AVK15 v Minister for Immigration

[2016] FCCA 2324

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AVK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2324

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for protection visa – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the Tribunal had regard to corroborating evidence of the applicant’s claims – whether the Tribunal failed to provide the material relied upon in making its decision – whether the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question – jurisdictional error – writs issued.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Applicant sought to rely on further amended application raising additional ground – leave granted.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 425, 430(1)

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
NAFF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1; [2004] HCA 62
Pokharel v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 34
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; [2003] HCA 30
Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 1599

Applicant: AVK15

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1416 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Smith

Hearing date: 30 May 2016

Date of Last Submission: 30 May 2016

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 15 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Chia

Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr W Sharpe, Minter Ellison

ORDERS

1. The name of the second respondent be amended to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The applicant have leave to rely on the further amended application attached to the written submissions dated 16 May 2016.

3. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision of the Tribunal dated 30 April 2015.

4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine the application made to it for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 9 December 2013 in accordance with the law.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1416 of 2015

AVK15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The applicant is a citizen of Iran who arrived in Australia on 4 August 2012 and lodged an application for a protection visa on 11 December 2012.

2. The applicant claimed to have converted from Islam to Christianity after meeting a friend of his wife who was a Christian. The applicant and his brother tried to attend an Armenian Christian church with this friend but were prevented from entering and they subsequently attended a “home church” conducted by the applicant’s uncle who had also converted to Christianity. The Iranian authorities became aware of these activities and the applicant and his brother were forced to go into hiding and then to leave Iran and travel to Australia.

3. The applicant also claimed to have participated in the Green Movement protests and demonstrations that occurred in Iran in 2009 following the presidential elections. He also claimed that he had been approached and questioned by the authorities about his manner of dress and hairstyle while in Iran.

4. Finally, the applicant claimed that he would be considered a spy and a traitor for having travelled overseas and for having sought protection in a Western country.

5. On 9 December 2013, a delegate of the Minister made a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal[1] for review of that decision.

   [1] As it was then known. On 1 July 2015 it became the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth).

6. The applicant’s brother also made a separate application for a protection visa, was refused that visa, and sought review of that decision by the Tribunal.

Tribunal’s decision

1. The applicant was invited by the Tribunal to attend a hearing to be conducted on 26 February 2015. Although the applicant did not request the Tribunal to obtain evidence from his brother, the issue of his brother’s claims was raised at the hearing and a written statement made by the applicant’s brother in support of his own visa application was provided to the Tribunal after the hearing by the applicant’s agent. It will be necessary to return to that statement in further detail.

2. At the hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant a number of questions about his claim to have attended a church named “Church of God” in Australia. It explained that its understanding of that church was that it was “based in South Korea with fairly unusual beliefs that are not mainstream to the Christian faith” and that “other Christian churches describe it as a cult”. It then referred to an “article from 2010” which referred to the Church of God and said that “… Mainstream Christians find its views unacceptable and… various cult support groups consider it to be a cult rather than a religion”. Towards the end of the hearing the Tribunal said that it would give to the applicant’s agent a copy of the article that it had referred to and that it would not make a decision on the application “for 7 days and possibly longer if it looks like other matters are relevant”.

3. By email dated 5 March 2015, the applicant’s agent wrote to the Tribunal reminding the Tribunal that it had indicated that it “would forward a copy of an article relied upon in the course of the hearing” and asking for a copy of the article at the Tribunal’s earliest convenience.

4. The Tribunal replied to this request by email the following day and purported to include an internet link to the article that it referred to. It was common ground before me that the link given by the Tribunal in this email was in fact not to the article referred to by the Tribunal.

5. The Tribunal made its decision on 30 April 2015 affirming the decision of the delegate of the Minister.

6. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s account of his religious activities in Iran or that those activities caused him to come to the adverse attention of the authorities there. One of the main reasons given by the Tribunal for these findings was the significant difference between the type of church the applicant claimed to have attended in Iran and the church that he attended in Australia. The former was of a Protestant denomination whereas, according to the independent sources referred to by the Tribunal, the Church of God held beliefs far outside mainstream Christian beliefs and had been described as a cult.

7. While the Tribunal accepted that the applicant may have attended Christian services in Australia, it did not accept that that attendance reflected a continuation of any interest in Christianity held by the applicant while in Iran. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had genuinely converted to the World Mission Church of God or that he would seek to practice that faith if he were to return to Iran now or in the foreseeable future.

