FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bai v Commissioner of Taxation
[2015] FCA 973
Citation: Bai v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 973 Appeal from: Tao Bai v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 612 Parties: TAO BAI v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: NSD 2091 of 2013 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 3 September 2015 Catchwords: TAXATION – onus of proof – Commissioner’s power to amend income tax assessments at any time under s 170(1) item 5 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) after forming opinion that there had been fraud or evasion – whether amendment excessive – where taxpayer sought to challenge amended assessment on ground that it was excessive because Commissioner in error in forming opinion that there was fraud or evasion – standard of proof for taxpayer to establish that there was no fraud or evasion – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal required taxpayer to exclude the possibility of fraud or evasion – whether Tribunal applied wrong onus – taxpayer bore civil onus of proving that there was no fraud or evasion on the balance of probabilities
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – procedural fairness – whether Tribunal denied taxpayer procedural fairness– where voluminous material relevant to taxpayer’s case seized by Australian Federal Police and shown to Commissioner under search warrants – whether material seized under search warrants not able to be used by Commissioner by force of s 3ZQU of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) – whether Commissioner required to provide certain documents to Tribunal under s 33(1AA) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth) – where both parties had access to copies of seized documents – where material not used by Commissioner and where counsel for Commissioner did not know of documents’ existence
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)Cases cited: Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2014) 9 ACTLR 178
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614
McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 98 CLR 263
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 296 ALR 307
Richard Walter Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 67 FCR 243
Tao Bai v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 612
Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1
WR Carpenter Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 237 CLR 198Date of hearing: 16 and 27 June 2014 Date of last submissions: 14 July 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 85 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Robertson QC with Ms L McBride Counsel for the Respondent: Mr BC Kasep Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Taxation Office
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 973
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the amended assessment was excessive, the standard of proof required for Ms Bai to establish the absence of fraud or evasion, and whether procedural fairness was observed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in handling the case. The court had to determine if the AAT applied the correct onus of proof and whether the Commissioner was required to provide certain documents to the AAT under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth).
The court held that the AAT had erred in applying the onus of proof to Ms Bai, who was required to prove on the balance of probabilities that there was no fraud or evasion. The court found that the AAT had applied the wrong standard of proof, which should have been the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. The court also concluded that there was no procedural unfairness because both parties had access to the relevant documents and neither party drew the Tribunal's attention to them. The court remitted the case back to the AAT to be heard and determined according to law.
The Federal Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, and the challenge to the 2005 assessment should be remitted to the AAT. The court also ordered that the Commissioner should pay the taxpayer's costs of the appeal, and the parties' costs in relation to notices to produce should be their costs in the proceedings. The parties were directed to bring in short minutes of orders to give effect to the court’s reasons for judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. On or before 18 September 2015 the parties bring in short minutes of orders to give effect to the Court’s reasons for judgment published today.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
She argued that the Commissioner’s assertion to her in cross-examination in the Tribunal that there was “not one record of any loan made … by High Trade to Brightfull” had led to procedural unfairness because the Commissioner had the two corroborative documents in his possession that showed that High Trade had provided financial support, at least in the form of its guarantees, for the Cronulla project. Accordingly, she argued, the matter ought be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted because of the Deputy President’s adverse view of her credibility, to consider whether she can establish that the 2005 assessment was excessive. However, the taxpayer did not lead any evidence to suggest (and I do not find) that when cross-examining her, counsel for the Commissioner had any awareness of the existence of the two corroborative documents that Mr Stone had located about one year before, in connection with the subsequently abandoned s 37(2) application.(3) The procedural fairness issue – consideration It is not necessary for me to express a final view on the procedural fairness issue. However, Ms Luk represented the taxpayer before the Tribunal and she had received the Commissioner’s evidence, including the four affidavits on which the Commissioner relied, and Ms Luk acted, in relation to the s 37(2) application and its withdrawal. I am not satisfied that the taxpayer was denied procedural fairness in the circumstances where she and her legal representative, Ms Luk, actually had the two documents on which she now relies in their possession at the time of the final hearing in the Tribunal. Those documents were available for use in those proceedings and the taxpayer could have deployed them in support of her case that the amended 2005 assessment was excessive. No doubt she, Ms Luk and, if he had ever seen or read them (of which there was no evidence) counsel for the Commissioner, may have forgotten about or overlooked the apparent relevance of those documents in a factually detailed, long and complex hearing in the Tribunal. There is no evidence that, first, the Tribunal ever had its attention drawn to the material in the four affidavits on which the taxpayer now relies at any time and in particular at the substantive hearing or, secondly, the Tribunal was asked to consider any part of those documents in its review. In Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38 at 99 [156] Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said (and see too: Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2014) 9 ACTLR 178 at 231 [166] per Rares, Wigney JJ and Cowdroy AJ):The rules of procedural fairness do not have immutably fixed content. As Gleeson CJ rightly observed (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 14 [37]) in the context of administrative decision-making but in terms which have more general and immediate application, “[f]airness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice”.