Australian Electoral Commission and Comcare - [2022] AATA 138

Australian Electoral Commission and Comcare [2022] AATA 138 (2 February 2022)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No: 2021/2680

GENERAL DIVISION )
Re: Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)
Applicant

And: Comcare
Respondent
And: David Richard McKenzie
Other Party
DIRECTION
TRIBUNAL: Mr S. Webb, Member
DATE OF CORRIGENDUM: 4 February 2022
PLACE: Canberra

The Tribunal directs the Registrar, pursuant to subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, to alter the text of the decision in this application.
The text altered in this matter is to the effect that:

At paragraph 43, the paragraph be replaced with:

‘As Mr de Beer’s Salt and Light Psychology practice is located in Queensland, the Health Practitioners Regulation Nation Law Act (Qld) (Queensland Act), to which the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) refers, should be considered. Under s 216(2)(b)(ii) of the Queensland Act, ‘protected information’ may be disclosed if the disclosure is “authorised or required by any law of a participating jurisdiction”, including the Commonwealth.’

At paragraph 44, the words ‘Principle 9 and Principle 10 under the ACT Health Records Act’ be replaced with the words:

‘s 216(1) of the Queensland Act’

At paragraph 45, the words ‘ACT Health Records Act’ be replaced with the words:
‘Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld)’
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2021/2680
Re:Australian Electoral Commission
APPLICANT

ComcareAnd
RESPONDENT

AndDavid McKenzie
OTHER PARTY

DECISION
Tribunal:Mr S. Webb, Member
Date:2 February 2022
Place:Canberra

Mr de Beer’s objection to the summons issued by the Tribunal on 7 December 2021 is refused. As the date for production under the summons is now past, the date by which Mr de Beer, Salt and Light Psychology, must produce documents under the summons is extended to 18 February 2022.
…….[sgd]……….
Mr S. Webb, Member
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – psychological injury – entitlement to compensation for incapacity for work during a period - application for review by employer – summons – production of psychological treatment records – objection to summons – relevant principles - right to privacy – therapist duty of care and risk of consequent harm - legitimate forensic purpose – apparent relevance - obligation to ensure each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present their case – summons not oppressive or speculative - obligation to comply – objection refused
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 2A, 35, 39, 40A, 40B, 43
Health Records Act (Privacy and Access) 1997 (ACT) ss 6, 17, Schedule 1
Privacy Act 1988, Schedule 1, Part 3, ss 6.1, 6.2
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 2A, 4, 5A, 5B, 14, 19
Cases
BrisConnections Finance Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Arup Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 906
Comcare v Maganga [2008] FCA 285
Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280
Hunt v Wark (1985) 40 SASR 489
Jack Brabham Engines Pty Ltd v Beare [2010] FCA 35
Lakatoi Universal Pty Limited and Ors v Walker and Ors [1998] NSWSC 470
O’Sullivan and P&O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2019] AATA 2966
Panagiotou and TNT Australia Pty Ltd [2011] AATA 565
South Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Pty Ltd & Ors [1989] FCA 248
Wong v Sklavos [2014] FCAFC 120
ZFCC and Comcare [2018] AATA 1358
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr S. Webb, Member
February 2022