8. For those reasons the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran on the basis of his religion.

9. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may have participated in demonstrations as claimed; however, given that he had not suffered any difficulties as a result, it found that there was no real chance that he would come to the adverse attention of the authorities because of those attendances. As the applicant did not claim that he proposed any further political activity, the Tribunal did not accept that he would engage in activities that may bring him to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities.

10. Next, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim to have come to the attention of the authorities in respect of his manner of dress and hairstyle. It found that the laws prescribing standards of Islamic dress and conduct to be laws of general application, applying to all Iranian citizens and would not be discriminatorily applied, implemented or enforced against the applicant for any Convention reason. For that reason, it concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his hairstyle or dress.

11. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may be identified by the Iranian authorities as a person who had unsuccessfully sought asylum in a Western country; however, in light of country information about forced returnees, it did not accept that he would be subjected to serious harm on that basis.

12. The Tribunal concluded, having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion in sub-s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth). For similar reasons, it also found that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria in sub-s.36(2)(aa) of the Act and so affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Consideration

1. There are two grounds in the amended application before the Court: first, that the Tribunal fell into error by failing to have regard to the corroborative evidence of the applicant’s brother; and secondly, that by failing to give the applicant a copy of the article relied upon by it in connection with the Church of God, the Tribunal either failed to review the delegate’s decision or failed to comply with its obligation under s.425 of the Act.

2. At the hearing the applicant sought leave to raise a third ground, namely, that in finding that the applicant had not genuinely converted to Christianity, the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question and so constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction. I reserved the question of leave and heard argument on all three grounds as though leave had been granted.

3. For the reasons that follow, the first ground will be successful, the second ground will fail, leave will be granted to rely on the third ground but it too will fail.

First ground: failure to have regard to corroborative evidence

1. It was not in dispute that the Tribunal did not refer to the statement made by the applicant’s brother and provided to it, by email on 13 March 2015, in its reasons. As the Minister submitted, however, that does not necessarily mean that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the statement. Section 430(1) of the Act requires the Tribunal to prepare a written statement that includes, amongst other things, its findings on any material questions of fact and refers to the evidence or any other material on which those findings of fact were based. These requirements entitle a court to infer that any matter not mentioned in the s.430 statement was not considered by the Tribunal to be material: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [69] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). That does not mean that a matter not mentioned in the Tribunal’s reasons was not considered: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 at [31] (French CJ and Kiefel J). Whether a matter was considered by the Tribunal is essentially a question of fact to be decided in all the relevant circumstances.

2. The Minister argued that the Tribunal had considered the statement: first, because the Tribunal was aware that the applicant’s brother had applied for a protection visa and sought review of the delegate’s refusal decision; and secondly, because the Tribunal referred in its statement of reasons to other aspects of the material provided to it at the same time as the brother’s statement.

3. I accept that those two matters weigh against the applicant. On the other hand, the brother’s statement was clearly corroborative of the applicant’s claims. On their version of events, the brothers had undertaken the same course of conversion and had fled Iran for the same reasons. The brother was, if accepted as truthful, an eyewitness to the events relied upon by the applicant. Further, the Tribunal referred to every other submission, witness statement and document relied upon by the applicant in support of his claims. In those circumstances, it is odd that the Tribunal would have considered the document but simply failed to refer to it at all in its statement of reasons. In light of the nature of the statement and the fact that the Tribunal’s decision was otherwise comprehensive, I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not have regard to it.

4. The failure by the Tribunal to consider material does not necessarily amount to jurisdictional error. In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317 (“SZRKT”) Robertson J said at [112]:

   As the Full Court said in VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [77] whether the Tribunal is obliged to consider a document or documents will depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document. In my opinion, the relevant factors in relation to (corroborative) evidence include first, the cogency of the evidentiary material and, second, the place of that material in the assessment of the applicant’s claims.

   …

5. Those comments have been approved in a number of cases since: see for example, Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114 at [46]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 at [52]; Pokharel v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 34 at [47].

