Australian Conservation Foundatiion Inc & Anor v The State of South Australia

[1990] HCATrans 193

Abt -!) AUSTRALIA & -'>}.)),:)'$-««.-(<-~

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No A7 of 1990

B e t w e e n -

AUSTRALIAN CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION INC and
CONSERVATION COUNCIL OF

SOUTH AUSTRALIA INC

Applicants

and

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

and OPHIX FINANCE CORPORATION

PTY LTD

Respondents

Application for special leave

to appeal

BRENNAN J

TOOHEY J

MCHUGH J

Conservation 1 23/8/90

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON THURSDAY, 23 AUGUST 1990, AT 11.21 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR B.R. HAYES, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with

MR J. COSTELLO for the applicant. (instructed by

Johnston Withers)

MR J.J. DOYLE, OCf Solicitor-General for South Australia:

If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned

friend, MR M. WALTER, for the first respondent.

(-instructed by the Crown Solicitor for South

Australia)

MSC. TRENORDEN: If the Court pleases, I appear for the

second respondent. (instructed by Norman

Waterhouse & Mutton)

BRENNAN J:	Mr Hayes.
MR HAYES:	The Court will have seen from the documents in

this case that the subject-matter of the litigation
involves a major tourist resort in an

environmentally sensitive area: the Flinders

Ranges. The application for special leave, in our

respectful submission, raises two important

questions, namely, the extent to which the immunity
of the Crown from compliance with the normal

planning and development control requirements

extends to a non-Crown commercial entity such as,

in this case, Ophix and, secondly, the relationship

between the National Parks and Wildlife Act and the developments in national parks and the Planning Act

which also covers developments throughout the State

including developments in national parks.

Your Honours, the legislative scenario here is

a familiar one in this area of law and is, in fact,
common to many other parts of Australia. You have,
on the one hand, national parks and wildlife

legislation governing management of national parks

with powers vested in the minister to implement the

objectives of that legislation through authorized

management plans, and you have, on the other hand,

fairly common planning legislation governing the

whole of the State and covering all forms of

development within the State, together with fairly

elaborate procedures incorporating public
participation and input into decisions for specific

projects, anrd built into that legislation you also

have the normal rights of appeal and the exemptions

that one finds which apply to the Crown or

specified Crown agencies to be exempt in some

circumstances from that legislation.

Now, notwithstanding this familiar legislative

scenario which we have here and which is common in

other States, there is, in fact, in our respectful

submission, no authority directly in point upon the

issue which is raised in this case and that is

whether a totally separate and independent

Conservation 23/8/90

commercial entity who wishes to carry out a major

development in a national park which is on Crown

land, and who enters into a long lease with the
government for that land, can do so completely

immune from the normal planning processes which would otherwise have applied to that commercial

entity.

Justice Jacobs, in his decision, at first

instance, dealt with this by holding, in effect,

that the National Parks and Wildlife Act

legislation simply pulled out development out of

the normal planning process. Can I take

Your Honours to page 18 of the application book and

in particular the last paragraph on that page at

line 25? His Honour there says:

In my opinion the legislature has evinced a

clear intention to take 'development' in

national parks outside the ordinary planning

process, and the legislation itself discloses

sound reasons of public policy why that should

be so. National parks are important

resources, and as such are placed under the

control of the Minister who is answerable to

Parliament, and ultimately to the electorate for the management and development of the park.

He applied that reasoning in relation to the ability of Ophix, in this case, to take advantage

of that type of exemption. At page 21, line 3, he

says:

There is no basis for reading down the

unqualified operation of Sec. 40 (l)(b) -

and that is of the National Parks and Wildlife

Act -

and to conclude that it does not speak at all

to a lessee.

His Honour then went on to deal with the

distinction which he drew between our National

Parks and Wildlife Act and the National Parks and

Wildlife Act in New South Wales which was an

unreported decision which he dealt with. Then, if

the Court goes down to line 24 on page 21, he goes

on to say:

Moreover, it would be obviously inconvenient,

manifesting an intention not lightly to be

attributed to Parliament, to subject the

Minister and his lessee to different planning

legislation in respect of the same

development.

