Barrett v City of Cockburn

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION:   BARRETT -v- CITY OF COCKBURN [2023] WASC 384

CORAM:   VANDONGEN J

HEARD:   15 MAY 2023

DELIVERED          :   4 OCTOBER 2023

PUBLISHED           :   4 OCTOBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1037 of 2022

BETWEEN:   DONALD GRAHAM BARRETT

Appellant

AND

CITY OF COCKBURN

Respondent


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Single judge appeal - Application for extension of time within which to appeal

Local law - Validity - Whether local government has power to make law regulating parking and stopping of vehicles on roads - Inconsistency with state government laws

Criminal law - Criminal procedure - Validity of infringement notice - Validity of certificate of authority for an authorised person issued pursuant to s 9.10 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) - Relevance to issues on appeal

Criminal law - Criminal procedure - Validity of prosecution notice - Whether notice signed by a person authorised to commence that prosecution - Whether prosecution validly commenced - Whether alleged offence adequately described

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Procedural fairness - Whether appellant not afforded the right to properly represent himself pursuant to s 144(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) - Whether substantial miscarriage of justice occurred

Local law - Parking infringement - Validity of no parking signs - Whether local government had passed a resolution to erect signs - Whether evidence supported appellant's assertions - Whether substantial miscarriage of justice occurred

Criminal law - Evidence and proof - Validity of certificate tendered pursuant to s 9.41(3) of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) - Whether certain items of evidence could be tendered without the need for a witness to be called

Criminal law - Criminal procedure - Failure to produce documents in answer to summons or as directed - Whether substantial miscarriage of justice occurred

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Whether verdicts of guilty unreasonable or unable to be supported

Practice and procedure - Costs - Whether magistrate erred by exercising discretion in awarding costs - Proportionality

Legislation:

City of Cockburn (Local Government Act) Local Laws 2000
City of Cockburn Parking & Parking Facilities Local Law 2007
Courts and Tribunals (Electronic Process Facilitation) Act 2013 (WA)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Main Roads Act 1930 (WA)
Public Works Act 1902 (WA)
Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA)
Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA)

Result:

Application for extension of time within which to appeal against conviction refused
Application for extension of time within which to appeal against sentence refused
Application for extension of time within which to appeal against costs order allowed
Leave to appeal against costs order allowed and appeal against costs order allowed
Costs order set aside and new costs order substituted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
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Details
Case
[2023] WASC 384
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Donald Graham Barrett, sought leave to appeal against judgments of conviction that were entered against him in the Magistrates Court in Fremantle on 24 November 2020, in relation to one charge of parking on a portion of a thoroughfare to which a no parking sign applied, contrary to cl 26(1)(e) of the City of Cockburn Parking & Parking Facilities Law 2007 (Parking Law) (Charge 1), and one charge of driving across a footpath, contrary to s 9.4(b) and s 12.24 of the City of Cockburn (Local Government Act) Local Laws 2000 (Local Laws) (Charge 2). The appellant also sought leave to appeal against fines of $200 imposed in respect of each of those offences and against an order made that he pay the respondent's costs fixed at $8,074. The appeal notice was filed in this court on 20 April 2022, almost 16 months after the judgments of conviction were entered and sentence was imposed. Accordingly, the appellant requires an extension of time within which to appeal. Although it is very clear that the appellant feels aggrieved, and not only because he was convicted of these offences, it is a great pity that so much time and effort has been expended on a matter that resulted in a total of $400 in fines, particularly when the appellant had the option of dealing with the matter by paying a modified penalty of $100.

The appeal was listed for directions on 20 February 2023. The purpose of the directions hearing was to see whether the appellant was able to clarify his grounds of appeal, and the contentions made in support of those grounds. It was pointed out to the appellant that because of the sheer volume of material that he sought to rely on there was a risk that the points that he wished to make on the appeal might not be properly identified. Following the directions hearing, my associate provided the parties with a document setting out, in summary form, the grounds of appeal that the court understood the appellant wished to argue. After considering the document the appellant then made some amendments, added some comments, returned it to the court and provided a copy to the respondent. The court has proceeded on the basis that this document, a copy of which appears as Annexure 1 to these reasons, sets out all the grounds of appeal that the appellant wishes to rely on (Grounds of Appeal).

