JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BARBOUTIS -v- THE KART CENTRE PTY LTD [No 2] [2020] WASCA 41
CORAM: BUSS P
MITCHELL JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 7 FEBRUARY 2020
DELIVERED : 3 APRIL 2020
FILE NO/S: CACV 133 of 2019
BETWEEN: COLIN JOHN BARBOUTIS
First Appellant
BULLSBROOK CAPITAL PTY LTD (ACN 611 318 604) AS TRUSTEE OF THE ATHENA TRUST
Second Appellant
AND
THE KART CENTRE PTY LTD [No 2]
First Respondent
ANDREW NOEL FREEMAN
Second Respondent
RILYLA PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE FREEMAN FAMILY TRUST
Third Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ACTING MASTER WHITBY
File Number : COR 73 of 2019
Catchwords:
Corporations - Application to wind‑up company - Whether master erred in finding that a person was not a director of the company - Whether there was evidence to the contrary for the purposes of s 1274B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Turns on own facts.
Corporations - Application to wind‑up company - Whether master erred in finding that the second appellant was not a creditor - Turns on own facts.
Corporations - Application to wind‑up company - Whether master erred in finding that company was not insolvent pursuant to s 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Whether company could pay debts as and when they fell due and payable - Whether company had ability to obtain unsecured loan funds - Turns on own facts.
Corporations - Application to wind‑up company - Whether master ought to have wound up the company on the basis that it was 'just and equitable' - Turns on own facts.
Cross appeal - Refusal to make costs order in favour of the company - Whether manifest error or order outside limits of sound discretionary judgment - Turns on own facts.
Legislation:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 95A , s 1274B(2).
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Leave to cross-appeal refused
Cross-appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| First Appellant | : | C K Pearce |
| Second Appellant | : | C K Pearce |
| First Respondent | : | P A Martino |
| Second Respondent | : | P A Martino |
| Third Respondent | : | P A Martino |
Solicitors:
| First Appellant | : | Blackwall Legal LLP |
| Second Appellant | : | Blackwall Legal LLP |
| First Respondent | : | P A Martino |
| Second Respondent | : | P A Martino |
| Third Respondent | : | P A Martino |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Australian National Hotels Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 234
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards [2005] NSWSC 831; (2005) 220 ALR 148
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 1) [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 175 FLR 124
Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514
Barboutis v The Kart Centre Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 353
Knight v Bulic (1994) 13 ACSR 553
Leslie v Howship Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 459
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 41
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the master erred in determining that Barboutis was not a director of the company, whether the second appellant was not a creditor of the company, whether the company was insolvent under s 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and whether the company could pay debts as they fell due and payable, and had the ability to obtain unsecured loan funds. Additionally, the court considered whether the master should have wound up the company on the basis that it was 'just and equitable', and whether there was a manifest error in the refusal to make a costs order in favour of the company.
The court held that the master did not err in her findings that Barboutis was not a director of the company, and that the second appellant was not a creditor of the company. The court found that the company was not insolvent as it could pay debts as they fell due and payable and had the ability to obtain unsecured loan funds. The court also found that the master did not err in declining to wind up the company on the basis that it was 'just and equitable'. The court held that there was no manifest error in the refusal to make a costs order in favour of the company.
The court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the orders of the master. The respondents were awarded costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Rule 22 of the Company's constitution provided:22.APPOINTMENT, REMOVAL AND REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS22.1Appointment(a)The Directors have the power to appoint any person as a director to fill a casual vacancy or as an addition to the board provided that the number of Directors does not exceed any maximum number of Directors fixed by the Company.(b)Subject to these Rules and the Act, a Director appointed to the Company holds office for life.22.2Removal(a)The Company may remove any Director and appoint another Director as a replacement.(b)The removal or replacement of a Director must be effected by ordinary resolution of the Company.…22.6Vacation of officeThe office of a Director becomes vacant if:…(b)the Director is removed under these Rules;…(e)the Director resigns;… The paramountcy provision in cl 30 of the Shareholders Agreement provided:The provisions of this agreement [ie the Shareholders Agreement] will prevail over any inconsistent article in the articles [ie the Company's constitution] and the shareholders agree that the articles will be amended to remove any inconsistency. There was considerable documentary evidence before the master. This dealt with such things as searches of the ASIC's records, the Company's financial records, dealings concerning the Share Sale Agreement and voluminous correspondence between the parties and their respective solicitors. Also of importance was an affidavit sworn by one of the respondents' solicitors, Timothy Stott, as to the absence of various available records in the Company's corporate secretarial file. Mr Stott had attended the offices of an accounting firm, Calder Roth & Co, on 30 April 2019 to inspect the documents held by them for the Company. Calder Roth & Co's premises were the Company's registered office at various times including as late as 1 April 2019.[13] The Company's corporate volume was located at Calder Roth & Co having been deposited there by Mr Barboutis. Calder Roth & Co were Mr Barboutis' accountants and were the Company's external accountants before the differences emerged between Mr Barboutis and Mr Freeman.[13] GAB 50. It will be necessary to refer to much of the documentary evidence so far as the appellants challenge certain of the master's factual findings. It is more convenient to address these materials when dealing with the merits of the grounds of appeal. The master first addressed the appellants' respective standing to make the winding-up application. In findings that are now challenged on appeal, the master determined that:1.Mr Barboutis was not a director of the Company.[14]2.The second appellant was not a creditor of the Company.[15][14] Primary reasons [39], [47], [49], [89], [102(a)], [105], [108], [111].[15] Primary reasons [61] - [62], [76(a)], [81], [109]. Bullsbrook also contended that it had standing as a contributory. (There was, however, no written application for leave in accordance with s 459P(2)(b) of the Corporations Act so far as the application relied on the insolvency ground.) The master stopped short of finding that Bullsbrook remained the holder of shares in the Company. In circumstances where Rilyla (the putative purchaser of shares from Bullsbrook) was not a party to the proceedings the master determined that it was not appropriate for her to determine the issues that arose in relation to the Share Sale Agreement.[16] The master contented herself with a finding that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether or not Bullsbrook held shares in the Company.[17][16] Primary reasons [90], [97] - [98].[17] Primary reasons [98].