FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1002
Appeal from: AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 226 File number: NSD 290 of 2016 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 24 August 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – where Tribunal did not consider appellant a credible witness – whether Tribunal applied wrong test in assessing risk of harm if appellant returned – whether Tribunal erred in giving appellant’s supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to appellant’s credibility and on country information – appeal dismissed.
MIGRATION – obligation to provide reasons under s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 424AA, 430 Cases cited: BAX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 491
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; (2010) 184 FCR 485
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
SZQHH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 45; (2012) 200 FCR 223
SZRBA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 81; (2014) 314 ALR 146
Date of hearing: 11 May 2016 Date of last submissions: 1 July 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Keevers, Solicitor of Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 290 of 2016 BETWEEN: AWD15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal). The appellant claimed a fear of persecution or significant harm by reason of his Tamil ethnicity, his support for the United National Party (UNP), and the difficulties he would face as a failed asylum seeker, forced returnee and by reason of having left Sri Lanka illegally. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa).
The sole ground of appeal raised in the…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1002
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal applied the wrong test in assessing the risk of harm if the appellant were to return to Sri Lanka, and whether the Tribunal erred in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to the appellant's credibility and on country information. The court held that the Tribunal did not apply the wrong test in assessing the risk of harm, and that it was not in error in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight. The court found that the Tribunal had given the appellant a genuine hearing and made comprehensive adverse findings in relation to the appellant's claims.
The court's reasoning was that a determination of whether a fear is "well-founded" requires the Tribunal to assess what may occur in the future, even though past events may assist in assessing what is likely to occur in the future. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility or in applying the correct test in assessing the risk of harm. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to the appellant's credibility and on country information.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed. The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed and that the appellant was to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge concluded that the appellant’s first ground was an impermissible challenge to the merits of the Tribunal decision and failed to make out any jurisdictional error. As to the second ground, the primary judge concluded that the Tribunal gave the appellant a genuine hearing and made comprehensive adverse findings in relation to the appellant’s claims. 3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Did the Tribunal apply the correct test in assessing the risk of harm if the appellant is returned? The appellant took issue with the manner in which the Tribunal set about the task of assessing the risk of harm if he is returned to Sri Lanka. Specifically, the appellant contended that the Tribunal had engaged in “guessing what will happen to me if I go back” and relied upon past events. As noted by the respondent in further written submissions, this ground appears to be that the Tribunal applied the wrong test in respect of the appellant’s risk of future harm in that it based its findings on this issue on its assessment of whether or not the appellant had suffered harm in the past. With respect, I do not accept the appellant’s submission. First, a determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” for the purposes of determining whether the appellant satisfies the definition of a refugee requires the Tribunal to assess what may occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real substantial basis for it”, even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). On the other hand, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”: ibid. Similarly, in determining whether there is a real chance that the appellant may suffer significant harm in the sense defined for the purposes of his complementary protection claim, the Tribunal must reach a view as to what may occur in the future. Secondly, in forming an opinion as to whether there is a real chance of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason, past events may assist in assessing what is likely to occur in the future. As the joint judgment held in Guo at 574, “[p]ast events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability — high or low — of their recurrence.” Thus, in the context of applying the definition of a refugee in the Refugees Convention, the joint judgment in Guo held at 575:Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many, if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future. It is therefore ordinarily an integral part of the process of making a determination concerning the chance of something occurring in the future that conclusions are formed concerning past events.