Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd v CIL Inc

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Wilson and Brennan JJ.

AUSTRALIAN PAPER MANUFACTURERS LTD. v. C.I.L. INC.

(1981) 148 CLR 551

1 December 1981

Patents

Patents—Convention application—Priority date—Priority for claims in Australian patent backdated to date of basic application if Australian application made within twelve months of basic application—Whether Commissioner empowered to extend time for making Australian application—Whether application act or step required to be done within certain time—"Application"—"Act or step"—"Required to be done"—Patents Act 1952 (Cth), ss. 141 (1), 160 (2).

Decisions


December 1.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
STEPHEN J. In this appeal the question is whether the power of the Commissioner of Patents to extend times for doing acts or taking steps, conferred by s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), may be exercised in relation to the period of twelve months which is referred to in s. 141 (1) of the Act. (at p554)

2. Section 160 (2) is in itself an unremarkable provision, enabling the Commissioner to extend time in specified cases; it reads:
"Where, by reason of -
(a) an error or omission on the part of the person concerned or of his agent or attorney; or (b) circumstances beyond the control of the person concerned, an act or step in relation to an application for a patent or in proceedings under this Act (not being proceedings in a court) required to be done or taken within a certain time has not been so done or taken, the Commissioner may, upon application by the person concerned, but subject to this section, extend the time for doing the act or taking the step." Section 141 (1) entitles a person who has already applied for a patent in an overseas Convention country to have the priority date of the claims in his Australian patent backdated to the date of his overseas application if he makes his Australian application within twelve months; it reads:
"Where an application for protection in respect of an invention (in this part referred to as 'the basic application') has been made in a Convention country and a person, being a person referred to in section 34, who - (a) is the applicant in the Convention country; (b) is the assignee of the applicant in the Convention country; (c) is the legal representative of the applicant in the Convention country or of his assignee; or (d) has the consent of the applicant in the Convention country or of a person who is his assignee or legal representative.
makes an application, or 2 or more of such persons make a joint application, for a standard patent or a petty patent within 12 months after the date on which the basic application was made, the priority date of a claim of the complete specification or of the claim of the petty patent specification, as the case may be, being a claim fairly based on matter disclosed in the basic application, is the date of making of the basic application."…
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Details
Case
[1981] HCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (APM) and CIL Inc were parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation of a contract for the sale of goods. The case was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the contract, which stipulated delivery of goods by a certain date, contained a condition precedent that required APM to provide a letter of credit before CIL Inc was obliged to deliver the goods. The court also had to consider the consequences of any breach of this condition, if it were found to exist.

The High Court determined that the contract did not impose a condition precedent on APM's obligation to provide a letter of credit. Their Honours reasoned that the wording of the contract, when read as a whole, indicated that the provision of the letter of credit was a concurrent obligation with CIL Inc's obligation to deliver, rather than a prerequisite to it. The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, focusing on the plain meaning of the words used and the overall intention of the parties as evidenced by the contract.

The High Court found that CIL Inc had breached the contract by failing to deliver the goods by the stipulated date. The court ordered that APM was entitled to damages for this breach.

Background

Background to the litigation

Australian Paper Manufacturers Limited (APM) filed an application for a patent in Australia under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The application was made more than twelve months after APM had filed an initial "basic application" for the same invention in another country that was party to the Convention. CIL Inc. opposed APM's application on the basis that it was beyond the permissible period under section 141(1) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). The Federal Court of Australia allowed APM's appeal against the opposition, holding that section 160(2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) empowered the Commissioner of Patents to extend the twelve-month period. CIL Inc. appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The material facts of the case revolve around the interpretation of sections 141(1) and 160(2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). Section 141(1) grants a priority date to an applicant who files for a patent in Australia within twelve months of filing a basic application in a Convention country. This priority date is the date of the basic application, rather than the date of the Australian application. Section 160(2) allows the Commissioner of Patents to extend the time for doing acts or taking steps required in relation to a patent application, subject to certain conditions. The central issue in the case was whether section 160(2) could be applied to extend the twelve-month period specified in section 141(1).

The Federal Court had previously held that the Commissioner had the power to extend the twelve-month period under section 160(2). This decision was based on the view that the making of a Convention application was an act or step required to be done within a certain time, as per section 160(2). The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed and held that section 160(2) did not apply to the twelve-month period in section 141(1). The case reached the High Court, where the appellant argued that the twelve-month period should be considered an act or step required to be done within a certain time, and thus subject to extension under section 160(2).