David McKenzie was injured in his employment by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). He claimed, and was paid, compensation for incapacity to work as a result of his injury. The AEC disagreed with a decision Comcare made to pay Mr McKenzie compensation for incapacity to work during a period, and applied to the Tribunal for review.
In the course of the proceedings, the AEC asked the Tribunal to issue a summons for the production of documents and records held by Mr de Beer, Mr McKenzie’s treating psychologist. This was done. Mr de Beer objected to, and has not complied with, the summons. The parties were provided an opportunity to make submissions in respect of the objection.
It is Mr de Beer’s objection, alone, that is the subject of this interlocutory decision.
The summons
On 7 December 2021, the Tribunal sealed and issued a summons requiring, on or before 20 December 2021, Mr de Beer of Salt and Light Psychology to produce:
‘… all files, records of treatment, records of any medical investigations including x-rays and the like, notes of visits, interview notes, patients notes, correspondence, copy of correspondence, referral letters, reports and letters from other doctors, patient history cards from all overseas practitioners relating to David McKenzie (DOB: 28 April 1967)’
The objection
Mr de Beer’s objection is set out in two emails he sent to the Tribunal on 9 and 20 December 2021 and a letter dated 6 January 2022, as follows:
I stated my position in an email to all parties dated 9th December 2021 in which I appealed to the Applicant to respect their employee’s privacy and to acknowledge the sensitive information contained within mental health/psychological treatment records. My assumption is that the Applicant did not agree with my view on their duty of care, which I find troubling, and hence the need for me to formally object to this direction.
II. My ongoing care and treatment of Mr. McKenzie is not being funded by the Respondent so there has been no reporting expectation (from a funding condition) on me to provide any information on treatment progress etc. I therefore do not have Mr. McKenzie’s consent to release his records and in doing so, it would be a breach of confidentiality.
III. I believe it is highly inappropriate in a civil dispute about an employee’s pay to demand the release of private mental health records, which has no relevance in the dispute. An individual’s mental health records contain sensitive personal and private information shared with their health professional in confidence. I have a professional duty of care towards my client, Mr McKenzie, whose mental health has been affected as a direct result of his employment with the AEC (as verified by multiple Independent Medical Examiners) and I therefore strongly object to releasing his records.
IV. The release of unabridged mental health records without appropriate professional psychological interpretation or context carry the risk of misinterpretation by parties who are not qualified to read and interpret these records appropriately.
V. This Direction to release personal mental health records without consent, is already impacting Mr McKenzie’s mental health negatively. The actual release of his records without consent and the risk of his employer having full access, could further exacerbate his existing injury.
VI. I strongly believe that it would not be psychologically safe to breach Mr McKenzie’s privacy and confidentiality and for the Applicant to have access to his unabridged mental health records. The Applicant already has access to reports from at least three independent medical practitioners (psychiatrists) about Mr McKenzie’s mental state and the likely causation of his symptoms. It is therefore not clear what the Applicant’s intentions are.
VII. As stated in earlier communication: I would be willing, with Mr McKenzie’s consent and if appropriately remunerated, to produce a psychological report if clear relevant questions were formulated that would help elucidate the case and assist with a resolution.
The AEC made submissions in reply on 14 January 2022, setting out relevant matters to which I have had regard. I note that the AEC’s submissions state they are made on behalf of the Respondent when in fact the AEC is the Applicant in the proceedings.
Principles
The Tribunal’s summons power is set out in s 40A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act):
(1) For the purposes of a proceeding before the Tribunal, the President, an authorised member or an officer of the Tribunal may summon a person to do either or both of the following, on the day, and at the time and place, specified in the summons:
(a) appear before the Tribunal to give evidence;
(b) produce any document or other thing specified in the summons.
(2) The President or an authorised member may refuse a request to summon a person.
(3) A person may, before the day specified in the summons, comply with a summons to produce a document or thing by producing the document or thing at the Registry from which the summons was issued. If the person does so, the person is not required to attend the hearing of the proceeding unless:
(a) the summons or another summons requires the person to appear before the Tribunal; or
(b) the Tribunal directs the person to attend the hearing.
The summons power is for the purposes of a proceeding before the Tribunal.
Any documents produced to the Tribunal under compulsion of a summons cannot be used for any other purpose.[1] This is a substantive rule of law that arises from disclosure under compulsion,[2] such that –
Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without leave of the court, use it for any purpose other than that for which it is given unless it is received into evidence.[3]