Conservation 3 23/8/90

Your Honours, the Full Court raised this issue

at page 40 of the appeal book, at about the middle

of that page after dealing with the plans of

management under the National Parks and Wildlife

Act:

The plan, when adopted, controls the

management of the reserve. Section 40
provides that subject to the rights of a
holder of any mining tenement granted in

relation to the land "(a) the provisions of the plan must be carried out in relation to

that reserve and (b) operations must not be

undertaken in relation to that reserve unless

those operations are in accordance with the

plan of management". This Act, then, provides

a scheme for the management and improvement of

each reserve by means of a plan which the

minister is obliged to implement. Obviously

many improvements to reserves would amount to

development within the meaning of the planning

Act and if the provisions of that Act apply to

development on reserves, the Minister's power
to implement a plan of management would be

curtailed by the planning regime imposed by

the Planning Act. How does the Planning Act

cope with this potential conflict or

inconsistency?

Then the Full Court resolves that at page 47 of the

appeal book. The Court will see, in the second

paragraph, the Full Court has dealt with the

factual situation:

.. The correct interpretation of the facts

set out above, to my mind, is that the lease

and the obligations of the second respondent

thereunder, are the means by which the

Minister is implementing the government's

plans for the development of the park. The

second respondent is not, however, the agent

of the Minister for that purpose. It has its

role to play as a principal in the

development. The second respondent is to

construct the resort at its own expense and
the resort buildings are to be the property of
the second respondent during the term of the

lease. The second respondent is to operate

the resort as a principal.

TOOHEY J:  Mr Hayes, does your argument accept that if the

Crown had, in this instance, acted not through a

lessee but in some way had sought to conduct the

operations itself that Crown immunity would exist?

MR HAYES:  If the Crown, itself, constructed this on the

basis of the decision of the Full Court which

Conservation 23/8/90

section 7 would apply, we say, with one

qualification - and that is a qualification I was

going to come back to in a moment - and that is the

curious wording of section 7 itself - Your Honours

will recall Justice Jacobs mentioning that. It

starts off, on the one hand - perhaps I can turn

quickly to page 14 of the appeal book. His Honour

Justice Jacobs says, at the top of that page:

There are two features of this statutory

provision which call for comment -

he has just referred to section 7 -

In the first place, the drafting is a little

curious. It begins by asserting that 'subject

to this section', this Act binds the Crown,

but concludes by asserting that 'except as
provided by this section this Act does not

bind a Minister of the Crown'.

We would say a matter which justifies the

granting of special leave, apart from the other

points that I am about to make, is this, that on

the fact of that, if the section 7 notice
provisions do not apply because of an exemption
granted under the regulation, as was the case here,
then it is arguable that the Crown is bound by the

other provisions of the Act because it is only

subject to that section that the Crown is not bound

by the Act. Therefore the section does not speak

to the Crown because, as His Honour says at

line 21:

if the Section does not speak to him at all,

he is not otherwise bound by the Act.

Now, we do not, with respect, accept that is

necessarily right, particularly in the light of

this Court's most recent deqision in Bropho. So,

we do not accept.	We do say that that is a special
leave point which would justify the Court examining

this aspect of the decision. Subject to that

qualification, if the immunity does extend to the

Crown then the Crown certainly can construct the

resort pursuant to the provisions of section 7 if

they are applicable, but, so can a Crown's

contractor in the true sense of the word. It can

employ a builder to do that and the builder clearly

is not going to be caught by the provisions of the

Planning Act.

It is quite a different matter to say that the

Crown can, by leasing on a long lease to an

individual, then impart that immunity to the

individual, and Your Honours will see, the only

authority quoted for that proposition which was

Conservation 23/8/90

relied upon by the Full Court was the authority of

Bradken's case. We say, with respect, that Bradken

is inapplicable. It is clearly distinguishable,

which I would seek to do in a moment, and is wholly

inapplicable to the circumstances which apply here.

