Australian Hardboards Ltd v Hudson Investment Group Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Australian Hardboards Limited and Others v Hudson Investment Group Limited  [2006]  NSWCA 146

FILE NUMBER(S):
40768/05

HEARING DATE(S):               14, 15, 16 February 2006

DECISION DATE:     06/06/2006

PARTIES:
AUSTRALIAN HARDBOARDS LIMITED (ACN 088 183 420)  (First Appellant/First Cross-Respondent) 
HUDSON TIMBER PRODUCTS LIMITED (ACN 081 809 814)  (Second Appellant/Second Cross-Respondent) 
A H BREMER PARK PTY LIMITED (ACN 089 657 188)  (Third Appellant/Third Cross-Respondent) 
HUDSON INVESTMENT GROUP LIMITED (ACN 004 683 729)  (Respondent/Cross-Appellant) 

JUDGMENT OF:       Giles JA Santow JA Bryson JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          SC 50066/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Einstein J

COUNSEL:
C R C NEWLINDS, SC/ P T NEWTON  (Appellants/Cross-Respondents) 
L G FOSTER, SC/ D R STACK  (Opponent/Respondent) 

SOLICITORS:
Corrs Chambers Westgarth  (Appellants/Cross-Respondents) 
Deacons  (Respondent/Cross-Appellant) 

CATCHWORDS:
RECTIFICATION – Rectification of a deed (the “Entitlement Deed”).
CORPORATIONS – Whether a previous deed purporting to amend the Entitlement Deed was validly executed by the two companies concerned – Whether absence of board authority to execute deed – Whether there was breach of fiduciary duty and its effect where common directors purporting to act for each company – “ratification” by way of ratifying what occurred at non-existent meeting – formalities required for genuine board meetings. 
CONTRACT – Whether letter intended to constitute legally binding agreement – Masters v Cameron – possible fourth category. 

LEGISLATION CITED:
Corporations Law s260B

DECISION:
(1)  Save for the variation in (2), appeal and cross-appeal dismissed. 
(2)  Vary order 8 made by Einstein J on 15 September 2005 to read –
8.  Order that the Third Defendant execute and deliver to the Plaintiff mortgages in favour of the Plaintiff in such form as the parties may agree or, in default of agreement within 21 days from 6 June 2006, as may be settled by an Associate Justice.
(3)  Appellants to pay the costs of the appeal and cross-appellant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal. 

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40768/05
SC 50066/04

GILES JA
SANTOW JA
BRYSON JA

6 JUNE 2006

AUSTRALIAN HARDBOARDS LIMITED and Others v HUDSON INVESTMENT GROUP LIMITED

Judgment

  1. GILES JA:  I agree with Santow JA.

  2. SANTOW JA: 

    INTRODUCTION 

    This appeal, while again seeking rectification of a deed (“the Entitlement Deed”), concentrates on a challenge to the trial judge’s conclusion that a deed purporting to amend the Entitlement Deed was never validly executed by the two companies concerned.  Invalidity was held to follow from the absence of board authority to execute the deed and breach by the directors of their fiduciary duties in attempting to cause their respective companies to enter into the deed.  The directors were on notice of any lack of authority as they were common to both companies who were parties to the deed. 

  3. The events leading up to these proceedings began with a property joint venture to develop certain potentially valuable land of some 335 hectares in Ipswich, Queensland.  The venture was constituted by a Heads…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Australian Hardboards Ltd and others (appellants) appealed and cross-appealed from orders made by Einstein J concerning the rectification of an Entitlement Deed. The dispute centred on whether a subsequent deed purporting to amend the Entitlement Deed was validly executed, and whether a letter dated 23 July 2003 constituted a binding agreement for the disposal of a 50% shareholding in Bremer by HTP to HIG. The trial judge had found that the letter did not create a binding agreement, citing the intention of the parties to enter into a further formal agreement, consistent with the principles in *Masters v Cameron*.

The court was required to determine the validity of the purported amending deed, specifically whether it was executed with the necessary board authority and whether any breach of fiduciary duty by common directors affected its validity. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the letter of 23 July 2003 was intended to be legally binding, or if it represented an agreement in principle subject to the execution of a formal contract. The court also had to assess the trial judge's findings regarding the reliability of witnesses and the interpretation of documentary evidence.

The court reasoned that the purported amending deed was not validly executed due to a lack of proper board authority and formalities required for board meetings. The court found that the common directors, purporting to act for both companies, had not obtained the necessary approvals. Regarding the letter of 23 July 2003, the court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that it did not constitute a binding agreement, finding that the parties intended to be bound only upon the execution of a formal contract, thus falling within the first category of *Masters v Cameron*. The court also considered the evidence regarding the Entitlement Deed and its amendment, noting that a revised version was prepared and sent to Mr McLeod, with a specific provision concerning the payment upon disposal of the Land.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, save for a variation to an order concerning the execution of mortgages by the Third Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff. The appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, and the cross-appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Save for the variation in (2), appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

(2) Vary order 8 made by Einstein J on 15 September 2005 to read –

8. Order that the Third Defendant execute and deliver to the Plaintiff mortgages in favour of the Plaintiff in such form as the parties may agree or, in default of agreement within 21 days from 6 June 2006, as may be settled by an Associate Justice.

