FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Firearms and Munitions Pty Ltd v Attorney-General [2018] FCA 1442
File number: QUD 615 of 2017 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 21 September 2018 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review – classification of shotgun for purpose of importation – whether decision was authorised under the relevant regulations – where respondent submits that email was an expression of opinion with no legal effect – whether there was a “decision…under an enactment” – application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3(1), 5, 5(1) and 13
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 50, 50(1), 51(1), 203, 229, 233(1) and 233(1AA)
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth) reg 4F, subregs (2), (2A) and (2B), Items 2, 2(f), 12, 12(a), 12(b) of Sch 6, cl 9 Pt 1 and Pt 2
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Granite Arms Pty Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 149
Date of hearing: 18 April 2018 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 74 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SA McLeod Solicitor for the Applicant: RBG Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G del Villar Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
QUD 615 of 2017 BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN FIREARMS AND MUNITIONS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended originating application is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RANGIAH J:
This an application brought under s 5(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) for judicial review of what is alleged to be a “decision” to give the Verney-Carron Veloce Shotgun a particular classification under the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth) (the Prohibited Imports Regulations).
The applicant alleges that the decision is invalid on the grounds of denial of natural justice, failure to take into account a relevant consideration, error of law and unreasonableness.
The respondent has filed a notice of objection to competency on the basis that there is no “decision to which this Act applies” within s 5(1) of the ADJR Act. The respondent contends that there was only an expression of opinion that has no operative legal effect. The respondent submits, in the alternative, that the applicant has not made out its grounds of review.
It should be noted that the applicant has not relied upon s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The case is concerned only with review under s 5(1) of the ADJR Act.
It is necessary to begin by traversing a series of correspondence asserted by the applicant to reflect an application and a decision to classify the Veloce Shotgun. It will…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1442
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the decision made by the respondent was not authorised under the regulations and did not constitute a "decision... under an enactment". The court found that the decision was not expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment, and did not confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations. The court held that the decision was merely an expression of opinion and did not have legal effect. The court also found that the decision did not constitute a "decision... under an enactment" because it did not derive from the enactment and did not confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations.
The court dismissed the application for judicial review. The court held that the decision made by the respondent was not reviewable because it did not constitute a "decision... under an enactment". The court also held that the applicant had not established any of the grounds of review that it had argued.
The court made no orders for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended originating application is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application for judicial review, seeking to challenge the decision of the respondent regarding the classification of the Veloce Shotgun. The applicant argued that the respondent had improperly classified the Veloce Shotgun and that this decision was unlawful. The applicant had previously made an application to import the Veloce Shotgun, which was granted under the "official purposes test". However, the applicant contested the subsequent classification of the shotgun as an Item 12 article, arguing that this classification was incorrect and should have been as a lever action shotgun. The court was required to determine whether the decision regarding the classification of the Veloce Shotgun constituted a "decision under an enactment" as defined by the relevant legislation.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the email correspondence between the applicant and the respondent constituted an application and a decision to classify the Veloce Shotgun under the Prohibited Imports Regulations.
2. Whether the decision regarding the classification of the Veloce Shotgun was authorised under the relevant enactments.
3. Whether the classification of the Veloce Shotgun as an Item 12 article, which prohibits importation for the purpose of sale, was lawful.
4. Whether there was a “decision…under an enactment” within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Held
1. The court concluded that the email correspondence between the applicant and the respondent did not constitute an application and a decision to classify the Veloce Shotgun under the Prohibited Imports Regulations.
2. The court determined that the decision regarding the classification of the Veloce Shotgun was not authorised under the relevant enactments.
3. The court found that the classification of the Veloce Shotgun as an Item 12 article, which prohibits importation for the purpose of sale, was lawful.
4. The court held that there was no “decision…under an enactment” within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, the applicant submits that when the correspondence is read as a whole it is apparent that the decision of 14 September 2017 was not a preliminary decision but a final one. ConsiderationThe notice of objection to competency It is convenient to begin by considering the notice of objection to competency. If it is successful, then the application for review must fail. It is necessary to consider what the applicant applied for and what was decided. The applicant contends that in its email of 27 May 2017 it made an application for the respondent to classify the Veloce Shotgun under Item 2 of Sch 6, Pt 2. I accept that the email can be construed in that way. However, many things can be applied for—whether there is any legislative authority for an application to be granted is a quite different question. The applicant contends that on 14 September 2017 the respondent made a decision to not classify the Veloce Shotgun under Item 2, and to instead classify it under Item 12. In the email of 14 September 2017, Mr Kiley said, “Based on the assessment we have now received, the firearm’s classification as an Item 12 article hasn’t changed”. There was debate between the parties as to whether the language used reflected the making of a decision, or was a statement of Mr Kiley’s preliminary view as to the appropriate classification. I do not think it matters in the circumstances of the case. The main point raised by the notice of objection to competency is not whether Mr Kiley made a “decision” in any ordinary sense of that word, but whether he made a “decision under an enactment” within s 3(1) of the ADJR Act. That issue depends upon the objective criteria described in Griffith University v Tang, and not upon the manner in which Mr Kiley expressed himself, or whether any party thought a decision was being made. In Griffith University v Tang, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ held at [89]:The determination of whether a decision is ‘‘made . . . under an enactment’’ involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be ‘‘made . . . under an enactment’’ if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice. A determination as to whether these criteria are met requires consideration of the statutory framework for the classification and importation of firearms. At this point, it is necessary to say that the statutory scheme involves the interplay of Commonwealth and State laws. While the parties addressed the Commonwealth laws, neither party referred to the relevant State laws. Nor is there any evidence as to the practical administration of the scheme as between Commonwealth and State authorities. Accordingly, the analysis that follows is limited by the parameters of the argument and the evidence, and does not purport to be a comprehensive account of the way in which the importation of firearms is controlled and administered in Australia.