Bartley & Anor v Myers & Ors No. Scciv-00-978

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BARTLEY & ANOR V MYERS & ORS
[2002] SASC 24

Full Court: Prior, Lander and Wicks JJ

  1. PRIOR J:              I agree with the reasons given by Lander J and with the orders he proposes.

  2. LANDER J.           

    Introduction

  3. This is an appeal and cross appeal.  The appellants were two of three defendants in proceedings brought by the respondents/plaintiffs.  The cross appellants are the plaintiffs.  I will refer to the parties as they were described in the court below.

  4. The first plaintiff brought this action in her own right.  She is also the sole director of the second plaintiff, which is the trustee of the Susan Myers Family Trust pursuant to a Deed of Settlement executed on or about 28 April 1997.  For all intents and purposes the first plaintiff controls the second plaintiff.  The second plaintiff was created for the purpose of conducting the business which was acquired by the first plaintiff from the first defendant and which is the subject matter of this litigation.  The first defendant is Evelyn Neis.  She is not an appellant to these proceedings.  She is, however, a respondent to the cross appeal brought by the plaintiffs.  She did not appear on this appeal.  However, in respect of the ground of appeal raised against her the second and third defendants had a like interest.  In the end result her non appearance did not disadvantage her.  The second defendant has changed his name to Bartley.  He was the first defendant’s and the plaintiffs’ accountant.  He conducted his public accountancy practice through the third defendant Unite Pty Ltd (Unite).

  5. During both the trial and the appeal the second and third defendants were treated compendiously. 

  6. The defendants joined a third party, Australasian Law Chambers Pty Ltd, which carries on a law practice under the name of Winters.  Those third party proceedings were discontinued before the trial and are unimportant in a consideration of this matter.

    The Agreements

  7. The brief facts are these.  The first plaintiff agreed to purchase from the first defendant and the first defendant agreed to sell to the first plaintiff for a consideration of $125,000:

    1The first defendant’s stock in trade in a business known as Evelyn Neis Creations;

    2the first defendant’s debtors;

    and

    3a franchise to carry on a business in the name of Evelyn Neis Creation pursuant to a ‘Franchise Agreement’.

  8. The contract (the Sale of Assets Agreement) was in writing and was executed on 9 April 1997 but bears the date 10 April 1997.

  9. On that latter date the first plaintiff paid to the first defendant the sum of $10,000 by way of deposit.

  10. The first plaintiff and the first defendant entered into a second agreement (the Fit-Out Agreement), which was also in writing and was executed on 12 April 1997 whereby the first defendant sold to the first plaintiff fixtures and fittings situated within a shop at Shop 28, Adelaide Arcade, Adelaide.

  11. On 16 April 1997, the first plaintiff and the first defendant executed a third written agreement (the Franchise Agreement)…

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Details
Case
[2002] SASC 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bartley & Anor v Myers & Ors No. Scciv-00-978, the central dispute involves the sale of a women’s clothing business, Evelyn Neis Creations, and the subsequent claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The primary parties in this case are the plaintiffs, Bartley and another, and the defendants, Myers and others. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in fraudulent activities during the sale of the business, including withholding crucial financial information and misrepresenting the business's financial health. The court was tasked with determining whether these allegations were substantiated and, if so, what remedies should be applied.

The legal issues before the court encompassed several key areas. Firstly, it was necessary to ascertain whether the defendants had indeed committed fraud by withholding essential financial documents and information. Secondly, the court had to decide if the appointment of Bartley as the defendant's accountant post-sale constituted a conflict of interest or a breach of fiduciary duty. Additionally, the court needed to evaluate the reliability of the testimonies provided by the parties and the documentary evidence tendered in court.

In examining the evidence, the court found that the contemporaneous documents provided a more reliable basis for determining the facts of the case than the testimonies of the parties, who were deemed unreliable. The court noted that the Trial Judge had extensively reviewed the facts and found that the defendants had indeed withheld crucial financial information and misrepresented the financial state of the business. The appointment of Bartley as an accountant after the sale was also scrutinized, and the court found that it was an attempt to obscure the true financial condition of the business. The court concluded that the defendants’ actions amounted to fraud and a breach of fiduciary duty.

