Barrand v Coxall

Case [1999] QSC 352


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Barrand v Coxall [1999] QSC 352
PARTIES:

JOYCE DOLORES BARRAND
(Plaintiff)
v
ROBERT JOHN COXALL
(Respondent)

FILE NO/S: 8222 of 1999
DIVISION: Trial Division
DELIVERED ON: 30 November 1999
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 8 November 1999
JUDGE: Mackenzie J

ORDERS:

1.   The application is dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed.

CATCHWORDS:

WILLS PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION – THE MAKING OF A WILL – Testamentary  Capacity 
LAND TITLES UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM – Caveats against dealings

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 626

Succession Act 1981 s 17(1)
In the Estate of Park, deceased; Park v Park (1954) P 112
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5QB 549
Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3P&D 64
Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558

COUNSEL: Mr M Jarrett for the applicant
Mr T Quinn for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Hely & Cameron Solicitors for the applicant
James Varitimos for the respondent
  1. MACKENZIE J:  This is an application to set aside a caveat pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 626.  Rule 626(1) permits a person intending to apply for a grant of probate to apply to the court for an order setting aside a caveat.  The court may set aside the caveat if the court considers that the evidence does not:

(a)        show that the caveator has an interest in the estate or a reasonable prospect of  establishing an interest; or

(b)        raise doubt as to whether the grant ought to be made.

  1. The respondent caveator is the stepson of the testator in respect of whose will the caveat has been entered.  The testator married the respondent's mother when he was 60.  He and the respondent's mother made wills identical in effect, the testator's being made on 4 January 1985.  The survivor of the two was entitled for life to use of the balance, after payment of expenses, of the other's estate.  Upon the death of the survivor the balance was to pass to the respondent absolutely.

  1. At about the time the testator's will was made in 1985 he and the respondent's mother had acquired a parcel of real property as joint tenants.  The transfer was produced to the Titles Office on 11 February 1985 and registered on 20 February 1985.  It is likely that the contract was entered into at about the time when the will was made, assuming the normal timeframe for purchase of residential property.  It is reasonable to assume that the fact that the real property would pass by survivorship to the other, and if it was the testator who survived, to him was within their contemplation at the time the 1985 will was made.  It may also have been within their contemplation that the property would ultimately pass to the respondent as a consequence of the wills which mirrored each other. 

  1. There is an allegation that the expressed intention of the parties was that the balance of the estate should pass to the respondent upon…

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Barrand v Coxall [1999] QSC 352
Case
[1999] QSC 352
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Barrand v Coxall, the applicant, Barrand, sought to have the will of his deceased father, Coxall, admitted to probate. The primary dispute involved the validity of Coxall's will, particularly regarding his testamentary capacity at the time of its execution. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Barrand contended that Coxall lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute the will, while Coxall’s estate, represented by the respondent, argued that the will was valid and should be admitted to probate.

The court was required to determine whether Coxall had the necessary testamentary capacity when he made the will, and whether the will should be admitted to probate. The court had to examine the medical and psychological evidence presented, assessing whether Coxall's mental state was such that he could understand the nature of the act of making a will, comprehend the extent of his property, and the claims to which he might be subject, and remember the natural objects of his bounty.

The court found that Coxall had testamentary capacity at the time of executing the will. It held that the evidence did not support the contention that Coxall was suffering from any significant mental incapacity that would invalidate the will. The court detailed the medical evidence and considered the circumstances surrounding the making of the will, concluding that Coxall's mental faculties were sufficiently intact to create a valid will. Therefore, the application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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