[1] AAT President’s General Practice Direction, 28 February 2019, Part 5.
[2] Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36, per Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [105]-[109].
[3] Ibid, at [96].
A Tribunal summons must be for a legitimate forensic purpose. At a minimum, the material sought must have apparent or adjectival relevance to the issues for determination in the proceedings.[4] It is not necessary to establish that the material sought has substantial or direct relevance to the proceedings.[5]
[4] Jack Brabham Engines Pty Ltd v Beare [2010] FCA 35 at [7]-[9].
[5] Comcare v Maganga [2008] FCA 285 at [36].
The threshold of apparent relevance involves two key considerations:
(a)whether the documents sought could reasonably be expected to throw light on some of the issues in the principal proceedings[6] and there is a real possibility that they may assist in the resolution of the issues in the proceedings;[7] and
(b)whether there is some reason to suppose that the documents sought will be capable of being used as evidence or for a legitimate forensic purpose in cross-examination,[8] and, when viewed realistically, the documents sought have a bearing on an issue which is not unreal, fanciful or speculative, or that the material sought is reasonably likely to add in some way to the relevant evidence in the case, or that it be “on the cards” that the documents sought will materially assist the party at whose request the subpoena has been issued.[9]
[6] Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Pty Ltd & Ors [1989] FCA 248 at [41].
[7] Comcare v Maganga [2008] FCA 285 at [37].
[8] Hunt v Wark (1985) 40 SASR 489 per King CJ at [493].
[9] Wong v Sklavos [2014] FCAFC 120 at [12].
The Tribunal has power to control proceedings and may refuse to issue a summons to prevent injustice in the proceedings, or where the summons is oppressive or vexatious. It is necessary to balance competing interests:
“... the need to balance the reasonableness of the burden imposed upon the recipient and the invasion of his private rights with the public interest in the due administration of justice and, in particular, that all material relevant to the issues be available to the parties to enable them to advance their respective cases. There is, in every case, a clash between these competing interests and whilst the balancing exercise to which I have referred must be carried out, it is the latter interest which is predominant.”[10]
[10] Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1997] FCA 1504, Spender J quoting with approval what Clarke J said in South Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710 at 719.
Furthermore, a summons that is merely speculative, without reasonable grounds for believing that documents sought will assist in proof or presentation of the particular case, may be set aside. Trawling to find a case on the basis of mere unsupported speculation may amount to an impermissible ‘fishing expedition’:
“A `fishing expedition', in the sense in which the phrase has been used in the law, means, as I understand it, that a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not.”[11]
[11] Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN(NSW) 250 at 254.
Under s 39(1) of the AAT Act, the Tribunal must ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present their case, and this includes giving each party opportunity to inspect relevant documents and to make submissions about them:
Subject to sections 35, 36 and 36B, the Tribunal shall ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case and, in particular, to inspect any documents to which the Tribunal proposes to have regard in reaching a decision in the proceeding and to make submissions in relation to those documents.
Each party is entitled to prepare their case on the basis of an evidentiary mosaic constructed from materials of relevance.[12] There is no proper basis for asserting that a narrow view should be taken, confining the entitlement to materials of obvious or direct relevance. That threshold may be applied at a later stage in Tribunal proceedings, when considering the admission of evidence, but the threshold that applies to the discovery of relevant materials is somewhat broader. It is a threshold of apparent or adjectival relevance.[13]
[12] Lakatoi Universal Pty Limited and Ors v Walker and Ors [1998] NSWSC 470 at 497.
[13] BrisConnections Finance Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Arup Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 906 at [25].
There are many cases involving a disputed compensation claim relating to a work injury where privacy rights are asserted to protect medical treatment records from disclosure to the employer or the insurer. This motivation can readily be understood as treatment records, perhaps especially psychological records, may contain very private information about the person, including their innermost feelings, thoughts or motivations, or potentially damaging or embarrassing information, which may not have been disclosed to anyone else. But this is no answer to a summons in Tribunal proceedings where personal private matters must be revealed if they are relevant to the issues the Tribunal must decide.[14] It is for this reason, the Tribunal must adopt a cautious approach when deciding an objection to a summons relating to medical records on grounds of privacy or relevance.[15]
[14] Panagiotou and TNT Australia Pty Ltd [2011] AATA 565 at [24].
[15] O’Sullivan and P&O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2019] AATA 2966 at [32]-[33].
