BBF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BBF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1177

Appeal from: BBF15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 809
File number: VID 390 of 2017
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 4 October 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration, being country information produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – whether primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the third appellant as part of its review – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), (c), 411(1)(c), 412(2), 476(2), (4), 499(2)(a)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 9.63

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 2.08, 4.31A

Date of hearing: 11 August 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 390 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BBF15

First Appellant

BBG15

Second Appellant

BBH15

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 OCTOBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first and second appellants be appointed as litigation representatives of the third appellant, effective from the date of the filing of their notice of appeal.

2.Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the requirement to comply with r 9.63(2) of those rules be dispensed with.

3.The appeal be dismissed with costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellants appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the FCCA) dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 27 May 2015, by which the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the first and second appellants’ protection visas (protection visas).

    Two grounds of appeal

  2. The appellants raise two grounds of appeal, which are the same as those raised in the FCCA.

  3. The first ground is that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely, country information about Bangladesh produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

  4. The second ground is that the Tribunal was wrong to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the third appellant as part of its review of the first delegate’s decision, and that it should have found to the contrary.

  5. For the reasons set…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BBF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was asked to review a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) regarding the refusal of protection visas to three appellants. The Tribunal had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the application of the third appellant, who was the child of the first two appellants. The primary judge had dismissed an appeal against this decision, and the appellants sought further review by the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court. The central legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge had erred by not finding that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant country information and whether the Tribunal had correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the application of the third appellant.

The Full Court found that the primary judge had not erred in concluding that the RRT had not failed to consider the country information produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The court reasoned that the DFAT information, which included reports of acid attacks on women, was not crucial to the Tribunal's decision as the appellants' credibility was already in question. The court held that the Tribunal had focused on the credibility of the appellants rather than the inherent plausibility of their claims, and therefore, the omission of the DFAT information did not significantly impact the decision. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal was correct in asserting that it lacked jurisdiction to review the application of the third appellant, as no reviewable decision was made in relation to the child when the application for review was lodged, and the statutory time limit for such an application had expired.

In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the first and second appellants be appointed as litigation representatives for the third appellant, effective from the date of the filing of their notice of appeal. Additionally, the court waived the requirement to comply with a specific rule of the Federal Court and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs to be agreed upon or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and second appellants be appointed as litigation representatives of the third appellant, effective from the date of the filing of their notice of appeal.

2. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the requirement to comply with r 9.63(2) of those rules be dispensed with.