6. The Minister argued that the corroborative evidence of the brother was able to be given no weight by the Tribunal on the basis that the applicant’s claims were not believed and, for that reason, the statement was not of such significance as to make it erroneous not to have regard to it. The premise of that argument may well be accepted (see Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; [2003] HCA 30 at [49]), however, it does not apply here. The point is that the Tribunal simply did not assess the brother’s statement. To suggest that the Tribunal could have rejected it is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, the suggestion is that the Tribunal would have rejected it, in that case, it goes only to the merits of the decision and is not a matter for investigation by the Court. What is important is what impact the statement could have had. That is why Robertson J found the cogency of the material overlooked in SZRKT was an important factor in deciding whether there was jurisdictional error. His Honour was careful to point out that the Court was not involved in traversing findings of fact made by the Tribunal: [120]. That is because the Tribunal did not deal with the particular material relied on by the applicant.

7. The two important considerations here are: first, that the statement, on its face, appeared to be a cogent corroboration of the applicant’s claims; and secondly, that the rejection of those claims was critical to the Tribunal’s decision. It is the connection between the material and the reasoning of the Tribunal that leads me to conclude that the failure by the Tribunal to consider the material was sufficiently serious as to amount to jurisdictional error.

8. For those reasons, the first ground is made out and the Tribunal’s decision must be set aside.

Second ground: failure to provide the applicant with material relied upon

1. The applicant argues in this ground that the failure by the Tribunal to provide the applicant with the article upon which it actually relied in accordance with its stated intention was an error analogous to that identified by the High Court in NAFF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1; [2004] HCA 62 (“NAFF”).

2. In that case, at the end of the hearing the Tribunal told the applicant that it would write to him about inconsistencies with regard to certain dates of events and then said: “So what I will do is to write to you in the next couple of days and you will have 21 days in which to respond…”. However, the Tribunal did not write to the applicant and instead proceeded to make a decision adverse to him.

3. The High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The plurality (McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ) said:

   [31]The case, then, is an unusual one. In her closing remarks on 5 February 2002, the Tribunal member was herself acknowledging that the purposes of the review had not been completely fulfilled by the documents supplied before 5 February 2002 or by the events of 5 February 2002. She was indicating that she had not yet finished receiving the presentation of arguments by the appellant which he had been invited to make, pursuant to s 425(1) of the Act, by the letter of 13 December 2001. She was saying that procedural fairness required some further steps to be taken, so that the matters indicated could be ironed out one way or the other. It is clear that the Tribunal member was in the best position to judge whether the review process was incomplete. Her conduct is only consistent with the formation of a firm impression that it was.

   [32]It is possible that the reason why the Tribunal member failed to send the promised questions was that, on reflection, she thought that everything she required had in fact already been put before her, or that a resolution of the perceived inconsistencies in the appellant's statements was not crucial in deciding the review against him. If either of these explanations, or any other explanation, existed, it is to be expected that the Tribunal member would have advanced it, either by a letter to the appellant or in her detailed reasons for decision. She did not do so. It is probable, when the workload under which the Tribunal labours is borne in mind, that the Tribunal member did not send the promised questions because she had forgotten or overlooked the fact that she had made the promise to send them. Her failure to give any indication otherwise suggested that her original impression that the review process was incomplete had not altered on reflection, and was soundly based. It would not be complete until the steps which she had thought could remedy its defects had been carried out. The failure to complete the review process was a failure to comply with the duty imposed by s 414(1) to conduct the review and the duty under s 425(1) to hear from the appellant.

   [33]Whatever the source of power to do what was done, its existence, in the context of the other powers listed in Pt 7 Divs 2-7A of the Act, suggests that its exercise was a serious matter. Thus the course contemplated by its exercise in the manner in which it was exercised in the present case, once embarked on, was not lightly to be departed from. There was no provision permitting the making of a decision affirming the delegate's decision, and the handing down of reasons for that decision, before the course contemplated was complete. Hence whether the Tribunal member was relying on s 427(1)(b) or s 415(1) read with s 56, that part of the process of review which involved participation by the appellant, as provided for in s 425(1), had not been concluded.

4. The analogy with that case, however, is not perfect. Here, unlike in NAFF, the Tribunal did write to the applicant and at least purported to provide information to him by way of his representatives. Further, the applicant’s representatives responded to the issue in respect of which the information was relevant. Given these differences, it is necessary to examine in a little more detail:

   i)the precise information that was promised;

   ii)the difference between that and the information that was given;

   iii)    the response to the information actually given; and

   iv)the extent of the reliance by the Tribunal on the information that was promised but not given.

