AZS v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation
[2014] NSWCATAD 147
•18 September 2014
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
New South Wales
Case Title: AZS v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation Medium Neutral Citation: [2014] NSWCATAD 147 Hearing Date(s): On the papers Decision Date: 18 September 2014 Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Before: J McAteer, Senior Member Decision: 1. Pursuant to section 38 (5) of the old Act I set aside the decision of the compensation assessor.
2. Pursuant to section 29 (1) (a) of the old Act I make an award of Statutory Compensation.
3. Pursuant to section 35 (1) of the old Act I make an award for costs.Catchwords: Civil Standard - Balance of Probabilities - Evidence - Act of Violence - Victims Compensation Legislation Cited: Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996
Victims Rights and Support Act 2013
Victims Rights and Support Regulation 2013Cases Cited: Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Sarah Jane Hill (2000) NSWCA 75
Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 [at 160]
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade [1991] HCA 61
Reifek v McElroy (1965) 112CLR 517 at 521-522Category: Principal judgment Parties: AZS - (Appellant)
Victims Compensation Fund Corporation - (Respondent)Representation - Solicitors: Kelso's the Law Firm (Appellant)
Inhouse Counsel (Respondent)File Number(s): 137298 (decision under appeal 171339) Publication Restriction: Section 64 (1) (a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act:
An order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal or a witness summoned by, or appearing before, the Tribunal).
REASONS FOR DECISION
AZS claims statutory compensation by way of an application lodged in December 2010, in which she alleges that she suffered a compensable injury as a result of being sexually assaulted (whilst a child) by an older relative at Marayong in the State of New South Wales.
I note that AZS was represented by Kelso's the Law Firm and continues to be represented for this subsequent appeal.
On 16 December 2010 AZS submitted the Application to the Victims Compensation Tribunal ("the Tribunal").
I note that the application was lodged outside of the statutory period required by section 26 of the old Act.
The matter was listed for leave to proceed out of time by way of letter dated 20 December 2010.
On 11 February 2011 leave was granted to proceed outside of the statutory limitation period of 2 years, presumably for the reasons outlined in section 26 (3) (b) of the old Act.
Also on 11 February 2011, approval was given for AZS to see an Authorised Report Writer (ARW) for the purpose of establishing evidence of a compensable injury in accordance with Schedule 1 Clause 5 (1) of the old Act.
On 18 May 2012 the Tribunal advised AZS's Solicitors that the matter was listed for determination at the first available opportunity on or after the month of September 2012.
I note that AZS's Solicitors were reminded of the need to ensure that all relevant evidence to establish the claimed compensable injuries must be received prior to the listing date.
On 18 April 2013, the Compensation Assessor determined that AZS was not entitled to compensation and issued a Notice of Determination under section 29 of the old Act. The Assessor found that there was insufficient evidence that AZS the victim of an act of violence, and dismissed the claim. The Notice of Determination , which was (inter-alia) in the following terms, advised:
...I note the solicitor's submissions on file and the statutory declaration in support of the applicant's claim. It appears that nothing on file actually predates the lodging of the applicant's claim for compensation and all documents appear to have been created for the purpose of the applicant's claim. I note that the applicant is claiming that she was a victim of a pattern of sexual abuse.
Incidents took place over ten years ago. There is no supporting evidence from the time in question or even moderately close to the time in question that supports the applicant's allegations. It appears that the first time the applicant ever sought any medical treatment in respect of the alleged sexual abuse was 2010 a few months before the applicant's claim for compensation was lodged. It does not appear that the incidents ever came to the attention of medical or school authorities, the department of community services or the applicant's parents.
The applicant reached her majority in 2007. Matters have never been reported to police or it appears a complaint made to the department of community services. As matters have never been reported to police the applicant has never provided a formal statement to police and the applicant's allegations have never been investigated or tested. I note the alleged offender appears to have never been charged or convicted of any offence whatsoever.
