Avery v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages

[2008] NSWADTAP 68

Appeal Panel - Internal

CITATION:	Avery v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2008] NSWADTAP 68
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery RESPONDENT Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages
FILE NUMBER:	089035
HEARING DATES:	30 July 2008
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	30 July 2008
DATE OF DECISION:	31 October 2008
BEFORE:	Hennessy N - Magistrate (Deputy President); Handley R - Deputy President; Bolt M - Non-Judicial Member
CATCHWORDS:	Statutory interpretation
DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	Ex tempore reasons
FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL:	073384
DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	03/06/2008
LEGISLATION CITED:	Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995
CASES CITED:	Standard Property Investment Plc v British Plastics Federation and Anor (1987) 53 P. & C.R.25 McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 Hodgkinson v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (1994) 50 FCR 504 Williams v Bryant (1839) 5 M & W 447; 151 ER 189 Director-General , Department of Community Services v The Adoptive Parents [2005] NSWCA 385
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT In person RESPONDENT M Dalla-Pozza, solicitor
ORDERS:	Leave is granted for the appeal to extend to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal’s decision to affirm the decision of the Registrar is affirmed.

Background

1 Introduction. Ms Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery applied to the Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages (the Registrar) to change her name to Tatiana Igorevna Orechkina. On 11 December 2007 the Registrar issued a change of name certificate but Ms Avery maintained that it did not accord with the Registrar’s responsibilities under the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (Registration Act). The Registrar agreed that there were some typographical errors and that Ms Avery’s former names were not listed in chronological order. The Registrar agreed to issue a new certificate correcting those errors if Ms Avery returned the original certificate. However Ms Avery still objected to several details in the proposed certificate. Her main objection was that under the heading “Former Name”, the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery appears. She says that one of her former names is Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery but that the shortened version omitting one of her middle names is not one of her former names. Despite the continuing dispute about the details on the certificate, her new name (Tatiana Igorevna Orechkina) has been registered.

2 Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Ms Avery applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Registrar’s decision. Under section 56 of the Registration Act, “A person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Registrar made in the exercise or purported exercise of functions under this Act may apply to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for a review of the decision.” We are satisfied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Registrar to issue the Change of Name Certificate in the form that it now proposes that it be issued (Tab Q to the section 58 documents).

3 Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal gave oral reasons for its decision affirming the Registrar’s decision to include the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery as a former name on the certificate. The Tribunal accepted the submission of the Registrar that the term “former names of the person” includes not only legal names, that is names acquired by repute or usage and registered names, but other names that a person has used. In this case there was evidence of two statutory declarations that Ms Avery had signed suggesting that she used the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery. There was also evidence that this version of her name appeared on her driver's licence. The Tribunal was satisfied that Ms Avery had used that name, that it was a former name within the meaning of that term in clause 8 of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Regulation 2006 (Registration Regulation), and that the Registrar was required to record that information in the certificate.

4 Appeal from Tribunal’s decision. Ms Avery has appealed to the Appeal Panel against the Tribunal's decision both on questions of law and on the merits of the decision. She is entitled to appeal on questions of law but needs the Appeal Panel's permission to appeal against the merits of the Tribunal's decision: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (ADT Act), section 113.

5 Chronology of events. A short chronology of the most significant events will help put the issues in this appeal in context:

Preliminary issues

6 Two issues. The following preliminary issues have arisen:

a. should the Appeal Panel take into account further submissions and evidence filed by Ms Avery after its decision had been reserved?

b. should Ms Avery be permitted to rely on objections to the certificate which were not raised in the Tribunal proceedings but which were raised at the Appeal Panel hearing?

