FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AZAFV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 79
Appeal from: AZAFV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2407 File number: SAD 322 of 2015 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 10 February 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision – whether change in hearing date before the Federal Circuit Court resulted in a breach of the rules of procedural fairness – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a), s 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Schedule 2
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123 at 1127; [2009] HCA 39
NAHI v Minister for Immigration Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301
Date of hearing: 10 February 2016 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Tredrea Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SAD 322 of 2015 BETWEEN: AZAFV
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
3.If taxed, the amount of costs awarded is not to exceed the sum of $5800.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (which is now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (the visa) pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The principal issue raised on the appeal is whether the change in the date on which the application for judicial review was listed in the Court below resulted in a breach of procedural fairness. For the reasons below, there was no breach of procedural fairness occasioned. Otherwise, the appeal seeks to challenge adverse findings of fact by the Tribunal which were open to it as a matter of law. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The appellant’s claims for protection and decision…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 79
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues involved whether the change in the hearing date before the Federal Circuit Court resulted in a breach of procedural fairness, as well as whether the Tribunal's findings were open to challenge on legal grounds. The court examined the procedural fairness of the hearing date change and considered whether the appellant had sufficient time to prepare his case despite the earlier hearing date. The court also scrutinized the Tribunal's findings to determine if they were legally sustainable.
The court found that there was no breach of procedural fairness as the appellant was given adequate notice of the change in the hearing date and still had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. The court held that the appellant had ample opportunity to file necessary evidence and submissions, and the change in the hearing date did not deprive him of a reasonable opportunity to present his case. Additionally, the court concluded that the Tribunal's findings were legally sound and open to it, thus the appeal was dismissed on both grounds.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal is dismissed, the appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed, and if taxed, the amount of costs awarded is not to exceed the sum of $5800.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
3. If taxed, the amount of costs awarded is not to exceed the sum of $5800.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant seeks the following orders from the Court:[1] To give me protection or complimentary protection.[2] Exempt from the cost of first respondent and other costs.(errors in original.)3. CONSIDERATION The appellant did not file any written submissions in advance of the hearing but made oral submissions at the hearing which raised two grounds. I note with respect to the first ground of the appeal that it appeared at one point in his oral submissions in reply that the appellant sought an adjournment. However, upon the matter being clarified, it was apparent that no such application was made but rather the submissions were directed towards addressing the first ground. In any event I would have refused any such adjournment, given in particular the lateness of any such application. 3.1 The change in the date of the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court First, the appellant submitted that the primary judge erred because the hearing date in the Federal Circuit Court was brought forward and he had consequential problems in preparing for the hearing. In this regard, the order made by the Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court on 13 March 2015 listed the matter for hearing on 9 September 2015. However, by a letter dated 3 August 2015 from the associate to the primary judge, the parties were advised that the hearing had been re-scheduled for 10am on 26 August 2015. The appellant’s submission amounts in effect to an allegation of a breach of the rules of procedural fairness by the Federal Circuit Court by reason of the reduction in preparation time occasioned by the change in the hearing date. In this regard, the Full Court recently said in Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301 (Shrestha) at 308-309 [37]-[38] that:It is axiomatic that the primary judge was obliged to accord procedural fairness to the appellant: Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1; Re JRL;Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 350 per Mason J; Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 184-185 per Kirby J. Counsel for the Minister did not, of course, gainsay that proposition.It is equally axiomatic that the requirements of procedural fairness include the provision of a reasonable opportunity for the appellant to present evidence and to make submissions: Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 at 589 per Rich J; Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383 at 395-396 per Dixon and Webb JJ. The reasons of the Federal Circuit Court do not refer to any application for an adjournment and no such application or foreshadowed application is apparent from the Court file. Nor was it clear from the appellant’s submissions whether or not he recalled making any such application although he seemed to suggest that he may have raised this with Registry staff but had been told that it was not possible. Ultimately, however, it is unnecessary to decide whether or not any such application was made or was raised with the Registry. In my view, this is plainly not a case where the appellant was deprived of a reasonable time within which to regularise his materials and present his arguments: cf Shrestha. First, depending upon precisely when the letter was received, the appellant was given 3 weeks or so advance notice of the change in the date. Secondly, it was not suggested that the appellant was deprived of the opportunity, for example, to file evidence in support of his application by reason of the fact that the hearing had been moved to an earlier date: cf Shrestha at 311-312 [57]-[59]. To the contrary, under the orders made by the Registrar on 13 March 2015, any evidence on which the appellant sought to rely, including the transcript before the Tribunal, should have been filed by 3 July 2015 and therefore before the change in the listing date. The Court Book had also been filed earlier on 20 April 2015. Thirdly, the only outstanding material was the appellant’s outline of submissions to be filed and served 10 business days before the hearing and the Minister’s outline, 3 business days before the hearing. As a consequence of the new trial date, the appellant’s submissions were therefore to be filed by 12 August 2015 which, while earlier than originally provided for, was not an unreasonable period given among other things the time which had already elapsed since the matter was originally set down. In the fourth place, the appellant had already had almost 6 months within which to engage a legal representative if he so wished and there was no suggestion by the appellant that he would have been able, or intended, to secure legal representation but was deprived of that opportunity by reason of the changed date for the hearing. The mere fact that he was unable, as the appellant suggests, to engage pro bono legal representation does not in itself establish a breach of procedural fairness.