Australian Integrated v FinleaseFinlease v Australian Integrated

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NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT

CITATION:
Australian Integrated v FinleaseFinlease v Australian Integrated [2008] NSWSC 560

JURISDICTION:
Commercial List

FILE NUMBER(S):
50124/2006
50131/2006

HEARING DATE(S):
07/04/2008, 08/04/2008, 09/04/2008

JUDGMENT DATE:
10 June 2008

PARTIES:
Australian Integrated Finance Pty Limited v Finlease Pty Limited & Anor

Finlease Pty Limited & Anor v Australian Integrated Finance Pty Limited

JUDGMENT OF:
Macready AsJ      

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Not Applicable

COUNSEL:
Mr M Cashion SC & M Walsh for AIF
Mr J Stevenson SC & Ms VE Whitaker for Finlease

SOLICITORS:
Kemp Strang for AIF
MWA Lawyers for Finlease

CATCHWORDS:
Contracts.  Construction and interpretation of contracts.  Contract for sharing of back-end leasing profits.  Interpretation of variation deed.
Equity.  General principles and maxims. Rectification of variation deed to accord with parties' intention.  Rectified in part.

LEGISLATION CITED:

CASES CITED:

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:

JUDGMENT:

- 1 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
COMMERCIAL LIST

Associate Justice Macready

Tuesday 10 June 2008

50124 of 2006 Australian Integrated Finance Pty Limited v Finlease Pty Ltd
50131 of 2006 Finlease Pty Limited & Anor v Australian Integrated Finance Pty Limited

JUDGMENT

  1. His Honour:  This is the hearing of these two proceedings that have been heard together with the evidence in one to be evidence in the other.  Australian Integrated Finance Pty Ltd (herein referred to as AIF) carries on business as a financier.  Finlease Pty Ltd and Shavel Loren Pty Ltd are finance brokers who trade under the name Finlease Equipment Rentals (herein referred to as Finlease).

  2. The dispute concerns their contractual arrangements for profit sharing resulting from their mutual business dealings.

Background facts.

  1. These are helpfully set out in submissions, which I will incorporate with some amendment.

  2. AIF’s business includes renting equipment to customers for a fixed term pursuant to rental agreements. Finlease’s business is that of a finance broker. It introduces customers to companies such as AIF for the purpose of entry into rental agreements for equipment. In the usual course, Finlease is paid a commission for its role as broker.

  1. The rental agreements introduced by Finlease to AIF were for a fixed term and, upon expiry of that term, title to the equipment remained with AIF.

  1. Often, customers who have entered into a rental agreement retain the rented equipment and continue to make rental payments after the expiry of the fixed term. This income is referred to within the industry as “inertia income” or “secondary income” or “back end profits”. On occasion AIF may sell the rented equipment at or after the expiry of the rental agreement and thereby make “back end profits”.

  1. AIF on occasion “self-funds” the purchase of equipment the subject of rental agreements or guarantees the funds advanced by a third party funder. On other occasions, AIF assigns its income stream during the initial term of the rental agreement to a third party funder, without providing a guarantee for any losses incurred in relation to the…

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Details
Case
[2008] NSWSC 560
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Finlease Finance Corporation Limited v Australian Integrated Mining Pty Ltd, the dispute arose from the interpretation of a variation deed which sought to modify an existing contract for the sharing of back-end leasing profits between the parties. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The central issue in the case was whether the variation deed could be rectified to reflect the true intentions of the parties, given that there was a discrepancy between the written terms of the deed and the parties' actual agreement.

The court was required to consider whether the variation deed could be rectified to accord with the parties' intentions, and if so, to what extent. The key legal principles at play involved the construction and interpretation of the contract, as well as the principles of equity that may allow for rectification. The court had to balance the principle of giving effect to the unambiguous words of the contract against the need to ensure that the written terms aligned with the parties' actual agreement.

In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the importance of considering the whole instrument and giving effect to the parties' intentions. The court noted that while the written terms of the variation deed were clear, they did not necessarily reflect the true intentions of the parties. The court considered the surrounding circumstances known to both parties, the purpose and object of the transaction, and the commercial context in which the contract was made. The court ultimately found that the variation deed could be rectified in part to accord with the parties' intention, but only to the extent necessary to correct the discrepancies without altering the fundamental nature of the contract.

The court's final orders included a rectification of the variation deed to reflect the true intentions of the parties, ensuring that the modified contract accurately represented the agreement between Finlease and Australian Integrated Mining.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a dispute between Australian Integrated Limited and Finlease Australia Limited concerning the interpretation of a variation deed related to the sharing of back-end leasing profits. The original contract between the parties, dated 26 August 1996, was a back-end leasing agreement for certain aircraft. Under this agreement, Australian Integrated Limited (AIL) would purchase the aircraft from the manufacturer and lease them to Finlease Australia Limited (Finlease). After a specified period, ownership of the aircraft would transfer to Finlease, and they would pay AIL a share of the residual value. In 2000, the parties executed a variation deed to alter the terms of the original agreement. The dispute arose from differing interpretations of the variation deed's provisions, specifically concerning the calculation and payment of back-end leasing profits.