The applicant has seen a solicitor and an authorised report writer and prepared statutory declarations in support of her claim yet the applicant has never reported matters to any authority for investigation.
Taking into account the complete lack of supporting evidence from the time in question, the fact that little detail is provided in respect of what actually happened and the fact that matters have never been investigated and the alleged offender never charged or convicted of any offence whatsoever I cannot be satisfied that an act of violence is established.
Grounds of Appeal
The Notice of Appeal was lodged on 29 July 2013. The Grounds of Appeal are:
(1)The Assessor erred in dismissing the application for compensation;
(2)The Assessor erred failing to find act of violence;
(3)The Assessor did not give proper weight to the circumstances which impeded the Appellant's ability to
report this act of violence to police.
(4)The Assessor did not give proper weight to the multiple Statutory Declarations filed.
Particulars of appeal were filed in support of the application. Those particulars amplified the matters outlined in the Grounds of Appeal by way of submissions.
Application of the old Act
On 7/05/2013 the New South Wales Government introduced legislation that changed the form of support provided to victims of violent crime in New South Wales. The Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 ("the old Act") was repealed and replaced by the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 ("the new Act"). The legislation came into force on 4 June 2013 and the Tribunal was then abolished and, by operation of Clause 14 of Schedule 2 of the new Act, appeals to it were taken to have been commenced before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal ("ADT").
On 16 August 2013 the Registrar of the ADT wrote to AZS's Solicitors advising them of the matters outlined in paragraph 12 above.
However, also on 16/08/2013, Clause 16 of the Victims Rights and Support Regulation 2013 ("the Regulation") commenced operation. This provided that despite the repeal of section 36 of the repealed Act, if a notice of determination of a compensation assessor was served before the repeal and an appeal could have been duly made in accordance with section 36 (3) (a) if it were still in force, an appeal may be made after 3 June 2013 as if section 36 (other than section 36 (2) and (3) (b)) were still in force.
On 22 October 2013, the Registrar of ADT wrote to AZS's Solicitors advising them of the ADT's guideline for dealing with the appeal and the opportunity to make final submissions prior to the reserved date of 24 January 2014.
On 28 October 2013 AZS's Solicitors filed further evidence in support of the appeal.
On 1 November 2013, AZS's Solicitors provided amended Grounds of Appeal. Those amendments only related to the particulars in support of the appeal, and 'pleaded' the 'orders' sought by AZS of the ADT, in essence recognising the remedies again available under the old Act rather than the 2013 Act.
However, the ADT was abolished from the date of commencement of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 and Clause 7(1) of Schedule 1 Savings, transitional and other proceedings, provides:
All unheard proceedings in an existing tribunal are taken, on and from the establishment day, to have been duly commenced in NCAT and may be heard and determined instead by NCAT.
Further, Clause 7(3) provides:
For the purposes of subclauses (1) and (2):
(a) NCAT has and may exercise all the functions that the relevant existing tribunal had immediately before its abolition, and
(b) the provisions of any Act, statutory rule or other law that would have applied to or in respect of the proceedings had this Act and the relevant amending Acts not been enacted continue to apply.
As a Senior Member in the Administrative & Equal Opportunity Division of the NCAT, I have been directed by the President of the NCAT to hear the appeal and, in doing so, to exercise all the functions that were exercised by the Tribunal immediately before the commencement of the new Act.
Decision on the papers
AZS has not applied for the appeal to proceed by way of hearing and I am satisfied that the matter can be properly determined without a hearing under section 38(2) of the old Act, pursuant to section 38 (1).
The practice of the VCT and the practice of this Tribunal is that an appeal can be dealt with on the papers unless there is a significant issue of credibility in respect of the evidence.
(a) Section 38 (1) of the old Act provides that
(1) Except as provided by subsection (2), the Tribunal is to proceed to determine a matter the subject of an appeal or reference to it under this Division without a hearing.
