AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1002

Appeal from: AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 226
File number: NSD 290 of 2016
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 24 August 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – where Tribunal did not consider appellant a credible witness – whether Tribunal applied wrong test in assessing risk of harm if appellant returned – whether Tribunal erred in giving appellant’s supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to appellant’s credibility and on country information – appeal dismissed.

MIGRATION – obligation to provide reasons under s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 424AA, 430
Cases cited:

BAX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 491

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; (2010) 184 FCR 485

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

SZQHH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 45; (2012) 200 FCR 223

SZRBA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 81; (2014) 314 ALR 146

Date of hearing: 11 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 1 July 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Keevers, Solicitor of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 290 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AWD15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal).  The appellant claimed a fear of persecution or significant harm by reason of his Tamil ethnicity, his support for the United National Party (UNP), and the difficulties he would face as a failed asylum seeker, forced returnee and by reason of having left Sri Lanka illegally.  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa). 

  2. The sole ground of appeal raised in the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1002
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AWD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the delegate's decision to refuse the grant of a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of his credibility and in its evaluation of the risk of harm if he were to return to Sri Lanka. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility or in applying the correct test in assessing the risk of harm if the appellant were to return.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal applied the wrong test in assessing the risk of harm if the appellant were to return to Sri Lanka, and whether the Tribunal erred in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to the appellant's credibility and on country information. The court held that the Tribunal did not apply the wrong test in assessing the risk of harm, and that it was not in error in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight. The court found that the Tribunal had given the appellant a genuine hearing and made comprehensive adverse findings in relation to the appellant's claims.

