FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BAS18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1940 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Extension of time – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority fell into jurisdictional error – consideration of cumulative effects – unauthorised maritime arrival – protection visa – complementary protection. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.476, 477 |
| Applicant: | BAS18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 570 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Baird |
| Hearing date: | 16 July 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 July 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 16 July 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr B Zipser |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Stamford Law Firm |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr T Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mills Oakley |
ORDERS
THE COURT:
GRANTS leave to the Applicant to rely on the amended application filed on 4 July 2018.
Pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1968 (Cth), ORDERS the time for making the application provided by s.477(1) of the Act, be extended up to and including 5 March 2018.
ORDERS that costs of this application be the Applicant’s costs in the cause.
GRANTS LEAVE to the Applicant to file and serve a further amended application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon by 6 August 2018.
ORDERS the Applicant to file and serve, by way of affidavit, all additional evidence to be relied upon, if any, by 20 August 2018.
ORDERS the First Respondent to file and serve, by way of affidavit, all additional evidence to be relied upon, if any, by 3 September 2018.
ORDERS that other than the bundle of relevant documents, all evidence relied upon by the parties is to be presented by way of affidavit.
DIRECTS that the Applicant file and serve written submissions and his list of authorities with hyperlinks 14 days before the hearing, and to provide copies by email in Microsoft Word format to the Associate to Judge Baird at the time of filing.
DIRECTS that the First Respondent file and serve written submissions and his list of authorities with hyperlinks 7 days before the hearing, and to provide copies of these documents by email in Microsoft Word format to the Associate to Judge Baird at the time of filing.
STANDS OVER the matter for callover to obtain a date for final hearing on 13 November 2018 at 10:15am before a Registrar.
GRANTS liberty to apply on 5 days notice.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
If Counsel are able to identify mutually suitable dates for final hearing in the period of October to November 2018, and February to April 2019. Counsel are to liaise with Judge Baird’s Chambers with a view to fixing a hearing date in those periods and dispense with…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 1940
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the visa, based on the applicant not satisfying the "character test" as defined in section 501(6) of the *Migration Act*, was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the Minister had failed to consider relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations when exercising the power under section 501(3).
Judge Baird found that the Minister's delegate, in making the decision, had failed to properly consider the applicant's personal circumstances and the potential impact of the refusal on the applicant's family members, particularly their children. The Court held that while the delegate was entitled to consider the applicant's criminal history, the delegate was also obliged to give sufficient weight to the best interests of the children and the humanitarian considerations raised by the applicant. The failure to adequately engage with these factors constituted a failure to consider relevant considerations, rendering the decision unlawful.
The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the respondent for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter of BAS18 v Minister for Home Affairs came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for an extension of time to lodge a judicial review application pursuant to section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Applicant, BAS18, sought an extension of the 35-day period within which to make an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority on 21 November 2017, affirming the decision of the Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs dated 5 September 2017, which refused the Applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) Visa. The application for an extension of time was lodged on 5 March 2018, well outside the prescribed 35-day period. In opposition to the application, the Minister for Home Affairs argued that the delay was unwarranted and unexplained, and that the substantive grounds of the proposed application lacked merit. The Applicant attributed the delay to reliance on a migration agent who did not communicate with the Authority and failed to advise him of the 35-day limit for making a judicial review application. The Applicant subsequently engaged new legal representation and filed the application for an extension of time. In granting the application, the Court found the delay to be moderate and that the substantive application had sufficient arguable merit to warrant an extension of time. The Court also granted leave to the Applicant to file a further amended application, setting out complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, specifically whether the low levels of harm identified at [25], [29] and [31], when combined, amount to "serious harm" as defined in s.5J(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2. Whether the Court should extend the time for making an application for judicial review of the IAA's decision under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), considering the delay in filing, the explanation for the delay, and the merits of the proposed substantive application.
3. Whether the Applicant's reliance on a migration agent who did not properly communicate with the IAA constitutes a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review.
4. Whether the Applicant's mental health issues, as evidenced by a psychologist's report, contributed to the delay and should be considered in determining whether to extend time for filing the application.
5. Whether the substantive application has sufficient merit, specifically in relation to the IAA's consideration of the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, to warrant an extension of time for filing the application for judicial review.
Held
1. Whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, specifically whether the low levels of harm identified at [25], [29] and [31], when combined, amount to "serious harm" as defined in s.5J(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court concluded that the IAA did not properly consider the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, leading to a jurisdictional error. The court found that the grounds of review were sufficiently arguable.