1. The Tribunal’s summary of the information at the hearing has been set out at [8] above. In its decision, it stated at [19], (see also [28]):

   [19]  … As put to the applicant at hearing, independent sources indicate that church holds beliefs far outside mainstream Christian beliefs and has been described as a cult.

   …

2. The footnote to these statements was:

   Cult Information and Family Support Inc Australia 2 August 2010 World Mission Society Church of God: Tabs Kept on Church at (“The 2010 article”).

3. The link which was actually given to the applicant by way of email dated 6 March 2015 was: >

   The 2010 article was in evidence. It stated:

   CULT experts have vowed to keep tabs on a church group that has opened its new Melbourne headquarters in Pascoe Vale.

   The Korean-based World Mission Society Church of God moved from Nunawading into a vacant church in Pascoe Vale Rd in April. Church deaconess Hilda Dursun said the church’s growing congregation prompted a move to bigger premises.

   Cult experts contacted by the Leader said the group – which believes God lives in Korea in the form of a woman known as Heavenly Mother and that a man called Ahnsahnghong was the second coming of Jesus Christ – held views many mainstream Christians would find ‘‘unacceptable’’.

   Melbourne cult support group organiser David Ayliffe, who coauthored the book My Brother’s Eyes about his involvement in a fundamentalist group in NSW, said the group’s views were of concern.

   ‘‘Their extreme claims concerning Ahnsahnghong and the woman known as God the Mother means they can exercise, whether they do or not, controlling authority over the lives of any followers simply because of their interpretation of ‘God said’,’’ Mr Ayliffe said.

   Cult Information and Family Support network co-ordinator Ros Hodgkins said the group was lowkey in Australia but she was in contact with a group member’s parents. ‘‘They’ve had a pretty horrid time over the past couple of years,’’ Ms Hodgkins said.

   ‘‘Their child virtually gave and sold everything he had to get to Korea to meet with the saviour.’’

   Cult Counselling Australia director Raphael Aron said the group was ‘‘very much out of the general square when it comes to Christian churches’’.

   He said the group believed the world would end in 2012 and it needed 144,000 recruits before then.

   But group members hit back, saying such claims were wrong.

   Ms Dursun said the church’s teachings were all based on the Bible.

   ‘‘Many people can have their fixed idea about any church,’’ she said. ‘‘If people are against us, they are against people who follow God.’’

   The group’s ‘‘overseer’’ Jeon Chang Joo said the church was seeking to bring unity to peoples lives. ‘‘Earth is a kind of village and family but people have forgotten the existence of God the Mother,’’ Mr Joo said.

   Ms Dursun said the group was well-established worldwide with 1.1 million members and the United Nations had recently recognised its charity work in raising $100,000 for the Haiti disaster relief fund.

4. There was also evidence of what was accessible by following the link actually given to the applicant by the Tribunal. First, there is what appears to be the part of the “Cult Education Institute” website dedicated to the “World Mission Society Church of God”. There are links to other pages both in the middle of that page as well as on either side of the page. One of those links is entitled “Church bought by Korean group”. That link takes you to an article from the Otago Daily Times dated 10 June 2012 which states:

   A Korean religious group which has been described as a cult is to establish a new church in Dunedin.

   The World Mission Society Church of God was confirmed yesterday as the buyer of the former Roslyn Presbyterian Church, in Highgate, Dunedin.

   The church, which sold for $370,000 this week, became surplus following the merging of the Maori Hill and Roslyn parishes in 2005, to become the Highgate Presbyterian Church.

   “It's good for our parish, although a lot of our parishioners are a bit sad that an era has passed”, a Presbyterian committee member who helped co-ordinate the sale, Netta Noone, said yesterday.

   The Korean church would continue to use the building as a place of worship, she said.

   They're going to keep it as a church. It means the stained-glass windows and everything will still be looked after. They are fairly active in New Zealand. They have branches in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.

   The funds were likely to be used for the upgrading of buildings and mission initiatives, Mrs Noone said.

   But we haven't really thought that far ahead, yet.

   The 850sq m church, designed by architect J. Louis Salmond, was built in 1904 and has a rateable value of $670,000.

   The World Mission Society Church of God was founded in 1964 by Ahn Sahng-Hong, who members believe was an incarnation of Christ.

   It has since established more than 2200 churches in 150 countries since 1997 and claims an international membership of about 1.4 million followers.