7 Further submissions and evidence. After the Appeal Panel’s decision had been reserved, Ms Avery wrote to the Tribunal on 5 August 2008 saying, in part, that “Hereby we claim and we are going to claim the continuity of our name ‘Avery, Stephanie Tatiana Patricia’ from 29 December 1997 to the date of change in the future.” Ms Avery attached documentation in support of that application. On 19 August 2008, Ms Avery filed an “Application for Leave” which sought eleven separate orders. The requested orders are either not within the Appeal Panel’s jurisdiction to make (orders 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) or were not made to the Tribunal at first instance (order 1). The Tribunal has no jurisdiction either because the requested orders do not relate to the proposed certificate which is the subject of the reviewable decision (Tab Q to the section 58 documents) or because they are not the kinds of orders the Appeal Panel has power to make on appeal: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (ADT Act), section 114 and section 115. Consequently, Ms Avery’s application to file and serve further material is refused.

8 Objections not relied on in the Tribunal proceedings. An issue which Ms Avery raised at the Appeal Panel hearing, but did not raise before the Tribunal, was that the names of her parents were not recorded either on the original version of the change of name certificate, or on the proposed version. Clause 8 of the Registration Regulation requires the Registrar to record “the full names of the parents of the person (as at the date of the person’s birth or registration of the person’s birth) in the Register”. Although this matter was not raised before the Tribunal, the Registrar has agreed to include the names of Ms Avery’s parents in the version of the certificate that is ultimately issued. We accept the Registrar’s undertaking to do so and make no formal orders in relation to that matter.

Statutory framework

9 Objects. The objects of the Registration Act include providing for the “the registration of changes of name” and “the keeping of registers for recording and preserving information about changes of name in perpetuity”: section 3.

10 Change by registration or by repute or usage. Changes of name (including addition, omission or substitution) are provided for in Part 3 of the Registration Act. As well as changing a name by registration, a person may still establish a change of name by repute or usage: Registration Act, section 32. The common law principles in relation to a change of name by repute or usage were summarised in Standard Property Investment Plc v British Plastics Federation and Anor (1987) 53 P. & C.R.25 by Walton J quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England:

. . . the law prescribes no rules limiting a person’s liberty to change his name. He may assume any name he pleases in addition to or substitution for his original name; . .

. . . the law concerns itself only with the question whether he has in fact assumed and has come to be known by a name different from that by which he was originally known . . .

. . . if a man has become generally known by a name which he has assumed in addition to or in place of his baptismal name, there is no doubt that the name so assumed is valid for purposes of legal identification. A person who, in executing an instrument, subscribes a first name, which is not, his Christian name may be sued in that name, and is bound, as he would be if he had signed his proper name.

11 Register must contain certain particulars. The Registrar must maintain a Register of registrable events including a change of name: section 43(1). The Register:

(a) must contain the particulars of each registrable event required under this Act, or another law, to be included in the Register, and

(b) may contain such further information as the Registrar considers appropriate for inclusion.

12 If a person applies for a change of name to be registered, section 31(1) obliges the Registrar to register a change of name and to include certain particulars:

The Registrar registers a change of name by making an entry about the change of name in the Register including the particulars required by the regulations.

13 Section 62 of the Registration Act allows the Governor to make Regulations “not inconsistent with” the Registration Act. Clause 8 of the Registration Regulation lists the particulars that are required to be included in the Register when there is a change of name:

For the purposes of section 31 (Entries to be made in the Register) of the Act, the following particulars are required:

(a) the sex and date and place of birth of the person whose change of name is being registered,

(b) the name of the person immediately before the change of name,

(c) the name first given to the person after birth and any other name shown on the person’s birth registration,

(d) any other former names of the person,

(e) the new full name of the person,

(f) the full names of the parents of the person (as at the date of the person’s birth or registration of the person’s birth).

14 The Registrar must include these particulars. There is no discretion to exclude certain particulars. Clause 8(d) is the provision in issue in these proceedings.

Submissions to Tribunal

15 Registrar’s submissions. In summary, the Registrar’s submission to the Tribunal was that the decision to include the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery as a former name was based on two policy documents. The first is the Change of Name Policy and the second is the Proof of Identity Policy. The Change of Name Policy requires all former names to be recorded on the change of name certificate. The Registrar interprets this policy as applying to former names actually used by an applicant, that is, names by which the applicant is actually known, not merely names that have been previously registered as changes of name. In oral submissions, Mr Della Pozza elaborated on this submission saying that it is not necessary for the Registrar to be satisfied that the person has registered a change of name or changed their name at common law by usage or repute. A name must be recorded as a former name if the name appears in the identifying documents that a person is required to provide when applying to change their name.

