Barrett; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review) - [2017] AATA 1588

Barrett; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review) [2017] AATA 1588 (29 September 2017)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/2845
Re:Secretary, Department of Social Services
APPLICANT

AndTara Barrett
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Member D K Grigg
Date:29 September 2017
Place:Brisbane

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution decides that the Respondent’s Family Tax Benefit claim was not effective pursuant to section 14A of A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth).
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Member D K Grigg
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – family tax benefit – late lodgement of claim – late lodgement of tax returns – whether claim effective – whether special circumstances exist – decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
CASES
Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Gammaldi and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 1028
Groth and Secretary Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708
Lineham and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 127
Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1993] FCA 261; (1993) 42 FCR 443
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales [1997] FCA 1565; (1998) 82 FCR 154
Secretary of the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs v Jones 2012) 89 ATR 267; [2012] FCA 639
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member D K Grigg
29 September 2017
INTRODUCTION

On 31 March 2016 Ms Barrett applied for a family tax benefit (“FTB”) payment for the 2015 – 2016 financial year.[1] On 9 April 2016 the Department of Human Services (“Centrelink”) confirmed that Ms Barrett’s FTB payments would commence from 1 July 2015.[2] On the same day a further letter was sent by Centrelink to Ms Barrett informing her that because her tax return for the 2014/15 financial year had not been lodged an assessment of her FTB for the 2014-15 financial year could not be finalised. Centrelink advised Ms Barrett that the tax returns of herself and her partner had to be lodged by 30 June 2016 (“April Letter”).[3]
[1]           Exhibit 1, T documents, T5, pages 24 – 29, Claim for FTB 2015 – 2016 dated 31 March 2016.
[2]           Exhibit 1, T documents, T 11, pages 98 to 100, Letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett dated 9 April 2016.
[3]           Exhibit 1, T documents, T 11, pages 101 – 102, Letter from Centrelink Ms Barrett dated 9 April 2016.
Ms Barrett and her husband lodged their income tax returns for the 2014-15 financial year on 9 August 2016.[4]
[4] Exhibit 2, Secretary's statement of facts issues and contentions dated 11 August 2017, attachment a, screen
captures – FAO income for previous years (FIPY).
On 10 August 2016 Centrelink advised that because Ms Barrett and her husband had not lodged their tax returns by 30 June 2016 her FTB could not be paid.[5]
[5] Exhibit 1, T documents, T 11, pages 115 – 116, letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett dated 10 August 2016.
On 20 August 2016 Ms Barrett then made a past period claim for an annual lump sum payment of FTB for the 2014-15 financial year.[6]
[6] Exhibit 1, T documents, T6, pages 30 – 85, claim for FTB 2014 – 2015 dated 20 August 2016.
On 5 September 2016 Centrelink advised Ms Barrett that because they had not received her claim for FTB for the 2014-15 financial year by 30 June 2016 that they were unable to pay her FTB.[7]
[7] Exhibit 1, T Documents, 11, pages 120 – 121, Centrelink letter to Ms Barrett dated 5 September 2016.
Ms Barrett applied for an extension of time to meet the legislative timelines but this was rejected by Centrelink.[8]
[8] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T 11, pages 125 – 126, Letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett dated 6 September 2016.
Ms Barrett argues that special circumstances exist such that an extension of time to lodge her FTB claim and tax returns should have been granted.
CLAIM HISTORY
Ms Barrett sought a review of Centrelink’s original decision by an Authorised Review Officer (“ARO”).[9] The appeal to the ARO was unsuccessful on the grounds that no “special circumstances” existed to extend the lodgement period for her tax returns.[10]
[9] Exhibit 1, T documents, T 11, page 130, Letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett dated 11 October 2016.
[10] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T9, pages 90–95, Authorised Review Officer’s Decision and Notes dated 5 November
2016.
Ms Barrett then lodged an application for review with the Social Services and Child Support Division (“SSCSD”) of this Tribunal.[11] The SSCSD set aside the ARO’s decision on 6 April 2017. The SSCSD decided that Ms Barrett’s FTB claim was effective, however, due to the late lodgement of her tax returns, she was not entitled to FTB.[12]
