FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
AXV19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 427
File number: MLG 649 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 28 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (subclass 866) visa – review of decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal – judicial review – definition of refugee – risk of persecution of significant harm – whether the Tribunal found relocation necessary to avoid risk of harm – whether internal relocation principle engaged – whether the Tribunal required to assess reasonableness of relocation – whether Tribunal failed to conduct relocation assessment – Tribunal’s decision attended by jurisdictional error – writ of certiorari issued – writ of mandamus issued Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1), 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R, 91S, 499
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 17.05(2)(g)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.12, sch 2, cl 866.221
Cases cited: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 322, 43 FCR 280
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45, 254 CLR 317
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6, 185 CLR 259
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40, 233 CLR 18
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 39 Date of last submission/s: 27 February 2025 Date of hearing: 14 March 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Aleksov Solicitors for the Applicants: Erskine Rodan and Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K McInnes Solicitors for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 649 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AXV19
First Applicant
AXW19
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorariissue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made on 11 February 2019 in Case No 1704488.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine, according to law, the application for review made to the AAT in Case No 1704488.
3.The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Gostencnik
INTRODUCTION
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 427
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal properly applied the internal relocation principle and whether it was required to assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh. The applicants submitted that the Tribunal’s failure to conduct a relocation analysis amounted to jurisdictional error. The Minister argued that the internal relocation principle did not apply because there was no finding that the first applicant faced a real chance of persecution in any place to which she is likely to return.
The court found in favour of the applicants and issued a writ of certiorari setting aside the Tribunal’s decision. The court held that the Tribunal had failed to properly apply the internal relocation principle. While the Tribunal did not find a real chance of persecution in any specific location, it did find that the first applicant could avoid harm by residing with her father or sibling. This finding triggered the application of the internal relocation principle and required the Tribunal to assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh. The court found that the Tribunal’s failure to conduct a relocation analysis amounted to jurisdictional error.
The court’s orders set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the court’s reasons. The Tribunal is required to properly apply the internal relocation principle and assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh to avoid a risk of persecution of significant harm.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Consequently, the Tribunal concluded the applicants did not meet the refugee criterion with respect to s 36(2)(a) of the Act, nor are they persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa): at [59]-[60]. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants protection visas: at [62]. CONSIDERATION The earlier mentioned judicial review application advances a single ground of review as follows:1.The Tribunal found that upon any return to Bangladesh, the [first] applicant might need to reside with her father in Rajbari to avoid harm (Reasons [51]). The applicant had resided there prior to her departure from Bangladesh, and upon any return there, residing in Rajbari would involve relocation. However, the Tribunal failed to conduct a relocation analysis with respect to her claims to complementary protection. In short compass, the applicants contend that the Tribunal accepted at [50] of the Decision, based on the available country information, that single women, or divorced women, are exposed to gender-based violence in Bangladesh. And at [51], it found that the first applicant could live near her father (regionally, in Rajbari), or near to one of her siblings in Dhaka, to avoid the threat of gender-based violence by gaining support and a degree of protection from these family members, and it considered the first applicant could live with one of the identified family members while she finds her feet on return to Bangladesh. The applicants contend that where, as here, the Tribunal having found the first applicant would need to make adjustments to their life (by living with an identified family member), even if temporarily, to avoid a risk of persecution of significant harm, and where there is any geographical dimension to the adjustment – for example, to move to a new part of the country, or reside in only one part of the country, or not to enter some part of the country – the internal relocation principle will arise. Consequently, the Tribunal is required to assess whether the adjustment is reasonable. The applicants contend that the notion of the first applicant living with her father in Rajbari, even if only temporarily, was a matter of relocation for the first applicant. To the same end, so too would be residence in Dhaka close to one of her elder siblings. Each amount to an adjustment to that which might otherwise be the first applicant’s residential choices. The applicants contend that the Tribunal could not rely on its findings at [51] to determine that the first applicant would not be at risk of serious harm without first undertaking an assessment of the reasonableness of relocation. The first respondent contends that the applicants misunderstand the Tribunal’s reasons set out at [50] and [51] of the Decision and says the principle of internal relocation did not arise. The issue of relocation did not arise, so the first respondent submits, because there was no finding by the Tribunal of a real chance of persecution in any place to which the first applicant is likely to return.