16 Ms Avery’s submission. In summary, Ms Avery’s submission to the Tribunal was that former names only refer to names that have been lawfully acquired or which the applicant requests be included as a former name. She said that the only reason that she used the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery was because the Roads and Traffic Authority mistakenly issued her with a driver’s licence in that name. The fact that the RTA did not follow the correct procedure does not mean that she has acquired a name that she did not choose to acquire. Since the name was not lawfully acquired, nor did she request that it be included, it should not be listed as a former name.

Tribunal’s decision

17 The Tribunal’s decision is set out below:

MONTGOMERY: I think the best thing is for me to tell you what I think. What I need to do is determine what I think the correct interpretation of the legislation is. Section 62 of the Act provides for the making of regulations that are not inconsistent with the Act and that has happened we have the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Regulation (2006), which is made pursuant to Section 62. Section 31 of the Act refers to the particulars that the Register is included and that is cross-referenced to particulars in the Regulations and the particular regulation is Regulation 8. The argument that has been presented is that Regulation 8 should be read down to provide that the registration of a change of name should only record former registered or former names that an applicant wishes to have included.

The Registry says that is not the case and if that was Parliament’s intention that it could easily have said that was how it should be read and I agree with that. I think that a broader interpretation is meant to be given to Regulation, clause 8 and therefore, any former name can be included it is not just registered names or names that an applicant wants to have included. It is then necessary for me to decide whether or not the name that has been recorded is, in fact, a former name and the argument against that is that the RTA has wrongly recorded a name Stephanie Tatiana Avery when, in fact, the applicant’s correct name was Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery and that the other documents that have been prepared and provided to the Registry are a flow on from the mistake made by the RTA.

I think there is some strength to that argument, however, working against that is the fact that even though the RTA has wrongly recorded the name, the applicant has used that name for the best part of ten years. Not at all times, but at some times has used the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery and that is clear from the statutory declaration that the applicant has made on 10 December 2007 where she states that the name she is using is Stephanie Tatiana Avery and there is also a statutory declaration made on 10 December independent of that application for the change of name where the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery is used.

It seems to me that at some time in the last ten years the names Stephanie Tatiana Avery has been used and that being the case I think on the authorities that I have been given which are the Director General, Department of Community Services v The Adoptive Parents (2005) Court of Appeal 385 and the Williams v Bryant authority suggest that the use of the name, in that form, is, in fact, sufficient to form the conclusion that a separate name has been used.

That being the case I think Stephanie Tatiana Aver is a former name and is correctly recorded and therefore, I think the Registry has made the correct decision and it should be affirmed. I will leave it at that.

Grounds of Appeal

18 After hearing Ms Avery’s oral submissions, it was apparent that her main grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:

(a) the Tribunal erred by not affording her procedural fairness;

(b) the Tribunal gave inadequate reasons for its decision; and

(c) the Tribunal misconstrued the words “former name” by including names that she had used rather than confining that term to names that had been lawfully changed.

19 Ms Avery appealed on several other grounds, which can be dealt with shortly. The first was that the Tribunal did not address the fact that the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery was recorded under the heading “Endorsements” on the proposed new certificate. She refused to accept as genuine the Registrar’s explanation that there was room for only three former names on the form and that the fourth name was placed under the heading “Endorsements” merely because of lack of space. We accept the Registrar’s explanation.

20 Ms Avery also insisted that the Appeal Panel not determine the appeal without obtaining the electronic print outs of the information the Registrar entered on the Register. Those documents were not before the Tribunal. In our view they are not relevant to any issue that arises in this appeal. Ms Avery also said that, contrary to the regulation making power in s 62 of the Registration Act, clause 8 was not consistent with the Act. That matter was raised with the Tribunal. No inconsistency was brought to our attention and we are not aware of any inconsistency.