[11] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T10, pages 96 – 97, application to SSCSD for review dated 20 December 2016.
[12] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T2, pages 3-5, SSCSD’s Decision and Reasons for Decision dated 21 April 2017.
The Secretary has sought a review of the SSCSD’s decision by this Tribunal.[13] The Secretary contends that Ms Barrett’s FTB claim was not effective and that the SSCSD erred in law by failing to consider section 14A of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (“Administration Act”).
[13] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T1, pages one – 3, Application for Review dated 11 May 2017.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The issues for determination arewhether:
(a)Ms Barrett lodged an effective claim for FTB for the 2014-15 financial year; and
(b)there were “special circumstances” that prevented Ms Barrett and her husband from lodging their 2014-15 income tax returns on or before 30 June 2016.
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to the Administration Act, a valid claim for FTB must be made in accordance with the Administration Act: section 5(1), Administration Act.
If a claim is not effective, it is taken not to have been made: section 13(1), Administration Act.
Section 10(2)(b) of the Administration Act provides that a claim for FTB for a past period is only effective if the claim is made within:
(i)the first income year after the relevant income year; or
(ii)such further period (if any) as the Secretary allows, if the Secretary is satisfied that there are special circumstances that prevented the claimant from making the claim before the end of that first income year.
Section 14A of the Administration Act relevantly provides:
Restriction on determining claim where income tax return not lodged
(1) If, in relation to a claim for payment of family tax benefit made by an individual:
(a) the claim is for payment of that benefit for a past period; and
(b) the past period falls in an income year (the past period income year) that is one of the 2 income years before the one in which the claim is made; and
(c) one or more of subsections (2) to (3A) apply;
then the claim is taken never to have been made.
(2) This subsection applies if:
(a) the claimant is required to lodge an income tax return for the past period income year; and
(b) the claimant has not lodged the return before the end of:
(i) the first income year after the past period income year; or
(ii) such further period (if any) as the Secretary allows, if the Secretary is satisfied that there are special circumstances that prevented the claimant from lodging the return before the end of that first income year.
…
(4) The further period referred to in subparagraph (2)(b)(ii), (3)(c)(ii) or (3A)(b)(ii) must end no later than the end of the second income year after the past period income year.
Section 10(2) of the Administration Act is concerned with whether a claim has been made in time. Section 14A(2) of the Administration Act is concerned with a situation, such as here, where a claim has been made for a past period and relevant tax returns have not been lodged in time.
Both sections allow time to be extended if there are “special circumstances”. However, those “special circumstances” must have “prevented” the FTB applicant from making the claim or filing the tax returns on time.
Pursuant to section 14A(2) of the Administration Act, which is applicable here, for an FTB claim to be effective, relevant tax returns must have been lodged, within 12 months following the period to which the claim relates. Therefore, to claim FTB for the 2014-15 income period, Ms Barrett must have lodged her tax returns by 30 June 2016.
It is not in contention that Ms Barrett and her husband did not lodge their FTB claim and income tax returns on time. The question is whether “special circumstances” existed which prevented the claim and/or the tax returns from being lodged in time.
Unless there are “special circumstances” that prevented Ms Barrett from lodging her FTB claim and tax returns by 30 June 2016, Ms Barrett’s FTB claim is not effective.
ARE THERE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PREVENTED MS BARRETT FROM LODGING HER FTB CLAIM AND TAX RETURNS BEFORE THE END OF 30 JUNE 2016 FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 10(2) AND 14A(2), ADMINISTRATION ACT?
FTB Claim – Do special circumstances exist?
The issue is whether the time to lodge the FTB claim should be extended because of “special circumstances” which prevented Ms Barrett from lodging it by 30 June 2016.
The SSCSD found that “special circumstances” existed that prevented Ms Barrett from making the claim before the end of that first income year and that therefore the claim was effective.[14] The Secretary did not take issue with this finding.[15]
What does “special circumstances” mean?