So, there is, in our submission, no authority

for the proposition, as found by the Full Court,

that a government can implement its wishes or its

plans for a tourist resort in the national park by

entering into a long lease with a private

commercial entrepreneur who can then carry out the
development at his expense; he will own it; he

will operate it; but he will do so with the

benefit of the Crown immunity that the Crown would

have in terms of complying with the normal

provisions of the Planning Act, and we say there is
no authority for that proposition and Bradken is

not authority for that proposition.

BRENNAN J: There are two problems, are there not, on this?

One is that if this were simply a lease which

contained no covenant with respect to the

development then any development would have to take

place pursuant to the Planning Act.

MR HAYES:	Yes.
BRENNAN J:	So that the first question is whether, by the

content of the covenant in the lease requiring the

development to be effected, the Crown can, by that

contractual term, confer its protection on the

covenanter?

MR HAYES:	Yes.
BRENNAN J:	Now, a second proposition, I suppose, is whether

or not, having regard to the general structure of

the two Acts, the regime of the wildlife plan

adopted by the Minister excludes entirely the

operation of the Planning Act?

MR HAYES:  Yes, that is right, Your Honour. Can I just go

one step further in relation to that first

proposition? Your Honour identified the one

covenant in the lease as being the foundation upon

which the immunity might flow. We say the whole of

the lease would have to be taken into account and,

notwithstanding that covenant, our argument would

be that it would not carry the immunity into the

lessee and there are various reasons for saying

that.

BRENNAN J: Yes.

MR HAYES:  The point, of course, is, at this stage, we say

that it deserves the attention of this Court to

Conservation 6 23/8/90

examine that aspect with a view, we would be

arguing, to confining, if necessary, that second

limb of Bradken's case and not extending it as,

indeed, this case has done.

BRENNAN J:  Yes. I think we would be advantaged if we

called on the solicitor at this stage, Mr Hayes.

MR HAYES: If the Court pleases.

MR DOYLE: If Your Honours please. As best I could jot it

down, my learned friend said the central issue was

in these terms, that there is no authority that the

government can implement its plans in the national

park by means of a long-term commercial lease, the
work then being done at the expense of the

developer with the benefit of Crown immunity, and

he said Bradken's case does not go this far.

In our submission, with great respect, that is

simply not the point in this case and the point

lies perhaps in the question that Your Honour

Justice Brennan put to him. Our submission is

quite simply that the short answer to the whole

case is that section 40 of the National Parks and

Wildlife Act does prescribe an exclusive code - I

might have to qualify that slightly but I will put

it in unqualified terms at the moment - for

development within reserves and the only issue in

this case is whether it can be said that the

Minister is carrying out the provisions of the

management plan.

So, the only question in this case is one of

fact and detail really, namely, on the facts of

this case, does it fall within section 40? Can I

just provide to Your Honours some - - -

BRENNAN J: That is not really a question in grave contest,

is it? The real question is whether or not the

provisions of the Planning Act are impliedly

excluded by the operation of section 40.

MR DOYLE: Certainly, Your Honour, and the premise to my

proposition is that section 40 does exclude the provisions of the Planning Act in relation to a national park where a plan of management has been

adopted. So, whether one calls that the minor or

the major premise that is the premise, and then we

submit, if that is so, then all that is left is the

factual question in this case which is in truth

what is happening here, an instance of the Minister

carrying out the provisions of the management plan

which clearly was adopted; there was a management

plan.

Conservation 7 23/8/90

BRENNAN J:  Mr Solicitor, that might raise one interesting

question of fact that I was not able to ascertain

by reading the appeal book. It seems that the

lease was dated 16 January 1989 and it was in that

month, on an unspecified date, that the plan of
management, as amended, was adopted by the

Minister.

MR DOYLE:	Yes.
BRENNAN J:	Is it known whether or not the plan of

management was adopted before or after the lease?