The court's reasoning was that a determination of whether a fear is "well-founded" requires the Tribunal to assess what may occur in the future, even though past events may assist in assessing what is likely to occur in the future. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility or in applying the correct test in assessing the risk of harm. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in giving the appellant's supporting documents no weight based on prior findings as to the appellant's credibility and on country information.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed. The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed and that the appellant was to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal must be dismissed. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 Visa application and decision of the delegate The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia in August 2012 as an Irregular Maritime Arrival. The appellant lodged an application for the protection visa which was stamped as received on 28 August 2013. On 10 January 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused the grant of a protection visa. 2.2 The Tribunal’s decision On 16 January 2014, the appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision. Oral arguments were made and evidence was presented at a hearing before the Tribunal on 30 March 2015. The appellant was assisted by an interpreter and a representative. At the representative’s request, the appellant was given until 13 April 2015 to provide further written evidence and to provide written comments on matters raised at the hearing, pursuant to s 424AA of the Act. On 5 May 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Tribunal set out the appellant’s claim for protection at [1], [24] to [40] in its reasons. In summary, the appellant claimed he would face harm if returned for the following reasons:(1)he is an ethnic Tamil of Catholic faith married to a Sinhalese woman whose family does not support the marriage;(2)his active involvement in and strong support of the UNP and that of his family, including that he had previously canvassed votes and actively campaigned for UNP candidates;(3)his imputed favourable opinion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the basis of being a Tamil from the North West of Sri Lanka; (4)the fact that his is a Tamil from the North West of Sri Lanka; and(5)his status as a failed asylum seeker, a forced returnee from a Western country and his illegal departure from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claims. The Tribunal expressed “significant concerns regarding aspects of the applicant’s claims and evidence, particularly those he claims led him to leave Sri Lanka” (see [41] of the Tribunal’s reasons). As to the appellant’s marriage to a Sinhalese woman, the Tribunal noted that upon questioning the appellant, the appellant indicated that he did not now face any difficulties by reason of his marriage to a Sinhalese woman even though he did around the time of marriage, and he did not fear harm on this basis. The Tribunal accordingly rejected this aspect of the appellant’s claim (see [44]-[46] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal further found that the appellant was not credible as to his or his family’s active, past and future involvement in the UNP in the manner he claimed, concluding that his evidence was inconsistent, his knowledge not commensurate with the level of involvement claimed, and he “has fabricated these claims and concocted evidence to achieve an immigration outcome” (see [47]-[81] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal did not give any weight to the appellant’s documentary evidence which purported to support his claimed involvement with the UNP due the appellant’s lack of credibility and country information about the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Sri Lanka.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant lodged an application for the protection visa which was stamped as received on 28 August 2013. On 10 January 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused the grant of a protection visa. 2.2 The Tribunal’s decision On 16 January 2014, the appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision. Oral arguments were made and evidence was presented at a hearing before the Tribunal on 30 March 2015. The appellant was assisted by an interpreter and a representative. At the representative’s request, the appellant was given until 13 April 2015 to provide further written evidence and to provide written comments on matters raised at the hearing, pursuant to s 424AA of the Act. On 5 May 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Tribunal set out the appellant’s claim for protection at [1], [24] to [40] in its reasons. In summary, the appellant claimed he would face harm if returned for the following reasons:(1)he is an ethnic Tamil of Catholic faith married to a Sinhalese woman whose family does not support the marriage;(2)his active involvement in and strong support of the UNP and that of his family, including that he had previously canvassed votes and actively campaigned for UNP candidates;(3)his imputed favourable opinion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the basis of being a Tamil from the North West of Sri Lanka; (4)the fact that his is a Tamil from the North West of Sri Lanka; and(5)his status as a failed asylum seeker, a forced returnee from a Western country and his illegal departure from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claims. The Tribunal expressed “significant concerns regarding aspects of the applicant’s claims and evidence, particularly those he claims led him to leave Sri Lanka” (see [41] of the Tribunal’s reasons). As to the appellant’s marriage to a Sinhalese woman, the Tribunal noted that upon questioning the appellant, the appellant indicated that he did not now face any difficulties by reason of his marriage to a Sinhalese woman even though he did around the time of marriage, and he did not fear harm on this basis. The Tribunal accordingly rejected this aspect of the appellant’s claim (see [44]-[46] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal further found that the appellant was not credible as to his or his family’s active, past and future involvement in the UNP in the manner he claimed, concluding that his evidence was inconsistent, his knowledge not commensurate with the level of involvement claimed, and he “has fabricated these claims and concocted evidence to achieve an immigration outcome” (see [47]-[81] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal did not give any weight to the appellant’s documentary evidence which purported to support his claimed involvement with the UNP due the appellant’s lack of credibility and country information about the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal also did not accept the claim that the appellant would be perceived as a supporter of the LTTE (see [82]-[99] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal found that the appellant and his family had never been involved with, or were imputed to be involved in, the LTTE, or perceived to be opposed to the government due to their ethnicity, or that there was a real chance of the appellant suffering discrimination due to his ethnicity.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge concluded that the appellant’s first ground was an impermissible challenge to the merits of the Tribunal decision and failed to make out any jurisdictional error. As to the second ground, the primary judge concluded that the Tribunal gave the appellant a genuine hearing and made comprehensive adverse findings in relation to the appellant’s claims. 3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Did the Tribunal apply the correct test in assessing the risk of harm if the appellant is returned? The appellant took issue with the manner in which the Tribunal set about the task of assessing the risk of harm if he is returned to Sri Lanka. Specifically, the appellant contended that the Tribunal had engaged in “guessing what will happen to me if I go back” and relied upon past events. As noted by the respondent in further written submissions, this ground appears to be that the Tribunal applied the wrong test in respect of the appellant’s risk of future harm in that it based its findings on this issue on its assessment of whether or not the appellant had suffered harm in the past. With respect, I do not accept the appellant’s submission. First, a determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” for the purposes of determining whether the appellant satisfies the definition of a refugee requires the Tribunal to assess what may occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real substantial basis for it”, even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). On the other hand, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”: ibid. Similarly, in determining whether there is a real chance that the appellant may suffer significant harm in the sense defined for the purposes of his complementary protection claim, the Tribunal must reach a view as to what may occur in the future. Secondly, in forming an opinion as to whether there is a real chance of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason, past events may assist in assessing what is likely to occur in the future. As the joint judgment held in Guo at 574, “[p]ast events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability — high or low — of their recurrence.” Thus, in the context of applying the definition of a refugee in the Refugees Convention, the joint judgment in Guo held at 575:Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many, if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future. It is therefore ordinarily an integral part of the process of making a determination concerning the chance of something occurring in the future that conclusions are formed concerning past events.