Barone and Whittle
[2019] FamCA 924
•6 December 2019
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BARONE & WHITTLE | [2019] FamCA 924 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – interim application – where the applicant in the substantive proceedings seeks orders pursuant to s 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – where respondent in the substantive proceedings denies the existence of the de facto relationship – where the respondent seeks the issue of the de facto relationship be determined as a separate and threshold issue – application for determination of threshold issue or bifurcation – applicant opposes separate determination – where overlap of facts relevant to the determination of jurisdiction and issues relevant to s 90SB(a) and (c) and s 90SM– no separate determination ordered. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AA, 90SB, 90SM, 114(2A) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 1.04, 10.13, 10.14 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 28.2 |
| DMW v CGW (1982) 151 CLR 491 Norton & Locke (2013) FLC 93-567 Sinclair & Whittaker (2013) FLC 93-551 Somers & Collier [2017] FamCAFC 123 Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372 Wernham & Campagnola [2012] FamCAFC 137 Yunghanns & Ors v Yunghanns & Ors (1998) FLC 92-836 Zagoreos & Zagoreos (2018) 57 Fam LR 358 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Barone |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Whittle |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 2251 | of | 2018 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 6 December 2019 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Harper J |
| HEARING DATE: | 6 November 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT: | Dr Birch SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR APPLICANT: | V L Macri Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: | Mr Richardson SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR RESPONDENT: | Vizzone Ruggero Twigg Lawyers |
Orders
The proceedings shall proceed to finality on all issues of fact and law to be heard together.
The parties confer by no later than 4.00 pm on 13 December 2019 for the purpose of producing agreed Short Minutes with all necessary procedural orders for the further progress of the proceedings to be submitted to Chambers by no later than 4.00 pm on 16 December 2019.
In the event the parties are unable reach agreement in accordance with Order 2, each party is to submit to Chambers by no later than 4.00pm on 16 December 2019 the proposed Short Minutes with all necessary procedural orders for which they contend for the further progress of the proceedings.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Barone & Whittle has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 2251 of 2018
| Mr Barone |
And
| Ms Whittle |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In these proceedings a central factual issue is the existence of a de facto relationship. The applicant in the substantive proceedings, Ms Whittle, contends that a de facto relationship continued for approximately eight years from June 2010 to January 2018. The respondent in the substantive proceedings, Mr Barone, contends that no de facto relationship ever existed.
No final hearing dates have been allocated. There is a significant procedural debate between the parties about how the determination of issues in the proceedings should take place. Mr Barone argues that there should be a hearing limited to the issue, which has been called “the threshold issue”, namely whether a de facto relationship ever existed between the parties. Ms Whittle, for her part, argues that there should be a hearing on all issues together, including the question of contributions by both parties during the alleged relationship and orders for property adjustment, and that a hearing date should be allocated accordingly.
The matter first came before me for a Less Adversarial Trial on 15 August 2019. On that occasion Mr Barone made an application for the separate determination of the threshold issue. The proceedings were stood over to 6 November 2019 for callover. On that date I heard submissions on the application for a separate determination of the threshold issue. This judgment relates to that application.
Senior Counsel for Ms Whittle filed written submissions in support of the general proposition that the proceedings are not apt for the determination of any threshold issue. After reference to the appropriate rules, namely Rules 10.13 and 10.14 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“Family Law Rules”), Ms Whittle referred to the decision in Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372 (“Southwell v Bennett”), as stating the applicable legal principles. In that decision, Hallen AsJ (as he then was) set out the principles that apply in determining whether to make an order for the separate determination of a question under Rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”). His Honour stated them at [15] – [17] as follows:
15 I take the principles that apply in determining whether to make an order for the separate determination of a question under the rule to be:
(a) The rule speaks of “questions” and not “issues” and does not differentiate between questions of fact, or law, or partly of fact and partly of law.
(b) The judicial determination of a “question” must involve a conclusive, or final, decision based on concrete and established, or agreed, facts, for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334, at [45] and [51].
(c) The rule permits the Court to hear and determine the separate question at any point before, at, or after, any trial or further trial in the proceedings, rather than only as a preliminary question.
(d) Whether such an order should be made is a matter for the court’s discretion, which discretion must be exercised judicially, but cannot otherwise be fettered: Dunstan v Simmie & Co Pty Ltd [1978] VicRp 62; [1978] VR 669, at 670; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7].