MR DOYLE:  I do not myself know for certain, Your Honour. I

am afraid I do not know, Your Honour, for certain.

I hope that does not turn out to be too interesting

a question, Your Honour. My friend says that for

the purposes of the case, the applicant did not

know either, so it looks as if that was perhaps an

issue of fact that was not clarified before Justice

Jacobs. Perhaps I can say one would think the

management plan would have been adopted because the

process under the National Parks and Wildlife Act

is the adoption of the plan and then the obligation

of the Minister to implement it. But I am afraid I
cannot say, as a matter of fact, and from what my

friend says it would appear that probably the facts

before the Court do not cover that point.

BRENNAN J: Well, it would be regrettable if special leave

were granted in order to discuss the matter of some

significance in legal principle if it were to turn

upon some disputed issue of fact of that kind.

MR DOYLE:  Yes.

BRENNAN J: Is it possible to agree the fact for the

purposes of the application?

MR DOYLE: Well, Your Honour, all I can say is, for what it

is worth, I am instructed that it was, in fact,

adopted seven days before the lease was signed but

at the moment I am not sure whether that is

contained in the papers before Justice Jacobs.

There was a statement of facts put before him and,

again, I assume from what my learned friend just

said, that that likewise did not cover the point.

So, while I would anticipate the relevant fact can

be agreed in the light of what I have just been

told, obviously my friend may want to dispute it

when he sees the documents because I can sense it

may be to his advantage to dispute it. So, I just

do not know.

But, Your Honours, could I go briefly to the

argument on section 40 because it is our submission

that that, in the end, is the answer to the case.

Conservation 23/8/90

I will provide to the Court copies not of the whole

Act but just the relevant sections. Your Honours

will see first of all from the preamble to the Act

that it is clearly an Act specifically to provide

for the establishment and management of reserves

and the operation of the definitions is that this

· park was a reserve. Under section 35(2), which

Your Honours should have there:

reserves are vested in the Crown -

and, under subsection (1):

the Minister has the control and administration of all reserves -

and, under section 36(1):

all reserves are under the management of the

Director.

Section 37 states the objectives of management, and

Your Honours could note in particular

subparagraph (h):

the encouragement of public use -

which it might be thought may well involve the

provision of facilities. Could we just jump for a

moment to the rear of the extracts - section 80(2),

which is the regulation-making power, setting out

the matters on which regulations may be made, and
then if Your Honours would look at

subparag~aph (u):

regulate, restrict or prohibit the erection of

buildings, signs or other structures in

reserves;

(v) provide for the protection and

preservation of buildings -

et cetera; not the complete field, as it were, of

planning law but, of course, central to planning

law, controls over buildings and structures. So,

we have the context, first of all, that management

obviously envisages encouraging public use; the

specific power to make regulations relating to the

erection of buildings.

Then, in section 38, Your Honours will see

that as soon as practicable after the constitution

of a reserve the Minister has to propose a plan of

management. I will not take Your Honours through

the subsections but they provide for a process of,

in effect, consultation and expert advice not

dissimilar to what one would do if one were

Conservation 23/8/90

adopting a development plan although, obviously, it

is a truncated version because we will be looking

here at a relatively confined area of land.

Then section 39 provides that the plan may

. provide for zones. Then we come to, what we submit

is central, section 40, that where the Minister has

adopted a plan of management the provisions of the

plan must be carried out in relation to that

reserve. Now, he has no choice. It is obviously,

in a sense, an obligation without a sanction and

presumably the sanction is the the parliamentary

one and I suppose public criticism, but there is a

specific obligation to carry out the plan. Then in

subparagraph (b), the negative provision that

nothing may be done unless it is done:

in accordance with the plan.

Now, Your Honours, it was not in issue in this

case that what was being done was in implementation

of the plan. Justice Jacobs so found and his

judgment records that that was not disputed.	So it
was accepted that the work being done was in
implementation of the approved management plan.	Our

respectful submission is that when one looks at the

structure of this legislation and compares it with

the provisions of the Planning Act it is clear that

it was Parliament's intention that once a management

plan has been adopted in relation to a reserve that

section 40 provides a sort of code.

