Australian Telecommunications Commission v Parsons

[1985] FCA 39

.

39 CATCHWORDS

Dy$es - fatal injury - claims under Compensation (Fatal

Injuries) Act (N..T.) - de facto wife and two children -

l

loss of support, solatium, consortium, care and guidance

and household services - appropriateness of two stage (pre- . . .

trial and post-trial) process of assessment of damages -

whether adequate allowance made for contingencies/vicissitudes

in assessment of pre-trial component of damages,.in particular,

prospect of wife marrying or entering into another de facto

relationship - whether damages for loss of consortium and

solatium recoverable by de facto wife - whether damages for

solatium and loss of care and guidance recoverable by child

where not actual' child of deceased - quantum- of damages.

State Government Insurance Office (Qld.) v. Biemann

(1983) 49 A.L.R. 247 - con.

AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, DANNY O'BRIEN and and LESLIE MARK PARSONS by their next friend BESSIE PARSONS

No. NT 43 of 1 9 8 3

Woodward, Neaves and Beaumont, JJ.

20 February 1985.

Sydney.

f

i

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION 1 No. NT 43 of 1983

ON APPEAL f rom t h e Supreme Court of t h e

N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y

BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

DANNY O'BRIEN and WALTER WILLIAM HALL

Appel lan ts

- AND : BESSIE PARSONS, REUBEN JOSEPH PARSONS and

LESLIE MARK PARSONS b y t h e i r next f r i e n d

BESSIE PARSONS

Respondents

ORDER

Judges making order: Woodward, Neaves and Beaumont, JJ.

Date order made: 20 February 1985.

Where made;	Sydney.
THE COURT ORDERS $HAT:

1. The appeal dismissed. be

2.	The	a p p e l l a n t s	p a y	t h e	r e s p o n d e n t s '	c o s t s	of	t h e
appeal .

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF	AUSTRALIA	1
1 *

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT	REGISTRY	1
GENERAL DIVISION	1 No. NT 43 o f 1983

ON APPEAL f r o m t h e Supreme Court of t h e

N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y

BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

DANNY OIBRIEN and WALTER	WILLIAM	HALL
Appel lan ts

- AND : BESSIE PARSONS, REWEN JOSEPH PARSONS and

LESLIE MARK PARSONS by t h e i r next f r i e n d

BESSIE PARSONS

Respondents

C ORAM : Woodward, Neaves and Beaumont, JJ.

DATED : 20 February 1985.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT: This is an appeal f rom a judgment of a s i n g l e

judge t he (Muirhead, o f Supreme Court of t h e Compensa t ion N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y

J. ) i n c la ims made under the (Fa ta l

I n j u r i e s ) Act ( N . T . ) ( " the Act" ) . I n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e

learned judge awarded the f i r s t respondent damages i n t h e

2.

i

i	t o t a l sum	o f $181,000.00;	the	s	econd	r e sponden t ,	an	i n fan t ,
I

.i .:;;

t h e sum of $16,500.00; a n d t h e t h i r d r e s p o n d e n t , a l s o a n

i

i n f a n t , , t h e sum of $24,500.00 (see (1983) 28 N. T.R. 1 9 ) .

The appe l l an t s , t he de fendan t s be low, appea l aga ins t each o f

these awards . A claim was also made b y t h e f i r s t respondent

i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r t h e Law Refo rm (Misce l l aneous

Provis ions) Act (N.T.). This c la im was d ismissed by the

l e a r n e d j u d g e f o r w a n t o f t i t l e t o s u e . No a p p e a l i s

brought against t h i s d i s m i s s a l .

The claims made i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a r i s e o u t o f t h e

dea th of Mark Les l i e Pa r sons on 15 March 1976. The deceased

died as a resul t of e l e c t r o c u t i o n s u f f e r e d i n t h e c o u r s e o f

h i s e m p l o y m e n t w i t h t h e f i r s t a p p e l l a n t . L i a b i l i t y was

admit ted. The writ was n o t i s s u e d u n t i l l5 March 1982, s i x

y e a r s a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f t he deceased .

The f i r s t respondent and the deceased d id no t marry

b u t t h e y h a d l i v e d i n a f a c t o r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r a b o u t

t h r e e y e a r s on 17 June 1968, is t h e natural son p r i o r t o h i s d e a t h . The second respondent , born

o f t he f i r s t respondent

by a p r e v i o u s a s s o c i a t i o n . The d e c e a s e d s t o o d i n l o c o

parentis t o t h e s e c o n d r e s p o n d e n t who l i v e d with t h e f a m i l y

and was accepted by the deceased as h i s c h i l d . The t h i r d

r e s p o n d e n t , b o r n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e d e a t h d e c e a s e d of the deceased on

18 A p r i l respondent. 1 9 7 6 , is t h e s o n o f t h e a n d t h e f i r s t

3 .

The a c t i o n was b r o u g h t u n d e r s.7(1) o f t h e Act

which provides:

W h e r e t h e d e a t h o f a person is caused by a

wrongfu l ac t , neg lec t o r d e f a u l t and t h e a c t ,

n e g l e c t or d e f a u l t is. s u c h t h a t it would, if

d e a t h h a d n o t e n s u e d , h a v e e n t i t l e d t h e

p e r s o n i n j u r e d t o m a i n t a i n a n a c t i o n a n d

r ecove r damages i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i n j u r y , t h e

p e r s o n who w o u l d h a v e b e e n l i a b l e , i f t h e

death had not ensued, is l i a b l e t o a n a c t i o n

f o r damages p e r s o n i n j u r e d n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e

I1

. . .

By s.8(1) o f t h e Act no t more t h a n o n e a c t i o n may

be	brought	against	any	one	person	i n r e s p e c t	o f	a dea th .	By
~~.

s.8(2), s u b j e c t t o s.13, any such ac t ion sha l l be b rough t by

and i n t h e name o f t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e

d e c e a s e d p e r s o n f o r t h e b e n e f i t of those members of t h e

deceased pe r son ' s f ami ly who s u s t a i n e d damage by reason of

his death. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , no a p p l i c a t i o n was made f o r

t h e g r a n t o f l e t t e r s o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e d e c e a s e d ' s

e s t a t e . I n s u c h a c a s e , s.l3(l) enab les an ac t ion t o be

brought by any one o r more of t h e p e r s o n s f o r whose b e n e f i t

an a c t i o n may be b rough t . I n t ha t even t , s.13(2) prov ides

t h a t s u c h a c t i o n s h a l l be f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e same

p e r s o n s a n d s u b j e c t t h e t o same p r o v i s i o n s , m u t a t i s

mutandis, as i f it were brought by the p e r s o n a l

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e d e c e a s e d on b e h a l f o f t h o s e p e r s o n s .

4-

A member o f a deceased person ' s fami ly is def ined

t h e immedia t e ly Act t o i n c l u d e a p e r s o n t o whom t h e

b y s . 4 ( 2 ) ( c ) deceased o f

s tood , be fo re h i s dea th , i n l o c o

parentis. By s.4(3), as it s tood a t t h e r e l e v a n t d a t e , a

person who, a l t h o u g h n o t l e g a l l y m a r r i e d t o the deceased ,

was, immedia t e ly be fo re t he dea th o f t he deceased , l i v i n g

w i t h t h e d o m e s t i c b a s i s s h a l l b e t r e a t e d d e c e a s e d as w i f e , o n a permanent and -- b o n a f i d e

as t h e wife of the deceased .

Damages are d e a l t w i th b y s.10. S e c t i o n lO(1)

p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e Court may award t o t h e p a r t i e s

r e s p e c t i v e l y f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e a c t i o n is brought , such

damages as it may th ink p ropor t ioned t o t h e i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g

.~

f rom t h e amount df damages d e a t h o f t h e recovered p e r s o n i n j u r e d . By s.10(2), t h e

under the sec t ion sha l l , a f te r

d e d u c t i n g t h e costs pe r sons not recovered f rom the defendant , be

d iv ided amongs t t he fo r whose b e n e f i t t h e a c t i o n i s

brought i n such sha res as the Cour t de te rmines . Sec t ion

lO(3) i d e n t i f i e s a number of heads o f damages, t o which

s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e will b e m a d e l a t e r . By s.10(4), i n

assessing damages i n a n a c t i o n , n o r e d u c t i o n s h a l l b e made

on accoun remarr t o f ( i n t e r a l ia) t h e r e m a r r i a g e o r p r o s p e c t s o f

iage o f the surv iv ing spouse .

5.

The learned judge f i r s t cons idered damages f o r loss

of dependency. He proceeded by a two s t age a s ses smen t and

awarded damages f o r l o s s o f s u p p o r t i n t h e t o t a l sum o f

$198,000.00 as f o l l o w s :

To t o date of t h e f irst respondent -

t r i a l $ 18,000

f u t u r e 129,000

To t o d a t e o f the s econd r e sponden t -

t r i a l 5,000

f u t u r e 4,500

To t h e t h i r d respondent -

.	t o d a t e	o f	t r i a l
future

I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e c l a i m , h i s

Honour made the f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s of fact , none of whfch is

c h a l l e n g e d i n t h i s a p p e a l ( 2 8 N.T.R. at p .24) . The first

respondent was born on a c a t t l e s t a t i o n i n t h e T e r r i t o r y o n

1 July 1948. She is o f pa r t Abor ig ina l descen t . She was

taken from her mother at the age o f four and brought up i n a

church home at A l i c e S p r i n g s u n t i l s h e w a s re turned l 5 y e a r s of t o Darwin. age.

She t h e n w e n t i n t e r s t a t e f o r a year and

A t t h e respondent as a resul t of a rather c a s u a l a g e o f 20 y e a r s s h e g a v e b i r t h t o t h e s e c o n d

r e l a t i o n s h i p . She

r e tu rned t o A l i ce Sp r ings where she worked as a c l e a n e r .

S h e a c q u i r e d deceased , a Housing Commission f l a t a n d s h e m e t t h e

o f European o r ig in , i n ea r ly 1973. He was working

i

as a t r u c k d r i v e r at t h e t ime and he had a s t a b l e employment

h i s t o r y u n t i l h i s d e a t h . They l i ved t oge the r and sha red

expenses. H i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e second respondent was

6 .

good. They moved t o Darwin i n September 1974 and obtained

temporary accommodat ion, having appl ied for a Housing

Commission home. She ob ta ined c leaning work o f a temporary

na tu re at t h e Darwin Hosp i t a l . The cyclone i n December 1974

d i s r u p t e d t h e i r p l a n s . The f i r s t respondent was t empora r i ly

e v a c u a t e d t o A l i c e S p r i n g s but she and the second respondent

r e t u r n e d t o Darwin i n a b o u t May 1975. S h e d i d n o t work

again b e f o r e t h e d e c e a s e d l s d e a t h , b e i n g s u p p o r t e d b y h i s

e a r n i n g s . T h e y l i v e d i n a Housing Commission caravan

e r e c t e d on a b lock o f land prev ious ly occupied by a house

destroyed i n t h e c y c l o n e . He p a i d t h e r en t and suppl ied her

with housekeeping. The ev idence d id no t permi t the l earned

judge t o make p r e c i s e f i n d i n g s as t o t h e a c t u a l m e a s u r e o f

suppor t at deceased was a non-smoker b u t a moderate t h a t t i m e . They budgeted on a c a s h b a s i s . The

dr inker . He owned

two moto r veh ic l e s du r ing t he i r a s soc ia t ion , bu t one was

' l'smashed1l and a t t h e time o f h i s dea th t hey had p leasures . no veh ic l e .

They l i ved f rom week t o week en joying s imple I n

Apr i l 1976, s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e d e c e a s e d ' s d e a t h , t h e f i r s t

respondent changed her surname by deed p o l l f r o m Connors t o

Parsons. She gave ev idence t ha t t hey p l anned t o mar ry a f t e r

t h e c h i l d s h e was expec t ing was born i n Apr i l 1976 a n d s h e

had informed found her evidence on t h i s others of t h i s e x p e c t a t i o n . The learned judge

a s p e c t t o b e somewhat equivoca l

7 .

and he was n o t s a t i s f i e d on t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t m a r r i a g e

would t h e n h a v e t a k e n p l a c e . But h i s Honour t h o u g h t t h a t

t h i s d i d n o t intrude upon t h e claim f o r l o s s o f t h e b e n e f i t s

of her dependency as he was s a t i s f i e d t h a t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p

wi th the deceased was r e a s o n a b l y s t a b l e .

The l e a r n e d j u d g e a c c e p t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s

a g r e e d b y t h e p a r t i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e e c o n o m i c loss

claimed (28 N.T.R. a t p.25):

“1. The deceased commenced t o work f o r

Telecom on 13 September 1975. A t d a t e of

dea th he was a temporary linesman.. On t h a t

d a t e h i s p a y , c l e a r o f tax was $190. He had

pe r fo rmed h i s work i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y manner

and had probably have achieved permanent	th i s	pe r fo rmance	con t inued	he status	would
i n or

a b o u t t h e yea r 1978. By t h e d a t e of t r i a l ( 2

November 1983) i f had he remained i n

Telecom’s employ would he probably have

achieved the status o f l i n e s serviceman, with

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h a v i n g a c h i e v e d t h e status

o f l i n e s s u p e r v i s o r g r a d e 1.

2 . A t d a t e o f t r i a l t h e f o l l o w i n g wage

l e v e l s w e r e c u r r e n t - a l l c l e a r o f tax:

Linesman $320

serviceman Lines $340

supe rv i so r L ines $360

3. S i n c e d a t e of death ‘wastage’ from a l l

causes f r o m t h e p o s i t i o n o f l i n e s m a n h a s b e e n

about 2 p e r c e n t .

4. Between t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s d a t e o f d e a t h a n d t h e r e f e r r e d t r ia l

d a t e , assuming s u r v i v a l , c o n t i n u i n g work w i t h

, T e l e c o m a n d t h e t o

a b o v e , t h e d e c e a s e d ’ s t o t a l e a r n i n g s C l e a r Of

t a x would have amounted t o $gO,OOO.tt

8.

A f t e r r e f e r r i n g t o t h e e v i d e n c e o f Mr. S t r a t f o r d , a

c o n s u l t i n g a c t u a r y , t o b e d e a l t w i t h l a t e r , h i s Honour made

t h e f o l l o w i n g f u r t h e r f i n d i n g s ( 2 8 N.T.R. a t p .27):

" I n t h i s c a s e , as I h a v e s a i d , I h a v e v e r y

l i t t l e e v i d e n c e o f a family b u d g e t . I t

a p p e a r s t h a t when t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n commenced

t h e d e c e a s e d c o n t r i b u t e d l i t t l e , l i v i n g w i t h

t h e w i f e , i n c o n t r i b u t e d h e r f la t a n d u s i n g h e r e f f e c t s .

I c a n o n l y f i n d that once they came t o Darwin

h e r e g u l a r l y towards the upkeep

of t he w i fe and he r son and t ha t a measure of

suppor t would have continued i n t h e future.

He appears t o have l ived f rom day t o day and

t o h a v e b e e n i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n

meeting commitments t o t h o s e who f i n a n c e d t h e

p u r c h a s e o f a car - i t s e l f f o r a t i m e a

f a m i l y a s s e t w h i c h h e d i d n o t p o s s e s s at d a t e

o f	dea th . have poo led he r ea rn ings w i th t hose o f t he	The	wi fe ,	when	she	worked,	seems
t	o

deceased there and was evidence which

s a t i s f i e s me t h a t f o r some t i m e s h e was

drawing a suppor t ing mo the r ' s pens ion t o

which she cour se o f t ime it was n o t e n t i t l e d a n d which i n t h e

became necessa ry f o r he r t o

r epay . In a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e b e s t I

can do is t o approach the m a t t e r on t h e b a s i s

t h a t 40% o f h i s n e t e a r n i n g s would have been

a p p l i e d t o h i s own suppor t and p e r s o n a l

a f i n d i n g I have appl ied t o t h e

expend i tu re ,

past as w e l l as t h e future. 'I

!

It was common ground t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d ' s n o r m a l

r e t i r i n g a g e would have been 65. The learned judge accepted

the ev idence o f Mr. S t r a t f o r d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e o f a n

annu i ty commencing on t h e t r i a l d a t e o f $1.00 p e r week n e t

l o s s on t h e j o i n t l i v e s o f t h e deceased and t h e f i r s t

r e s p o n d e n t was $924.00 . H i s H o n o u r t h e n e x p r e s s e d h i s

conclus ions as follows (28'N.IP.R. at p.28):

9.

"Piaking a l lowance fo r t he deceased ' s own

s u p p o r t , t h e loss t o t he dependan t s a t d a t e

of t r i a l c a l c u l a t e d on t h i s b a s i s i s $54,000

(60% o f $90,000). Only l i m i t e d a l l o w a n c e f o r

con t ingenc ie s such as unemployment , s i c k n e s s

and t h e evidence of the l i k e s h o u l d b e made o v e r t h i s p e r i o d

of a lmost Telecom e i g h t y e a r s b e a r i n g i n mind t h e

low was tage exper ienced by

and was a young man who a p p e a r s t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d

t o h a v e h a d a

h e a l t h y e x i s t e n c e . I a l l o w $48,000 for

economic loss t o d a t e o f t r i a l . The youngest

c h i l d was b o r n s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s f a t h e r ' s

d e a t h b u t I s e e no p o i n t i n d i f f e r i n g t h e

allowance t o t h e c h i l d r e n o v e r t h i s p e r i o d

when t h e y maintained by him. w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e b e e n w h o l l y

On t h i s a s p e c t I

a p p o r t i o n $5000 t o each o f t h e c h i l d r e n and

$38,000 t o t h e w i f e .

As t o t h e future , I c o n s i d e r just ice w i l l be

done i f I work o n t h e n e t salary o f a l i n e s

s u p e r v i s o r - $340. ( H i s Honour

i n t e n d e d t o r e f e r t o a l i n e s s e r v i c e m a n .

Again I i n t e n d t o assess damages f o r t h e fami ly as a whole and make an apport ionment I consider reasonable . Applying Mr S t r a t f o r d ' s

calculation t h a t $924 i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e

va lue o f an annu i ty o f $1 per week and using

round f igures assessment reaches one an i n i t i a l

of $314,000 which must i n c l u d i n g be reduced

by 408 t o a l l o w f o r t h e d e c e a s e d ' s own f u t u r e

suppor t and p e r s o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e ,

o f cou r se p ropor t iona te sha re o f househo ld

e x p e n s e s s u c h as r e n t , f o o d a n d c l o t h i n g .

Reduced i n t h i s manner one a r r i v e s at a t o t a l

of $188,400, (608 o f $314,000)."

But the l ea rned j udge t hough t that con t ingenc ie s . t h i s sum should

!

b e s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d t o take accoun t o f

He s a i d ( 2 8 N.T.R. at p.28):

"There must i n my view be a more s u b s t a n t i a l

r e d u c t i o n c o n t i n g e n c i e s . f o r I a m no t

p e r s u a d e d t h e d i c t a t e s p a r t i e s would have married and

o n e ' s e x p e r i e n c e t h a t t h e i r o f

n a t u r e d e f a c t o . r e l a t i o n s h i p s are still a p t

t o be more t r a n s i t o r y t h a n m a r r i a g e s . I do

I U .

n o t o v e r l o o k c h i l d r e n t h e l i n k b e t w e e n p a r t n e r s t h a t

p r o v i d e . F u r t h e r m o r e i n t h e l o n g

run the a s ses smen t must be a mat te r o f

judgment-, gu ided , bu t no t based on a c t u a r i a l

c a l c u l a t i o n . The p a r t i e s may have had

f u r t h e r c h i l d r e n . The p l a i n t i f f s a y s t h e y

planned a f a m i l y o f f o u r b u t e v e n t u a l l y h e r

dependency would probably have decreased

b e l o w t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f 60$ which family. I h a v e

al lowed as a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e To

c a l c u l a t e t h i s a c t u a r i l y seems t o me t o b e a

u s e l e s s e x e r c i s e as t h e d i c t a t e s d a t a i s h y p o t h e t i c a l .

I c o n s i d e r j u s t i c e will done , be in

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e o f t h e s t a t u t e ,

i f I make a m o r e s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c o u n t . I

a l l o w $ l 5 O , O O O f o r t h e f u t u r e economic l o s s

s u f f e r e d b y t h e f a m i l y . "

The l ea rned j udge cons ide red it p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e

deceased would have suppor ted the two ch i ldren un t i l they

were 16 t o 18 y e a r s o f age. He appor t ioned $129,000.00 t o

t h e f i rs t respondent and $4,500.00 and $16,500.00 t o t h e

second and t h i r d r e s p o n d e n t s r e s p e c t i v e l y .

Whilst c o n c e d i n g t h a t a two s t a g e p r o c e s s of

i

assessment is c o n v e n t i o n a l i n p e r s o n a l i n j u r y l i t i g a t i o n ,

t h e a p p e l l a n t s c h a l l e n g e its employment i n a claim under

Lord Campbel l ' s l eg is la t ion except f o r t h e l i m i t e d p u r p o s e

of t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f i n t e re s t i n t e r e s t b e f o r e j u d g m e n t i n t h o s e

j u r i s d i c t i o n s where such may be c la imed. ( In the

Ter r i to ry , in te res t cannot be awarded before judgment . ) The

a p p e l l a n t s n o t o n l y q u e s t i o n t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e two s t a g e

assessment process i n p o i n t o f p r i n c i p l e . They a l s o

cha l l enge i t s a p p l i c a t i o n as b e i n g u n f a i r i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r

11.

c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s c a s e . They p o i n t t o the delay. i n t h e

i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s ; t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y l e g a l l y

e n f o r c e a b l e r i g h t t o s u p p o r t against t h e d e c e a s e d ; t h e

r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t p e r i o d o f employment o f t he deceased by t he

f i r s t a p p e l l a n t ; t h e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y n a t u r e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

o f ac tua l suppor t by t he deceased ; . and t h e real p o s s i b i l i t y

t h a t t h e deceased would r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e f i r s t respondent and the

not h a v e s u b s i s t e d .

I n our op in ion , t he l ea rned j udge was c o r r e c t i n

adop t ing a two s t a g e method of assessment . The p r o p r i e t y o f

such an approach has been assumed, if no t squa re ly dec ided ,

i n a number o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h i s a r e a , i n c l u d i n g a t

l e a s t t h r e e Te r r i t o ry handed d e c i s i o n s o f t h e Supreme Court of the Northern

down between 1979 and 1982 by Muirhead, J.,

G a l l o p , J. a n d F o r s t e r , C.J. r e s p e c t i v e l y . It w i l l b e

s u f f i c i e n t t o r e f e r t o o n l y two d e c i s i o n s o f t h e High Court .

I n Jacobs v. Varley (1975) 9 A . L . R . 219, a l though the Cour t

was d iv ided on t h e u l t i m a t e f a t e o f t h e a p p e a l , t h e r e was no

sugges t ion by a n y j u s t i c e t h a t t h e Full Court of the Supreme

Court of South Australia e r r e d i n a d o p t i n g t h e t w o s t a g e

method i n a claim under Lord Campbe l l ’ s l eg i s l a t ion .

Although i n d issent , Gibbs , J. (as he t hen was) s a i d ( w i t h

the concurrence of Stephen, J.) (a t pp.223-4):

12.

" I n a s s e s s i n g damages i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e it

is f i r s t dependants f o r t h e necessa ry t o compensate the

l o s s o f t h e b e n e f i t w h i c h

they might reasonably have expec ted to der ive

d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f r o m t h e d a t e o f d e a t h t o

t h e d a t e o f t r i a l ... The second pe r iod t o be

cons idered i n t h e making of an assessment i s

t h a t commencing w i t h t h e d a t e t h e o f

judgment. I t

O f t h e m a j o r i t y who f a v o u r e d d i s m i s s a l o f t h e

a p p e a l , t h e r e a s o n i n g o f Mason, J. at l e a s t assumed t h a t t h e

F u l l C o u r t ' s t e c h n i q u e was a p p r o p r i a t e . H i s Honour 's

analysis of t h e Full Court ' s assessment of l o s s , f irst , up

t o t h e o n l y w i t h h i s a p p r o v a l t r i a l , a n d , t h e n , a f t e r t h e t r i a l , was c o n s i s t e n t

o f such an approach (a t pp.229; 231).

More r e c e n t l y , t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n

i n S t a t e (1983) 49 A.L.R. G o v e r n m e n t I n s u r a n c e O f f i c e ( Q l d . ) v . Biemann

247 i n t h e c o n t e x t o f legis la t ion. a c la im f o r i n t e r e s t

i n an ac t ion unde r Lord Campbel l ' s The t r i a l

judge had awarded i n t e re s t pu r suan t t o s . 72 o f t h e Common

Law P r a c t i c e Act, 1867 (Qld . ) bo th on t h e amount

r e p r e s e n t i n g l o s s o f dependency t o t h e d a t e o f t r i a l and

t h a t r e p r e s e n t i n g future l o s s of dependency. It was he ld by

t h e High Court t h a t , on t h e t rue c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s . 7 2 , t h e

d i s c r e t i o n t o award in t e re s t shou ld be exe rc i sed i n fa ta l

a c c i d e n t claims as i n p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n s , s o as t o draw

a d i s t inc t ion be tween de t r imen ta l consequences su f f e red

b e f o r e t h e d a t e o f t r i a l a n d t h o s e s u f f e r e d t h e r e a f t e r .

Accord ing ly , unde r s . 72 and l eg i s l a t ion i nd i s t ingu i shab le

i

f rom i t , t h e t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d s p l i t a n award i n to two

p a r t s : o n e r e p r e s e n t i n g loss of dependency before t r i a l ,

t h e o t h e r r e p r e s e n t i n g loss o f dependency a f t e r t h a t d a t e .

I n t e r e s t (at half t h e c u r r e n t s h o r t t e r m rate) shou ld on ly

be awarded on the amount r e p r e s e n t i n g l o s s b e f o r e t r ia l .

I n the i r j o in t j udgmen t , G ibbs , C . J . , Mason, Deane

and Dawson, JJ., a f t e r d i s c u s s i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e

dec i s ions and r eason ing i n Ruby v. Marsh (1975) 132 C.L.R.

642 and F i r e and A l l Risks Insu rance Co. Limited v. Callinan

(1978) 140 C.L.R. 427, s a i d (at p.252):

" S i n c e Ruby v Marsh t h i s c o u r t h a s h a d n o

o c c a s i o n t o cons ide r an award o f i n t e r e s t on

a v e r d i c t i n a fa ta l acc iden t claim.

However, t h e House of Lords cons idered the

q u e s t i o n i n Cookson v Knowles ... It h e l d

(1) t h a t i n a normal f a t a l a c c i d e n t s c a s e ,

t h e damages ought, as a g e n e r a l ru le , t o be

spl i t i n t o two p a r t s : (a) t h e p e c u n i a r y l o s s

wh ich it. was e s t i m a t e d t h e d e p e n d a n t s h a d

a l r e a d y s u s t a i n e d f r o m t h e date of

dea th pecun ia ry up

t o t h e d a t e o f t r i a l , and (b ) t he

loss which i t was e s t i m a t e d t h e y would

s u s t a i n f r o m t h e t r i a l onwards; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e

i n t e r e s t o n t h e p r e - t r i a l l o s s s h o u l d b e

a w a r d e d f o r a p e r i o d b e t w e e n t h e d a t e o f

dea th and t he da t e o f t r i a l a t h a l f t h e s h o r t

term i n t e r e s t rates c u r r e n t d u r i n g t h a t

per iod; and (3) f u t u r e l o s s . t h a t no i n t e r e s t s h o u l d b e

awarded on Although i n Cookson v Knowles ...

Lord F rase r o f

T u l l y b e l t o n s a i d . . . t h a t S 79A ( o f t h e

V i c t o r i a n l e g i s l a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d i n Ruby v. Marsh) is i n terms b road ly similar t o h o s e of t h e E n g l i s h l e g i s l a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d i n t h a t

c a s e , S 79A d i f f e r s f r o m t h e E n g l i s h

l e g i s l a t i o n , as i t d o e s f r o m S 72 o f t h e

Queensland Act, i n a number of r e s p e c t s . . .

F i r s t , S 796 p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e j u d g e ' s h a l l '

i

14.

award i n t e r e s t ' u n l e s s good cause i s shown t o

t h e c o n t r a r y ' , a n d n o t t h a t h e 'may' do s o .

Secondly, S 79A does no t exp res s ly pe rmi t t he

g i v i n g of i n t e r e s t on p a r t o n l y o f t h e amount

awarded. Thirdly - and t h i s i m p o r t a n t g r o u n d

of d i s t i n c t i o n was p o i n t e d o u t i n C u l l e n v

Trappe l l . . . - S 79A conta ins , and S 72 does

no t , an is awarded as expres s p roh ib i t i on on the allowance

o f i n t e r e s t on compensa t ion for t h a t p a r t o f t h e damages which

l o s s o r damage

t o be incur red or s u f f e r e d after t h e d a t e o f

the award. "

Thei r Honours p roceeded t o d i s t i n g u i s h - Ruby v .

Marsh:

"The d e c i s i o n i n Rub7 v Marsh depended on t h e

- p a r t i c u l a r w o r d s whe the r o f S 79A and i n particular

on the 79A(3)(b) are concerned ques t ion t he words of S

with a j u r i s t i c

concept or a p r a c t i c a l o n e . T h a t q u e s t i o n

does not arise i n t h e p r e s e n t case, where, t o

u s e t h e words o f Thompson v F a r a n i o , t h e

effect o f S 72 'was s i m p l y t o l e a v e t h e p o i n t

r e s t i n g on p r i n c i p l e ' , n a m e l y , t h e p r i n c i p l e

expounded i n r e l a t i o n t o a c t i o n s f o r p e r s o n a l

i n j u r i e s i n F i r e and All Risks Insurance CO

L t d v a c c i d e n t claims i n Cookson v C a l l i n a n a n d i n r e l a t i o n t o f a t a l

~~ ~

Knourles. I n

o t h e r w o r d s , t h e g e n e r a l d i s c r e t i o n g i v e n t o

a t r i a l j u d g e by S 7 2 fa ta l t o a w a r d i n t e r e s t

s h o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d i n a c c i d e n t claims

as w e l l as i n a c t i o n s f o r suffered p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s

s o as t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

detr imental consequences b e f o r e t h e

date o f t h e t r i a l a n d t h o s e t o b e s u f f e r e d

t h e r e a f t e r . Accordingly, c a s e s i n w h i c h

a r i s e u n d e r S 72 of the Queensland Act, and

u n d e r s u c h i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e l e g i s l a t i o n o f o t h e r S t a t e s as is

f r o m t h a t s e c t i o n it w i l l

b e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a t r i a l judge (1) when he

is a b l e t o do s o t o s p l i t t h e award i n t o two

p a r t s , as d i d t h e t r i a l judge i n t h i s c a s e ,

t h e first p a r t r e f l e c t i n g l o s s of dependency

b e f o r e . the t r i a l and t he s econd pa r t

r e f l e c t i n g loss dependency of a f t e r t ha t

date; and (2) t o award i n t e r e s t o n l y on t h e

l o s s b e f o r e t h e d a t e o f t r i a l , making no

award o b e s u f f e r e d a f t e r t h a t d a t e . " f i n t e re s t i n r e s p e c t o f t h e l o s s t o

Although the mat ter immediate of concern i n

Biemann's Case was t h e q u e s t i o n of i n t e r e s t , t h e r e a s o n i n g

of t h e stage method C o u r t i s c o n s i s t e n t with i t s a p p r o v a l o f t h e t w o

of assessment even where interest is n o t an

issue.

The a p p e l l a n t s p l a c e much r e l i a n c e upon t h e r e c e n t

dec i son of t h e House o f Lords i n Graham v. Dodds [l9831 1

W.L.R. 808. But, i n our view, t h e case is o f no a s s i s t a n c e

h e r e . The p o i n t t h e r e c o n s i d e r e d w a s whe the r , unde r t he

E n g l i s h m u l t i p l i e r system, t h e r e l e v a n t d a t e i n a claim

under Lord Campbel l ' s legis la t ion, is w h e r e a s t h e d a t e o f d e a t h o r

t h e d a t e o f p e r s o n a l o f t r i a l . The House h e l d t h a t , i n t h e c a s e

in jury i f t h e p l a i n t i f f h a d s u r v i v e d t o t h e d a t e

o f t r i a l t h a t was a knovm f a c t and a c c o r d i n g l y t h e

m u l t i p l i e r a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e l e n g t h o f h i s f u t u r e working

l i f e had t o b e s e l e c t e d as at t h a t d a t e , i n t h e c a s e o f a

fatal a c c i d e n t t h e r e w a s u n c e r t a i n t y as t o what might have

happened t o t h e d e c e a s e d a f t e r t h e d a t e o f h i s d e a t h had he

!

s u r v i v e d a n d , a c c o r d i n g l y , t h e m u l t i p l i e r h a d t o b e s e l e c t e d

as at t h e d a t e o f d e a t h a n d t h e number of p r e - t r i a l y e a r s

f o r w h i c h deduc ted f rom tha t mu l t ip l i e r . s p e c i a l d a m a g e s w e r e a w a r d e d s h o u l d t h e n b e

16.

Al though t he dec i s ion i n Graham v. Dodds c l a r i f i e d

some a s p e c t s o f t h e r e a s o n i n g i n Cookson v. Knowles, supra

( s e e U, Assessing Damages Fa t a l in Acc iden t Cases ,

L i t i g a t i o n , (1983) Vol.3 No.1 a t p.15), it is concerned only

w i t h t h e m u l t i p l i e r / m u l t i p l i c a n d s y s t e m p e c u l i a r t o t h e

United Kingdom. The d e c i s i o n s i n J a c o b s v. Var l ey and i n

Biemann's Case a r e a u t h o r i t a t i v e a n d m u s t ' g o v e r n t h e g e n e r a l

p o s i t i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y e v e n i f n o t s q u a r e l y d e c i s i v e of

t h e q u e s t i o n t o b e d e t e r m i n e d i n t h i s a p p e a l ( s e e a l s o

Luntz, Assessment o f Damages, 2nd Ea. at assessment pp. 59-60).

Moreover, adoption of t h e two s t a g e method of is

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t w h i l s t t h e

a s s e s s m e n t o f damages must be r e f e r a b l e t o t h e d a t e o f

death, the Court . "is bound t o use such facts as have come t o

l i g h t s i n c e a s s e s s m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n s p e c u l a t i o n s t h e d a t e o f d e a t h w h i c h a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e

t o which recourse would

h a v e h a d t o b e made h a d t h e c o u r t b e e n c o n f i n e d t o s u c h

f a c t s as were known a t t h e d a t e o f d e a t h . F u r t h e r , t he

c o u r t w i l l award damages i n money o f . t h e day of the award,

n o t b e i n g i n t e r v a l s i n c e t h e d a t e o f d e a t h	d e t e r r e d	t h e r e f r o m	b y	t h e	f a c t	t h a t	i n	t h e
t h e	v a l u e o f money may have

changed. See O'Brien v. McKean . . . ' l (per Barwick, C . J . ,

Ruby v . Commonwealth (1946) 73 C.L.R. Marsh, s u p r a , a t p . 6 4 7 ; s e e a l s o Willis v. - The

105 at p.109).

l

A s a p p l i c a t i o n has b e e n m e n t i o n e d , a p p e l l a n t s t h e a l s o

c r i t i c i s e t h e b y t h e l e a r n e d j u d g e o f t h e two

s t a g e a p p r o a c h i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s case.

Many o f t h e c r i t i c i s m s a r e n o more t h a n a t t e m p t s t o

c h a l l e n g e t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e . For e x a m p l e , h i s

H o n o u r ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e

c o n t i n u e d t o c o n t r i b u t e 60% of h i s income t o t h e s u p p o r t o f

h i s f a m i l y , and t h a t h e was u n l i k e l y t o have separa ted f rom

t h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t , w e r e b o t h c h a l l e n g e d . T h e r e was,.

however, ample evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e s e f i n d i n g s . On t h e

o ther hand , the submiss ion tha t a l lowance should be made f o r

t h e r e s p o n d e n t s ' d e l a y i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o c e e d i n g s

should , along with	one	o r	two	o t h e r	m a t t e r s ,	be	s e p a r a t e l y
d e a l t w i t h .

O'Brien In v. McKean (1968) 118 C.L.R. 540,

Barwick, C.J., o b s e r v e d , o b i t e r , t h a t it was p o s s i b l e t h a t a

p l a i n t i f f who de layed could ob ta in (a t p .545) . a s u b s t a n t i a l a d v a n t a g e

by h i s own was expressed by d i l a to ry conduc t A similar r e a c t i o n

Lord B r i d g e i n Graham v . Dodds, s u p r a , (at

p . 8 1 5 ) . It i s t r u e t h a t , i n some c a s e s , some advan tage

c o u l d a c c r u e i n t h i s way. I t is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t a

p l a in t i f f cou ld be d i sadvan taged by t he occu r rence of

c e r t a i n e v e n t s which occur be tween the da te o f in jury o r

dea th and t h e d a t e o f t r ia l . A p l a i n t i f f who d e l a y s the

commencement o f p r o c e e d i n g s , f o r s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n s o r

o the rwise , runs a measure. 02 r i s k a c c o r d i n g l y ( s e e L u n t z ,

op. c i t . at p.39).

18.

Whatever be t h e outcome of the taking of t h e risks

inhe ren t i n t h e d e l a y , it cannot , as a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e ,

j u s t i f y a n y d e p a r t u r e f r o m or mod i f i ca t ion o f t he two stage

method of assessment of damages. A s h a s b e e n s a i d , t h a t

method is roo ted i n t h e p o l i c y t h a t c o u r t s p r e f e r f a c t s t o

prophecies . That pol icy is fundamenta l and should no t be

d isp laced by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a p r i n c i p l e which a t tempts

t o a s s e s s w h a t i s a r e a s o n a b l e time w i t h i n w h i c h t h e

l i t i g a t i o n o u g h t h a v e t o b e e n commenced. Any such

assessment would, i n any event , raise its own d i f f i c u l t i e s .

For one t h i n g , it is n o t e a s y t o lay down o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a

for t h i s p u r p o s e . For a n o t h e r , it i s t o b e e x p e c t e d t h a t

d i s p u t e s w o u l d a r i s e as t o w h a t s h o u l d b occurred. e r e g a r d e d as a

s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n o f delay which has If it

m a t t e r s , i t i s n o t c l a i m e d i n t h e p r e s e n t blameworthy c a s e t h a t t h e

f i r s t respondent was i n any personal sense f o r

the de lay which occur red . I n our op in ion , the l e a r n e d judge

was not bound t h e l a t e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s . t o take i n t o a c c o u n t i n r e d u c t i o n of t h e c l a i m

The a p p e l l a n t s n e x t d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t

t h a t , i n making allowance f o r con t ingenc ie s when a s s e s s i n g

p r e - t r i a l damages, h i s Honour d i d n o t e x p r e s s l y r e f e r t o t h e

p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t the pa r t i e s migh t have s epa ra t ed , o r t h e

deceased might have d ied before the t r i a l f r o m som,e cause

o t h e r t h a n t h a t f o r w h i c h t h e a p p e l l a n t s w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e .

It seems u n l i k e l y t h a t a judge as experienced as h i s Honour

19.

would have overlooked these factors, and he was not. obliged

to list all the contingencies which he had in mind in making

the reduction which he did. In any event, by adopting the

figures of actual earnings lost between death and trial

which were agreed between the parties, his Honour was not

using the money values of the date of trial for the earlier

years' figures. It would be reasonable to offset this

against the factors advanced by the appellants (cf. Jacka v.

Horsten (1980) 88 LSJS 419 at p.424, in the Full Court of

South Australia).

It by failing to take into account in reduction of the claim is also suggested that the learned judge erred

for loss o f dependency the circumstance that, unlike a legal

wife, the first respondent had no enforceable right of

support against the deceased. In our opinion, this is an

irrelevant consideration. The first respondent satisfied

the statutory definition of a facto wife for the purposes

of the Act. The question of actual support, one of fact

only, was determined adversely to the appellants. No ground

for disturbing that finding within the established

principles has been demonstrated.

The appellants also attack the use made by the

learned judge of the actuarial evidence. It is submitted

that a multiplier of 1,080 should have been adopted as from

the date of death. But this submission depends for its

20.

acceptance upon the adopt ion of a s i n g l e s t e p a s s e s s m e n t o f

l o s s of dependency . S ince , for reasons a l ready g iven , cr i t ic ism a two

s t a g e a p p r o a c h i s r e q u i r e d , t h e u r g e d b y t h e

appe l l an t s canno t be sus t a ined .

I n coming t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e l e a r n e d j u d g e

q u i t e p r o p e r l y t o o k i n t o a c c o u n t , as c o n t i n g e n c i e s , t h e

o r d i n a r y v i c i s s i t u d e s o f l i f e f o r which allowance should

p rope r ly be made. The appel lan ts , however , say t h a t t h e

l e a r n e d judge p rospec ts e r r e d i n t h i s r e s p e c t b y f a i l i n g t o t a k e

account o f the of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . f i rs t r e s p o n d e n t ' s marrying

o r e n t e r i n g i n t o a f u r t h e r f a c t o They

r e l y , i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , u p o n a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e f i r s t

r e s p o n d e n t e n g a g e d i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a s o l d i e r who

f a t h e r e d a c h i l d b o r n t o t h e f i r s t r e s p o n d e n t s h o r t l y b e f o r e

t h e t r i a l Supreme Court shou ld o f t h e a c t i o n . The appe l l an t s submi t that t h e

have t aken t hese c i r cums tances i n to

account i n r e d u c t i o n o f t h e c l a i m f o r loss of dependency.

It i s t r u e , as t h e a p p e l l a n t s say, t h a t t h e

requirement made r e d u c t i o n b y s . 1 0 ( 4 ) ( h ) o f t h e Act t h a t , i n a s s e s s i n g

d a m a g e s , n o s h a l l b e made o n a c c o u n t o f t h e

remarriage o r p r o s p e c t s o f r e m a r r i a g e o f t h e s u r v i v i n g

s p o u s e i s n o t , i n i t s l i t e r a l t e r m s , a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e f i r s t respondent may e n t e r i n t o a n o t h e r

- d e f ac to mar r i age . On the o ther hand , even i f there were no

s t a t u t o r y e x c l u s i o n c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e o f . t h a t o f

I

C l .

p o s s i b i l i t y , i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t i t was p r o p e r l y a

m a t t e r t o b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , e v e n a p a r t f r o m t h e

cons t ruc t ion o f s . l 0 ( 4 ) ( h ) t o which re ference w i l l l a t e r b e

made. I n 'Wild v. Eves [l9701 2 N.S.W.R. 326, i n a n a c t i o n

under Lord whether a widow's Campbel l ' s legis la t ion, t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e

cohabi ta t ion wi th a man is a fac tor which

reduces her or t h e c h i l d r e n ' s e n t i t l e m e n t t o damages. The

m a j o r i t y ( J a c o b s a n d M o f f i t t , J J . A . ) , a f t e r r e f e r r i n g t o

"Thus C o u r t s t r e s s e s H i g h t h e t h e

i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e r e s u l t o f t h e s p o u s e ' s

d e a t h b e i n g a r e v i v e d c a p a c i t y t o r e m a r r y

with t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f the consequent

d e p e n d e n c y o n t h e new h u s b a n d . T h i s i s

d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e f a c t u a l resu l t o f a

s p o u s e ' s d e a t h b e i n g a g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o

e a r n , a n o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h i s g r e a t e r o r

sma l l e r by d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , cho ice . When we a p p l y t h i s

we f i n d t h a t

d e a t h o f a husband simply does not revive a

c a p a c i t y as d i s t i n c t f r o m a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o

c o h a b i t w i t h a n o t h e r man. That c a p a c i t y

a lways ex i s t ed . The case can be envisaged of

a cont inued dependency despi te such

c o h a b i t a t i o n . It is t r u e tha t t h e r e i s a far

greater o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s u c h c o h a b i t a t i o n

w i t h o u t t h e proceedings sanc t ion ma t r imon ia l o f

o r withdrawal of maintenance by a

husband. But t o a l e s s e r d e g r e e t h e s e

s a n c t i o n s may e x i s t i n t h e c a s e o f a w i f e who

i n s i s t s on working. The d i f f e rence t hough

v e r y l a r g e i s one of degree , no t o f k ind . In

s h o r t t h e r e is no r e v i v e d c a p a c i t y t o c o h a b i t

as t h e r e is a r e v i v e d c a p a c i t y t o r e m a r r y ,

and t h a t t e s t o f c a p a c i t y is the one which

has been l a i d down. 'I

22.

It was h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c o h a b i t a t i o n w i t h

a man was n o t a f a c t o r w h i c h r e d u c e d h e r e n t i t l e m e n t t o

'! damages except s o far as i t might be evidence from which an

i n f e r e n c e	c o u l d	b	e	d r a m	t h a t	t h e	p l a i n t i f f	would	remarry.
-	A

f o r t i o r i Manning, it d id no t r educe t he en t i t l emen t o f a c h i l d .

J. d i s sen ted . I n h i s v i e w , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a - d e

f ac to r e l a t ionsh ip cou ld gene ra l ly be t r i a l i gnored bu t , where it

had ac tua l ly occu r red by t he and was con t inu ing , i t

should be taken i n t o account .

It Lord Campbe l l ' s l eg i s l a t ion has no t may well b e t h a t t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n of

ye t b e e n f i n a l l y s e t t l e d

i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s ( s e e L u n t z , o p . c i t . at p.451) but , i n

any event , p r o p e r l y i n our view, t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s . l 0 ( 4 ) ( h ) , when

c o n s t r u e d , r e q u i r e t h e c o u r t t o i g n o r e b o t h t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y o f a - de f a c t o r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f

s u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p i f it h a s a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d . I n our

op in ion , s . l 0 (4 ) (h ) shou ld be cons t rued s o as t o e x t e n d n o t

o n l y t o legal marriages b u t t o - d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e s as well.

Any o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would l e a d t o a result which would

b e b o t h c a p r i c i o u s ()rollongong) a n d i r r a t i o n a l ( s e e Cooper Brookes

Pty. Limited v. Pederal Commissioner of

Taxat ion (1981) 147 C.L.R. 297 p e r Mason and Wilson, JJ. at

p . 3 2 1 ) . S i n c e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e scheme as a whole seeks t o

e l e v a t e - d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e s t o t h e status of legal marr iages ,

i t is p e r m i s s i b l e t o i m p l y i n t o s . l 0 ( 4 ) ( h ) a p r o v i s i o n t o

t h e same e f f e c t d e a l i n g w i t h f a c t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( s e e

23.

C o o p e r B r o o k e s , s u p r a , p e r G i b b s , C . J . a t pp .305-7 ; per

S t e p h e n , J . a t pp.312-3; per Nason and m a r r i a g e Wilson, J J . a t

pp.320-3). I n t h e f i rs t p l a c e , t h e o f t h e s u r v i v o r

o f a - de f a c t o r e l a t i o n s h i p c o v e r e d b y s . 4 ( 3 ) ( c ) o f t h e Act

s h o u l d t r e a t e d s . l 0 ( 4 ) ( h ) b e as a " r e m a r r i a g e " f a l l i n g w i t h i n

( s e e B e n n e t t v. Liddy (1979) 25 A.L.R. 340 a t

p.352). It would be en t i re ly anomalous i f such a marr iage

were t o be d i s r ega rded bu t a f r e s h r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e t y p e

contempla ted by s .4 (3) (c) had t o be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . I n

our opin ion , as a l i a i s o n ma t t e r of l a w , t h e l e a r n e d j u d g e c o r r e c t l y

d i s r e g a r d e d t h e r e l i e d on b y t h e a p p e l l a n t s . I n any

even t , as a m a t t e r o f f a c t , t h e a p p e l l a n t s h a v e f a i l e d t o

e s t a b l i s h any b a s i s upon which an in fe rence cou ld r easonab ly

be drawn t h a t t h e f i rs t respondent is l i k e l y t o remarry o r

engage i n another permanent de f a c t o r e l a t i o n s h i p .

The a p p e l l a n t s a l s o a t t a c k f i rs t t h e award made b y t h e

l e a r n e d j u d g e t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t t h e i n sum o f

$10,000.00 i n r e s p e c t o f l o s s of consortium and solatium.

By s.lO(3) o f t h a t Act i t is p rov ided t ha t :

" ( 3 ) Damages i n an a c t i o n may inc lude -

.	..
(C) if the deceased person is su rv ived by a wife o r husband - damages f o r

l o s s or impairment of consortium of

husband and wife i n t h e same manner

as d a m a g e s w o u l d b e a s s e s s e d i n a

c l a i m i n t o r t b y a husband for

damages f o r loss o r impai rment o f

. consort ium;

.. .

( f ) so la t ium."

it r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s c a n h a v e i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t , i n t h e c a s e o f a - d e f a c t o

no a p p l i c a t i o n s i n c e

t h e j u r i s t i c s o u r c e o f t h e s e c o n c e p t s is t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n

o f husband and wife and nothing short of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p

w i l l s u f f i c e as a f o u n d a t i o n f o r s u c h a c l a i m . i t i s

f u r t h e r s u b m i t t e d that any claim for consor t ium ended wi th

the dea th damages o f the . deceased . The a p p e l l a n t s a l s o a r g u e t h a t

can o n l y b e a w a r d e d u n d e r t h e A c f o r t l o s s o f

expec ta t ion o f a p e c u n i a r y b e n e f i t , y e t t h e r e s p o n d e n t s a r e

s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r damages i n r e s p e c t o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f

a n i n c i d e n t w h i c h c o u l d n o t h a v e c o n f e r r e d any m a t e r i a l

b e n e f i t . I n s h o r t , e v e n i f a l o s s was s u f f e r e d , i t f e l l

o u t s i d e t h e s ta tute .

i n o u r o p i n i o n , t h e c o n t e n t i o n s now advanced on

beha l f o i n t e n t i o n o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o e q u a t e f t he appe l l an t s shou ld no t be accep ted . G iven t he

a - de f ac to mar r i age

w i t h a l e g a l m a r r i a g e i n a l l r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s , it must

f o l l o w t h a t s . l 0 ( 3 ) ( c ) and ( f ) should be cons t rued s o as t o

e x t e n d	t h e i r	o p e r a t i o n	t o	a	p e r s o n	i n	t h e	p o s i t i o n	o f
t h e marriage

f i r s t r e sponden t no twi ths t and ing t ha t no formal

o c c u r r e d . Any o t h e r r e s u l t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e s e

p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d b e c a p r i c i o u s a n d i r r a t i o n a l . S u c h a

l i t e r a l r e s u l t	i s t h u s	t o
b e s t a t u t e a v o i d e d as a matter o f t h e

p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e ju r i sd ic t ion ( s e e C o o p e r B r o o k e s ,

s u p r a ) . I n our v iew, the o f the Cour t t o award

damages under these heads was e s t a b l i s h e d .

The a p p e l l a n t s a l s o c r i t i c i s e t h e quantum o f t h e

award but any such appeal can only b e e n t e r t a i n e d if t h e

!

t r i a l judge misapprehended t he f ac t s has acted on a wrong p r i n c i p l e o f law o r has

o r h a s , f o r t h e s e o r o t h e r r e a s o n s ,

made a whol ly e r roneous es t imate o f the damage s u f f e r e d ( s e e

Hodges v . F r o s t c i t e d ) . (1984) 53 A.L.R. 373 a t p . 3 7 5 a n d t h e

a u t h o r i t i e s t h e r e No $10,000.00 s u c h e r r o r b e e n on t h i s h a s

demonstrated i n t h e award of s c o r e . The

only a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r which has any substance a t a l l i s

t h a t , by r e q u i r i n g d a m a g e s f o r l o s s o f c o n s o r t i u m t o b e

a s s e s s e d " i n t h e same manner as damages would be assessed i n

a c l a i m impa i rmen t i n t o r t b y a h u s b a n d f o r d a m a g e s f o r l o s s o r

o f conso r t ium" ( s . l 0 (3 ) (c ) ) , t he Act had l i m i t e d

s u c h d a m a g e s t o t h e p e r i o d , i f any , be tween i n j u r y and

death. It was a r g u e d t h a t s u p p o r t f o r t h i s a p p r o a c h may be

found i n S l o a n v. K i r b y & Redman (1979) 20 SASR 263 a t

pp.275-8. But i n t h a t c a s e , W h i t e , J. was c o n s t r u i n g

l e g i s l a t i o n which ass imilated a w i f e ' s p o s i t i o n t o t h a t o f a

husband i n claims f o r l o s s of consort ium ar i s ing f r o m e i t h e r

dea th o r paragraph is conce rned disablement . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e r e l e v a n t

on ly w i th t he c l a ims a r i s ing f rom

26.

dea th , bu t w i th claims o f e i t h e r a wife o r a husband. It

would be e n t e r t a i n e d w e r e t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o extraordinary i f the only c la ims which could be

a possible per iod between

in jury and dea th . The w o r d s " i n t h e same manner", i n t h e

passage c i ted above , must be read as r e l a t i n g t o t h e n a t u r e

and e x t e n t o f damages r a t h e r t h a n t o t h e p e r i o d .

The respondent learned judge a lso awarded the sum of $7,000.00

t o the second i n r e s p e c t of solat ium and l o s s o f

care and guidance. The l a t t e r head of damage is

s p e c i f i c a l l y m e n t i o n e d i n s . l 0 ( 4 ) ( e ) ( i i ) . The a p p e l l a n t s

s u g g e s t t h a t solat ium is n o t ava i l ab le because t he s econd

respondent was n o t t h e a c t u a l c h i l d of the deceased . I n our

op in ion , t he submiss ion shou ld be r e j ec t ed . The Act t r e a t s

a c h i l d t o whom the deceased s tood -- i n l o c o p a r e n t i s as on an

e q u a l f o o t i n g t o an r e l a t i o n s h i p a c t u a l c h i l d . The learned judge found,

on t h e f a c t s , t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y was

e s t a b l i s h e d so d e c e a s e d . as t o deem t h e s e c o n d r e s p o n d e n t t o

b e as a m a t t e r t h e

c h i l d o f t h e It f o l l o w s t h a t , o f

cons t ruc t ion o f s.lO(3) t h e A c t , o f h i s Honour had

j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award damages under these heads. Any o t h e r

c o n s t r u c t i o n would g i v e s.lO(3) an operation which would be

a b s u r d i n shou ld be r e j ec t ed acco rd ing ly . t h e s e n s e e x p l a i n e d i n Cooper Brookes, supra, and

l

!

Finally, the appellants submit that, because the

second respondent had resumed his relationship with his

actual father, the award of damages on this account was

l	excessive. The learned judge considered this aspect of the
claim with some care. There can be no suggestion that he
was not fully seized of the circumstances of the claim. In
our opinion, no basis for interfering with his assessment
has been made out.

We would dismiss the appeal with costs.

I certify that this and the 26 preceding

pages are a true copy of :he reasons for

judgment herein of the Court