The court’s reasoning and findings led to the conclusion that the defendants were liable for their fraudulent actions and breach of fiduciary duty. The final orders of the court would address the remedies available to the plaintiffs, which could include compensation for the losses suffered due to the fraudulent sale, as well as any other appropriate remedies deemed necessary to address the breach of fiduciary duty.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

His Honour was right, in my opinion, to proceed upon the basis that none of the parties was particularly reliable. The better evidence to rely upon for a determination of the issues in the case was contained in the exhibits which were tendered by the various parties.The Facts I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Wicks J. His Honour has dealt extensively with the facts. I shall merely mention those facts which appear to me to be more important. The first defendant carried on the business of designing, manufacturing and selling women’s clothing under the label of Evelyn Neis Creations. She carried on that business from both her premises at North Terrace and at Shop 28, Adelaide Arcade. The business sold only a few garments each week. The business targeted the more affluent market. Most of the clothing which she sold had a mark up of 100% over wholesale price. The first plaintiff and the first defendant were known to each other. Originally the first plaintiff was a customer of the first defendant. In due course she became an employee. The Trial Judge found that by early 1997 the first defendant was not in a good financial position. There are a number of factors which caused her then poor financial position, which do not need to be examined. On or about 21 March the first defendant rang the first plaintiff to ascertain her interest in purchasing the business of the shop. The plaintiff was keen to do so and immediately contacted her bankers, the ANZ Bank. The next day the first plaintiff and the first defendant met to discuss the terms of any purchase. The first defendant suggested that the plaintiff could take up a new lease on the shop at Adelaide Arcade which was due to expire shortly. She suggested the first plaintiff should sell only garments supplied by the first defendant on a franchise arrangement. It was suggested by the first defendant that the first plaintiff should buy the existing stock at half its retail price, and that she should assume the existing lay-by arrangements. The first defendant told the first plaintiff she did not seek any payment for goodwill. The first defendant required the transaction to be completed by 15 April. On Monday 24 March the first plaintiff met with Mr Bartsch at the ANZ Bank. Whilst the first plaintiff had sufficient funds to meet the purchase price which had been suggested on the Saturday she wished to retain her investments for income purposes. She believed that she would be better off to borrow the purchase price and retain her investments. The manager of the ANZ Bank told the first plaintiff that he would need to sight a Form 2 under the Land and Business (Sale and Conveyancing) Act 1994 and the financial statements for the business over the three preceding years. On the same day the first plaintiff telephoned her accountant. He also told her that she needed a Form 2. The first plaintiff then spoke to the first defendant seeking a Form 2 and the previous three financial year’s statements. The first defendant in turn instructed the second defendant to provide those documents and any other information to the first plaintiff. The second defendant had been the first defendant’s accountant for some years.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to the first finding, I am of the view that Mr Bartley was and Unite were appointed Ms Myers’ accountants on 7 April 1997. I will now deal with the evidence relating to that appointment.Evidence as to date of appointment of Mr Bartley as accountant of Ms Myers In cross-examination by counsel on behalf of Ms Neis, Ms Myers gave the following evidence, commencing on p 175 of the transcript:"QWhen did you first meet, actually physically meet, Mr Popowski [Bartley].AOn Monday, 7 April 1997.QThat was at the ANZ Bank.ANo, that was at the Augusta Coffee Shop.QAt that meeting was Mr Popowski [Bartley], my client and yourself.AThat’s correct.QWho arranged for Mr Popowsky[sic] [Bartley] to be present at that meeting.AEvelyn Neis.QOn your understanding, why was he at that meeting.AI was supposed to originally be meeting Mr Popowsky[sic] [Bartley] on Friday, 4 April. He was unable to keep that meeting. Therefore, the next possible time for him to meet with Evelyn and myself was on the Monday, the 7th....Q... When you met Mr Popowsky[sic] [Bartley] on 7 April, did you engage him as your accountant.AOn that day, yes, in a roundabout way, yes.QCan you explain to me the roundabout way.AAfter we had gone through all of the business that Evelyn and he wanted to talk about, and him stating that he would come to the bank with me to produce the documents that the bank required for me to be able to get a loan to purchase the business, … I told him that I had not done my 1996 tax return and that, seeing he had been Evelyn’s accountant for approximately 15 years, and he knew the business so well, would he continue and act for me, because he knew the business, rather than me going on to Mr Wiadrowski, who would have been coming into a completely new aspect. I thought it was best to stay with the same accountant, and he agreed with me.QThis is on 7 April.AYes.QBefore you signed any contract documents regarding this transaction.AThat’s correct.QDid you, at that time apprehend a danger in having the same accountant as the person you were about to enter a transaction with.ANo, I never thought about it that way. I just thought that he would act as my accountant for the business I was purchasing because he was so familiar with it. …QWhen you met him in the morning at the coffee shop, do you remember roughly what time that was.AIt would have been later in the morning, possibly 11, but I’m not positive of the time.QIn any event, it was not first thing in the morning.ANo, it wasn’t first thing.QWhat time was your appointment at the bank.A2 p.m.QWhen you met Mr Popowsky[sic] [Bartley] at, say, around 11 a.m.AYes.QHad you made arrangements with him for him to go to the bank with you at 2 o’clock.AI had not made any arrangements, no.QYou just asked him if he would come along.ANo, I didn’t ask him. He told me he would.QHe volunteered to come along.AThat’s right. …QAt 2 o’clock that afternoon, on the 7th, the Monday, you go to the bank and, at the bank you meet with Mr Popowsky[sic] [Bartley] and Mr Bartsch.AYes."