The reason why I said a little earlier I had

to slightly qualify my proposition was that,

clearly, before there is a plan of management

adopted that the position is different. So, I am

suggesting that the Act, as it were, takes reserves

right outside the scheme of the Planning Act, but

in our submission, once the plan of management has

been adopted and, bearing in mind this obligation

to implement the provisions of the plan, one could

not really say that Parliament envisaged that the

Minister, for a start, or the Crown, would have to

seek a planning approval because, clearly, it is

conceivable that the planning approval might be

refused and it would be a very odd result if one

had section 40(l)(a) but, nevertheless, the

planning approval refused.

So, if one accepts what is perhaps the major premise that section 40 does provide the code for

development in relation to a reserve when a plan of

management has been adopted then, the only issue in

this case is an issue of mainly fact and perhaps

some points of law which was resolved in favour of

the respondent by Justice Jacobs in the Full Court;

namely, well, on the facts here, is the Minister

Conservation 10 23/8/90

carrying out the provisions of the plan?

Obviously, in every case one will look at the facts

reasonably closely and may assign significance to

some facts or other facts but, in our submission,

the issue becomes essentially a factual one then;

· can it be said that what is happening here is done

pursuant to section 40(l)(a)?

TOOHEY J: Where is the power to lease to be found?

MR DOYLE: Section 35(3), Your Honour.

TOOHEY J: Yes, thank you.

MR DOYLE:  And, in our submission - just following on from

that point - clearly Parliament envisaged first of

all that if a lease was granted that nothing could be done in relation to the reserve contrary to the

plan, so we have the negative provision in

section 40(l)(b), and while in a sense it could be

said Parliament has not fully effected its scheme,

again the clear implication is that Parliament

would have envisaged that if the Minister did grant

a lease he would ensure, in granting it, that the

things to be done under it were in conformity with

the approved plan.

McHUGH J:  Mr Solicitor, surely public health legislation

and so on would apply to Ophix when they are

carrying out this plan.

MR DOYLE: It might, Your Honour, yes.

McHUGH J: Well then, why should not the Act be construed so

that Ophix has got to comply with environmental

legislation?

MR DOYLE: Well, Your Honour, because we are not talking

about, with all respect, environmental legislation.

We are talking about the application of the

Planning Act which, while I do not deny from one

point of view, could be said to be environmental	legislation, the Planning Act is primarily
legislation which controls development and what we
are looking at here is development, and, in our submission, we are looking at two pieces of
legislation whose central concern is the very one
thing.

As to public health or perhaps building safety

it is much easier to say, "Well, even though the

Minister must implement the management plan he has

got to provide adequate and healthy toilets and

when they are building he has got to provide

adequate and safe scaffolding." But, in our

respectful submission, it is another thing to say

that he is subject to a regime of planning control

Conservation 11 23/8/90

which purports to say to him, not in the details of

how he does the work so much but to say in

principle, "Well, you may or you may not put up

that building" and to decide that point by

reference to somewhat different criteria.

In other words, there is no reason to assume

that the principles of the development plan will

precisely mirror the provisions of the management

plan because inevitably - - -

McHUGH J:  I thought you emphasized paragraph (a) but is not

paragraph (b) of section 40(1) the relevant one?

MR DOYLE: Sorry, is it not irrelevant?

McHUGH J:  No, the relevant one?

MR DOYLE: Well, both are relevant, Your Honour, because if

what was being done was not in accordance with the

plan of management there may be a basis for seeking

an injunction to restrain it as contravening the

plan. But, Your Honours, it was conceded before

Justice Jacobs that what was being done was, in fact, in accordance with the plan of management.

That was not in issue before His Honour, and that

is at page 8, line 25, where Justice Jacobs records

that concession and appears to endorse it and, in

my submission, that has never been in issue.

