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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No BlS of 1990 B e t w e e n -
AVEL PTY LTD
Appellant
and
MULTICOIN AMUSEMENTS PTY LTD
First Respondent
BRITISH AMUSEMENTS (NORTH COAST)
CORPORATION PTY LTD
Second Respondent
MASON CJ
DEANE J
DAWSON J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
| Avel(2) |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
| AT BRIS;J3ANE ON . TUESDAY, | 2(:) JUNE 1990, AT 3. 37 PM |
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| BlTl0/1/DR | 1 | 26/6/90 |
| MR P.H. MORRISON, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR D. JACKSON, for the appellant.
(instructed by Chambers McNab Tully & Wilson)
| MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR K. KILVINGTON, for the
respondents. (instructed by Greg Kelly & Company)
| MASON CJ: | Yes. | Mr Morrison. |
| MR MORRISON: | Your Honours, this is an appeal from the Full |
Federal Court sitting in turn on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland and the decision of
Mr Acting Justice Helman. The appeal is pursuant
to special leave which was granted on 6 April and
the Full Federal Court judgment was handed down on20 December. Can I, immediately before handing to
Your Honours an outline of our submissions, outline
a couple of the more salient factual features of
the case for we submit that not many facts will
clutter Your Honours' decision in this case.
The appellant, Avel, is an importer and distributor
of what was called in the case, "amusement games";
this being a compendious term to refer to "pin-ball
games" as we might classically know them and
"video parlour games" of some other sort. In 1986 it
and the manufacturer of those games in the United
States - a company which, by Your Honours' leave , I will
simply call "Williams" - it and Williams executed a
contract under which the appellant was granted
exclusive rights for Australia; exclusive not only ofother potential competitors but of Williams as well.
Under that agreement, which was current at all
material times for the purposes of this action, the
appellant received supplies of various models of
the games that were comprised within the agreement - there
are only really two relevant to this appeal and their
identities will not trouble Your Honours greatly.
It is common ground and really was at all times
that there is copyright in the machines that were brought out to my client; a copyright vesting in the owner, Williams. The copyright consisted in the
artwork on the machine itself that one could see and the computer programmes which ran them. It may have
subsisted in our other factors but it is not material
for this case. In respect of each new model of
machine that was made by Williams the appellant was
given the same rights for that model by that model
being incorporated under the agreement by an addenda.
The structure of the agreement was a central agreement
giving rights and…
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- Case
- [1990] HCATrans 141
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondents' importation of amusement machines, which were models covered by Avel's exclusive distribution agreement with Williams, constituted copyright infringement. This involved determining the scope of Avel's exclusive rights and whether the respondents' actions fell within the ambit of those rights, thereby infringing the copyright subsisting in the machines.
The Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the exclusive distribution agreement and its implications for copyright. Avel argued that its exclusive rights extended to preventing the importation of machines by third parties, even if those machines were legitimately manufactured by Williams. The Court considered the terms of the contract between Avel and Williams, and the extent to which it conferred rights that could be enforced against third parties in Australia. The legal principle applied was that an exclusive licensee of copyright can, in certain circumstances, restrain third parties from infringing that copyright.
The appeal concerned the interpretation of the exclusive distribution agreement and its effect on the respondents' importation activities. The Court ultimately determined the outcome of the appeal based on its findings regarding the infringement of Avel's exclusive rights.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the High Court of Australia is an appeal from Avel Pty Ltd (the appellant) against the decision of the Full Federal Court, which itself was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The original action was commenced by Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd and British Amusements (North Coast) Corporation Pty Ltd (the respondents) in the Supreme Court of Queensland, seeking a declaration that threats of infringement proceedings by Avel were unjustified, an injunction to restrain such threats, and damages. Avel counter-claimed for declarations that its threats were justified and sought an injunction to restrain importation of machines that might infringe its rights. The trial judge, Acting Justice Helman, held that the threats were justifiable except regarding one model of machine. The Full Federal Court subsequently overturned the trial judge's decision, holding that the agreement between Avel and the manufacturer Williams was not exclusive in terms of the models of machines, but only individual machines, and that the onus of proving the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) lay with Avel. Avel then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was granted on 6 April, and the appeal was heard on 20 June 1990.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is there an onus on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)?