   However, many conventional church groups, including the Protestant Christian Council of Korea, have criticised the World Mission Society Church for deviating from mainstream Christian beliefs and condemn it as a cult.

   World Mission Society Church of God Trust pastor James Kim, of Christchurch, was not available for comment yesterday.

   (Emphasis added)

5. Another link from the first page is described as “WMS church proselytizing on campus”. That link is to an article from a publication called The Gateway from the University of Alberta dated 20 May 2011. The article recounts a number of incidents in which students were approached by missionaries from the World Mission Society Church of God who insisted that they be baptised in a washroom.

6. Another link from the first page is entitled “Korean church solicits Elm City”. That link is to an article from The Daily Pennsylvanian and dated 1 February 2008 which refers to the proselytising by members of the Korean church on members of the Yale community. It contains the following relevant statements:

   Representatives of the World Mission Society Church of God - a religious group based in Korea that has been labeled a cult by Korean political leaders and ex-members – have been approaching students on campus to talk to them about the religion.

   …

   … is called “Heavenly Mother” in the World Mission Society Church of God.

   …

   The woman said she was a Korean student and asked Marsden if she knew anything about the female god, Marsden said.

   …

   Yale University Chaplin Sharon Kugler … said the church will not be very successful at a school like Yale, because the students are generally very busy, and they are smart enough to realize the World Mission Society Church of God is not a recognized religious group on campus.

7. Finally, there is a link entitled “Korean church seeks recruits on campus”. That link is to another article from The Daily Pennsylvanian dated 1 February 2008. It concerns proselytising on the campus of Penn State University, contains some reference to the group’s founder and the heavenly mother and includes the following statement:

   …

   Religious Studies professor Stephen Dunning said many conservative Christians would consider the group a cult, given its deviations from traditional interpretations of the Bible.

   …

8. The information accessible by way of the link provided by the Tribunal was, in important respects, very similar to that contained in the 2010 article relied on by the Tribunal: the beliefs of the Korean church were not mainstream and, because of that, the group could be considered a cult by conservative Christians. In light of that, by being given the link by the Tribunal, the applicant was given the opportunity to comment on those two assertions. Importantly, that was the opportunity that the Tribunal thought was required in order for there to be a complete and fair hearing and, as a consequence, a full review of the delegate’s decision.

9. The applicant’s response to the information actually provided by the Tribunal was, relevantly:

   …

   After learning about the ideology of the Church, the applicant instructs that he felt the beliefs of the Church aligned with his beliefs and the teachings of the Church made sense to him. As such, he decided to continue to attend the Church of God and follow their interpretation of Christianity. We respectfully submit the fact the applicant has followed a different version of Christianity in Australia can be attributed to the wider choice of Christian denominations in Australia available to the applicant.

10. In this response, the applicant did not contest any of the statements in the information provided by the Tribunal.

11. For those reasons, it would have made no difference if the applicant had been sent the 2010 article as promised. The failure by the Tribunal to do so did not constitute jurisdictional error.

Third ground: wrong question

1. The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred by failing to make any independent evaluation of the beliefs of the applicant or the Church of God, but instead determined the issue of the applicant’s conversion by relying upon evidence from independent sources to the effect that the Church of God held beliefs far outside mainstream Christian beliefs.

2. Leave will be granted to the applicant to raise this ground because sufficient notice was given of the ground to enable the Minister to deal with it, it is not entirely hopeless and did not add much to the length or cost of the proceedings. However, the Tribunal did not fall into the error asserted by the applicant.

3. The applicant relied primarily on the decisions of Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 1599 (Gray J) and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108 (“SZLSP”). However, those cases are inconsistent with the applicant’s argument. The gist of the majority decision in SZLSP was that a decision maker can validly evaluate a person’s beliefs so long as he or she has some logical basis for doing so. As Kenny J explained at [38], the decision maker is not “prohibited from evaluating the applicant’s answers against probative material evincing the doctrines of the religion in question” (emphasis added).

4. That is precisely what the Tribunal did here: it relied on information about the beliefs of the Church of God as well as apparently cogent opinions that they were far from mainstream and that the organisation might be considered as a cult. There was no error in that approach.

5. The third ground is rejected.

Conclusion

1. The decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error and must be set aside. The Tribunal must complete its review of the delegate’s decision according to law.

I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Smith

Date: 15 September 2016