(b) Section 38 (2) of the old Act provides that
(2) The Tribunal is to conduct a hearing into the matter if the Tribunal is satisfied that it cannot properly determine the matter without a hearing.
I note that the order of the Section 38 was rearranged by 2010 amendments to the legislation (Courts and Crimes Further Amendment Act 2010) whereby the old section 38 (1) became section 38 (2) and vice versa. In my view this reinforces the presumption that an appeal under the old Act is to proceed without a hearing unless the Tribunal is satisfied that it cannot properly determine the matter without a hearing, whereas prior to December 2010 the Tribunal could conduct a hearing on discretionary grounds. (Emphasis added).
In this matter I note the passage of time since the incidents which are the subject of this application. I also note that notwithstanding the fresh evidence sought to be admitted, there is evidence provided both by AZS and other persons relating to a contemporaneous disclosure, and disclosures in the months following cessation of the alleged t act of violence.
I note the evidence that was before the Assessor and the fresh evidence sought to be admitted. (See below). Notwithstanding the fresh evidence, based on the evidence before the Assessor, and the evidence referred to in paragraph 25 (above), I am satisfied that I can properly determine the matter on the material before me. I have considered all of the evidence even though I may not specifically refer to all of it in these reasons for decision.
Act of violence
Section 29(2) of the old Act provides that in order to make an award of compensation the Tribunal must be satisfied that:
... On the balance of probabilities, that the person to whom the application for that compensation relates:
(a) is a primary victim, secondary victim or family victim of an act of violence, and
(b) is eligible to receive the amount of compensation provided by the award.
The onus is on AZS to prove the allegations of act of violence on the balance of probabilities.
AZS must establish that an act of violence occurred in order to be entitled to compensation. Section 5 of the Act relevantly provides;
(1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons:
(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and
(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and
(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.
(1A) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to an offence in subsection (1) (a) extends to conduct of a person that would constitute an offence were it not for the fact that the person cannot, or might not, be held to be criminally responsible for the conduct because of the person's age or mental illness or impairment.
(2) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence (as defined in the Dictionary).
(3) Except as provided by subsections (3A) and (3B), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because:
(a) they were committed against the same person, and
(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or compensation assessor:
(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or
(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or
(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.
(3A) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or compensation assessor, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts.
(3B) An act is not related to any earlier act in respect of which an award of statutory compensation has been made if it occurs after the award was made.
(4) For the purposes of this Act, a series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, constitutes a single act of violence.
The evidence
I note the evidence provided by AZS. The evidence consists of the following matters:
·Matters declared in her application form,
·The Report of the incident(s) involving the perpetrator as reproduced at the top of page 2 of the ARW report dated 5 April 2012,
·AZS's statutory declaration of 17 March 2011,
·The Correspondence of 'D.A.H.' (the Mother) witnessed by a Justice of the Peace on 1 August 2011, which deals with a disclosure / attempted report in 1997/1998 and again in 2006,
·The Statutory Declaration of 'S.A.M.' 16 April 2012 which refers to a disclosure by AZS in 2003,
·The Statutory Declaration of 'B.C.M.' Declared 16 April 2012 which refers to a disclosure by AZS in 2003.
·The Statutory Declaration of 'A.M.K.' which refers to a disclosure by AZS in 2003.
I note that all of this material was before the compensation assessor.
The compensation assessor appears to place significant weight on the lack of reporting to Police, the apparent lack of any contemporaneous reports of the allegations, the lack of 'independent' (presumably non AZS) evidence, or evidence not brought into admissible form solely for the purpose of assisting with a victims compensation claim. The Assessor refers to the fact that there is no supporting evidence from the time in question or even moderately close to the time in question. As the matter was never reported to police or any other form of authority, this situation is unsurprising and uncontroversial. If AZS said that she made no formal report at or soon after the incidents, then the nature of the available evidence is as one would expect.