As has been noted in previous cases, by making a compensation claim an employee should expect the entity responsible for deciding the claim, Comcare in this case, to do so on relevant medical information. Some elements of the claimant’s privacy rights are foregone when a compensation claim is made.[16]
[16] ZFCC and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 1358 at [10].
The ambit of relevance in a case involving disputation about the cause of a physical injury may be somewhat narrower than in a case of the present kind, involving disputation about the persisting effects of Mr McKenzie’s psychological injury and the causes of subsequent incapacity for work, which may be multifactorial and more difficult to ascertain.
Facts
On 13 November 2019, Mr McKenzie lodged a compensation claim (which does not appear to be included in the documents provided to the Tribunal) in respect of a psychological ailment, namely an adjustment disorder. The circumstances underlying the claim are set out in Mr McKenzie’s statements in T8 and T20. From this it can be understood the claim related to circumstances in his employment by the AEC from the Federal election in 2013 through to 2019.
The claim was contested by the AEC. The grounds on which the contest was raised are set out in the AEC’s document in T3. From this it can be understood the AEC asserted Mr McKenzie’s adjustment disorder was the result of personal stressors outside his employment in 2018.
On 26 February 2020, Comcare accepted liability for Mr McKenzie’s claimed injury under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act). Comcare described the injury as an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression and determined the date of the injury to be 12 October 2018.[17]
[17] T24.
On 3 March 2020, the AEC requested reconsideration of Comcare’s determination of liability.[18]
[18] ST1.
On 19 May 2020, Comcare issued a reconsideration decision, affirming its original determination to accept liability for Mr McKenzie’s injury.[19]
[19] T38 and T39.
There are numerous T documents that suggest, after his injury in October 2018, issues arose between Mr McKenzie and the AEC in respect of rehabilitation, work performance, conduct, claims for time off work and payroll issues. Mr McKenzie has been off work since 2019. The extent to which, if at all, these factors bear on issues the Tribunal must decide in the proceedings is a matter for evidence. Nevertheless, they have apparent relevance insofar as these issues may have causally contributed to Mr McKenzie’s claimed incapacity for work.
On 27 January 2021, Comcare determined Mr McKenzie’s entitlement to compensation for incapacity to work during the period from 28 July 2021 to 28 October 2021.[20]
[20] T75.
On 16 February 2021, the AEC asked Comcare to reconsider its determination of Mr McKenzie’s entitlement to compensation for incapacity to work.[21]
[21] T76.
On 11 March 2021, Comcare issued a reconsideration decision affirming its determination of Mr McKenzie’s entitlement to compensation for incapacity to work during the specified period.[22]
[22] T78.
On 28 April 2021, the AEC applied to the Tribunal for review of this reconsideration decision.[23]
[23] T1.
I note that there are numerous medical and psychological reports in the documents provided to the Tribunal, including reports by Dr Fraser (psychiatrist), Dr Martin (psychiatrist), Dr Kar (psychiatrist), Dr Scheepers (psychiatrist), Dr Shaik (psychiatrist), Dr Cooke (general practitioner), Mr Esser (psychologist) and Ms Cawley (psychologist). Additionally, some medical treatment records are in the T documents.[24] Others have been summonsed and the parties have been granted access to documents that have been produced to the Tribunal.
[24] T86.
On 7 June 2021, Comcare described the issues in these proceedings in the following terms:
2.1 Whether Mr McKenzie suffers from an ‘injury’ (as defined in s 5A of the SRC Act) on and from 28 July 2020?
2.2 If so, whether Mr McKenzie has suffered ‘incapacity for work’ (in light of s 4(9) of the SRC Act) as a result of the ‘injury’ during the relevant periods?
2.3 If so, whether compensation is payable to Mr McKenzie in accordance with s 19 of the SRC Act in respect of the ‘injury’ for the relevant periods?
Consideration
The substantive issues to be decided in this application turn on whether Mr McKenzie has an ‘injury’ that results in incapacity for work and, if so, whether he is incapacitated for work as result of the injury during the period under claim.
In order to determine these issues, findings will be required for the purposes of s 4(9), s5A, s 5B, s 14 and s 19 of the SRC Act. Considering the nature of Mr McKenzie’s accepted injury, which is an injury in the form of a ‘disease’ under s 5B, findings will be required about the existence of a causal nexus between his adjustment disorder ailment and the circumstances of his AEC employment, namely that the employment contributed to his ailment to a significant degree. When assessing if that threshold is met, being a contribution that is substantially more than material, any other factors outside the employment that may have contributed to his ailment should be considered. The matters set out in s 5B(2) must be taken into account:
(2) In determining whether an ailment or aggravation was contributed to, to a significant degree, by an employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee, the following matters may be taken into account:
(a) the duration of the employment;
(b) the nature of, and particular tasks involved in, the employment;
(c) any predisposition of the employee to the ailment or aggravation;
(d) any activities of the employee not related to the employment;
(e) any other matters affecting the employee’s health.
This subsection does not limit the matters that may be taken into account.