[14] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T2, pages 6-7, SSCSD’s Decision and Reasons for Decision dated 21 April 2017.
[15] Exhibit 2, Secretary's statement of facts issues and contentions dated 11 August 2017, para 15.
The Administration Act does not define what constitutes “special circumstances”.
There has been considerable judicial consideration of the phrase in the context of other social security legislation, for example:
·“Special” denotes something different from the usual or ordinary: Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708; (1995) 40 ALD 541, at 545 per Kiefel J (as she then was).
·French J (as he then was) said in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 82 FCR 154, at 162:
The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it...
·The Full Federal Court in Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 443 held, at 450:
Each particular case must be considered on its merits. It is the essential nature of the provision to create a broad discretion to meet the great variety of circumstances which must occur, raising considerations of individual hardship, need, fairness, reasonableness, and whatever else may move an administrator, keeping in mind the scope and purposes of the Act, to make a decision one way or the other.
·Jacobson J in Secretary of the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs v Jones (2012) 89 ATR 267; [2012] FCA 639 explained the effect of the authorities as follows [emphasis added]:
[51] ...the phrase “special circumstances”, although lacking in precision, is sufficiently understood as including events or things that render the operation of the statue in a particular case as unfair, unintended or unjust. What is required is something that takes the case out of the ordinary, and unfairness or unintended consequences may show that this exists. Moreover, the circumstances of the case are not confined to matters that are external to the operation of the statutory scheme: see Smith per von Doussa J at 60, 61–62; Groth per Kiefel J at 545, Kertland v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 per Merkel J at 71, 73; Kirkbright v Secretary, Dept of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281 per Mansfield J at [22], [26]–[27] and [31]–[32]; see also Secretary to the Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1 per Heerey J at [17].
The AAT has also considered the phrase and held that the interpretation in Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1, at [12] (i.e. that the circumstances must be unusual, uncommon or exceptional) applies to the Administration Act.[16]
[16]See Hunnibell and Secretary, Department and Community Services [2004] AATA 992, at [19]; Papps and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 660, at [37].
In summary, the circumstances relied upon to be “special” must be unusual, different, uncommon or exceptional.[17]
[17]The core requirement for “special reasons” is that there be something “unusual or different”: French J in Boscolo v Secretary, Dept of Social Security [1999] FCA 106; (1999) 90 FCR 531, at [18]; Barker J in Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084,
The SSCSD found that the April Letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett gives rise to an inference that Centrelink erroneously assumed Ms Barrett had lodged an effective claim for the 2014-15 financial year. The SSCSD found that it was reasonable for Ms Barrett to assume she did not need to make a further claim because the April Letter only referred to her needing to lodge her tax returns and made no mention of her not having lodged an effective claim. The SSCSD found it would be “unfair and unjust” to not allow Ms Barrett to rely on the April Letter as a “special circumstance” which prevented her from lodging her claim on time.
Even though Ms Barrett lodged her FTB claim for the 2015-16 financial year on time, no claim was lodged for the 2014-15 financial year until 20 August 2016.[18] The April Letter makes no reference to Ms Barrett needing to lodge a separate claim for the 2014-15 financial year and refers only to the requirement to lodge tax returns by 30 June 2016.
[18] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T6, pages 30 – 85, claim for FTB 2014 – 2015 dated 20 August 2016.
Ignorance of the legal requirements is not a “special circumstance”. “Centrelink is not required to advise claimants about their legal rights to any particular social security payment or the rate of payment”.[19]
[19]See Milroy and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011]
However, it would, I believe, be reasonable for someone to assume from this letter which says “We are unable to complete your assessment….until your…income details are confirmed”, that other than filing the tax returns, nothing further was required.