The assessor also refers to the fact that certain matters have been undertaken by AZS in recent years in order to assist with her victims compensation claim, yet the matters have never been reported to police. Whilst the old Act provides that the Assessor must have regard to whether a matter was reported to a police officer within a reasonable time, the Act does not specify what import a delay, or a decision not to report a matter to police should have on the merits of the claim. These matters under section 30 of the old Act are matters which become relevant only when a decision has been made to consider an award of statutory compensation after establishing both act of violence and compensable injury above the threshold on the evidence before the Assessor. Whilst the old Act makes it mandatory to have regard to the matters in section 30, the old Act does not specify what import that those matters should have on the claim, just that those issues must be considered.
There is evidence that the matter came to the attention of the AZS's mother around about the time when the alleged assaults were coming to an end (see the Mothers evidence concerning AZS's attempts to raise the issue with her when she was around 8 years of age - either 1997 or 1998). This evidence appears in contrast to the assessor's finding.
Whilst it is for a decision maker to be reasonably satisfied on the available evidence, that it is more likely than not that a specific allegation occurred, the particulars sought (to my mind) appear to go to a higher level requiring some type of contemporaneous corroboration, verification and other levels of substantiation. One only needs to be reasonably satisfied on the available evidence.
The information in the statement of the mother ('D.A.H.') coupled with the later disclosures in the Statutory Declarations of S.A.M., B.C.M. and A.M.K. provide significant weight to a contemporaneous, or at the very least historical corroboration of allegations being made. I note the age of AZS at the time of the incident, as well as other matters relating to other acts of violence, and the extended family circumstances relating to the incidents.
The onus is on AZS to prove the allegations of act of violence on the balance of probabilities. While the onus on the appellant is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities the following statements of the High Court in Reifek v McElroy (1965) 112CLR 517 at 521-522 apply:
The difference between the criminal standard of proof and the civil standard of proof is no mere matter of words: it is a matter of critical substance. No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in a civil case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to support a conviction upon a criminal charge.
I note that the above test was formulated in adversarial proceedings, unlike applications for statutory compensation and subsequent appeals.
Whether to receive further evidence
Section 38 (3) of the old Act provides that the appeal from a determination of a Compensation Assessor is to be determined "on the evidence and material provided to the Assessor". As outlined earlier, I have read and considered the whole of the evidence before the Assessor. I have taken it all into account even though I may not refer specifically to all the evidence and material in these reasons.
Section 38(3) of the old Act provides as follows -
"An appeal from a determination of a compensation assessor is to be determined on the evidence and material provided to the compensation assessor. However, the Tribunal may, by leave, receive further evidence and material if it considers that special grounds exist or if the evidence or material concerns matters occurring after the determination appealed against"
AZS seeks leave for the Tribunal to receive into evidence the following material -
A Statutory Declaration by 'KJR" dated 22 October 2013 which goes into more detail addressing section 5. KJR is the sister of the AZS.
The concept of "special grounds" in s 38(3) has been considered in many cases. In Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Sarah Jane Hill (2000) NSWCA 75 Court (Mason P, Sheller JA and Foster AJA) referred with approval to the test laid down for "special grounds" by the Court of Appeal in Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 [at 160]. Clarke JA (with whom Sheller and Powell JJA agreed on this point) said:
"Although it is not possible to formulate a test which should be applied in every case to determine whether special grounds exist there are well understood general principles upon which a determination is made. These principles require that, in general, three conditions need to be met before fresh evidence can be admitted. These are;
1. It must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;
2. The evidence must be such that there must be a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict;
3. The evidence must be credible.
In Wilson v The Prothonatory (2000) NSWCA 23 Heydon JA (with whom Sheller JA agreed) said [at 47];
"The tests (from Akins) are general principles or conditions applying to the generality of cases but the statutory discretion is capable of being exercised even if the tests are not all satisfied although such an exercise might only occur in exceptional circumstances."