(3) Appellants to pay the costs of the appeal and cross-appellant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent brings a cross-appeal. The gravamen of that cross-appeal is that there was a later binding agreement, contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial judge, whereby HTP agreed in mid-2003 to dispose of 50% of its shareholding in Bremer (and hence the Land) to HIG. This was said to have been agreed in principle prior to, and to have become binding by virtue and upon the terms of, a letter of 23 July 2003 (“the Letter”). The cross-appeal challenges the conclusion of the trial judge that no binding agreement was thereby entered into. The trial judge had concluded that upon the proper construction of the Letter and taking into account what he described as “loose ends” to be resolved, the parties intended that a further formal agreement be first entered into before they were to be legally bound, citing Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 343 at 360. SALIENT FACTS I set out the salient facts below, elaborating later on those disputed. The plaintiff at trial, HIG, incorporated in 1967, has at all material times been a public company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (“ASX”). Relevantly for issues anterior to a 2003 Group restructure, the principal shareholdings in HIG were at all material times held by Mr Vincent Tan and his family and associates. Mr Tan is currently a director of HIG. He did not give evidence. Prior to the Share Purchase Agreement referred to earlier being entered into, HIG owned both 100% of the first defendant at trial, AHL (an unlisted company) and approximately 89% of the second defendant, HTP. AHL was incorporated on 22 June 1999. It changed its name to its current name on 3 September 1999. HTP was incorporated on 27 February 1998 and listed on the ASX on 23 December 1998. On 4 June 2003, it changed its name to Hudson Timber Products Limited as part of the 2003 Group restructure. At all material times anterior to the 2003 Group restructure the directorships of each of HIG, AHL and HTP included the fourth defendant, Mr McLeod and the fifth defendant, Mr Holland. Mr Hughes was at all material times company secretary of HIG, AHL and HTP. The post-2003 Group restructure circumstances of relevance were that Mr McLeod remained a director of HTP and AHL (and a Mr Hills remained a director of AHL). The Land AHL operated a factory in Ipswich, Queensland. The Hudson timber and building products manufacturing operations were located on 22 hectares of this land. The factory produced large quantities of waste water and discharged this waste water via an irrigation system over the otherwise unused 335 hectares of land. A property developer, Wingate, identified the Land as having significant development potential. It was decided that, were the factory to dispose of its water through a water treatment facility, the remaining 335 plus hectares of land could be then used for property development purposes. The Heads of Agreement – 27 November 2000 On 27 November 2000 Heads of Agreement were entered into between Wingate, AHL and HIG for the purpose of considering proposals for the development of the Land.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In addition, AHL, HTP and Bremer as appellants seek again to argue that the Second Deed of Amendment was effective to remove the requirement for a mortgage and to alter cl 4 in the manner I have earlier described under “Introduction”. Trial Judgment The trial judge found, for reasons he elaborated, both Mr McLeod and Mr Holland to be unreliable witnesses (Judgment [36]-[39]). He also noted that no evidence had been given by Mr Tan, or by Mr Williams who had represented the Wingate interests in relation to the Heads of Agreement. He considered the evidence given by Mr McLeod to be unsatisfactory in the extreme, particularly as regards the Heads of Agreement. However, he did accept the following evidence from Mr McLeod (Judgment [47]-[52]): (a)by early March 2001 HTP had experienced a significant drop in its revenues placing it in breach of a number of financial covenants required by the ANZ Bank as part of its financing arrangements; (b)hence Mr McLeod commenced discussions with the ANZ Bank with a view to HTP restructuring its balance sheet by reducing debt, with the most effective way to carry out that object being to raise equity; (c)the ANZ Bank agreed in principle to a proposal for the sale of HIG’s shareholding in AHL to HTP; (d)Mr McLeod became involved in negotiating the terms and conditions of the transfer, in which negotiation he represented the interests of HTP, and Mr Tan represented the interests of HIG, these negotiations taking place in late April/early May 2001, and (e)Mr McLeod opposed Mr Tan’s suggestion that the Land be transferred to HIG for no cost prior to the sale, stating that neither AHL nor the ANZ Bank would permit this. However, on reviewing the evidence, the trial judge rejected as unreliable Mr McLeod’s evidence that he had reached an arrangement/agreement that HIG would be obtaining a predetermined profit share; Judgment [55]. The trial judge preferred the evidence of the legal adviser Mr Restas of Atanaskovic Hartnell as reliable (Judgment [57]). Mr Restas had been heavily involved in preparing the material documentation which followed the Heads of Agreement and in particular in preparing, with his partner Mr Simmons, the Share Purchase Agreement and Entitlement Deed, the latter involving another solicitor, Mr Kyriac. Mr Restas’ evidence, as summarised in considerable detail by the trial judge, was that in the context of acting for HIG he queried with Mr McLeod on 6 June 2001 whether HIG should receive the first $10 million of any consideration received for the sale of the Land, rather than the first $10 million of profit. This was because he considered the latter to be unreasonable from the point of view of HIG in the event that no profit was made from the development of the Land. It was Mr Restas who then prepared a revised version of the Entitlement Deed and sent it to Mr McLeod providing for payment, on disposal of the Land, of the lesser of $10 million (less deposit) and the value of the aggregate consideration received by AHL in relation to the disposal of the Land; see Judgment [73]. That was in the form of cl 4 of the Entitlement Deed as executed. He specifically drew Mr McLeod’s attention to this provision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established