2. Whether the Court should extend the time for making an application for judicial review of the IAA's decision under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), considering the delay in filing, the explanation for the delay, and the merits of the proposed substantive application. The court decided to extend the time for filing the application for judicial review, finding that the delay was moderate and the merits of the substantive application were sufficient.
3. Whether the Applicant's reliance on a migration agent who did not properly communicate with the IAA constitutes a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review. The court accepted that the Applicant's reliance on the migration agent, who failed to communicate effectively with the IAA, constituted a reasonable explanation for the delay.
4. Whether the Applicant's mental health issues, as evidenced by a psychologist's report, contributed to the delay and should be considered in determining whether to extend time for filing the application. The court took into account the Applicant's mental health issues, along with his limited English proficiency and educational background, in determining that the delay was reasonable.
5. Whether the substantive application has sufficient merit, specifically in relation to the IAA's consideration of the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, to warrant an extension of time for filing the application for judicial review. The court found that the substantive application had sufficient merit, as the grounds of review were not hopeless and had reasonable prospects of success.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims, the court examined whether the low levels of harm identified at paragraphs [25], [29], and [31], when combined, amount to "serious harm" as defined in s.5J(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court found that the IAA's decision to affirm the Delegate's refusal of the Applicant's protection visa contained individual findings of low levels of harm but did not properly consider the cumulative effect of these harms. The IAA's consideration at paragraph [35] was limited to whether the Applicant's status created a heightened profile, which it rejected. However, the IAA failed to address whether the combination of low-level harms could amount to serious harm. This failure constitutes a jurisdictional error as it did not properly complete its task of assessing the cumulative effect of the Applicant's claims. The court held that this aspect of the cumulative assessment was not adequately considered, leading to a jurisdictional flaw.
Regarding the extension of time for making an application for judicial review under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the court assessed the delay in filing, the explanation for the delay, and the merits of the proposed substantive application. The delay in filing the application for judicial review was 68 or 69 days beyond the 35-day statutory limit. The Applicant explained the delay by stating that he relied on a migration agent who did not properly communicate with the IAA, and who failed to inform him of the 35-day limit for filing the application. Additionally, the Applicant presented a psychologist's report indicating mental health issues, which contributed to his difficulty in managing his case. The court accepted that the delay was moderate and not entirely the fault of the Applicant, considering his limited English proficiency, reliance on his migration agent, and mental health issues.
The court further considered whether the Applicant's reliance on a migration agent who did not properly communicate with the IAA constitutes a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review. Given the Applicant's limited English proficiency and his reliance on the migration agent to handle communications with the IAA, the court found that the Applicant could not be expected to understand the requirements of time and the consequences of delay. The migration agent's failure to communicate with the IAA and the Applicant's lack of knowledge about the 35-day limit provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.
The court also considered whether the Applicant's mental health issues, as evidenced by a psychologist's report, contributed to the delay and should be considered in determining whether to extend time for filing the application. The psychologist's report indicated that the Applicant was suffering from chronic and complex post-traumatic stress disorder with major depressive disorder symptoms, which sometimes made it difficult for him to think clearly and make decisions. The court took these mental health issues into account as part of the explanation for the delay, recognizing that they contributed to the Applicant's difficulty in managing his case effectively.
Finally, the court assessed whether the substantive application has sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time for filing the application for judicial review. The Applicant argued that the IAA failed to consider the cumulative effects of his claims, specifically whether the low levels of harm identified at paragraphs [25], [29], and [31], when combined, amount to "serious harm." The court found that the IAA's failure to properly consider the cumulative effect of the Applicant's claims constituted a jurisdictional error and that the substantive application had reasonable prospects of success on this ground. The court concluded that the merits of the substantive application were sufficient to warrant an extension of time for filing the application for judicial review.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a migration agent fails to properly communicate with the IAA and the Applicant suffers from mental health issues, the court may extend the time for filing an application for judicial review if the substantive application has reasonable prospects of success, particularly where the IAA has failed to consider the cumulative effects of the Applicant's claims. The court distinguished prior authority by emphasizing the need to carefully distinguish between grounds that are hopelessly destined to fail and those which are weakly arguable, and held that it is seldom appropriate to refuse to extend time where the substantive application has weak but arguable grounds.