(e) As a general rule, the discretionary power to order separate determination of a question should be approached with caution: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd[1999] HCA 36; (1999) 198 CLR 180 at [436], per Callinan J; Tepko Pty Limited v The Water Board [2001] HCA 19;(2001) 206 CLR 1, at [168]–[170] per Kirby and Callinan JJ: Commonwealth Bank v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125 at [6], per Johnson J; Bailey and Bailey v Director-General Department of Energy Climate Change and Water and Ors[2010] NSWSC 979 at [4] per Studdert AJ.
(f) In exercising its discretion, the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, namely the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings (s 56) must be given effect.
(g) Generally, all questions of fact and law should be determined at the one time: Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141-42; SPI Spirits (Cyprus) Ltd v Diageo Australia Ltd [2006] FCA 14. If the Court is to depart from that position, the party seeking the separate determination of a question must satisfy the Court that it would be ‘just and convenient’ for that order to be made: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1999] FCA 718 at [8]- [9], see also Energy Australia v Australian Energy Limited [2001] FCA 1049.
(h) While it may appear attractive, superficially, to order the trial of a separate question, experience often shows that it will not be so, for example, because of the complications that can arise in relation to appeals, or to overlapping factual issues, or to questions of credit, if the same witnesses have to give evidence in relation to a question that is separated and those questions that are not: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd[2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7(6)] per Einstein J.; Owners Corporation Sp 70672 v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church[2010] NSWSC 946 at [16] per Ball J.
(i) The experience of courts suggests that the separation of proceedings often does not result in the quicker and cheaper resolution of proceedings, but often has the reverse effect. It sometimes happens that it turns out to be productive of the disadvantages of delay, extra expense, appeals and uncertainty of outcome which it is intended to avoid: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd; Tepko Pty Limited v The Water Board at [168].
(j) Before a question is to be separately determined, it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Pty Ltd at 142, per Giles CJ in Comm D; Parramatta Stadium Trust v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd; Century Medical v THLD (NSWSC, 27 August 1996, unreported).
(k) Where findings as to the credit of a witness is, or of witnesses are, or may be, involved in the consideration of the evidence relevant to the question, it is inappropriate to order a separate trial: ABB v Freight Rail [1999] NSWSC 1037.
(l) Often, a separate question is heard on the basis of:
(i) agreed statements of fact;
(ii) a narrow point to be determined; and
(iii) a hearing that is able to be conducted within a short time (or a short time relative to the total length if the hearing of the separate question were not to be dealt with).
(m) Factors that tend to support the making of an order, include that the separate determination of the question may:
(i) contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Holdings;
(ii) contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 602 per Kirby P at 607).
(n) It may be appropriate to determine a separate question, even if it will not resolve all the issues, provided that there is a strong prospect that the parties will agree upon the result when the core of the dispute has been decided, or if the decision will obviate unnecessary and expensive hearings of other questions: City of Swan v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd[2009] FCA 784; (2009) 73 ACSR 86 at [27] per Rares J. The determination of the one question should enable a sensible reassessment of litigation risks, which is generally likely to encourage some form of settlement discussions.
(o) Relevantly, one factor that may tell against the making of an order would be where there is likely to be a significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial — possibly involving the calling of the same witnesses at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society at [8]. There is always a risk of inconsistent findings arising from determination of separate questions.
(p) Whilst the decision is ultimately one for the court to determine, it will have regard to the attitude of the parties: TVW Enterprises Limited v Duffy (Federal Court of Australia, 28 March 1985, unreported) Toohey J.
(q) It is a relevant consideration to weigh the time likely to be taken in the hearing of a separate question and the availability of hearing dates for that purpose, against the time and expense of a substantive hearing and the length of time likely to elapse before such a hearing will take place: TVW Enterprises Limited v Duffy at pp 4-5.
(r) Each case will have its own dynamics that dictate the relative importance of various factors to be considered in exercising the discretion conferred.
(s) It is necessary that there be precision, both in formulating the question, and in specifying the facts upon which it is to be decided: Jacobson v Ross [1995] VicRp 24;[1995] 1 VR 337 at 341
16 Finally, I should refer to Allen v Gulf Oil[1980] UKHL 9; [1981] AC 1001, which seems to me, in the circumstances of the present case, to be not only sensible, but essential, to remember. Lord Wilberforce said, at p1010H:
"... My Lords, I and other of your Lordships have often protested against the procedure of bringing, except in clear and simple cases, points of law for preliminary decision. The procedure indeed exists and is sometimes useful. In other cases, and this is frequently so where they reach this House, they do not serve the cause of justice. The present is such an example. The question as originally framed was clearly inept. It was recast by Kerr J into an improved form. But both judges in the Court of Appeal found it either unintelligible or unanswerable: so I believe do some at least of your Lordships. The fact is that the result of the case must depend upon the impact of detailed and complex findings of fact upon principles of law which are themselves flexible. There are too many variables to admit of a clear-cut solution in advance."