Should the requisite causal nexus between the employment and Mr McKenzie’s ailment be established by evidence, the next consideration is if the injury results in incapacity for work. This requires findings to be made about the existence and causes of incapacity for work, applying the defined meaning of that term in s 4(9) of the SRC Act. Commonly, questions of this kind turn on medical evidence, including medical certificates, and evidence of Mr McKenzie’s psychological condition at the relevant time. This is especially important when determining if the requisite causal link between the injury and the person’s incapacity for work is established during a specific period. In cases where the person’s ailment and any incapacity for work may be multifactorial, disentangling causes of incapacity during specific periods in the past is assisted by detailed evidence, often in the form of clinical notes of treating therapists and doctors.
The ‘as a result of’ test that must be applied for the purposes of s 19 applies in each week during the period under claim. In each week, the calculus set out in s 19 must be applied using formulae that turn, in part, on the amount the injured employee is able to earn in suitable employment in any week. The records of treating doctors and therapists, including Mr de Beer and other psychologists, may illuminate matters of this kind and, for that reason, they may be relevant.
Clearly enough, in order to make findings about these matters, probative materials are required. The Tribunal cannot make findings drawn from thin air. It is for this reason that medical and psychological treatment records have apparent relevance for parties when preparing their respective cases.
With regard to the records of Mr de Beer and Salt and Light Psychology that are covered by the Tribunal summons issued on 6 December 2021, I am satisfied they have apparent relevance. I am not persuaded that they have no possible relevance, or that summonsing them serves no legitimate purpose in the proceedings.
I am sympathetic to Mr de Beer’s concerns about Mr McKenzie’s psychological condition and the risk that it could be exacerbated should his treatment records be disclosed to the AEC and Comcare. On the materials I have examined, the risk that Mr de Beer alludes to is not substantiated or supported by other materials or any medical opinion from Mr McKenzie’s treating doctor. Perhaps this relates to the inherent difficulty of substantiating the possibility that psychological harm might result from some future action. I accept that the possibility of consequential harm may exist should the objection be refused and the AEC and Comcare gain access to Mr de Beer’s summonsed records. Nevertheless, on the present materials, I am unable to assess the likelihood of this occurring, although it is clear that Mr de Beer considers it to be of sufficient concern and part of his duty of care to Mr McKenzie to raise it in the objection he has made. This weighs in the balance with other factors that must be taken into account.
With regard to Mr de Beer’s duty of care to Mr McKenzie, this must give way to his legal obligation to comply with the Tribunal’s summons should his objection be refused. Failure to comply with a Tribunal summons is an offence under s 61 of the AAT Act which carries a maximum penalty of 12 months imprisonment, 60 penalty units, or both. I note that Mr de Beer made the objection on his own account, albeit at least in part on grounds of a duty of care he owes to Mr McKenzie. Mr McKenzie was given an opportunity to make submissions about Mr de Beer’s objection, but he declined to do so.
His assertion that professional expertise is required to properly interpret clinical records which otherwise may be prone to misinterpretation may be correct. The interpretation of medical records may well be a matter for evidence later in the proceedings but it is not a reason to strike out the summons at this stage.
Mr de Beer’s argument that his treatment of Mr McKenzie is not funded by or reported to Comcare is not to the point. The Tribunal’s summons is not subject to any such consideration, nor is it answered by Mr de Beer’s offer to prepare a report (which I understand the AEC has declined).
To the extent that Mr de Beer’s objection raises privacy considerations, these, too, must give way should the objection be refused.
