AXV19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AXV19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 427

File number: MLG 649 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
Date of judgment: 28 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (subclass 866) visa – review of decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal  – judicial review – definition of refugee – risk of persecution of significant harm – whether the Tribunal found relocation necessary to avoid risk of harm – whether internal relocation principle engaged – whether the Tribunal required to assess reasonableness of relocation – whether Tribunal failed to conduct relocation assessment –  Tribunal’s decision attended by jurisdictional error – writ of certiorari issued – writ of mandamus issued
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1), 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R, 91S, 499

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 17.05(2)(g)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.12, sch 2, cl 866.221

Cases cited:

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 322, 43 FCR 280

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45, 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6, 185 CLR 259

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40, 233 CLR 18

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 39
Date of last submission/s: 27 February 2025
Date of hearing: 14 March 2025 
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitors for the Applicants: Erskine Rodan and Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K McInnes
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 649 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AXV19

First Applicant

AXW19

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GOSTENCNIK

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorariissue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made on 11 February 2019 in Case No 1704488.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine, according to law, the application for review made to the AAT in Case No 1704488.

3.The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Judge Gostencnik

INTRODUCTION

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants in this case are citizens of Bangladesh seeking judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The applicants argue that the Tribunal failed to properly assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh to avoid persecution. The Tribunal had found that the first applicant could reside with her father in Rajbari or near one of her siblings in Dhaka to avoid gender-based violence. However, the applicants contend that this finding required the Tribunal to assess whether relocating was reasonable. They argue that where the Tribunal finds that relocation is necessary to avoid a risk of persecution, the internal relocation principle applies and the Tribunal must assess the reasonableness of the relocation.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal properly applied the internal relocation principle and whether it was required to assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh. The applicants submitted that the Tribunal’s failure to conduct a relocation analysis amounted to jurisdictional error. The Minister argued that the internal relocation principle did not apply because there was no finding that the first applicant faced a real chance of persecution in any place to which she is likely to return.

The court found in favour of the applicants and issued a writ of certiorari setting aside the Tribunal’s decision. The court held that the Tribunal had failed to properly apply the internal relocation principle. While the Tribunal did not find a real chance of persecution in any specific location, it did find that the first applicant could avoid harm by residing with her father or sibling. This finding triggered the application of the internal relocation principle and required the Tribunal to assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh. The court found that the Tribunal’s failure to conduct a relocation analysis amounted to jurisdictional error.

The court’s orders set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the court’s reasons. The Tribunal is required to properly apply the internal relocation principle and assess the reasonableness of relocating within Bangladesh to avoid a risk of persecution of significant harm.

