BBFD and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration)

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

BBFD and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 3907 (18 September 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2018/5365

Re:BBFD

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Home Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC

Date:18 September 2019

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal decides that:

  1. The reviewable decision, being the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs dated 7 September 2018 to refuse the applicant’s Protection (Class XA) visa, is set aside.

  2. In substitution, it is decided that the application for a Protection (Class XA) visa be remitted to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) with a direction that the Applicant is not to be refused the visa under section 501(1) of that Act.

    .............................[sgd]...........................

    Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC

    CATCHWORDS

    MIGRATION – refusal of Protection (Class XA) visa – failure to pass the character test – whether discretion to set aside the delegate’s decision should be exercised – whether there is any risk of the applicant engaging in future criminal conduct – whether the applicant poses a risk of harm to the Australian community –  Direction No. 79 – primary considerations – protection of the Australian community – the best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision – expectations of the Australian community – other considerations – where applicant is owed non-refoulement obligations – decision under review set aside

    LEGISLATION

    Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 43

    Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 197C, 501

    CASES

    Azizi and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 2561
    BHKM and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 3
    Collector of Customs (New South Wales) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD
    DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 448
    Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1988] FCA 294; (1988) 19 FCR 342
    Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16; (2019) 93 ALJR 629
    FTYC and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 20
    Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc v the Minister of Health, Housing and Community Services [1992] FCA 599; (1992) 39 FCR 225
    SYLN and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 4408 (2018); 163 ALD 186
    Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673; (2014) 225 FCR 224

    SECONDARY SOURCES

    Direction No. 79 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s. 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s. 501CA

    REASONS FOR DECISION

    Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC

    18 September 2019

  3. The applicant is a lady in her forties.  She has been held in immigration detention for four years.  She is detained at Villawood.

  4. She was born in New Zealand and has applied for a protection visa. The Migration and Refugee Division of this Tribunal held that protection obligations are owed in respect of her, so that an important element of her protection visa application has already…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BBFD and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] AATA 3907
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal against the refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa, where the applicant failed to pass the character test. The applicant sought to have the delegate's decision set aside, raising questions about the risk of future criminal conduct and the potential harm to the Australian community. The decision under review was made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs.

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to determine whether to exercise its discretion to set aside the delegate's decision. This involved considering whether the applicant posed a risk of harm to the Australian community, the best interests of any minor children in Australia affected by the decision, and the expectations of the Australian community, as guided by Direction No. 79. The Tribunal also had to consider whether the applicant was owed non-refoulement obligations.

The Tribunal's reasoning was informed by established principles regarding its review function. It was noted that the AAT stands in the shoes of the primary decision-maker, exercising the same powers and subject to the same constraints. The AAT must address the same statutory question as the primary decision-maker, considering the same factors that the primary decision-maker was obliged to consider. The Tribunal is not confined to the evidence before the primary decision-maker but must determine the correct or preferable decision based on all the evidence before it, while remaining within the boundaries of the original decision.

The Tribunal ultimately set aside the decision under review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Similarly, in the same case, Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ said at [51] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied): That is because, except where altered by some other statute, which has not occurred here, the jurisdiction conferred on the AAT by ss 25 and 43 of the AAT Act, where application is made to it under an enactment, is to stand in the shoes of the decision-maker whose decision is under review so as to determine for itself on the material before it the decision which can, and which it considers should, be made in the exercise of the power or powers conferred on the primary decision-maker for the purpose of making the decision under review. The AAT exercises the same power or powers as the primary decision-maker, subject to the same constraints. The primary decision, and the statutory question it answers, marks the boundaries of the AAT's review. The AAT must address the same question the primary decision-maker was required to address, and the question raised by statute for decision by the primary decision-maker determines the considerations that must or must not be taken into account by the AAT in reviewing that decision. A consideration which the primary decision-maker must take into account in the exercise of statutory power to make the decision under review must be taken into account by the AAT. Conversely, a consideration which the primary decision-maker must not take into account must not be taken into account by the AAT. The primary decision-maker was required to address no more than he decided to address. The passage from Frugtniet which I have set out in [55] cites several Federal Court decisions, including Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1988] FCA 294; (1988) 19 FCR 342. In that case, a widow’s pension was cancelled by the Secretary because she was at the relevant date living with a man as his wife on a bona fide domestic basis although not legally married to him. Davies J heard an appeal from a decision of this Tribunal which had concluded that the de facto relationship has subsequently come to an end, and the Tribunal recommended, while affirming the reviewable decision, that the widow apply again for the pension in her then current circumstances. Davies J referred to the authorities stating that the Tribunal should have regard to facts proved before it in making its decision. His honour held, however, that the function of the Tribunal was to reconsider the decision of the delegate and determine whether the decision to cancel the pension was at the time it was made a correct or preferable decision. The question was not whether the appellant/applicant was entitled to a pension at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal. The other decision cited by Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ for the passage quoted in [55] above was Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc v the Minister of Health, Housing and Community Services [1992] FCA 599; (1992) 39 FCR 225. That was a decision of a Full Court constituted by Wilcox, Burchett and French JJ. In the course of the Court’s reasons for judgment, it was said at [23]: “It is, of course, well established that the Tribunal determines what was the correct or preferable decision having regard to the whole of the evidence placed before it. It is not confined to the evidence which was before the primary decision maker. The Tribunal is, however, obliged to address the same question as was before the primary decision maker. This distinction was spelled out in Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1988] FCA 294; (1988) 19 FCR 342.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.