Batros and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 519 (22 July 2016)
Division
TAXATION & COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s)
2016/1384
Re
Ryan Anthony Batros
APPLICANT
And
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal The Hon. D Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
Date 22 July 2016 Place Sydney The Tribunal refuses the Applicant’s application under section 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
.............................[sgd]...........................................
The Hon. D Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of decision – banning order prohibiting Applicant from providing any financial services – prospects of success of substantive application – financial hardship caused to Applicant – public interest – application refused
LEGISLATION
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 920A, 920B, 1043K
CASES
Re Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798
Re YFFM and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2010] AATA 340
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Another (2009) 181 FCR 130Re Oaklands and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 199
REASONS FOR DECISION
The Hon. D Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
22 July 2016
FACTS
Before the Tribunal is a request for a stay order brought by the Applicant pursuant to section 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“the AAT Act”). The application for the stay was filed on 17 March 2016 and is made in respect of a decision made by the Respondent on 8 March 2016. Such decision found that the Applicant had breached the provisions of section 1043A(1)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”) because of insider trading. In consequence of such finding, a banning order was made against the Applicant pursuant to ss 920A(1) and 920B(2) of the Corporations Act, prohibiting him from providing any financial services for a period of five years.
In reaching this decision, the delegate found:
(a)At all relevant times, ordinary shares in Metals of Africa Limited (“Metals of Africa”) (“the MTA”) and company options in Metals of Africa (“the MTAO”) were Division 3 financial products to which the insider trading prohibitions as found in Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act applied;
(b)The information contained in the announcement dated 3 September 2014 to the ASX titled “Placement and rights issue to raise over $5M” (“the announcement”) would have been expected to, and did in fact, have an effect on the price and the value of the MTA and the MTAO and this was “material” information to Metals of Africa;
(c)There was no information available in the market about a proposed capital raising for Metals of Africa until the announcement;
(d)This information was not generally available at the time the Applicant executed orders to sell MTA and MTAO on 25 and 26 August 2014 or until the announcement; and
(e)It therefore followed that the information was “inside information” as defined in sections 1042A, 1042C and 1042D and for the purposes of section 10443A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act.
The delegate was satisfied that:
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- Case
- [2016] AATA 519
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether to exercise its discretion to grant a stay of the banning order. This involved considering the prospects of success of Mr. Batros's substantive application, the financial hardship he claimed to be suffering, and the public interest. The Tribunal noted that the lodging of an application for review does not automatically operate as a stay.
In its reasoning, the Tribunal found that the material before it did not establish that a stay was warranted. It observed that the conduct under review, which appeared to involve the execution of trades while possessing non-public information despite being put on notice by Morgans, suggested deliberate action. The Tribunal also found that the claimed financial hardship was unsubstantiated by any financial data, making it impossible to conclude that a stay was essential for Mr. Batros's wellbeing. Crucially, the Tribunal weighed these factors against the strong public interest in prohibiting insider trading and protecting the public from the misuse of confidential information for private gain, noting the heavy onus on an applicant to demonstrate that their interests outweigh those of the public.
Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that Mr. Batros had not discharged the onus of proving that a stay was warranted and that it was unable to form the opinion that granting a stay would be desirable, taking into account the interests of any person who might be affected by the review. Accordingly, the Tribunal refused the application for a stay of the banning order. The Tribunal also declined to make an order for confidentiality regarding the proceedings, finding no basis for such an order in the public interest, and directed the parties to confer on scheduling an early hearing for the substantive review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Applying these principles, the Tribunal must consider the material placed before it and the circumstances relied upon by the Applicant as justifying a stay. The mere fact of lodging an application for review does not operate as a stay, as is well recognised.CONSIDERATION In the Tribunal’s consideration, the material relied upon by the Applicant in support of the stay falls short of establishing that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion in his favour. The decision under review raises matters which are troubling. For example it appears that even after the Applicant was clearly placed on notice by Morgans of the trades which caused it concern, the Applicant continued to effect trades whilst possessing knowledge which was not available to the general public. Such a finding suggests that the conduct engaged in was deliberate and that it was perpetrated in the full knowledge of the disapproval of Morgans. Accordingly, on the material presently available to the Tribunal, the Applicant cannot, at least in respect of these trades, rely upon the fact that he was awaiting instruction or advice from Morgans as to whether the trades could be executed. It further appears from the available material that such trades were executed by the Applicant resulting directly from his conduct, and that any involvement by Morgans’ computer system was merely implementing the Applicant’s instructions. As such, the defence that Morgans was itself executing the orders cannot be sustained. The assertion by the Applicant that he was in some doubt as to whether the orders could be executed was raised before the delegate. Such claim was rejected by the delegate because of the knowledge of the Applicant resulting from his involvement in the markets. On this application the Tribunal has no further material before it to indicate that the delegates’ finding was erroneous. The hardship claimed by the Applicant is not supported by any financial data. There is, for example, no evidence put forward of whether there is employment available for the Applicant, nor of his means, his assets or his income. Accordingly the Tribunal is unable to conclude that a stay is essential for the wellbeing of the Applicant. Against these factors the Tribunal must weigh up the provisions of the Corporations Act which prohibit insider trading. The banning order has been imposed for the protection of the public, who has a direct interest in ensuring that knowledge obtained and known by insiders only is not utilised for private gain at their expense. Accordingly, there is a very heavy onus on an applicant for a stay to show that their interests outweigh the interests of the public.DECISION The Applicant bears the onus of proving, by satisfying the Tribunal, that a stay is warranted: see Re Oaklands and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 199. Following consideration of the factors outlined in Re Scott, in this application the Tribunal finds that the Applicant has not discharged the burden of proof. Before the Tribunal grants a stay order, it must have formed the opinion that the making of such order “is desirable…taking into account the interests of any person who may be affected by the review”: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130. The Tribunal is unable to form such a conclusion. Accordingly, the Tribunal refuses the Applicant’s application for a stay of the decision to impose a banning order.OTHER MATTERS