See also Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quaid (1991) 178 CLR 134 at 140].
In Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Sarah Jane Hill the Court of Appeal observed, at [31];
"There appears no reason why those principles should not apply to S38 (3), despite the fact that the appeal to the Tribunal is not an appeal from a court to a court."
The Court also identified the legislative purpose for s 38(3) -
"26 The mischief that led to the enactment of s 38(3) was described by the Attorney General in debate in Committee on the Bill which became the Victims Compensation Act 1996. He explained why the Government opposed certain amendments (which were later rejected in the Legislative Council):
The Government takes the view that the amendments would undermine an essential element of the reform package. One of the difficulties in the existing scheme is the excessive litigation to which victim compensation claims give rise. There is a problem with applicants who, being legally represented before the Victims Compensation Tribunal, run a relatively perfunctory case and then, after taking advantage of the current right to an appeal de novo to the District Court, introduce a great deal more evidence and produce more extensive material.
(Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 15 May 1996)"
This Tribunal's Victim Support Division: Transitional Appeals: Guideline. A copy of which was sent to AZR's Solicitor, advises that -
If a party seeks to rely on new evidence or material that party must either identify the special grounds on which the evidence or material should be received or establish that the evidence or material concerns matters occurring after the determination appealed against. [old Act, s 38(3)]
This is not an exceptional case, which would justify setting aside one or more of the "special grounds" requirements. The following observation which the High Court (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) made in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade [1991] HCA 61, at [6] is apposite -
"If all that was necessary to procure the setting aside of a regularly obtained verdict was that the unsuccessful party show that fresh evidence which might have affected the outcome of the trial has become available after the trial, the verdicts of the courts would be of a provisional character only, being subject to the discovery of further relevant evidence."
Could the evidence have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the time of the Assessor's determination?
In my view, when one has regard to the Assessors Determination the evidence could have been provided earlier. The matters that the Assessor concluded could have been reasonably foreseen by AZS, however I note that the fresh evidence in essence merely amplifies the statutory declarations from AZS and third parties already filed in support of her claim. On this analysis, it could be argued that AZS could not foresee the need for this further evidence prior to the Assessor's determination. As outlined below, it is debatable whether this evidence (if admitted) is of equal weight to the evidence already before the Assessor in the first instance.
Is the evidence credible?
The evidence is no less credible (on the face of it) than any of the earlier evidence supplied by AZS, or on behalf of AZS.
Is the evidence likely to result in a different outcome?
Would it more likely than not it assist in a different outcome if it were received? On my assessment, as outlined above, the fresh evidence 'amplifies the matters relating to section 5, compensable injury, and section 30 (2) of the old Act. I have formed the view after looking at all of the evidence on file, that the fresh evidence is not the basis that this appeal is likely to result in a different outcome for AZS, as nothing of any great import (for reasons which will become self- apparent) turns on it. I also note my comments at the conclusion of paragraph 48 (above).
Therefore in the exercise of my statutory discretion I decline to receive the fresh evidence.
Consideration
Based on the definition in the dictionary to the old Act and section 5 (as set out above), and the medical evidence on file, as well as other sworn testimony, I am satisfied that the incidents that are described in the Application can properly be determined as an "act of violence" for the purposes of Section 5(1) of the old Act. The term 'offence' is defined in the dictionary to the old Act as 'criminal offence. On the material in the ARW Report the primary victim (AZS) has clearly sustained an injury (section 5 (1) (c) of the old Act) being 'psychological harm' (as defined in the dictionary to the old Act).
Having considered all of the evidence before the Assessor, I make a finding that AZS was the victim of an act of violence in accordance with section 5 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the old Act:
Has AZS sustained a compensable injury above the threshold?