21 Finally, Ms Avery said that the former names were not listed in chronological order. The Registrar has advised the Appeal Panel that the proposed new certificate lists the names in chronological order. If that is not the order in which Ms Avery would like the names to be listed, the Registrar has agreed to re-issue the certificate with the names in any order she requests. If Ms Avery does wish the former names to be listed in an order different from the order in the proposed certificate she should advise the Registrar of the order she prefers within 7 days of the date of these reasons. We turn now to the three remaining grounds of appeal.

Inadequate reasons

22 Ms Avery makes two points in relation to the adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons. First she says that the transcript of the Tribunal's reasons for decision is not a record of what the Tribunal Member said at the hearing. Her recollection is that the Tribunal Member said much less than has been recorded on the transcript. She does not have a tape or transcript of the decision as given on 6 March 2008 but surmises that the Tribunal Member must have added to the oral reasons given on the day. With respect, Ms Avery's recollection is not correct. We have both the original transcript of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision and the version provided to the parties. Apart from some minor typographical and grammatical corrections, the two versions are the same.

23 Ms Avery’s second point is that the Tribunal’s reasons do not accord with the requirements of section 89(5) of the ADT Act. That provision states that:

(1) If the Tribunal makes an original decision or determines an application for the review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to cause a copy of its decision to be served on each party to the proceedings for the decision.

(2) The Tribunal may give reasons either orally or in writing for its decision.

(3) If the Tribunal does not give reasons in writing for its decision:

(a) a party to the proceedings may, within 28 days after the day on which a copy of the decision of the Tribunal is served on that party, request the Tribunal to give the party a statement in writing of the reasons of the Tribunal for its decision, and

(b) the Tribunal must, within 28 days after receiving the request, give the party such a statement.

(4) For the purposes of compliance with subsection (3), it is sufficient if the Tribunal gives the party a copy of a transcript of oral reasons previously delivered that complies with subsection (5).

(5) If the Tribunal gives the reasons for its decision in writing under subsection (3), the written reasons are to set out the following:

(a) the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based,

(b) the Tribunal’s understanding of the applicable law,

(c) the reasoning processes that lead the Tribunal to the conclusions it made.

24 The Tribunal gave reasons for decision in writing and was obliged to set out its findings, its understanding of the applicable law and its reasoning process: section 89(5). The reasons set out the findings of fact, namely that Ms Avery had used the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery. Its understanding of the law (clause 8) was expressed as follows: “ . . . any former name can be included it is not just registered names or names that an applicant wants to have included”. This conclusion does not distinguish between former names assumed or acquired by usage or repute and names that an applicant has merely used on occasions. However, reading the decision as a whole we understand the Tribunal to have accepted the Registrar’s submission that former names include not only names changed by registration and names acquired through usage or repute at common law, but names that a person has used. Evidence of such usage may be found in the identifying documents that a person is required to provide when applying to change their name. Although the Tribunal’s reasons were brief, in our view they complied with the standards set out in section 89.

Procedural fairness

25 Order in which parties presented their case. Ms Avery said that the Tribunal changed the order in which the parties presented their case and that she did not agree to that change. In particular Ms Avery said that the transcript incorrectly records her as saying that she had no preference in relation to who should go first. The party who has the onus of proof generally goes first. However, when conducting a merits review of an administrative decision, there is no onus of proof on either party: McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354. Rather, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the decision maker and is able to inform itself in any manner that it thinks fit: ADT Act, section 63. Whether or not Ms Avery agreed to the Registrar presenting its case first, it is customary in this Tribunal for the agency whose decision is under review to give their evidence and submissions first. The applicant is then given the opportunity to respond. While this is the reverse of the conventional practice in civil proceedings involving two private parties, it is appropriate in merits review cases because it gives applicants an opportunity to understand the basis for the agency's decision prior to responding to it. There has been no breach of procedural fairness, nor has the Tribunal made any other error of law, by virtue of the fact that the Registrar presented its case before Ms Avery.