3. The appeal be dismissed with costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 15 April 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the adult appellants, in relation to a number of matters, including the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to the third appellant, as follows:The presiding member considers that there is no valid application for review before her in relation to your dependent child [name inserted]. When you lodged your application for review on 22 May 2014, in which your daughter was included, there was no reviewable decision by the delegate of the Minister in relation to your daughter, as the department had not, at that stage, been informed of her birth. No application for review was lodged in relation to the subsequent decision of the Minister’s delegate made on 16 July 2014 to refuse to grant your daughter a protection visa, and the statutory time period for lodging an application for review in relation to that decision has passed.You are invited to make comments in relation to the jurisdictional issue; however, should the presiding member’s decide that she does not have jurisdiction – that is, legal power – to consider your daughter’s application, she has no discretion to do so.You are invited to give comments on or respond to the above information in writing.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL On 27 May 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the first delegate’s decision not to grant the adult appellants the protection visas. The Tribunal determined that there was no RRT-reviewable decision in relation to the third appellant when the application for review was lodged, as follows:I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to review the decision to refuse protection visas to the first and second named applicants. I do not have jurisdiction to review the application for review in relation to the third named applicant, their child. There was no RRT-Reviewable decision in relation to the child when the application for review was lodged. No application for review has been lodged in relation to the decision made in relation to the third named applicant on 16 July 2014, and any application would now be out of time. The Tribunal summarised the evidence given by the adult appellants as follows:In summary, the applicant claims that she (and her husband and child) will be killed or seriously harmed (for example, by acid attack) by a man named [AH] who she claims liked her before she married the second named applicant in 2008. She claims that Mr [H] continued to stalk and harass her and her husband after their marriage, until they came to Australia in 2009. She claims that they came to Australia to get away from him. She claims that when they returned on a visit to Bangladesh from July-September 2012, she accidentally met Mr [H] on the night of 10 August 2012. He accosted her and kicked her in the abdomen. She suffered a miscarriage. He continued to threaten them until they returned to Australia earlier than planned. She fears that if they returned to Bangladesh he will make good his threat to harm them. She claims that Mr [H] is well connected with the Awami League, the current party of government. She claims that because of his political connections she would not be able to obtain protection. Moreover, she claims that violence against women is not taken seriously, and that Bangladesh is an extremely corrupt country with rampant political violence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In rejecting that ground, the primary judge held as follows:17.With respect to ground one, the applicant complains that the Tribunal Member had failed to discuss reports by non-government organisations that were mentioned in a DFAT country information report (a copy of which is annexed to an affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor in these proceedings), wherein 31 acid attacks against women were reported in 2013 which were said to be often related to a refusal to accept a marriage proposal, and more general comments that women living in poverty are vulnerable to sexual crime. It is argued that this material would have corroborated the applicant’s claims before the Tribunal with respect to the conduct of Mr H and that the Tribunal was obliged to specifically consider it as a result of the operation of Ministerial Direction number 56, made under s.499 of the Migration Act 1958. 18.The operation of this direction has been considered by Perram J in SZTMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 150 where his Honour said at [15]: 15.It has been held that the effect of s 430(1) is that the Court is entitled to infer that a matter not mentioned in the Tribunal’s reasons was not considered by it to be material: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [69]. Therefore it is permissible for this Court to conclude from the absence of any direct consideration of either the two guidelines or the country information that the Tribunal did not consider them to be material to its decision.19.It appears to me that it is necessary to read the decision of the Tribunal as a whole, in the context of the particular case, in order to make a determination as to whether or not the Tribunal either overlooked the material or failed to have regard to it (if it were relevant in the decision-making process). One must not overlook the reality that reasons will not refer to every piece of evidence.20.It does not appear to me that the nature of the applicant’s claim of an assault and a threat of acid being thrown over her is of itself inherently implausible. If there were any doubts in that regard, the country information confirms that it would be a plausible version of events with respect to a threat. The Tribunal, however, at no point suggested that the claims given by the applicant were inherently implausible; rather, the focus of the Tribunal’s assessment was the applicant’s credibility, in order to determine whether in fact a threat had been made as alleged or whether in fact an assault had been carried out has [sic] alleged …21.When reading the material as a whole and the particular factors that the Tribunal Member relied upon to conclude that they did not accept the applicant as a credible witness, and reject her version of events, it does not seem to me that the material contained in the DFAT information bore any real significance upon that decision. Had the Tribunal expressed some doubt as to the version of events, on the basis that it was an incredible story or an unlikely version of events due to the inherent nature of the allegations, then the DFAT information may have had some relevance at that point. There is no question that if the Tribunal had concluded that the applicant had been the subject of threats of acid being thrown upon her, that the DFAT information would then have been important in assessing the extent of the risk to her as a result of that threat (in the sense that in countries where such attacks are more common the threat may create a greater risk to a person threatened when objectively assessed than in countries where attacks are less frequent, although, generally, the specific circumstances of the threat will be the more significant evidence in assessing the risk involved). 22.In this case, the applicant’s case fell at the first hurdle, in that her credibility was so poor that the Tribunal Member did not accept that the threats were made at all. In these circumstances, there was no need to go on to consider whether or not those threats presented a real risk of serious harm to her. 23.To the extent it is argued that the claim should also have been dealt with on the basis of a generalised claim that effectively, women living in Bangladesh are at real risk of serious harm because of the circumstances of the country generally, it seems to me that such a claim is of such a great level of generality that it was appropriately dealt with by the comments of the Tribunal at paragraph [46] of their reasons.24.In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the failure of the Tribunal to specifically refer to the DFAT information shows either that the Tribunal did not have any regard to it as required under Direction Number 56 – nor am I satisfied that it was of sufficient relevance that one would expect it to be specifically referred to in the reasons in the context of the particular find-finding involved in this decision. I therefore find that this ground is not made out.FCCA’s consideration of ground 2