Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 746

Citation: Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 746
Parties: BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD v DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737) and NIGEL HUCKSTEP
File number: ACD 20 of 2010
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 6 July 2012
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Court should make blanket Freezing Orders against two respondents – relevant principles discussed – whether the mere fact that the only substantial asset of either respondent, a residential house property in Canberra, had been advertised for sale with an asking price which was at or near market value in circumstances where the respondent had moved permanently from Canberra to Western Australia in order to take up employment there constituted sufficient evidence of a threat by that respondent to dissipate his assets or to put his assets beyond the reach of the applicant as to warrant the Court’s entertaining the making of Freezing Orders
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011, Pt 7, Div 7.4
Cases cited: Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 followed
Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave GmbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 followed
Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 followed
Date of hearing: 6 July 2012
Place: Canberra
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MJ Heath
Solicitor for the Applicant: Goodman Law
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr WL Sharwood
Solicitor for the Respondents: Bradley Allen Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 20 of 2010

BETWEEN:

BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737)
Second Respondent

NIGEL HUCKSTEP
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JULY 2012

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 4 July 2012 be dismissed. 

2.The applicant pay the second and fourth respondents’ costs of and incidental to that Application as taxed or agreed.   

3.In the event that the amount of the said costs is not agreed within fourteen (14) days of today’s date, the said costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 20 of 2010

BETWEEN:

BAYLEY & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

DBR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 133 308 737)
Second Respondent

NIGEL HUCKSTEP
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

6 JULY 2012

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. Late in the afternoon of Tuesday last (3 July 2012), the applicant’s solicitor approached my Associate and requested that I relist this matter urgently so that the applicant could make an application for Mareva injunctive relief (now called “Freezing Orders” under the Federal Court Rules 2011: As…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 746
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd involved a dispute between the applicant and two respondents, focusing on the applicant's request for Freezing Orders to prevent the respondents from disposing of their assets. The application was dismissed by the Court. The key legal issue was whether the Court should grant the blanket Freezing Orders against the respondents, given the evidence presented regarding the respondents' financial situation and their intentions to sell their residential property.

In considering the matter, the Court examined the principles that guide the granting of Freezing Orders, which are discretionary and reserved for exceptional circumstances. The Court noted that such orders should be granted only when there is a significant risk that the defendant might dissipate their assets or otherwise evade judgment. The Court further noted that the orders should not be used as a means to provide security for a potential judgment or to improve the plaintiff's position in case of the defendant's insolvency.

The Court found that the evidence did not establish a sufficient threat of asset dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction to warrant the issuance of Freezing Orders. The fact that the only substantial asset, a residential property, had been listed for sale at or near market value, did not alone constitute evidence of an intent to dissipate assets or to place them beyond reach. The Court concluded that the applicants had not met the necessary threshold to justify such drastic measures.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Interlocutory Application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the Application, as taxed or agreed, with the possibility of taxation if costs were not agreed within fourteen days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 4 July 2012 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the second and fourth respondents’ costs of and incidental to that Application as taxed or agreed.