26 Opportunity to present her case. The second basis on which Ms Avery says that the Tribunal has breached the rules of procedural fairness is that she was not given a reasonable opportunity to present her case. There are two long established rules of procedural fairness, namely the hearing rule and the bias rule. The hearing rule requires that a decision maker hear a person before making a decision affecting their interests: Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550. Normally a person is entitled to attend the hearing in order to make relevant submissions, give evidence and call witnesses. It is also incumbent on the Tribunal, especially in circumstances where a party is self-represented, to clarify the factual and legal issues if there is any confusion: Hodgkinson v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (1994) 50 FCR 504.

27 Ms Avery said that the Tribunal made her undergo inquisitive style questions instead of allowing her to present her case uninterrupted. A review of the transcript confirms that the Tribunal did not allow Ms Avery to present her case uninterrupted. Rather, the Tribunal engaged Ms Avery in discussion about the issues, questioning and clarifying each point as it arose. In our view this is an entirely appropriate way for the Tribunal to have proceeded and is not in breach of the hearing rule. The Tribunal did not restrict Ms Avery in the presentation of her case and gave her ample opportunity to explain her point of view. In all the circumstances we are satisfied that there has been no breach of procedural fairness on this count.

Meaning of “any other former names of the person”

28 The question in this ground of appeal is whether the Tribunal made an error of law in the way in which it interpreted the phrase “any other former names of the person” in clause 8(c) of the Registration Regulation.

29 Purposive construction. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, as set out in section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 is that:

33 Regard to be had to purposes or objects of Acts and statutory rules

In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.

30 The Registrar submitted that one object of clause 8 of the Registration Regulation and section 31 of the Registration Act is to ensure that there is a way of cross-referencing the previous identities of a person who has changed his or her name with the new identity. That is said to be necessary to minimise the risk of identity fraud.

31 The Registrar submitted that the decision of Williams v Bryant (1839) 5 M & W 447; 151 ER 189 was also relevant. In Director-General, Department of Community Services v The Adoptive Parents [2005] NSWCA 385 the Court of Appeal described that case in the following terms at [31]:

. . . William Frances Bryant was sued on a bond executed in the name of William Bryant; a defence of non est factum ("it is not [my] deed") on the ground that the execution was by William Frances Bryant was rejected with the observations that a man could be sued “not merely by his true name of baptism, but by any first name which he has acquired by usage or reputation” and that it was sufficient that he was known as William Bryant at the time of execution. (Words in brackets added)

32 In Williams v Bryant Parke B also said at paragraph 193, that “ . . . we think a bond is not void which is in the name, whether such name be the first or Christian name, or family name, by which the party is commonly called or known . . . ” The Registrar reasoned that this case indicates that a mere usage of a name is sufficient for it to amount to a former name in the sense that a person was capable of being sued in legal proceedings by that name, although not necessarily a former legal name. That being the case the Registrar submitted that a name which is used by an individual could amount to a former name for the purpose of clause 8 even if it does not amount to a change of name at common law. With respect, that is not our understanding of the effect of the decision in Williams v Bryant. The decision relates to circumstances where a person had acquired a name at common law by usage or reputation.

33 Conclusion. In our view the ordinary meaning of the phrase “former name” is a name acquired by a person either formally through registration (or by a court in certain circumstances) or informally through repute or usage. That conclusion is consistent with the Registration Act which makes it clear that as well as changing a name by registration a person may establish a change of name by “repute or usage”: section 32. This interpretation is also confirmed when clause 8(c) is read in context. Clause 8 lists certain kinds of former names in clause 8(b) and (c). They are:

the name of the person immediately before the change of name, and

the name first given to the person after birth; and

any other name shown on the person’s birth registration.