Decision

Reasons for decision

LANDER J
Whilst I agree that the Trial Judge should not have arrived at the conclusion on the evidence as it stands, in my opinion, that error does not in any way invalidate His Honour’s conclusions.This Court’s Approach To The Judge’s Conclusions On The Witnesses His Honour has expressed very strong views on the truthfulness and reliability of the evidence of each of the parties to the action. He had a significant advantage not enjoyed by this Court. He heard and saw the parties give evidence. In Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479 Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:“More than once in recent years this Court has pointed out that a finding of fact by a trial judge, based on the credibility of a witness, is not to be set aside because an appellate court thinks that the probabilities of the case are against - even strongly against - that finding of fact. If the trial judge’s finding depends to any substantial degree on the credibility of the witness, the finding must stand unless it can be shown that the trial judge “has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage” or has acted on evidence which was “inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence” or which was “glaringly improbable.” ” In the same case Dean and Dawson JJ said at 480:“In a case where it appears that a challenged finding of fact has, to a significant extent, been based on the trial judge’s observations of the demeanour of the witnesses, the members of an appellate court are inevitably placed in a position of real disadvantage compared with the trial judge.” However their Honours went on to say that even in such a case, the court cannot abdicate its responsibility to assess the evidence for itself. More recently in State Rail Authority Of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1999) 160 ALR 588 at 610 Kirby J said:“Appellate Judges must necessarily perform their statutory function. They must rehear the matter and form their own conclusions on the evidence recorded at the trial. Rising to their duty they must condescend to a re-examination of the facts, if their statutory charter so requires or permits. Yet that re-examination obliges appellate judges to take into account, and give full weight to, the advantages which the trial judge had and which, in the nature of their different functions and purpose, they may not have.” His Honour went on to discuss the circumstances where credibility findings do not conclude the appeal in the appellate Court. This is one of those cases where, in my opinion, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the Trial Judge to determine the honesty and reliability of the parties. The Trial Judge did not rely upon the demeanour of the parties in assessing their credibility or reliability. His Honour determined those matters against objective and incontrovertible evidence. That evidence was contained in contemporaneous documents which were prepared in circumstances where no-one suspected that litigation would take place. In those circumstances one can usually expect that those contemporaneous documents will speak honestly of the facts which are contained in the documents.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LANDER J