3. In the event that the amount of the said costs is not agreed within fourteen (14) days of today’s date, the said costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As I have indicated, the question of what (if any) pecuniary relief might be granted to the applicant has been deferred to a second stage for determination in the future. There was, however, in the evidence before me at the liability hearing some evidence of some financial loss. As I recall that material, there were instances of fees allegedly being diverted from the applicant to the second respondent, the quantum of which has not been articulated with any precision for the purposes of the present hearing, although my recollection is that it would be no more than approximately $20,000. In addition, there was material suggesting that one of the valuable contracts secured by the second respondent from Defence Signals Directorate, a client of the applicant and also of the second respondent, had a gross value in excess of $300,000. That contract was a contract which the applicant contends should have come to it. Apart from those matters, there was no evidence before me in support of the applicant’s Interlocutory Application as to what the likely quantum of the applicant’s claim will be, assuming in its favour that it is ultimately successful in the case. THE RELEVANT FACTS The catalyst for the present application was some recent internet browsing or searching carried out by Ms Bayley, who is a director of the applicant. As a result of that activity, Ms Bayley discovered that the fourth respondent and his wife had advertised their family home for sale. That home is at 9 Punch Place, Monash, ACT (the Monash property). On the evidence before me, the Monash property was put on the market by no later than 3 May 2012. The asking price for the property, according to the advertisements tendered in evidence in support of the present Interlocutory Application, was $679,000. When she discovered that the Monash property was on the market, Ms Bayley immediately contacted her solicitor and instructed him to write to the lawyers for the second and fourth respondents, seeking certain undertakings. By letter dated 29 June 2012 sent to the lawyers for the second and fourth respondents, the applicant’s solicitors sought an undertaking that the fourth respondent would not proceed with the sale of the Monash property (which I take to be an undertaking that he would withdraw the property from sale) and that, if he declined to provide such an undertaking, the applicant would apply to the Court for orders that:1.The fourth respondent be restrained from taking any steps in relation to the sale of the property situate at 9 Punch Place Monash aka Block 36 Section 38 Monash;2.Alternatively, the Fourth respondent pay into court the net proceeds of any sale of the property;3.Such further or other order; and4. Costs. I pause to observe that the Monash property is owned by the fourth respondent and his wife as joint tenants. The evidence discloses also that, until very recently, the Monash property has been the family home of the fourth respondent, his wife and their children.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Court should make blanket Freezing Orders against the two respondents.
2. What relevant principles should be considered in deciding whether to make Freezing Orders.
3. Whether the mere fact that the only substantial asset of either respondent, a residential house property in Canberra, had been advertised for sale with an asking price which was at or near market value in circumstances where the respondent had moved permanently from Canberra to Western Australia in order to take up employment there constituted sufficient evidence of a threat by that respondent to dissipate his assets or to put his assets beyond the reach of the applicant as to warrant the Court’s entertaining the making of Freezing Orders.

Held
1. The Court decided to dismiss the Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant.
2. The Court determined that the applicant pay the second and fourth respondents' costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Application as taxed or agreed.
3. The Court ruled that if the amount of the costs is not agreed within fourteen days, the costs may be taxed forthwith thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The fourth respondent has MasterCard credit card debts totalling $17,856.80. He is liable to pay outstanding school fees in the amount of $12,000 to a private school in Canberra. The second respondent has MasterCard credit card debts totalling $16,412.63 as well as a tax debt of approximately $31,000. The fourth respondent estimates that the value of household furniture and electrical goods owned by him and his wife is $100,000. The evidence discloses that the only cash available to the fourth respondent, apart from his salary, is a few thousand dollars in one of the Westpac accounts. CONSIDERATION It is well established that this Court has jurisdiction to grant Freezing Orders in an appropriate case. However, the grant of such orders is an exceptional interlocutory remedy and must be granted only when the circumstances of the case justify such a significant interference in the personal affairs of a citizen. As was said by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 (BC9803225) at 9–10 in the BC report: Its function is to minimise the possibility of an unscrupulous defendant seeking to render himself or herself “Judgment proof” by taking steps to ensure that no assets within the jurisdiction can be found on the day of judgment: see generally Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 622. However it is a drastic remedy which should not be granted lightly. We agree with the comment in Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd ed § [2188] that:“It is obvious that by obtaining a Mareva injunction even an innocent plaintiff can wreak havoc with the defendant’s business, and an unscrupulous plaintiff can ruin his opponent ....”A mareva injunction is an interlocutory order which, if granted, imposes a severe restriction upon a defendant’s right to deal with his or her assets. It is granted at the suit of a plaintiff whose status as a creditor is in dispute and who need not be a secured creditor. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo, not to change it in favour of the plaintiff. The function of the order is not to “provide a plaintiff with security in advance for a judgment that he hopes to obtain and that he fears might not be satisfied; nor is it to improve the position of the plaintiff in the event of the defendant’s insolvency.” (Abella v Anderson (1987) 12 Qd R 1 at 2–3 per McPherson J) In Frigo, the Court went on to observe that the point of the exercise is not to create additional rights in favour of a putative judgment creditor, but rather to enable a court to protect its process from abuse in relation to the enforcement of its orders. A Mareva injunction is not a species of anticipatory execution nor does it provide a form of security for any judgment which may ultimately be awarded. In New South Wales, the leading case in which the principles upon which this extraordinary remedy will be granted were explained, is Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319. In that case, Gleeson CJ (when he was Chief Justice of New South Wales) at 321–322 said:The remedy is discretionary, but it has been held that, in addition to any other considerations that may be relevant in the circumstances of a particular case, as a general rule a plaintiff will need to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the defendant, and secondly, a danger that, by reason of the defendant’s absconding, or of assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with in some fashion, the plaintiff, if he succeeds, will not be able to have his judgment satisfied.