The issue is whether the receipt of the April Letter is what prevented Ms Barrett from filing a new claim in time? There is no record of Ms Barrett complaining to Centrelink that she had relied on the April Letter as the reason she failed to lodge her claim in time. Even after being informed on 5 September 2016 that she was not eligible for FTB for the 2014-15 financial year because no claim had been lodged on time, there is no record of this issue being raised by Ms Barrett. There is also no record of this issue being raised on appeal before the ARO and Ms Barrett did not raise any reliance on the April Letter in her written statement or in her application for review by the SSCSD.
However, the SSCSD said it “accepts [because of the letter] that Mrs Barrett assumed [she did not have to lodge a new claim]”.
Accepting that this was Ms Barrett’s evidence before the SSCSD and the fact that it would be reasonable for someone to have this interpretation of the letter and to rely on it, I find that “special circumstances” existed which prevented Ms Barrett from lodging her claim on time.
I also note that the Guide to Social Security Law, the Family Assistance Guide (“the Guide”) which is used by Centrelink, provides in section 4.2.4.10 that if a claimant has made an ineffective claim, “[t]he relevant Centrelink agency must advise the individual that they need to lodge a proper FTB claim form” (my emphasis). This was not done by Centrelink until 5 September 2016.
The Tribunal is not bound to apply the Guide but it may, and it should, apply it in exercising its discretion unless it is unlawful or “tends to produce an unjust decision”.[20]
[20] Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645.
Brennan J explained the relevance of an adopted policy to decision-making in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 640 (“Drake (No 2)”):
Decision-making is facilitated by the guidance given by an adopted policy, and the integrity of decision-making in particular cases is the better assured if decisions can be tested against such a policy. By diminishing the importance of individual predilection, an adopted policy can diminish the inconsistencies which might otherwise appear in a series of decisions, and enhance the sense of satisfaction with the fairness and continuity of the administrative process.
The Full Federal Court in Hneidi And Others v Minister For Immigration And Citizenship (2010) 265 ALR 292 set out the four propositions which emerge from Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 (“Drake”) when considering the entitlement of an administrative decision-maker to take into account a statement of governmental policy:
[41]…The first is that the decision-maker is entitled, in the absence of specifically defined criteria for the exercise of the discretion, to take into account “government policy”. Thus, where the tribunal is not under a statutory duty to regard itself as bound by the policy, it is entitled to treat the policy as a relevant consideration.
[42] Second, in the absence of a specific statutory provision (which would no doubt be unusual) the tribunal is not entitled to abdicate its function of determining whether the decision under review was, on the material before the tribunal, the correct or preferable one, to a more passive function of determining whether the decision conformed to the relevant policy.
[43] Third, it is not desirable to frame a general statement of the part which government policy should ordinarily play in the determinations of the tribunal. That is a matter for the tribunal to determine in the context of the particular case, informed by considerations of the desirability of consistency of administrative decisions but balanced against the ideal of justice in the individual case.
[44] Fourth, the borderline between cases in which the tribunal has abdicated its functions to those of an unthinking application of “government or ministerial policy” to the facts may sometimes be blurred. But where the tribunal considers that the correct or preferable decision results from the application of such a policy, it should make it clear that:
… it has considered the propriety of the particular policy and expressly indicates the considerations which have led it to that conclusion.
In Drake, Brennan J (as President of the AAT) noted that:
(a)An argument against the policy itself or against its application in the particular case will be considered, but cogent reasons will have to be shown against its application.[21]
(b)The Tribunal’s duty is to make the correct or preferable decision in each case on the material before it, and the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all, in fulfilling its statutory function.[22]
(c)Further, consistency with comparable cases and decisions is “[o]ne of the factors to be considered in arriving at the preferable decision… and one of the most useful aids in achieving consistency is a guiding policy.[23]
[21]         Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645.
[22]         Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 642.
[23]         Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 643.

