FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 746
Citation: Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 746 Parties: BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD v DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737) and NIGEL HUCKSTEP File number: ACD 20 of 2010 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 6 July 2012 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Court should make blanket Freezing Orders against two respondents – relevant principles discussed – whether the mere fact that the only substantial asset of either respondent, a residential house property in Canberra, had been advertised for sale with an asking price which was at or near market value in circumstances where the respondent had moved permanently from Canberra to Western Australia in order to take up employment there constituted sufficient evidence of a threat by that respondent to dissipate his assets or to put his assets beyond the reach of the applicant as to warrant the Court’s entertaining the making of Freezing Orders Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011, Pt 7, Div 7.4 Cases cited: Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 followed
Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave GmbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 followed
Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 followedDate of hearing: 6 July 2012 Place: Canberra Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 47 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MJ Heath Solicitor for the Applicant: Goodman Law Counsel for the Respondents: Mr WL Sharwood Solicitor for the Respondents: Bradley Allen Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 20 of 2010
BETWEEN: BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
ApplicantAND: DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737)
Second RespondentNIGEL HUCKSTEP
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 JULY 2012
WHERE MADE:
CANBERRA
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 4 July 2012 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the second and fourth respondents’ costs of and incidental to that Application as taxed or agreed.
3.In the event that the amount of the said costs is not agreed within fourteen (14) days of today’s date, the said costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 20 of 2010
BETWEEN: BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
ApplicantAND: DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737)
Second RespondentNIGEL HUCKSTEP
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
6 JULY 2012
PLACE:
CANBERRA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Late in the afternoon of Tuesday last (3 July 2012), the applicant’s solicitor approached my Associate and requested that I relist this matter urgently so that the applicant could make an application for Mareva injunctive relief (now called “Freezing Orders” under the Federal Court Rules 2011: As…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 746
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In considering the matter, the Court examined the principles that guide the granting of Freezing Orders, which are discretionary and reserved for exceptional circumstances. The Court noted that such orders should be granted only when there is a significant risk that the defendant might dissipate their assets or otherwise evade judgment. The Court further noted that the orders should not be used as a means to provide security for a potential judgment or to improve the plaintiff's position in case of the defendant's insolvency.
The Court found that the evidence did not establish a sufficient threat of asset dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction to warrant the issuance of Freezing Orders. The fact that the only substantial asset, a residential property, had been listed for sale at or near market value, did not alone constitute evidence of an intent to dissipate assets or to place them beyond reach. The Court concluded that the applicants had not met the necessary threshold to justify such drastic measures.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Interlocutory Application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the Application, as taxed or agreed, with the possibility of taxation if costs were not agreed within fourteen days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 4 July 2012 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the second and fourth respondents’ costs of and incidental to that Application as taxed or agreed.
3. In the event that the amount of the said costs is not agreed within fourteen (14) days of today’s date, the said costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Court should make blanket Freezing Orders against the two respondents.
2. What relevant principles should be considered in deciding whether to make Freezing Orders.
3. Whether the mere fact that the only substantial asset of either respondent, a residential house property in Canberra, had been advertised for sale with an asking price which was at or near market value in circumstances where the respondent had moved permanently from Canberra to Western Australia in order to take up employment there constituted sufficient evidence of a threat by that respondent to dissipate his assets or to put his assets beyond the reach of the applicant as to warrant the Court’s entertaining the making of Freezing Orders.
Held
1. The Court decided to dismiss the Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant.
2. The Court determined that the applicant pay the second and fourth respondents' costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Application as taxed or agreed.
3. The Court ruled that if the amount of the costs is not agreed within fourteen days, the costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fourth respondent has MasterCard credit card debts totalling $17,856.80. He is liable to pay outstanding school fees in the amount of $12,000 to a private school in Canberra. The second respondent has MasterCard credit card debts totalling $16,412.63 as well as a tax debt of approximately $31,000. The fourth respondent estimates that the value of household furniture and electrical goods owned by him and his wife is $100,000. The evidence discloses that the only cash available to the fourth respondent, apart from his salary, is a few thousand dollars in one of the Westpac accounts. CONSIDERATION It is well established that this Court has jurisdiction to grant Freezing Orders in an appropriate case. However, the grant of such orders is an exceptional interlocutory remedy and must be granted only when the circumstances of the case justify such a significant interference in the personal affairs of a citizen. As was said by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 (BC9803225) at 9–10 in the BC report: Its function is to minimise the possibility of an unscrupulous defendant seeking to render himself or herself “Judgment proof” by taking steps to ensure that no assets within the jurisdiction can be found on the day of judgment: see generally Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 622. However it is a drastic remedy which should not be granted lightly. We agree with the comment in Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd ed § [2188] that:“It is obvious that by obtaining a Mareva injunction even an innocent plaintiff can wreak havoc with the defendant’s business, and an unscrupulous plaintiff can ruin his opponent ....”A mareva injunction is an interlocutory order which, if granted, imposes a severe restriction upon a defendant’s right to deal with his or her assets. It is granted at the suit of a plaintiff whose status as a creditor is in dispute and who need not be a secured creditor. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo, not to change it in favour of the plaintiff. The function of the order is not to “provide a plaintiff with security in advance for a judgment that he hopes to obtain and that he fears might not be satisfied; nor is it to improve the position of the plaintiff in the event of the defendant’s insolvency.” (Abella v Anderson (1987) 12 Qd R 1 at 2–3 per McPherson J) In Frigo, the Court went on to observe that the point of the exercise is not to create additional rights in favour of a putative judgment creditor, but rather to enable a court to protect its process from abuse in relation to the enforcement of its orders. A Mareva injunction is not a species of anticipatory execution nor does it provide a form of security for any judgment which may ultimately be awarded. In New South Wales, the leading case in which the principles upon which this extraordinary remedy will be granted were explained, is Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319. In that case, Gleeson CJ (when he was Chief Justice of New South Wales) at 321–322 said:The remedy is discretionary, but it has been held that, in addition to any other considerations that may be relevant in the circumstances of a particular case, as a general rule a plaintiff will need to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the defendant, and secondly, a danger that, by reason of the defendant’s absconding, or of assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with in some fashion, the plaintiff, if he succeeds, will not be able to have his judgment satisfied.