17 Lord Roskill said at p1022A:
" ... The preliminary point procedure can in certain classes of case be invoked to achieve the desirable aim both of economy and simplicity. But cases in which such invocation is desirable are few. Sometimes a single issue of law can be isolated from the other issues in a particular case whether of fact or of law, and its decision may be finally determinative of the case as a whole. Sometimes facts can be agreed and the sole issue is one of law. But the present is not a case in which this procedure ought ever to have been adopted for the reasons stated by my noble and learned friend ...
... But I hope that your Lordships' agreement so to treat it will not encourage others to invoke the preliminary point procedure in unsuitable cases, or lead those whose task it is to decide whether or not the trial of preliminary points should be ordered, to be other than extremely cautious before acceding to pleas for the making of such orders as a result of attractively advanced submissions founded upon pleas of supposed economy."
As Hallen AsJ pointed out, Rule 28.2, the relevant rule in the UCPR, refers to “the decision of any question separately from any other question” and these can be questions of fact, or law, or partly of fact and partly of law.
In this Court the relevant Family Law Rule is in slightly different terms. It refers to “issues”. Rule 10.13 provides:
A party may apply for a decision on any issue, if the decision may:
(a) dispose of all or part of the case;
(b) make a trial unnecessary;
(c) make a trial substantially shorter; or
(d) save substantial costs.
I do not consider this difference to be material. The Full Court has held that “issue” in Rule 10.13 applies to any issue of fact or law and the rule does not purport to limit the powers of the Court or the trial judge to order a discrete hearing on an issue of fact or law, or both: Wernham & Campagnola [2012] FamCAFC 137 at [38]. Ms Whittle points out that in the decision of Zagoreos & Zagoreos (2018) 57 Fam LR 358 Forrest J referred to the decision in Southwell v Bennett at [42] and accepted that the principles set out by Hallen AsJ at [15] – [17] are applicable in this Court. I agree.
Jurisdiction
In deciding whether there should be a separate determination of the threshold issue, to give context to the arguments in this application, some attention should first be paid to the question of jurisdiction. In argument much attention was devoted to s 90SB, which is in the following terms:
S 90SB When this Division applies—length of relationship etc.
A court may make an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL, in relation to a de facto relationship only if the court is satisfied:
(a) that the period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years; or
…
(c) that:
(i) the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); and
(ii) a failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to Mr Barone; …
It can be seen that s 90SB is engaged when “this Division applies”. The Division in question is Division 2 of Part VIIIAB. It is settled that the existence of a de facto relationship is a jurisdictional fact necessary for the application of Subdivision A of Division 2, in which s 90SB and 90SM fall.
The grant of jurisdiction to this Court under Family LawAct 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) carries with it the power to determine the existence of the facts upon which that jurisdiction depends: DMW v CGW [1982] HCA 73; (1982) 151 CLR 491 at [6]. As pointed out by the Full Court in Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns & Ors (1998) FLC 92-836 at 85,723: “the Court always has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the purpose of, and up to the point of deciding, whether it has jurisdiction to make the orders sought in the proceedings.”
Thus the Court has jurisdiction up to the point of determining the jurisdictional fact whether a de facto relationship exists in a given case. The meaning “de facto relationship” is set out in s 4AA of the Act. A factual determination is required as to whether an asserted relationship meets the definition of de facto relationship in s 4AA. In determining whether a de facto relationship exists, the Court must be satisfied, inter alia, that “having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, [the parties] have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis”: s 4AA(1)(c). So the Court has regard to all the circumstances of the relationship, as well as the matters set forth in s 4AA(2) of the Act, with each to be given the weight the court thinks appropriate: Sinclair & Whittaker (2013) FLC 93-551 at [51]-[54].
Prior to that determination the Court has no jurisdiction to exercise powers, such as the power in s 114(2A) to grant injunctions in a “de facto financial cause”, which are predicated upon an anterior finding that a de facto relationship exists: Norton & Locke (2013) FLC 93-567.