Schedule 1 contains special provisions relating specified types of compensable injury. These include psychological or psychiatric disorder, sexual assault, burns and scarring and domestic violence. With respect to psychological or psychiatric disorder Clause 5 provides:
(1) For the purposes of establishing whether there is a compensable injury of psychological or psychiatric disorder, an application relating to statutory compensation for such an injury must be accompanied by a written assessment of the applicant's condition prepared by a qualified person chosen from a list of qualified persons designated by the Director.
(1A) In determining such an application, the Tribunal or compensation assessor concerned is not required to have regard to any report or assessment other than the assessment referred to in subclause (1).
(2) The Director may suspend or revoke the designation of a person under subclause (1).
(3) The compensable injury of psychological or psychiatric disorder (category 1) applies only in relation to an act of violence that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of any of the following offences:
(a) armed robbery,
(b) abduction,(c) kidnapping.
Psychological or Psychiatric injury
In respect of the claim for a Category 2 Psychological or Psychiatric Disorder compensable injury, I note the ARW's diagnosis and rating of AZS's level of disability. The ARW assigns a diagnosis of Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder and a moderate level of disability as a direct result of the impacts of the act of violence. Based on the evidence obtained in the ARW report, it is clear that AZS's overall functioning, condition and level of disability is a culmination of a significant number of stressors initially arising from the acts of violence but also exacerbated by consequential matters arising in the intervening years, starting in adolescence and through early parenthood. However, due to the absence of a chronic disorder that is severely disabling at the time of the assessment, it is not possible to find that a severe level of disability arises as a direct result of the act of violence, or as a result of the relevant exacerbation, aggravation, deterioration, or amelioration of an existing condition as per Clause 4 of Schedule 1 of the old Act. (Emphasis added).
'Offence based' injuries - s-11
I note the other compensable injuries claimed by AZS . In order for a Category 3 Sexual Assault award to be made, the decision maker must be satisfied that the act of violence involved:
·A pattern of abuse involving category 1 or category 2 sexual abuse,
·Unlawful sexual intercourse in which serious bodily injury is inflicted, or
·Unlawful sexual intercourse in which 2 or more offenders are involved, or
·Unlawful sexual intercourse in which the offender uses an offensive weapon.
The evidence is contained in AZS's application form, her statutory declarations, and the self-reporting recorded by the ARW. The Category 3 prong is presumably argued on the basis of a pattern of abuse, as in the absence of a Category 2 Psychological Disorder (or any other evidence) it is not possible to find any basis of the serious bodily injury aspect of this compensable injury. I note that there are no submissions on this point.
I note the evidence that the offender's offending occurred opportunistically at frequent intervals over a maximum period of six years. The evidence appears to indicate that there were more than half a dozen instances but possibly less than two dozen. I use the term 'indicate' as due to the understandably somewhat 'vague' recollection of the details (as explained by AZS and analysed by the ARW), coupled with evidence that the perpetrator had more than one victim, it appears on the totality of the evidence that the abuse was occasional over the years referred to above.
On this basis I can consider a Category 3 award based on a 'pattern' of Category 1 and / or Category 2 sexual assault.
Having regard to the matters contained within the Statutory Declarations of the Applicant, the Solicitors submissions, and noting the age of the victim at the time and the matters in section 30 (2) of the old Act, I determine that there are no relevant section 30 issues.
Section 14(1) of the old Act provides:
(1) The statutory compensation for which a primary victim of an act of violence is eligible comprises:
(a) compensation for compensable injuries received by the victim as a direct result of the act of violence, and
(b) compensation for financial loss incurred by the victim as a direct result of any such compensable injury.
The following compensable injuries are present:
·Sexual Assault Category 3 - a pattern of abuse involving category 1 or category 2 sexual assault.
Conclusion
I make the following orders:
(1)Pursuant to section 38 (5) of the old Act, I set aside the decision of the compensation assessor.
(2)I make an award of statutory compensation for Category 3 Sexual assault in the sum of $25,000.00
(3)I make an award for costs under section 35 (1) in the sum of $500.00 plus GST if applicable.
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