Bashour v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shah v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 183

Appeal from: Shah & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1369
File number: VID 769 of 2016
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2017
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 359A, 360, 368, 424A, 425, 430

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, cl 572.223(1)(a)

Cases cited:

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYZA [2013] FCA 572

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 29 November 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Appellants: The first appellant appeared in person on behalf of herself and the second appellant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 769 of 2016
BETWEEN:

VAISHALI VIKAS SHAH

First Appellant

VIKAS SHAH

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSHINSKY J:

Background

  1. The first appellant, a citizen of India, applied on 7 May 2013 for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa.  The second appellant, the first appellant’s husband, was a dependant applicant for such a visa.

  2. On 7 November 2013, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) decided to refuse the grant of such a visa to the first appellant and, consequently, to the second appellant.

  3. The appellants applied to the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) for review of the delegate’s decision.

  4. On 2 September 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the appellants inviting them to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal. The letter requested the appellants to provide certain information, including an “explanation of any gaps in your enrolment/s and any documentary evidence relevant to your explanation”. The letter stated that the Tribunal would “assess whether you intend genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily as required by cl 572.223(1)(a) of the Migration Regulations”. After stating that a direction from the Minister known as Direction No. 53 was relevant to this requirement, and noting that a copy of the Direction was attached, the letter requested the appellants to provide “a written statement addressing the issue of whether you are a genuine temporary entrant by referring to Direction No. 53”.

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bashour v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bashour v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, the Federal Court considered an appeal against a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The central issue before the court was whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error by not referring to specific pieces of evidence presented by the appellants during their visa cancellation review. The court was tasked with determining if the AAT's failure to mention particular aspects of the evidence constituted a jurisdictional error, and if not, whether the appeal should be dismissed. Additionally, the court examined whether the evidence presented by the appellants was indeed material to the AAT's decision-making process.

The court held that the AAT was not required to refer to every piece of evidence presented by the appellants, as it was only obligated to address the evidence that was material to its decision. The court found that the evidence in question, concerning the appellants' future entitlement to Workcover payments if they returned to India, was not material to the AAT's decision. Consequently, the AAT's failure to refer to this specific aspect of the evidence did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The court further noted that the AAT had indeed considered the appellants' evidence about Workcover and medical expenses, as evidenced by the AAT's written reasons. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the court ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs.

The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of the Migration Act, specifically section 368, which does not mandate the AAT to refer to each piece of evidence presented. Instead, the AAT is only required to address material evidence in its findings. The court referenced the decision in Yusuf, which established that the AAT need not detail every piece of evidence but only those that are material. This legal principle supported the court's conclusion that the AAT's decision was correct, and the appeal was without merit. The court's final order dismissed the appeal and mandated that the appellants pay the respondent's costs, as there was no justification for deviating from this standard practice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, no jurisdictional error is established by the Tribunal not raising the matters referred to in paragraphs (b) to (f) of the particulars under the second ground. The primary judge was correct to reject the corresponding ground before the Federal Circuit Court at [35]-[50] of the reasons.Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal is to be dismissed. There is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event. Accordingly, there will also be an order that the appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first of these factors is particularly important. Section 368 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) did not require the Tribunal to refer to each item of evidence that the first appellant gave (written or oral). The Tribunal was only required to set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision which it made and to the reasons it had for reaching that decision: see, in relation to s 430 of the Migration Act, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 (Yusuf) at [68] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Accordingly, it does not follow from any failure by the Tribunal to refer to any particular strand of the first appellant’s evidence about Workcover that the Tribunal did not in fact consider that evidence. The evidence upon which the appellants rely comprised statements made by the first appellant in response to questions asked by the Tribunal member. The relevant part of the transcript is set out in the Federal Circuit Court reasons at [20]. The Tribunal member asked the first appellant what would happen to her medical treatment and compensation if she were to return to India. In response, the first appellant said that the payments for compensation had stopped about a year earlier and that she had received notice that the payments for medical expenses would stop from 16 October 2014 (a matter of days after the Tribunal hearing). The appellants’ argument (at least before the primary judge) sought to characterise this evidence as a “claim” (see Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136 at [42] per Allsop J (as his Honour then was)) as to why she did not return to India for a period in the past (November 2013 to October 2014). But, in fact, the relevant evidence was merely a response to questions asked by the Tribunal as to what would happen in the future if she were to return to India. In response, the first appellant said that Workcover had ceased (or were ceasing) her payments anyway. In light of the above, it is to be inferred that the Tribunal did not consider the part of the evidence relied on by the appellants (namely, that the first appellant thought that Workcover would stop paying her if she were to return to India in the future) to be material to its decision. For this reason, the Tribunal was not required to refer to this matter in its findings: Yusuf. Further and in any event, the Tribunal specifically referred to the first appellant’s evidence about Workcover and her medical expenses (see the Tribunal’s reasons at [8](c), [9], [10](h)-(k), [13](t)). In these circumstances, it is improbable that the Tribunal did not consider the first appellant’s evidence that Workcover would stop paying her if she were to return to India. Finally, as the primary judge held at [31] of the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons, the relevant exchange between the Tribunal member and the appellant evidenced on the transcript (set out in the reasons of the primary judge) did not represent a “claim”; it was no more than an inquiry initiated by the Tribunal member and responded to by the first appellant, with such response not being chronologically relevant to the issue.