Ayles v The Queen - [2007] HCATrans 625

[2007] HCATrans 625

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A40 of 2007

B e t w e e n -
RAYMOND FREDERICK AYLES
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 24 OCTOBER 2007, AT 9.56 AM

(Continued from 23/10/07)

MR KOURAKIS: If the Court pleases, can I jump straight back into section 281 and say, your Honours, that the respondent accepts it is plainly for the prosecuting authorities to select the conduct that will be prosecuted and the provision of the law on which the prosecutor will rely. Section 281 does not in any way require the trial judge to assume that responsibility about the basic selection of the conduct and the charge. It addresses another question. It addresses the practical problem that the identification of the conduct and the source of the law by the prosecutor may be imperfectly described or addressed in the information.

The responsibility that the judge has under subsection (2) is to ensure that the information, the pleading if you like, is maintained in form that both properly states the prosecution case and ensures a fair trial. If the limitations on subsection (2) which are addressed, without taking your Honours to it, in paragraph 33 of our submissions are properly understood, the occasion will never arise for the trial judge to engage in that prosecutorial function of selecting the conduct that is to be charged. It is purely a responsibility for the state of the pleadings that arises out of two parts of subsection (2).

First, the requirement that there be no amendment unless the information is defective or there is a variation in the particulars, and the other requirement, that no amendment can be made if it would do injustice to the accused. The trial judge could not embark on any inquisitorial role or prosecutorial role without departing from those two important limitations on the section.

Your Honours, the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of the pleadings in a proper form that will allow the conduct to be tried fairly is not, in my submission, in any way antithetical to the judicial function but it is part of the responsibility one would expect, particularly of a trial judge in criminal matters. The responsibility of trial judges about leave in certain offences, even if they are not raised by the accused, is but one example of that overall responsibility.

KIRBY J: I suppose it depends on the particular case and it varies from case to case, but I am trying to think of what one would normally do if you find something like this in the pleadings when everything is over and you are sitting there in the quiet of your chambers and suddenly you realise that there is a wrong section or a wrong charge. I would have thought that normally on a matter so important…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ayles v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ayles v The Queen [2007] HCATrans 625
Case: [2007] HCATrans 625
Decision Date: 24 October 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Ayles against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained from Mr Ayles following his arrest, specifically statements made by him and the results of a blood sample taken from him. The prosecution sought to rely on this evidence, while the defence argued it was improperly obtained and should have been excluded.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence obtained from Mr Ayles was admissible in light of the circumstances of his arrest and detention. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the police acted unlawfully in detaining Mr Ayles for an extended period without charging him and whether the subsequent taking of the blood sample and obtaining of statements constituted an abuse of process or a breach of his rights, thereby rendering the evidence inadmissible. The Court also considered the application of the exclusionary rule in relation to improperly obtained evidence.

The Court ultimately held that the detention of Mr Ayles was unlawful and that the evidence obtained thereafter was therefore inadmissible. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Kiefel JJ jointly reasoned that the police had no lawful basis to continue detaining Mr Ayles once they had formed the view that there was insufficient evidence to charge him. The subsequent actions of the police in obtaining statements and a blood sample were tainted by this initial unlawful detention. Kirby J, in a separate judgment, agreed with the outcome but based his reasoning on the broader principles of abuse of process. The Court affirmed the principle that evidence obtained in breach of the law, particularly where it involves unlawful detention, may be excluded if its admission would be unfair to the accused or bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders