Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ryan
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ryan [2024] FCA 1267
File number(s):
VID 605 of 2023
Judgment of:
O’CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment:
6 November 2024
Catchwords:
CORPORATIONS – duties of directors – allegation that defendant contravened statutory duties as a director under ss 180, 181(1)(a) and 182 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where no allegation that defendant was motivated by or gained any personal benefit or advantage – where no allegation that creditors suffered any loss – where alleged that by voting in favour of certain resolutions when the company was nearing insolvency the defendant contravened ss 180, 181(1)(a) and 182, because the resolutions materially prejudiced the company’s ability to pay its creditors – where resolutions gave effect to two things: a change in the constitution of the subsidiary so as expressly to permit its directors to act in the best interests of the holding company; and entry by the subsidiary into a deed of acknowledgment of debt between it and the holding company – where alleged that the resolutions materially prejudiced the subsidiary’s ability to pay its creditors, because the purpose and effect of the deed was to prevent a voluntary administrator of the subsidiary from calling on the approximately $19 million intercompany receivable that would otherwise have been available for its creditors – where sixteen factual issues posited by plaintiff in closing for determination – where “decisional issue” was whether defendant honestly and reasonable relied on legal advice – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – undesirability of use of concise statements in cases of complexity
2.The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J
INTRODUCTION
Dixon Advisory & Superannuation Services Pty Ltd (DASS) and E&P Operations Pty Ltd (EPO) were wholly owned subsidiaries of E&P Financial…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ryan involved the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) prosecuting Mr Ryan for alleged breaches of his duties as a director under sections 180, 181(1)(a), and 182 of the Corporations Act 2001. ASIC contended that Mr Ryan contravened these statutory duties when he voted in favour of certain resolutions while the company was nearing insolvency, resulting in material prejudice to the company's ability to pay its creditors. Specifically, the resolutions facilitated a change in the subsidiary's constitution to permit its directors to act in the best interests of the holding company, and entered the subsidiary into a deed of acknowledgment of debt with the holding company, effectively preventing the subsidiary from accessing approximately $19 million that would have been available to its creditors. The key issue the court needed to decide was whether Mr Ryan honestly and reasonably relied on legal advice provided by MinterEllison.
The court found that Mr Ryan did indeed rely on the MinterEllison advice, and his reliance was reasonable and in good faith. Clauses 1.10 and 1.12 of the MinterEllison advice were not found to be materially inaccurate. The court concluded that Mr Ryan’s reliance on the legal advice justified his view that executing the deed of acknowledgment of debt was appropriate and in the best interests of the company. Consequently, ASIC had not proven that Mr Ryan contravened the statutory duties in question.
In light of the findings, the court dismissed the proceeding against Mr Ryan and ordered that the plaintiff, ASIC, pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding. This decision underscores the importance of a director's reliance on legal advice and the need for clear and precise statements in complex cases to avoid unnecessary complications and ensure a fair trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The proceeding be dismissed.
2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Messrs Ryan, Hill, Anderson and Hams were cross-examined.THE FACTS September 2020 Prior to the merger of Evans and Partners and Dixon Advisory, in around June 2011 Dixon Advisory established the URF, a unit trust and registered management investment scheme. The primary strategy of the URF was investing in the New York and New Jersey residential property market. Upon its establishment, DASS was the investment manager and responsible entity of the URF. On 23 July 2012, the URF was listed on the ASX. From 2020, DASS became the subject of myriad litigation relating to provision of financial advice to clients who were advised to invest in the URF and related products, including a proceeding issued by ASIC on 4 September 2020 in the Federal Court (ASIC proceeding); over 90 complaints made by its clients to AFCA; and two separate Federal Court class action proceedings. After the filing of the ASIC proceeding in September 2020, the Group engaged Messrs Robert Smith and Andrew Wharton at McGrathNicol, to assist it with what was called “contingency planning”. The contingency planning project came to be known as “Project Fork”. The scope of the project included “consider[ing] risks and contingency options for DASS in the event of a material adverse outcome from ASIC’s actions, including a Scheme of Arrangement or insolvency process”. The Project Fork team within the Group comprised Mr Ryan, Mr Araullo (then Executive Director – Risk & Compliance) and Mr Falkiner (then Executive Director, Strategy & Operations (E&P Wealth)), with oversight from Mr Anderson. From the time of its engagement in September 2020, it was Mr Ryan’s role to ensure that McGrathNicol was provided with access to all financial information of the Group that they requested. Mr Ryan worked closely with McGrathNicol, as did Mr Anderson and the senior management of the Group. Mr Ryan deposed that he did not have any experience in corporate restructuring or insolvency, and that he relied on Mr Anderson and McGrathNicol to provide him with guidance as to how to proceed towards a potential voluntary administration of DASS. Mr Ryan also deposed as to the following about Mr Bart Oude-Vrielink:From around July 2019, Bart Oude-Vrielink of MinterEllison provided advice to EP1, DASS and the Group in respect of regulatory and general corporate legal issues. Mr Oude-Vrielink has been David Evans’ go-to lawyer at least as far back as the formation of EAP in 2007 and was EAP’s preferred external legal advisor until the merger in 2017. He was utilised far less while Alan Dixon was in charge of EP1 but was progressively reinstated upon Mr Anderson’s appointment as CEO in mid-2019. I knew Mr Oude-Vrielink to be one [of] Australia’s pre-eminent corporate law and capital markets lawyers. In October 2020, MinterEllison was first requested to provide advice in connection with Project Fork. From that point, MinterEllison provided legal advice with respect to the Project Fork contingency planning through to the voluntary administration of DASS. Various requests for advice were made between October 2020 and December 2021 regarding the position of DASS. MinterEllison, specifically Mr Oude-Vrielink, was familiar with issues facing the Group and DASS and a trusted advisor to the Group and I also relied on him to provide me with guidance as to how to proceed towards a potential voluntary administration of DASS. October 2020
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
For the reasons that follow, I conclude (among other things) that:(1)Mr Ryan did in fact rely on the MinterEllison advice;(2)clauses 1.10 and 1.12 of the MinterEllison advice were not materially inaccurate;(3)Mr Ryan’s reliance was reasonable and in good faith and it did justify him holding the view, as he did, that the execution of the DOAD was appropriate and in the best interests of DASS;(4)ASIC has therefore not established that Mr Ryan contravened ss 180, 181(1)(a) or 182 of the Act in his capacity as a director of DASS; and(5)the proceeding is to be dismissed.THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON ASIC read three affidavits of Melisande Guanlao, an Investigator in ASIC’s Enforcement & Compliance team, one made 15 February and two made 15 May 2024, and (with some exceptions) tendered the bundles of documents referred to in those affidavits. Mr Ryan read the affidavits of:(a)himself made 26 April 2024;(b)Mr Stephen Hill (who was at the relevant times Group Financial Controller and then Deputy Chief Financial Officer of EP1) made 26 April 2024;(c)Mr Peter Anderson (who was at the relevant times the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of EP1) made 26 April 2024; and(d)Mr David Evans (Chairman of the EP1 Board) made 26 April 2024. ASIC correctly summarised the substance of Mr Ryan’s evidence in its written opening submission as follows: (a)from around October 2020, the Group began to plan for various contingencies, including the possibility of DASS having to be placed into voluntary administration;(b)the Group’s contingency planning was known as “Project Fork”, of which Mr Ryan was a member along with Mr Francis Araullo and Mr Marc Falkiner;(c)from September 2020, restructuring and insolvency firm McGrathNicol was intimately involved in all aspects of Project Fork;(d)from October 2020, MinterEllison provided legal advice with respect to the Project Fork contingency planning;(e)at some point between late October 2020 and late March 2021, he had a conversation with Mr Anderson in which Mr Anderson said to him that the intercompany loans in favour of DASS was one of the Group’s biggest risks if it ever became necessary to place DASS into voluntary administration and that they needed to manage those risks by reducing the balance of the loans as much as possible by the end of FY2021;(f)on his instruction, in late May and early June 2021, the finance team “started the process of reducing the balances of the intercompany receivables involving DASS”;(g)in or around late July or early August 2021, he had a discussion with Mr Hill in which one of them said that the only available lever they had to ensure that DASS remained in a net positive asset position was for EPO to waive the management fee for the 2021 financial year. He instructed Mr Hill to waive the management fee and prepare the DASS financial accounts accordingly;(h)shortly after the discussion with Mr Hill, he (Mr Ryan) had a conversation with Mr Anderson in which he told Mr Anderson that it was necessary for EPO to waive the management fee such that the balance of the intercompany receivable in favour of DASS would increase, not be reduced;(i)during a conference call with McGrathNicol, MinterEllison and the Project Fork team on 8 November 2021, he said that DASS should not be permitted to call on the intercompany receivable unless and until a claim had actually crystallised and it was not covered by insurance;(j)in early December 2021, the likelihood of a decision to appoint voluntary administrators to DASS was increasing;(k)on 20 December 2021, Messrs Anderson, Falkiner and Ryan met with Mr Stephen Longley of PwC to discuss the potential appointment of a voluntary administrator to DASS;(l)he relied on the fact that Mr Hill did not identify any errors in the Background section of the DOAD;(m)he was mindful that DASS’s creditors were all current or former clients of DASS and that the current clients were dependent on the ongoing support of EPO and the Group if they were to continue to receive investment advice services from the Group; and(n)he took into account that Mr Anderson had stated to him and the EP1 Board that he intended to ensure that the Group contributed an amount that was approximately the same as (and potentially more than) the balance of the intercompany receivable in favour of DASS at the time to any Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA).