34 Clause 8(c) then adds “any other former name of the person”. The use of the word “other” in clause 8(c) implies that the names caught by clause 8(c) are only the kinds of former names falling within the previously listed categories. Those names are all names that a person has acquired either through registration or at common law through repute and usage. For example, the name of the person immediately before the change of name may be a name that has been acquired through reputation or usage or a name that was previously registered on a birth certificate or on a change of name certificate. It is not a name that a person has merely used on occasions.

35 The Registrar’s submitted that this interpretation would undermine the purpose of the clause. Their argument was that the purpose of clause 8 and section 31 is to ensure that there is a way of cross-referencing the previous identities of a person who has changed his or her name with his or her new legal identity. The reason for this is to minimise the risk of identity fraud. If names which a person had used were not included in the list of former names, individuals could continue to use their former identities for some purposes and there would be no way to link their former identities with their present legal identity. Although it is arguable that listing all the names previously used by a person would lessen the risk of identity fraud, that policy goal cannot override the ordinary meaning of the phrase when read in context. An amendment would be needed to give clause 8(c) the meaning the Registrar has attributed to it.

36 It follows that the Tribunal made an error of law by interpreting the phrase “any other former names of the person” to include a name that a person has used on occasions. To be a “former name” a person must use an alternative name consistently, not merely on a few occasions. In those circumstances we regard it as appropriate to give leave to extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision: ADT Act, section 113(2)(b). The alternative would have been to remit the matter to the Tribunal to determine. It is more efficient for the Appeal Panel to determine the issue on the basis of the material, which was before the Tribunal, and the material, which is before us. The role of the Appeal Panel when reviewing the merits is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to all the material and any applicable written or unwritten law: ADT Act, section 115(1). The question for the Panel is whether Stephanie Tatiana Avery was a name that Ms Avery merely used on occasions or whether it was a name that she assumed or acquired through usage or repute.

Evidence

37 The evidence on this issue is contained in the documents and submissions provided to the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel and in the answers Ms Avery gave when questioned by the Tribunal. Although we have not mentioned each and every document, we have reviewed them and taken them into account. The use of the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery appears to have begun in 1997 when the RTA issued Ms Avery with a driver’s licence in that name. Ms Avery maintains, and we accept for the purpose of these proceedings, that that was a mistake and that Ms Avery’s actual name was Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery. Ms Avery’s argument was that the name on her driver’s licence was not “lawfully acquired”, therefore it is not a former name. She changed the name on her driver’s licence in January 2008. Identification documents containing her full name include her citizenship certificate, her passport and her student card. Ms Avery’s Medicare card identifies her as Stephanie T Avery.

38 When Ms Avery applied to change her name on 10 December 2007 she needed to complete a statutory declaration. Under the heading “Name you are using at present”, Ms Avery wrote “Avery, Stephanie Tatiana”. On the same day she signed another statutory declaration giving her name as Stephanie Tatiana Avery. When questioned by the Tribunal about why she used that name on these forms she agreed (at paragraph 16 of the transcript) that it was a name by which she was known but did not agree that it was a legal name. She said she never intended to change her name to Stephanie Tatiana Avery and did not want it to be recorded as a former name.

39 In our view, despite the fact that the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery was originally included on Ms Avery’s driver’s licence by mistake, she did not seek to alter the name on the licence for 10 years. In December 2007, she identified the name she was using as present as Stephanie Tatiana Avery. She also signed a document using that name at that time. In accordance with the common law principles on change of name by usage or reputation, Ms Avery assumed or acquired the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery in addition to the name, Stephanie Tatiana Patricia Avery. Proof of intention to assume or acquire a name is not required, nor is it relevant that the original use of that name was mistaken. When Ms Avery applied to change her name to Tatiana Igorevna Orechkina, the name Stephanie Tatiana Avery was a “former name” within the meaning of that term in clause 8(3) of the Registration Regulation. Consequently, we affirm the Tribunal’s decision.

Orders

Leave is granted for the appeal to extend to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision

The Tribunal’s decision to affirm the decision of the Registrar is affirmed.