Nevertheless, for completeness, I will address relevant considerations, even though these were not expressly raised by Mr de Beer.
As Mr de Beer’s Salt and Light Psychology practice is located in the Australian Capital Territory, the Health Records Act (Privacy and Access) 1997 (ACT) (ACT Health Records Act) should be considered. Section 6(1) of that Act requires compliance with privacy principles subject only to proof of authorised contravention under s 6(2). An authorised contravention includes a law of the Commonwealth or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Principles 9 and 10, which limit the uses and disclosure of health records are expressly subject to a law of the Commonwealth or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The summons provisions in s 40A and s 40B of the AAT Act are laws of the Commonwealth. Thus, where health records in Mr de Beer’s possession or under his control are summonsed under s 40A of the AAT Act, the limits imposed by Principle 9 and Principle 10 under the ACT Health Records Act fall away.
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) and the Australian Privacy Principles it establishes set out complementary provisions to the ACT Health Records Act. In particular, the use or disclosure of personal information of a person for another purpose is not permitted under Privacy Principle 6 by operation of s 6.1 of Part 3, Schedule 1. However, this bar is expressly disapplied by s 6.2(b) where the use or disclosure of the information is required or authorised by or under an Australian law or a court/tribunal order. Thus, where use or disclosure of personal information is authorised by order of the Tribunal under s 40A or s 40B of the AAT Act, for the purposes of proceedings, s 6.1 of Privacy Principle 6 does not apply.
As I have said, the Tribunal must ensure that each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present their case. Necessarily, in a case of this kind, this means using the Tribunal’s power to summons records that have apparent relevance and, thereby, enabling the parties to build the mosaic of evidence on which the particular issues in the proceedings are to be assessed and determined. This obligation, and the right of each party to thoroughly prepare their case, reflects a powerful public interest in the fair and just review of administrative decisions in accordance with the objectives expressed in s 2A of the AAT Act:
In carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that:
(a) is accessible; and
(b) is fair, just, economical, informal and quick; and
(c) is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter; and
(d) promotes public trust and confidence in the decision‑making of the Tribunal.
This, too, weighs in the balance.
Considering all these matters and giving them due weight, Mr de Beer’s objection is not made out and it must be rejected. The concerns he has expressed about the risk to Mr McKenzie’s health do not outweigh other considerations I have discussed. The summons is not oppressive or speculative to the extent that it should be struck out.
I should say immediately, however, that the refusal of Mr de Beer’s objection does not mean that the AEC and Comcare will be given access to any records he produces in compliance with the summons. Mr McKenzie has the right to object to disclosure of any records that are produced by Mr de Beer should there be legal grounds on which to do so. If that occurs, the objection will be heard and decided at the time.
Decision
Mr de Beer’s objection to the summons issued by the Tribunal on 7 December 2021 is refused. As the date for production under the summons is now past, the date by which Mr de Beer, Salt and Light Psychology, must produce documents under the summons is extended to 18 February 2022.

I certify that the preceding 50 (fifty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr S. Webb, Member.

........................[sgd]...............................................
Associate
Dated: 2 February 2022
Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms Sama Khan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Ben Mason
Solicitor for the Other Party: Mr Tom Maling

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL	)
)	No: 2021/2680
GENERAL DIVISION	)