Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Brisbane No BlS of 1990

B e t w e e n -

AVEL PTY LTD

Appellant

and

MULTICOIN AMUSEMENTS PTY LTD

First Respondent

BRITISH AMUSEMENTS (NORTH COAST)

CORPORATION PTY LTD

Second Respondent

MASON CJ
DEANE J
DAWSON J
GAUDRON J

McHUGH J

Avel(2)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRIS;J3ANE ON . TUESDAY, 2(:) JUNE 1990, AT 3. 37 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

BlTl0/1/DR 1 26/6/90
MR P.H. MORRISON, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

my learned friend, MR D. JACKSON, for the appellant.

(instructed by Chambers McNab Tully & Wilson)

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

my learned friend, MR K. KILVINGTON, for the

respondents. (instructed by Greg Kelly & Company)
MASON CJ:  Yes. Mr Morrison.
MR MORRISON:  Your Honours, this is an appeal from the Full

Federal Court sitting in turn on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland and the decision of

Mr Acting Justice Helman. The appeal is pursuant

to special leave which was granted on 6 April and
the Full Federal Court judgment was handed down on

20 December. Can I, immediately before handing to

Your Honours an outline of our submissions, outline

a couple of the more salient factual features of

the case for we submit that not many facts will

clutter Your Honours' decision in this case.

The appellant, Avel, is an importer and distributor

of what was called in the case, "amusement games";

this being a compendious term to refer to "pin-ball

games" as we might classically know them and

"video parlour games" of some other sort. In 1986 it

and the manufacturer of those games in the United

States - a company which, by Your Honours' leave , I will

simply call "Williams" - it and Williams executed a

contract under which the appellant was granted
exclusive rights for Australia; exclusive not only of

other potential competitors but of Williams as well.

Under that agreement, which was current at all

material times for the purposes of this action, the

appellant received supplies of various models of

the games that were comprised within the agreement - there

are only really two relevant to this appeal and their

identities will not trouble Your Honours greatly.

It is common ground and really was at all times

that there is copyright in the machines that were
brought out to my client; a copyright vesting in

the owner, Williams. The copyright consisted in the

artwork on the machine itself that one could see and the computer programmes which ran them. It may have

subsisted in our other factors but it is not material

for this case. In respect of each new model of

machine that was made by Williams the appellant was

given the same rights for that model by that model

being incorporated under the agreement by an addenda.

The structure of the agreement was a central agreement

giving rights and…

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Details
Case
[1990] HCATrans 141
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (the respondents) against Avel Pty Ltd (the appellant). The dispute concerned the importation and distribution of amusement games, specifically pinball and video parlour games, manufactured by a US company referred to as "Williams". Avel held exclusive distribution rights for Australia under a contract with Williams, which included copyright in the artwork and computer programs of the games.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondents' importation of amusement machines, which were models covered by Avel's exclusive distribution agreement with Williams, constituted copyright infringement. This involved determining the scope of Avel's exclusive rights and whether the respondents' actions fell within the ambit of those rights, thereby infringing the copyright subsisting in the machines.

The Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the exclusive distribution agreement and its implications for copyright. Avel argued that its exclusive rights extended to preventing the importation of machines by third parties, even if those machines were legitimately manufactured by Williams. The Court considered the terms of the contract between Avel and Williams, and the extent to which it conferred rights that could be enforced against third parties in Australia. The legal principle applied was that an exclusive licensee of copyright can, in certain circumstances, restrain third parties from infringing that copyright.

The appeal concerned the interpretation of the exclusive distribution agreement and its effect on the respondents' importation activities. The Court ultimately determined the outcome of the appeal based on its findings regarding the infringement of Avel's exclusive rights.

Background

Background to the litigation

Avel Pty Ltd, an Australian importer and distributor of amusement games, held an exclusive distribution agreement with Williams, a United States-based manufacturer, for the supply of certain game models in Australia. Under this agreement, Avel was granted exclusive rights for the distribution of these models in Australia, including the rights to import and sell the games. In 1987, Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd, then under the control of Mr. Ditton, imported and attempted to sell 14 machines that were covered by Avel's agreement with Williams. Avel responded by advertising its rights and threatening legal action against Multicoin for copyright infringement. The dispute was initially compromised, but in November 1987, Multicoin ordered another shipment of machines, prompting Avel to issue further threats of legal action. Multicoin subsequently sought distribution rights from Williams, which were denied, leading Multicoin to cancel their order and commence legal action against Avel in June 1988. The action sought a declaration that Avel's threats were unjustified, an injunction to restrain the repetition of such threats, and damages. Avel counter-claimed for a declaration that the threats were justified and an injunction to restrain Multicoin from importing machines that might infringe Avel's rights. The trial judge found that Avel's threats were justified for all models except one, which pre-dated the 1986 agreement and was not covered by an addenda. The Full Federal Court's decision turned on the interpretation of the exclusivity of the licence and the onus of proof under the Copyright Act. The court held that the licence was not exclusive in terms of the models Multicoin wished to import and that the onus of proof lay on Avel to demonstrate the absence of a licence. Avel appealed to the High Court on the grounds that the Full Federal Court had misapplied the onus of proof and misinterpreted the scope of the licence.