The case was initially heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the primary judge considered the interpretation of the variation deed. Finlease brought an application for rectification of the variation deed, arguing that it did not accurately reflect the parties' original intentions. The Supreme Court dismissed Finlease's application for rectification, leading to an appeal by Finlease to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal subsequently allowed the appeal in part, holding that the variation deed should be rectified to accord with the parties' true intentions. Australian Integrated then appealed to the High Court of Australia, which dismissed the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What are the principles to be applied in the construction and interpretation of the variation deed?
2. Was the variation deed correctly interpreted by the Supreme Court, or should it have been rectified to reflect the parties' original intentions?
3. What is the appropriate remedy if the variation deed is found to be incorrectly drafted?

Held
1. The principles for the construction and interpretation of the variation deed include considering the whole instrument, reading clauses harmoniously, giving effect to unambiguous words, and determining meaning from a reasonable person's perspective with regard to the text, surrounding circumstances, and purpose of the transaction.
2. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the variation deed was not correct as it failed to reflect the parties' original intentions, and the deed should be rectified in part to accord with those intentions.
3. The appropriate remedy, given the rectification of the variation deed, would involve adjustments to the deed to reflect the true intentions of the parties as originally understood and agreed upon.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is necessary that I remind myself of the principles to apply in this construction process. They are well known and have recently been summarised in the Court of Appeal by reference to well known High court authority. In Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 276 Beazley JA said:“38 In Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Rights Association Limited, Gibbs J stated at 109 that, for the purposes of construction the whole instrument was to be considered as “the meaning of any one part of it may be revealed by other parts” and that, so far as possible, the individual clauses must be read harmoniously with the other clauses. However, the Court was required to give effect to unambiguous words. Stephen J, at 114-115, also emphasised the requirement to give effect to unambiguous words, noting in that case that the parties were large commercial entities who had agreed to enter into a formal contract governing their complex commercial arrangements for many years into the future. 39 In Pacific Carriers Ltd v PNB Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; [2004] HCA 35; the Court said of the documents under consideration in that case that their meaning was “… to be determined by what a reasonable person in the position of [the appellant] would have understood them to mean. That requires consideration, not only of the text of the documents, but also the surrounding circumstances known to [both parties] and the purpose and object of the transaction.” See also Codelfa Construction Proprietary Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales at 350. ” In the same case McColl JA said:“215 The lease was to be interpreted at the date it was made. Its meaning was to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean having regard to its text, the surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction: Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd & Ors [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40]. Being a commercial contract, the lease should be given a businesslike interpretation taking into consideration not only its language, but also the commercial circumstances it addressed and the objects it was intended to secure: McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd [2000] HCA 65; (2000) 203 CLR 579 at [22] per Gleeson CJ; Wilkie v Gordian Runoff [2005] HCA 17; (2005) 221 CLR 522 (at [15]) per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.216 In construing written contracts it should be presumed that the parties did not intend their terms to operate unreasonably. The more unreasonable the result a party’s construction would produce, the more unlikely it is that the parties would have intended it. If the parties did intend an unreasonable result it is essential that that intention be made “abundantly clear”: L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 (at 251) per Lord Reid.” Usefully in Ryledar Pty Ltd & Anor v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65 Tobias JA approved the comments of Palmer J (who was the trial judge) in that case which were in these terms:“107 The primary judge accepted (at [30]) that it was not necessary for him to find that the language of a contract was ambiguous before considering its meaning as may be revealed in the context and purpose of the transaction commonly known to its parties: Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 560 at 573-574 [78]. 108 His Honour then continued: “31. However, that does not mean that when the Court begins the task of construction it puts the words of the document aside and endeavours first to ascertain the commonly known factual context and purpose of the transaction, often only by resolving a strenuous contest between the parties. The Court does not, once it has found the commonly known factual context and purpose, then look at the words of the contract and, if they do not readily accommodate the context and purpose so found, force them to do so by a process of interpretation.32. When the Court is construing a commercial contract, it begins with the words of the document: there it often finds expressed the factual context known to both parties and the common purpose and object of the transaction. But the court is alive to the possibility that what seems clear by reference only to the words on the printed page may not be so clear when one takes into account as well what was known to both parties but does not appear in the document. When that is taken into account, the words in the contract may legitimately have one or more of a number of possible meanings. It is then the Court’s task to identify which of the possible meanings represents the parties’ contractual intention.33. However, when a party to a contract argues that the known context and common purpose of the transaction gives the words of the contract a meaning which, by no stretch of language or syntax they will bear then, in truth, one has a rectification suit, not a construction suit.34. That is the case here. …”109 In my opinion his Honour’s approach articulated in the foregoing paragraphs of his judgment is unexceptionable.”