Decision
Reasons for decision
In his opening address, senior counsel for ASIC summarised the three critical issues raised by its case as follows:Let me tell you what we expect the case will be about. It will be about three things. I’m intending now to summarise the essence of the case accurately. These are the three things that it’s about. One thing is to understand what agreement or understanding was reached between these two entities through individuals in July, August and/or September. Mr Ryan and Mr Anderson have both given their sworn evidence on that, and we will test it in cross-examination. The second central feature of the case, which is about the acts and omissions of a director, is what reliance, in fact and/or reasonably, was placed on legal advice by MinterEllison and guidance by the group’s CEO, Mr Anderson. My expectation is that will be the decisional issue. MinterEllison gave advice. What reliance, in fact and/or truth, did Mr Ryan place on it?HIS HONOUR: Yes.MR SOLOMON: Thirdly, it appears from Mr Ryan’s evidence that he contends that this deed was in the interests of DASS, whether or not there was an earlier agreement or understanding.HIS HONOUR: Yes.MR SOLOMON: So that’s the essence of the case: the agreement or understanding Mr Ryan relies upon from July, August, and or September; the reliance on legal advice and, further, Mr Anderson in advance of the resolution in December; and the circumstance as to whether, in any event, the interests of the company were served by entering – of DASS were served by entering into this deed. There’s an associated question which concerns a resolution to amend the constitution, two days earlier, which we will deal with in the evidence.(Emphasis added.) By the time of ASIC’s closing address, those three issues had turned into sixteen which, it was submitted, would determine the outcome of the proceeding. As senior counsel put it:We think, and I expect this to be uncontroversial, that the essence of this case concerns the findings your Honour makes on various controversial factual matters. That might be true of most trials, but there’s a lot of cases that have been – that your Honour has been referred to. I’m speaking for myself. I’ve had the pleasure of reading each of them over the last four weeks. And law is interesting on aspects of 180 and 181 and 182 and 187 and 189. But as a submission, we invite your Honour, if your Honour considers them potentially relevant, to treat our 16 factual findings as the factual issues. They are not agreed. There are factual issues, and we think at the end of that, it’s likely to fall out what the legal conclusion then will be. Neither party took me in any detail in oral closing addresses to the sections of the Act relied on, and closing submissions proceeded on the basis contended for by senior counsel for ASIC – that is, that resolution of the sixteen factual questions, one way or the other, would determine the outcome of the proceeding. It was not, and is not, clear to me how a number of the questions were said to arise from the “pleaded” case, but counsel for Mr Ryan voiced no objection to me dealing with them seriatim, or with the proposition that the answers to the questions inherent in ASIC’s proposed factual findings would be determinative of the outcome. So I proceed accordingly.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the evidence presented by both parties to determine whether Mr Ryan had contravened his duties as a director of DASS under sections 180, 181(1)(a) and 182 of the Corporations Act. ASIC argued that Mr Ryan had acted contrary to his duties by voting in favour of certain resolutions when the company was nearing insolvency, thereby materially prejudicing the company’s ability to pay its creditors. Specifically, ASIC contended that the resolutions gave effect to a change in the constitution of the subsidiary, allowing its directors to act in the best interests of the holding company, and an entry into a deed of acknowledgment of debt between the subsidiary and the holding company. The court found that the reliance on legal advice from MinterEllison and the guidance provided by the Group’s CEO, Mr Anderson, was reasonable and in good faith. The court held that Mr Ryan’s reliance justified his view that the execution of the deed was appropriate and in the best interests of DASS. Additionally, the court concluded that the evidence provided by ASIC was not sufficient to establish their case, and thus the proceeding was dismissed with the plaintiff ordered to pay the defendant’s costs. The court's decision hinged on the reasonableness of Mr Ryan’s reliance on legal advice and the guidance from the Group’s CEO, which it found to be both honest and reasonable.
The court distinguished this case from prior authority by focusing on the reasonableness of the director’s reliance on legal advice and the guidance from the CEO, rather than on whether the director had acted in good faith or in the best interests of the company. The ratio decidendi established by this decision is that a director’s reliance on legal advice and guidance from the CEO, when found to be honest and reasonable, can justify their actions even if the outcome was detrimental to the company’s creditors. This decision underscores the importance of honest and reasonable reliance on professional advice in determining whether a director has contravened their statutory duties.