However, for the reasons set out below I find that Ms Barrett’s claim was not effective pursuant to section 14A(2).
Tax Returns – Do special circumstances exist?
The Electronic File Records of Centrelink record Ms Barrett told Centrelink that she had not lodged her tax returns on time because she had distressing family issues, she had not been aware of the time constraints regarding not lodging her income tax returns with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), and she thought she had to go through her accountant.[24]
[24] Exhibit 1, T documents, T 12, page 134, Centrelink Records.
In her application for review by the SSCSD Ms Barrett wrote that:[25]
·[she] wasn’t aware that [she] could lodge [her] tax returns [herself]
·[they had] faced crippling financial hardship leading to personal bankruptcy and liquidation of [their] business
·[they] have nothing left [and] have faced hardship that we never thought possible
·[they] lodged [their tax returns] only 40 days outside the allowable time
[25] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T10, page 96, Application to SSCSD for Review dated 20 December 2016.
At the hearing before me and in a statement made by Mr and Mrs Barrett in August 2016, Ms Barrett explained that since 2010, until recently, she and her family had had a very hard time. The biggest issue Ms Barrett and her family faced was financial hardship. Ms Barrett said:[26]
·they were homeless for 15 months
·due to the crippling financial position of the family business they had to close in August 2015
·they had no money to pay their accountant and as a result had fallen 5 years behind in preparing and lodging tax returns
[26] Exhibit 1, T documents, T7, pages 86 – 88, Statement of Mr and Mrs Barrett received 29 August 2016.
Ms Barrett said her accountant told her that she could not lodge her personal tax returns separately from the business tax returns and that she had to pay him before he would finalise and lodge them. As she did not have any money to pay her accountant to prepare the tax return she did not lodge them before 30 June 2016.
Ms Barrett says that these circumstances, looked at as a whole, constitute “special circumstances” that prevented her from lodging the relevant tax returns by 30 June 2016.
The Secretary submits that no “special circumstances” exist and that therefore the discretion in section 14A(2)(b)(ii) cannot be invoked.[27]
[27] Exhibit 2, Secretary's statement of facts issues and contentions dated 11 August 2017, para 24.
Lack of Awareness of Legislative Requirements
Ms Barrett acknowledged at the hearing that she knew the tax returns had to be lodged by 30 June 2016.
Even if she was not aware, ignorance of the legal requirements is not a special circumstance. “Centrelink is not required to advise claimants about their legal rights to any particular social security payment or the rate of payment”.[28]
[28]See Milroy and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011]
I find that the state of Ms Barrett’s knowledge of the legislative requirements does not constitute a “special circumstance” that prevented Ms Barrett from lodging her tax returns before the end of 30 June 2016.
Accountant’s Advice
There is no corroborating evidence from the accountant to confirm the advice given to Ms Barrett regarding lodgement of the tax returns nor is there any corroborating evidence as to when this advice was purportedly given. However, that is not surprising given that any corroborating evidence would be an admission by the accountant that they had given Ms Barrett incorrect advice.
This Tribunal has found on numerous occasions that an accountant’s failure to lodge tax returns within time was not a “special circumstance” for the purposes of the Administration Act.[29] Further, I note that pursuant to section 6.4.3 of the Guide, an example of a reason which would not generally meet special circumstances criteria includes a:
Failure by an accountant or tax agent to lodge a tax return within the lodgement period… will not ordinarily constitute special circumstances.
[29]Secretary, Department of Social Services and Cannon [2015] AATA 1028; Andre and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 205; Fedigan and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 211; Elrington and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 169; Secretary, Department of Social Services and Bleeker [2016] AATA 290; Secretary, Department of Social Services and Irvine [2016] AATA 306.
However, this situation is different because it is not a case where the accountant was engaged by the applicant and failed through some error or mistake to lodge the returns by the requisite period. The argument by Ms Barrett is that she relied on the accountant’s information that without lodging the business tax return her personal tax returns could not be lodged. What prevented Ms Barrett from lodging her tax returns was the fact that she relied on information provided by the accountant and because she was suffering from financial hardship was unable to engage her accountant to complete all of the tax returns.
