst the AAT’s reasons with respect to s 36(2)(aa) are short and only refer in general terms to findings made with respect to s 36(2)(a) as forming the basis for the findings with respect to this claim, this is understandable. As referred to by the primary judge, at J[21], the Full Court has accepted that there may be overlap in the findings that “no harm… was suffered” (under s 36(2)(a)) and whether the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm (under s 36(2)(aa)): SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; 138 ALD 26 at [32]. More recently the High Court in DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 388 ALR 363 at [27]:Although the statutory questions posed by s 36(2)(a) and (aa) are different, it has long been recognised that, to the extent that the factual bases for claims under s 36(2)(a) and (aa) overlap, a decision-maker, when considering the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa), is entitled to refer to and rely on any relevant findings the decision-maker made when considering the refugee criterion under s 36(2)(a). The question under s 36(2)(aa) then is whether, in light of those and any other relevant findings, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non‑citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm of the kind prescribed in s 36(2A), subject to s 36(2B) and (2C). And, as will be seen, that is what the Authority did in this case.(Footnotes omitted).