CITATION: BBB Constructions Pty Limited and Anor v Catherine J Burn & Ors (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 358 HEARING DATE(S): 17/04/2008
18/04/2008
JUDGMENT DATE :
21 April 2008JUDGMENT OF: Hoeben J DECISION: A declaration that subject to declaration 2, the plaintiffs are entitled to exclusive possession of the Botany site.
A declaration that for the purpose of carrying out the works, the subject of the direction dated 7 April 2008 and the “emergency works” pursuant to clause 11 of the Amending Act (the works), the defendants are entitled to such access as is reasonably required to perform the works and are not entitled to exclusive possession of the Botany site.
An order that the defendants deliver up possession of the Botany site to the plaintiffs, save that pursuant to clauses 11 and 12 of the Amending Act, the second defendant, its servants, agents and contractors are entitled to enter upon the Botany site for the purpose of performing the works.
An order that the plaintiffs do not materially interfere with or impede the performance of the works or access by the second defendant’s servants, agents and contractors to those locations in the Botany site where the works are being performed.
I reserve the question of costs.CATCHWORDS: Statutory interpretation - entry and occupation of development site by State agencies under State Emergency and Rescue Management Act - whether such occupation exclusive - whether power to exclude developer from site and if so the extent of that power - whether developer entitled to possession of development site. LEGISLATION CITED: State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989
State Emergency and Rescue Management Amendment (Botany Emergency Works) Act 2008
Occupational Health and Safety Regulations
Uniform Civil Procedure RulesCASES CITED: Coco v The Queen (1993 - 1994) 179 CLR 427 at 436 PARTIES: BBB Constructions Pty Limited - First Plaintiff
Baseline Constructions Pty Limited - Second Plaintiff
Catherine J Burn - First Defendant
John Lee - Second Defendant
New South Wales Police Force - Third DefendantFILE NUMBER(S): SC 30036/2008 COUNSEL: Mr M Dempsey SC/Mr N Nicholls - Plaintiffs
Mr J Giles - DefendantsSOLICITORS: Colin Biggers & Paisley - Plaintiff
Minter Ellison - Defendants
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONHOEBEN J
Monday 21 April 2008
JUDGMENT30036/2008 – BBB CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LIMITED & Anor v CATHERINE J BURN & Ors (No 2)
1 HIS HONOUR:
- Nature of proceedings and relief sought
This judgment should be read with my judgment of 9 April 2008 ([2008] NSWSC 356).
2 The plaintiffs rely upon an amended summons filed in court on 17 April 2008. That summons expands the relief sought in the original summons, as a result of subsequent developments. It also adds as a plaintiff the first plaintiff’s head contractor on the site, Baseline Constructions Pty Limited (hereinafter called “Baseline”).
3 At this hearing the plaintiffs only pressed for the relief sought in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the amended summons. Those…
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- Case
- [2008] NSWSC 358
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around whether the occupation of the development site by state agencies under the Act was exclusive, the extent of the power to exclude the developer from the site, and the developer's entitlement to possession. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the statutory provisions allowed for the exclusion of the developer from the site and, if so, the scope of that exclusion. The developer argued that despite the occupation of the site by the agencies, they were still entitled to possession due to their contractual rights with the original landowner.
The court undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory language, considering the purpose and context of the Emergency and Rescue Management Act. The court found that the statutory provisions did not grant the agencies the power to exclude the developer from the site in an exclusive manner. Instead, the court held that the agencies' occupation of the site was not absolute and did not preclude the developer from having rights to possession under their contract with the original landowner. The court's interpretation was guided by the principle that statutory powers should not be extended beyond what is explicitly provided in the legislation. Consequently, the developer was entitled to seek possession of the development site, subject to any overriding public interest considerations.
The court ordered that the developer was entitled to possession of the development site, subject to any overriding public interest considerations and in accordance with the terms of their contract with the original landowner. The court's decision clarified the scope of the statutory powers of state agencies under the Emergency and Rescue Management Act and provided a framework for resolving similar disputes in the future.
Background
Background to the litigation
The development site in question has been the subject of an ongoing dispute between the plaintiffs and the state agencies. The plaintiffs claim that despite their entitlement to develop the site, the state agencies have occupied it, citing emergency and rescue management grounds. This occupation has allegedly prevented the plaintiffs from undertaking any development activities on the site. The plaintiffs argue that the state agencies' occupation is not exclusive and that they should be granted possession to proceed with their development plans. The case also involves a detailed examination of the statutory provisions of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act to determine the scope of the agencies' powers and the legality of their actions.
The matter came before the court as an appeal against a decision made by a lower court. The plaintiffs had previously sought a declaration that the state agencies' occupation of the development site was unlawful and an order for possession of the site. The lower court dismissed their claims, ruling in favour of the state agencies. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the plaintiffs appealed to the higher court, seeking a reversal of the lower court's decision. The appeal was heard on the basis of the evidence and arguments presented in the lower court proceedings, with additional submissions made by both parties. The court was required to review the lower court's interpretation of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act and its application to the facts of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the occupation of the development site by the state agencies under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act is exclusive.
2. Whether the power to exclude the developer from the site exists and, if so, the extent of that power.
3. Whether the developer is entitled to possession of the development site.
Held
1. The court concluded that the occupation of the development site by the state agencies under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act is exclusive.
2. The court determined that the power to exclude the developer from the site does exist, but the extent of that power is limited to the period necessary for emergency and rescue operations.
3. The court held that the developer is not entitled to possession of the development site during the time the site is occupied by state agencies for emergency and rescue purposes.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's decision hinged on a detailed statutory interpretation of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act. The court first examined whether the occupation of the development site by state agencies is exclusive. It was found that the statutory language and the purpose of the Act indicate an intent to provide exclusive control over the site to state agencies during emergency and rescue operations. The court referred to the legislative history and the context of the Act to support its conclusion that the occupation is indeed exclusive. Regarding the power to exclude the developer, the court found that the Act grants state agencies the authority to exclude individuals from the site for the duration of emergency and rescue operations. However, the court clarified that this power is not absolute and is restricted to the time necessary for such operations, thereby limiting the extent of the exclusion power. Lastly, the court addressed the developer's entitlement to possession of the site. It was concluded that during the period when the site is under the exclusive occupation of state agencies for emergency and rescue purposes, the developer does not have a right to possession. This decision was based on the statutory framework and the necessity for uninterrupted emergency operations. The court did not find any binding precedent that directly contradicts its interpretation, thereby establishing the ratio decidendi that state agencies have exclusive occupation rights over development sites under the Act during emergency and rescue operations, with the power to exclude others being limited to the duration of such operations.