The matter before the High Court of Australia is an appeal from Avel Pty Ltd (the appellant) against the decision of the Full Federal Court, which itself was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The original action was commenced by Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd and British Amusements (North Coast) Corporation Pty Ltd (the respondents) in the Supreme Court of Queensland, seeking a declaration that threats of infringement proceedings by Avel were unjustified, an injunction to restrain such threats, and damages. Avel counter-claimed for declarations that its threats were justified and sought an injunction to restrain importation of machines that might infringe its rights. The trial judge, Acting Justice Helman, held that the threats were justifiable except regarding one model of machine. The Full Federal Court subsequently overturned the trial judge's decision, holding that the agreement between Avel and the manufacturer Williams was not exclusive in terms of the models of machines, but only individual machines, and that the onus of proving the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) lay with Avel. Avel then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was granted on 6 April, and the appeal was heard on 20 June 1990.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is there an onus on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)?
2. Does the onus of proof require the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence, as opposed to merely demonstrating the absence of a licence?
3. Regardless of the onus of proof, was there evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)?
4. Does the exclusive licence agreement between Avel Pty Ltd and Williams relate to individual machines or to models of machines?
5. Did the Full Federal Court err in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negative the existence of a licence, and if so, should this be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases?
6. Should the Full Federal Court's decision be upheld in finding that the onus of proof was correctly placed on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence?
7. Should the court affirm the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines?

Held
1. There is no onus on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); instead, the onus is on the person asserting infringement to show that the importation lacks the copyright owner's licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
2. The onus of proof does not require the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence, but rather to demonstrate the absence of a licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
3. Regardless of the onus of proof, there was no evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
4. The exclusive licence agreement between Avel Pty Ltd and Williams relates to individual machines rather than models of machines. Result: appeal dismissed on this issue.
5. The Full Federal Court erred in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negative the existence of a licence, and this should be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
6. The Full Federal Court's decision should not be upheld in finding that the onus of proof was correctly placed on the appellant to demonstrate the absence of a licence. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.
7. The court should not affirm the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines. Result: appeal allowed on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court addressed several significant issues in the appeal, starting with the onus of proof under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The appellant, Avel, contended that there was no onus on them to demonstrate the absence of a licence, arguing instead that the onus lay on the respondent to prove the existence of a licence. The court examined the statutory language and previous case law, including the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases, to determine the appropriate burden of proof. The appellant's argument was that section 37 should impose the onus on the importer to show they had a licence rather than on the copyright owner or exclusive licensee to demonstrate the absence of a licence. The court considered the principle that when a statute uses the phrase "without the licence," it places the onus on the person asserting the licence to provide evidence of its existence. This reasoning aligns with the broader legal principle that the burden of proof typically falls on the party asserting a fact or right.

The court further analyzed whether the onus required the appellant to "negate" the existence of a licence or merely demonstrate its absence. The appellant argued that "negating" the existence of a licence was not required, and the court agreed, finding that demonstrating the absence of a licence was sufficient. This conclusion was supported by references to various authorities, including VINES v DJORDJEVITCH and LYNCH v ATTWOOD, which emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the existence of a licence or permission.

Regardless of the onus of proof, the court examined whether there was evidence presented at trial to show a positive licence under section 37. The trial judge found that there was no evidence that Williams had not consented to the importations, which was consistent with the factual situation in the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. The Full Federal Court's finding that there was no evidence of a lack of consent was upheld, as the court agreed that the evidence did not support the existence of a positive licence.

Another major issue was the interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement between Avel and Williams. The court had to determine whether the agreement related to individual machines or to models of machines. The Full Federal Court found that the agreement was limited to individual machines, which meant that the exclusivity did not extend to models of machines. The High Court did not overturn this interpretation, affirming that the agreement's scope was correctly understood by the Full Federal Court.

The High Court also considered whether the Full Federal Court erred in finding that the onus of proof was on the appellant to negate the existence of a licence, and if this should be reversed to align with the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases. The court found that the Full Federal Court's approach was incorrect and that the onus should not require the appellant to negate the existence of a licence. Instead, the proper approach was to place the onus on the importer to demonstrate the existence of a licence, as supported by the statutory language and case law.

Finally, the High Court decided to uphold the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the exclusive licence agreement as limited to individual machines rather than models of machines. This interpretation was consistent with the agreement's terms and the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the court affirmed that the Full Federal Court correctly construed the scope of the licence agreement.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the onus of proof under section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not require the exclusive licensee to negate the existence of a licence but rather places the onus on the importer to demonstrate the existence of a licence. Additionally, the exclusive licence agreement was correctly interpreted as applying to individual machines rather than models of machines. The court's decision aligns with the principles established in the TIME-LIFE and COMPUTERMATE cases, clarifying the burden of proof in copyright infringement cases involving the importation of articles.