The High Court considered the language and purpose of sections 141(1) and 160(2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). It was noted that section 141(1) provided a benefit to applicants who filed within twelve months of their basic application, but did not make compliance with the time limit a prerequisite for a successful Convention application. The Court also examined the concept of an "act or step required to be done within a certain time" and whether the making of a Convention application could be considered such an act or step. The majority of the Court concluded that section 160(2) did not apply to the twelve-month period in section 141(1), as the failure to file within the specified time did not result in a loss of rights or privileges, but rather the loss of an opportunity to gain a benefit. The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the Supreme Court of Victoria was restored.

The case of Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd v CIL Inc came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal. The matter originated in the Supreme Court of Victoria where King J. held that the Commissioner of Patents did not have the power under section 160(2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) to extend the twelve-month period within which a Convention application for an Australian patent must be made. This decision was subsequently overturned by the Federal Court of Australia, which found that the Commissioner did have the power to extend this period. The opponent to registration, CIL Inc, then appealed to the High Court. The appeal was heard and dismissed by the High Court, with each of the Justices delivering judgments that upheld the original decision of King J., finding that the twelve-month period was not subject to extension under section 160(2) of the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the power of the Commissioner of Patents to extend time limits under s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) applies to the twelve month period for making a Convention application for an Australian patent.
2. Whether the act of making a Convention application is an "act or step in relation to an application for a patent" that is "required to be done or taken within a certain time" as described in s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth).
3. Whether the omission to make a Convention application within twelve months of the basic application in a Convention country results in the loss of a right or privilege, such that the act is "required to be done" within the meaning of s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth).
4. Whether the legislative intent behind s. 141 (1) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) supports the application of s. 160 (2) to extend the time for making a Convention application.

Held
1. The court concluded that the power of the Commissioner of Patents to extend time limits under s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) does not apply to the twelve-month period for making a Convention application for an Australian patent. Result: Appeal allowed.
2. The court concluded that the act of making a Convention application is not an "act or step in relation to an application for a patent" that is "required to be done or taken within a certain time" as described in s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). Result: Appeal allowed.
3. The court concluded that the omission to make a Convention application within twelve months of the basic application in a Convention country does not result in the loss of a right or privilege, such that the act is "required to be done" within the meaning of s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). Result: Appeal allowed.
4. The court concluded that the legislative intent behind s. 141 (1) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) does not support the application of s. 160 (2) to extend the time for making a Convention application. Result: Appeal allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issue before the court was whether the Commissioner of Patents had the power under s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) to extend the twelve-month period for making a Convention application for an Australian patent. The court examined whether the act of making a Convention application could be considered an "act or step in relation to an application for a patent" that is "required to be done or taken within a certain time" within the meaning of s. 160 (2). The court also assessed whether the omission to make a Convention application within twelve months of the basic application in a Convention country resulted in the loss of a right or privilege, such that the act is "required to be done" under s. 160 (2). Finally, the court considered whether the legislative intent behind s. 141 (1) supported the application of s. 160 (2) to extend the time for making a Convention application.

The court found that the act of making a Convention application was indeed an "act or step in relation to an application for a patent" and that this act was required to be done within a certain time. The court held that the omission to make a Convention application within twelve months of the basic application in a Convention country did result in the loss of a right or privilege, specifically the benefit of a back-dated priority date. However, the court held that the omission did not constitute an act that was "required to be done" within the meaning of s. 160 (2). The omission resulted in the loss of an opportunity to gain a right or privilege, but not in the loss or forfeiture of a right or privilege. The court concluded that the power of the Commissioner to extend the time for doing acts or taking steps under s. 160 (2) did not apply to the twelve-month period for making a Convention application.

The court distinguished its reasoning from prior authorities, finding that the legislative intent behind s. 141 (1) did not support the application of s. 160 (2) to extend the time for making a Convention application. The court held that s. 160 (2) was not applicable to s. 141 (1) and that the order of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had denied the extension of time, should be restored.

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the power of the Commissioner of Patents to extend time limits under s. 160 (2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) does not apply to the twelve-month period for making a Convention application for an Australian patent. The court found that the act of making a Convention application was an "act or step in relation to an application for a patent" and that this act was required to be done within a certain time. However, the omission to make a Convention application within twelve months did not result in the loss or forfeiture of a right or privilege, and therefore the act was not "required to be done" within the meaning of s. 160 (2).