It is important to realise that s 90SB, in particular, has no work to do unless the existence of a de facto relationship has been established: Somers & Collier [2017] FamCAFC 123 at [33]. Therefore, it appears that until jurisdiction is established the Court cannot make any determination for the purposes of s 90SB, including findings about contributions or serious injustice for the purposes of s 90SB(c).
Nonetheless, at the general level of statutory construction, the interplay of ss 4AA, 90SB and 90SM shows there is clear potential for overlap between the factual issues necessary to found jurisdiction and those which may be necessary to establish an asset pool between the parties or for assessment and evaluation of contributions either for the purposes of s 90SB(c) or s 90SM(4), including subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c). When the circumstances set forth in s 4AA(2) are focussed upon, several may involve factual matters which have the potential to overlap with findings about and assessment of contributions under s 90SM. For example, it can be accepted that s 4AA(2)(d) (“the degree of financial dependence or interdependence”) and (e) (“the ownership, use and acquisition of their property”) would often be likely to require factual findings which would also be relevant, or necessary, to findings about contributions.
But consideration is not limited to the matters in s 4AA(2). As already noted, the Full Court has made clear that the Court has regard to all the circumstances of the relationship to decide if it meets the definition of de facto relationship in s 4AA. Since this is not limited to the matters in s 4AA(2), in determining whether a de facto relationship exists, the Court may in a given case properly take account of assets brought to, or acquired during, or contributions made during, the asserted relationship, as part of its circumstances.
Therefore, some factual findings about the parties’ assets and evaluation of contributions by the parties during the asserted relationship may become important in considering “all the circumstances” to establish jurisdiction, before s 90SB, and particularly subparagraph (c), or s 90SM, fall for consideration.
Evaluation
In this Court, it is not uncommon for the existence of a de facto relationship to be determined separately as a threshold issue. Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, such an approach may lead to a more expeditious outcome and a more efficient use of court time. But the facts of each case are different, and each case must be assessed on its own facts and circumstances.
Ms Whittle submitted that, for a number of reasons, “it would be just, preferable and expeditious for all outstanding issues in the proceedings to continue to trial as a consolidated matter”, and that such a determination would reflect the main purpose of the Family Law Rules as set out in Rule 1.04:
R 1.04 Main purpose of Rules
The main purpose of these Rules is to ensure that each case is resolved in a just and timely manner at a cost to the parties and the court that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
Ms Whittle submitted that Mr Barone is likely to call up to 16 witnesses other than himself. Mr Barone did not dispute this. This is evidence from Mr Barone’s case outline filed 14 August 2019. Ms Whittle submitted that the relationship the subject of the proceedings was overwhelmingly conducted in a period during which she was an employee of a company owned and controlled by Mr Barone. Thus there is a significant overlap between the evidence relevant to the threshold issue and the evidence that relates directly to a significant aspect of Ms Whittle’s contributions that would require determination pursuant to section 90SM(4) of the Act, if jurisdiction is established. Ms Whittle’s evidence deals extensively with her role in the workplace and what she contends she did and contributed within and beyond her role as an employee.
Ms Whittle further submitted that the credibility of witnesses will be critical to the final outcome of the proceedings and the possibility of conflict in conclusions about the credibility of witnesses should be avoided. She further contended that the resolution of the threshold issue may not finally determine the issue but merely result in an appeal by the dissatisfied party, “creating a multiplicity of proceedings, interruption to the court an undesirable fragmentation of the proceedings”.
In arguing against the separate determination of a threshold issue, Ms Whittle referred to the following specific factors set out in Southwell v Bennett (supra):
15.1 Para (e) Any superficial attraction that bifurcation will result in an expeditious disposal of the proceeding needs to be treated with caution. The reasons are addressed below.
15.2 Para (g) This important statement of principle operates powerfully here. There is substantial risk that the delay to ultimate proceedings could be enormous if proceedings are bifurcated and result in an appeal process that then has the Family Law proceedings sit behind, potentially to confront appeals again. Further, it is undesirable, particularly where there are substantive credit issues, to see the parties subjected to the ultimate inevitability of 2 different judges determining at first instance the 2 different proceedings and potentially coming to contrary views as to the evidence of relevant witnesses.
15.3 Sub Para (h) The cautions stated in this paragraph are self-evident and important. Here the credit issues and inter-relationship [sic] with overlapping evidence are critically important.
15.4 Sub Para (i) The caution here stated has been touched upon above.
15.5 Sub Para (j) The hurdle identified in this paragraph cannot cogently be met by the evidence and issues in the present proceedings.