Background

Background to the litigation

By their application made on 7 March 2019, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant the first applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa and refusing to grant the second applicant a visa as a member of the first applicant’s family unit. BACKGROUND The first applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 16 September 2014 with her son, the second applicant, on a Visitor (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa: Court Book (CB) 209. The first applicant applied for a protection visa on 9 December 2014 with the assistance of a solicitor and migration agent: CB1-CB18; CB76-CB92, and was granted an associated Bridging A (Class WA) (Subclass 010) visa: CB163-CB164. The second applicant was included in the application as a member of the same family unit: CB8-CB18; CB105-CB111. The application was accompanied by the first applicant’s Statutory Declaration made on 8 December 2014: CB93-CB103, which detailed the first applicant’s protection visa claims, contending that she feared harm from her former husband who was violent and emotionally abusive. The first applicant claimed that she was ridiculed and ostracised for being a Shia Muslim. She claimed to fear harm in Bangladesh from her former husband and his family, from the Sunni Muslim community because of her Shia Muslim religion, and because she is a divorced woman and a single mother. The first applicant claimed that there was no place in Bangladesh to which she could relocate so that she would be safe from feared harm and that it would be difficult for her to move to another part of Bangladesh as a single mother without family support or employment connections. The first applicant claimed that the local Bengali authorities “do not protect women at all and regard family violence as a private matter”: CB93 at [2]. Receipt of the protection visa application was acknowledged on 28 January 2015: CB150-CB157. On 20 December 2016, the delegate invited the first applicant to attend an interview scheduled on 23 January 2017 to discuss the claims in her application: CB168-CB171, and enclosed with the correspondence an ‘Important information about your protection visa interview’ factsheet: CB172-CB180. By email transmission on 23 December 2016, the first applicant’s migration agent informed the Department that neither she, nor the first applicant were available on the scheduled interview date, and a case officer from the Department confirmed on 4 January 2019 by reply email that the interview date was re-scheduled to 6 February 2017: CB182-CB183. On 1 February 2017, by email transmission, the migration agent provided the Department a Supplementary Statement in support of the applicant’s visa application. The applicants’ migration agent informed the Department that “there were some minor errors” in the prior Statutory Declaration, and that “[the first applicant] wanted to clarify and provide further information about certain related matters”. The migration agent also noted that the first applicant completed the Supplementary Statement “with the assistance of a friend”: CB181. The Supplementary Statement similarly detailed the first applicant’s protection visa claims: CB184-CB201.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By its decision made on 11 February 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision refusing to grant the applicants a protection visa. The applicants were notified of the Tribunal’s decision by email transmission on 12 February 2019: CB448, which attached a copy of the Tribunal’s Statement of Decision and Reasons (Decision): CB452-CB475, and an ‘Information about decisions – MR Division’ factsheet: CB449-CB451.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS The Tribunal’s decision begins with a summary of the background to the review application, including a summary of the delegate’s decision: at [1]-[8]. That which follows at [9]-[14] are the Tribunal’s summaries of the first applicant’s: protection visa claims set out in her Statutory Declaration dated 8 December 2014; Supplementary Statement by the first applicant’s representative provided 1 February 2017; further submission dated 9 March 2018; and supporting documents enclosed with the submission. At Attachment A to the Decision, the Tribunal set out that which it identified as the applicable law and relevant protection visa criteria, by reference to ss 5, 36, 91R, 91S, 499 of the Act, Sch 2 to the Regulations, Ministerial Direction No.56, and Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention). The Tribunal noted the criterion in relation to the second applicant who is a member of the same family unit, referencing ss 5(1) and 36, and reg 1.12 of the Regulations, and referred in its Decision to the 2016 and 2018 Country Information Report of Bangladesh by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in assessing the first applicant’s protection visa claims. The Tribunal discussed its findings and reasons at [15]-[58] of the Decision, noting at [15] that the issue before the Tribunal was whether the first applicant faced a real chance of suffering treatment that would amount to persecution involving serious harm, and whether there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal concluded at [16] that the decision under review should be affirmed, and proceeded to discuss its assessment of the first applicant’s protection claims. The Tribunal noted at [23] of the Decision that it “ha[d] significant concerns regarding the [first] applicant’s credibility” and identified that which it regarded as significant discrepancies between her 8 December 2014 Statutory Declaration and her 1 February 2017 Supplementary Statement. During the hearing, the Tribunal asked the first applicant about the discrepancies, and the Decision records that she stated that after the application was submitted by her legal representative, she sought a translation by her Bengali friend who assisted her to prepare a revised statement in English, which was subsequently submitted on 1 February 2017. The Tribunal records that it endeavoured to discuss the discrepancies between the two statements and notes the first applicant’s response as “she is not very comfortable talking about her initial statement as she made many mistakes when that was prepared”: at [25]. The Tribunal observed that as the initial statement was prepared over a significant period of time with an experienced legal practitioner and the assistance of a Bengali interpreter, it did not accept that the discrepancies were a product of unintentional error or oversights. The Tribunal put the first applicant on notice that her credibility was an issue and that it could not ignore her initial statement. The Tribunal considered that “the applicant chose quite deliberately to manufacture and alter the elements of her account over a period of time”, and found that this raised serious questions about her motives and the credibility and veracity of her claimed genuine statement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Consequently, the Tribunal concluded the applicants did not meet the refugee criterion with respect to s 36(2)(a) of the Act, nor are they persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa): at [59]-[60]. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants protection visas: at [62]. CONSIDERATION The earlier mentioned judicial review application advances a single ground of review as follows:1.The Tribunal found that upon any return to Bangladesh, the [first] applicant might need to reside with her father in Rajbari to avoid harm (Reasons [51]). The applicant had resided there prior to her departure from Bangladesh, and upon any return there, residing in Rajbari would involve relocation. However, the Tribunal failed to conduct a relocation analysis with respect to her claims to complementary protection. In short compass, the applicants contend that the Tribunal accepted at [50] of the Decision, based on the available country information, that single women, or divorced women, are exposed to gender-based violence in Bangladesh. And at [51], it found that the first applicant could live near her father (regionally, in Rajbari), or near to one of her siblings in Dhaka, to avoid the threat of gender-based violence by gaining support and a degree of protection from these family members, and it considered the first applicant could live with one of the identified family members while she finds her feet on return to Bangladesh. The applicants contend that where, as here, the Tribunal having found the first applicant would need to make adjustments to their life (by living with an identified family member), even if temporarily, to avoid a risk of persecution of significant harm, and where there is any geographical dimension to the adjustment – for example, to move to a new part of the country, or reside in only one part of the country, or not to enter some part of the country – the internal relocation principle will arise. Consequently, the Tribunal is required to assess whether the adjustment is reasonable. The applicants contend that the notion of the first applicant living with her father in Rajbari, even if only temporarily, was a matter of relocation for the first applicant. To the same end, so too would be residence in Dhaka close to one of her elder siblings. Each amount to an adjustment to that which might otherwise be the first applicant’s residential choices. The applicants contend that the Tribunal could not rely on its findings at [51] to determine that the first applicant would not be at risk of serious harm without first undertaking an assessment of the reasonableness of relocation. The first respondent contends that the applicants misunderstand the Tribunal’s reasons set out at [50] and [51] of the Decision and says the principle of internal relocation did not arise. The issue of relocation did not arise, so the first respondent submits, because there was no finding by the Tribunal of a real chance of persecution in any place to which the first applicant is likely to return.