The appellant requires an extension of time within which to appeal. As I have already observed, the appellant filed his notice of appeal almost 16 months out of time. The principles to be applied in relation to a grant of an extension of time within which to appeal are well established. Generally, the following factors are to be considered in deciding whether to exercise the discretion to extend time, although they are not exhaustive: the nature and extent of the delay; the reasons for delay; the proposed grounds of appeal and their merit; the prejudice to the applicant if an extension of time is not granted, and the prejudice (if any) to the respondent if an extension of time is granted. Further, where there has been a lengthy delay, an appellant must show exceptional circumstances before an extension of time for leave to appeal against conviction will be granted, unless it can be shown that there will be a miscarriage of justice if an extension is not granted. There is no question that there has been a very lengthy delay in the commencement of this appeal. In my view, that delay is not adequately explained. I agree with the respondent's submission that while the appellant may have been struggling with several psychological and other medical conditions, he has nevertheless demonstrated that he was capable of preparing several weighty tomes in support of his appeal. Accordingly, the appellant must show that there are exceptional circumstances before an extension of time for leave to appeal will be granted, unless he can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice will occur if an extension is not granted.

I have not set out the unfortunate history of this matter simply to criticise an unrepresented appellant. However, and with the benefit of hindsight, the court should not have indulged the appellant. The appellant's approach to this matter has severely hampered my ability to confidently and efficiently identify the key points the appellant wishes to make.

I have concluded that none of the appellant's complaints have merit, except for his contention that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the magistrate's refusal to allow him to have access to his computer during his trial. In relation to that contention, I have concluded that no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred. Accordingly, I would refuse the applications to extend time within which to appeal against conviction and sentence. Given my conclusions about the appellant's applications to extend time it is strictly unnecessary for me to consider the question of leave to appeal against conviction or sentence. This is because the effect of refusing to extend time is that the appeals are taken not to have commenced. However, to the extent that it may be necessary, I would also refuse leave to appeal against conviction and against sentence on all grounds on all grounds other than on the ground relating to the magistrate's refusal to allow the appellant access to his computer during his trial. I would, however, dismiss that ground because no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred. On that basis I would dismiss the appeals against conviction, and against the sentences that were imposed.

The appellant contends that the magistrate erred in making an order that the respondent was entitled to his costs in the amount of $8,074. As I understand it, the appellant says that: (1) The magistrate erroneously used the maximum costs that were allowable under the Legal Profession (Official Prosecutions) (Accused's Costs) Determination 2020 (Costs Determination). (2) The magistrate erred by including amounts not permitted under the Costs Determination. (3) The amount ordered to be paid was unreasonable, including because the magistrate did not make any inquiries about the appellant's means and because the amount was disproportionate.

The appellant does not contend that the respondent was not entitled to its costs. Indeed, the respondent, as a successful party, was entitled to its costs by operation of s 67(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 67(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that if a court convicts an accused of a charge, the court may order that the accused pay all or part of the prosecutor's costs. Further, pursuant to s 67(3): The amount of costs ordered under subsection (2) may be determined in accordance with the relevant determination made under the Legal Profession Act 2008 section 275 for the purposes of the Official Prosecutions (Accused's Costs) Act 1973 and with the Legal Profession Act 2008 section 280. In Fry v Keating the Court of Appeal said that s 67(3) gives the court a discretion in determining the amount of costs to be paid to the prosecutor. Further, the determination referred to in s 67(3) is only binding for the purposes of determining the costs of an accused. However, the court said that for the purposes of determining the amount of costs under s 67(3) that

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