15.6 Sub Para (k) The issue of credit findings was touched upon above. It is to be highlighted that the prohibitive language used here is important. The conclusion being that it is “inappropriate” to make such an order where the credit of a witness or witnesses is involved.
15.7 Sub Para (l) The obvious attraction to a separate hearing in relation to an issue that meets the criteria identified in this subparagraph is obvious. Here, none of that criteria is met.
15.8 Sub Para (o) This factor is a significant risk in the present proceeding.
Senior counsel for Mr Barone argued that the parties have conducted the proceedings from the beginning on the basis that there would be a separate determination of the threshold issue, and that the evidence prepared to date was directed to that issue. I note here that Ms Whittle argued that was incorrect because from the start, as seen in her Initiating Application, filed 11 April 2018, her claim for the application of 90SM was based upon section 90SB(a) and section 90SB(c). Mr Barone further asserted that “the desire for a speedy hearing would be frustrated” as it would require him to prepare a substantial amount of new material to deal with any issues outside the threshold issue.
I am satisfied that, if Mr Barone is relying upon up to 16 witnesses and Ms Whittle will be giving evidence about her contributions made through her role as employee, both to establish a de facto relationship and to support her arguments for property adjustment, an overlap of the type referred to above at [14] and [15] will be likely. The Court will look at all the circumstances for the purposes of s 4AA of the Act. Mr Barone may wish to rely, for example, upon evidence concerning financial dependence or financial support, if any, between the parties or the ownership, use and acquisition of property between the parties, for the purposes of s 4AA(2). I do not know yet, but the point is that for the purposes of determining whether a de facto relationship exists the court will have regard to the evidence of both parties. Such evidence may bear upon not only jurisdiction but also upon contributions, for example, if jurisdiction is established. Since Ms Whittle also relies upon s 90SB(c), this will also require the Court to make a determination as to whether the Ms Whittle made substantial contributions during the alleged relationship of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c) of the Act and whether a failure to make an order or declaration as to the existence of the de facto relationship “would result in serious injustice” to Ms Whittle.
I am satisfied that the proceedings should progress to a final hearing of all issues without any determination of a separate threshold issue or bifurcation. In accordance with the authorities referred to in Southwell v Bennett (supra), I accept that the discretion to determine a threshold issue should be exercised with caution, and that as a general rule all questions of fact and law should be determined at the one time. I take account of the need for any exercise of discretion under Rules 10.13 or 10.14 should seek to achieve the main purpose of the Family Law Rules, set out in Rule 1.04, to ensure that this case is “resolved in a just and timely manner at a cost to the parties and the court that is reasonable in the circumstances”.
I accept the contentions of Ms Whittle that there is a real likelihood of considerable overlap between the findings necessary for the proposed threshold issue, to found jurisdiction, and the factual findings which will ultimately be required for a determination under s 90SB(c) and s 90SM(4).
It is also significant in my view that there is neither an agreed statement of facts likely, nor is a narrow point to be determined nor is the hearing even of the threshold issue able to be conducted within a short time or even a short time relative to the total length of the trial if all issues are determined together.
Mr Barone submitted a hearing on all issues may well require a longer trial than a trial of the threshold issue alone. He contended the scope of the hearing of all issues together would be greatly expanded because of the necessity to undertake complicated valuations of corporate entities said to be owned or controlled by Mr Barone. I accept there is some force in this submission, but it is difficult to form a more specific view about the extent to which any hearing would be expanded. But Mr Barone’s arguments seem to assume that, because of the need for complicated valuations for a hearing on all issues, a hearing of the threshold issue first will result in a more “speedy” trial. This is not persuasive. As I understand the submissions of the parties, the choice really is between a long trial on the threshold issue or a longer trial on all issues. Case management pressures in this Court and the claims upon judicial time by other litigants mean one lengthy trial is preferable to two trials, at least one of which will be lengthy.
It seems to me that these considerations, when combined with the complications that may arise in relation to appeals, and the potential for conflict to arise in the assessment of the credit of witnesses or inconsistent findings of fact if two hearings were to be conducted, conspire to prevent, in all likelihood, a judicial determination on the threshold issue finally quelling the controversy between the parties or resulting in an expeditious use of Court time which would promote the main purpose of the Family Law Rules. These conclusions weigh in favour of a hearing on all issues.
I decline to order the separate determination of any threshold issue.
I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Harper delivered on 6 December 2019.
Associate:
Date: 6 December 2019
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