2. Does the onus of proof require the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence, as opposed to merely demonstrating the absence of a licence?
3. Regardless of the onus of proof, was there evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)?
4. Does the exclusive licence agreement between Avel Pty Ltd and Williams relate to individual machines or to models of machines?
5. Did the Full Federal Court err in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negative the existence of a licence, and if so, should this be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases?
6. Should the Full Federal Court's decision be upheld in finding that the onus of proof was correctly placed on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence?
7. Should the court affirm the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines?
Held
1. There is no onus on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); instead, the onus is on the person asserting infringement to show that the importation lacks the copyright owner's licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
2. The onus of proof does not require the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence, but rather to demonstrate the absence of a licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
3. Regardless of the onus of proof, there was no evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
4. The exclusive licence agreement between Avel Pty Ltd and Williams relates to individual machines rather than models of machines. Result: appeal dismissed on this issue.
5. The Full Federal Court erred in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negative the existence of a licence, and this should be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
6. The Full Federal Court's decision should not be upheld in finding that the onus of proof was correctly placed on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
7. The court should not affirm the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court addressed several significant issues in the appeal, starting with the onus of proof under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The appellant, Avel, contended that there was no onus on them to demonstrate the absence of a licence, arguing instead that the onus lay on the respondent to prove the existence of a licence. The court examined the statutory language and previous case law, including the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases, to determine the appropriate burden of proof. The appellant's argument was that section 37 should impose the onus on the importer to show they had a licence rather than on the copyright owner or exclusive licensee to demonstrate the absence of a licence. The court considered the principle that when a statute uses the phrase "without the licence," it places the onus on the person asserting the licence to provide evidence of its existence. This reasoning aligns with the broader legal principle that the burden of proof typically falls on the party asserting a fact or right.
The court further analyzed whether the onus required the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence or merely demonstrate its absence. The appellant argued that "negating" the existence of a licence was not required, and the court agreed, finding that demonstrating the absence of a licence was sufficient. This conclusion was supported by references to various authorities, including VINES v DJORDJEVITCH and LYNCH v ATTWOOD, which emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the existence of a licence or permission.
Regardless of the onus of proof, the court examined whether there was evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37. The trial judge found that there was no evidence that Williams had not consented to the importations, which was consistent with the factual situation in the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. The Full Federal Court's finding that there was no evidence of a lack of consent was upheld, as the court agreed that the evidence did not support the existence of a positive licence.
Another major issue was the interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement between Avel and Williams. The court had to determine whether the agreement related to individual machines or to models of machines. The Full Federal Court found that the agreement was limited to individual machines, which meant that the exclusivity did not extend to models of machines. The High Court did not overturn this interpretation, affirming that the agreement's scope was correctly understood by the Full Federal Court.
The High Court also considered whether the Full Federal Court erred in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negate the existence of a licence, and if this should be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. The court found that the Full Federal Court's approach was incorrect and that the onus should not require the appellant to negate the existence of a licence. Instead, the proper approach was to place the onus on the importer to demonstrate the existence of a licence, as supported by the statutory language and case law.
Finally, the High Court decided to uphold the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines. This interpretation was consistent with the agreement's terms and the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the court affirmed that the Full Federal Court correctly construed the scope of the licence agreement.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the onus of proof under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not require the exclusive licensee to negate the existence of a licence but rather places the onus on the importer to demonstrate the existence of a licence. Additionally, the exclusive licence agreement was correctly interpreted as applying to individual machines rather than models of machines. The court's decision aligns with the principles established in the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases, clarifying the burden of proof in copyright infringement cases involving the importation of articles.