The Secretary did not dispute that Ms Barrett and her family had clearly suffered financial hardship throughout the relevant period and that there had been other difficult circumstances that she had to deal with (discussed further below).
Ms Barrett’s submission is that she relied on her accountant’s advice and could not afford to pay him to prepare the tax returns. This evidence is consistent with:
(a)Centrelink’s records of the reasons given by Ms Barrett at the time; and
(b)Ms Barrett’s submissions to the ARO and the SSCSD.
Ms Barrett acknowledged at the hearing that she knew the tax returns had to be lodged by 30 June 2016. She told the Tribunal she knew she could have asked people what to do or called Centrelink or the ATO for advice before 30 June 2016 but she said she trusted what her accountant said, was afraid to contact the ATO (because she owed a debt to the ATO) and, given everything she was dealing with, it was not easy.
Ms Barrett was aware of the deadline, and resigned herself to the unfortunate result that she would not be entitled to FTB. Ms Barrett told the Tribunal that around 8 August 2016 she finally contacted the ATO, because Austudy payments to one of her children had ceased, and at that point, the ATO informed her that she did not have to wait for her business tax return to be filed in order to lodge a personal tax return. As a result of becoming aware of this information Ms Barrett lodged the relevant tax returns on 9 August 2016. On 10 August 2016 Centrelink informed Ms Barrett that because the tax returns had been lodged after 30 June 2016 she was not entitled to FTB.
Ms Barrett could have made her own enquiries, particularly of Centrelink, regarding what to do given her accountant’s advice. For example, Ms Barrett could have called Centrelink prior to 30 June 2016 and informed them that she would not be able to lodge a tax return because of her accountant’s advice and her inability to pay. If she had done so she may have been informed, as she ultimately was by the ATO, that she did not need to lodge her business tax returns first. Further, the April Letter clearly states that “if there are special circumstances that prevent you and your partner from lodging your tax return/s…please call us”.[30] Ms Barrett could have called Centrelink to discuss her predicament but she did not.
[30] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T11, page 101, Letter from Centrelink to Ms Barrett dated 9 April 2016.
Financial Issues
While it is understandable that Ms Barrett was going through a difficult financial and emotional period between 2010 and 2016, there is no evidence to corroborate that the impact of that occurrence was such that Ms Barrett was not capable of arranging for her tax returns to be completed. I also note that once Ms Barrett had spoken to the ATO, she was able to complete the tax returns herself and that these difficult financial circumstances did not hinder her ability to do so.
In Gammaldi and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2016] AATA 1028 the Tribunal found that even where the Applicant had had a difficult year, with family health issues, business challenges and increased responsibilities, which understandably distracted him from lodging his return by 30 June 2014, these events did not constitute uncommon or unusual occurrences and were not “special circumstances”.
In Drake (No 2) Brennan J noted (at 643) that consistency with comparable cases and decisions is “[o]ne of the factors to be considered in arriving at the preferable decision”.[31]
[31] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 643.
On the available evidence, I am unable to find that Ms Barrett’s financial issues, combined with her reliance on her accountant’s advice, prevented her from lodging her tax returns before the end of 30 June 2015.
CONCLUSION
Ms Barrett’s appeal fails. No “special circumstances” exist such that the time for the lodgement of her tax returns should be extended.
The decision under review is set aside. Ms Barrett’s FTB claim for the 2014-15 financial year was not effective pursuant to section 14A of the Administration Act.

I certify that the preceding 62 (sixty-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member D K Grigg

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Associate
Dated: 29 September 2017

Date of hearing:
12 September 2017

Respondent: By phone

Solicitors for the Applicant: Ms Jasmine Forsyth, Solicitor
Department of Human Services

at [37].

AATA 488, at [16]; Ivor Biddlecombe and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] AATA 451, at [23]; Brian Murphy and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] AATA 115, at [17];; Barnard and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 436, at [47]; Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774, and on appeal Scott and Another v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241.

Date of hearing:	12 September 2017
Respondent:	By phone
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Ms Jasmine Forsyth, Solicitor Department of Human Services