BRENNAN J:  The problem, Mr Solicitor, is that

section 40(l)(a) is so curiously expressed that if

it creates any duty at all one would think it is a

duty imposed upon the Minister.

McHUGH J: Yes, it is a duty of impeded obligation in a

sense.

BRENNAN J: It is not a duty which is imposed upon, in this

case, Ophix.

MR DOYLE:  No .

BRENNAN J: Well then, whatever protection there may be

which the Minister can invoke by reason of the

statutory duty imposed upon him, the question

remains whether a like protection can be acquired

by Ophix under section 40(l)(a) and that is where

the problem arises, is it not?

MR DOYLE: Well, not in my respectful submission,

Your Honour, because, with respect, Your Honour is rather coming at it in what we submit is the wrong

way, namely to say, "Can Ophix have the benefit of

the protection" - if we call it that - "given to

the Minister?" In our submission, the issue simply

Conservation 12 23/8/90

is, is the Minister, in fact, here, implementing

the provisions of the plan?

BRENNAN J: Well, the answer to that, as a matter of fact,

is no, Ophix is.

MR DOYLE:. Well, in my respectful submission, Your Honour,

it is an issue of fact -

BRENNAN J: Yes.

MR DOYLE:  - - - and the courts have so far concluded on the

facts that the Minister is; he is doing it through

Ophix. If I can just extend the answer a fraction,

Your Honour, he could, for instance, use public servants to do the building work and then lease it

to Ophix. He could, in my submission, hire

independent builders to build the resort and then

lease it to Ophix. What he has chosen to say

through the lease is, "Well, I am going to

supervise and control your plans and you can't lay

a brick without my approval but once we are agreed

on what I want built there and where and how

extensive, away you go."

So, in my submission, he is merely choosing

one of three very common methods, namely, using his

own staff and then leasing; hiring a contractor

and then leasing; or leasing with covenants to do

the work. So, that is why I submit that while I

accept it is a factual issue, first of all that is

not really an issue which warrants the grant of

special leave but, secondly, the courts so far, in

my submission, could not be said to be obviously

wrong in having concluded that the Minister was

doing it.

BRENNAN J: Well, that seems to me to really come to the

heart of the problem because that was, in fact, the

way in which the Full Court, in the judgment of the

Chief Justice, expressed it, was it not, that the

Minister was implementing the plan and if the
Minister was implementing the plan then

section 40(l)(a) applies and cadit quaestio.

MR DOYLE:  Yes.

BRENNAN J: If, however, it is not right to describe what

was happening as an implementation of the plan

then, whether one calls it a question of fact or a
question of law, the issue for determination is
whether or not it is a case of the discharge of the

40(l)(a) duty that is taking place. Is not that,

in itself, an important question?

MR DOYLE: Well, Your Honour, in my respectful submission -

could I give a qualified answer - in a sense, yes,

Conservation 13 23/8/90

Your Honour, but in the end it will always depend

upon the relatively fine detail of the particular

case. While, of course, far be it for me to say

what Your Honours might or might not accomplish if

special leave were given, in our respectful

submission, it is doubtful whether any general

helpful principles would be found. One would

always be driven back to the facts and it is a bit

like seeking special leave to debate the question

of whether a person is an employee or an

independent contractor.

It is an important issue at principle but in

the end the principles tend to dissolve within the
given facts of the case and if the Court granted
special leave it would simply be combing over the
terms of the lease and the facts with a view to

deciding what is, I acknowledge in a senses, an

important point but one on which, in my respectful

submission, there is little prospect of the Court

being able to lay down generally applicable

criteria.

TOOHEY J:  Mr Solicitor, I cannot see.any definition of

"plan of management" in the Act. Is there one?

MR DOYLE:  Not, Your Honour, in the definition provisions.

It, in effect, comes from section 38 and so the

terminology simply flows through to sections 39 and

then 40.

TOOHEY J: Yes, thank you.

MR DOYLE:  The only other point I would make, Your Honours,

is that, in our submission, again it is not an

issue of Bradken's case here. That was uttered by

me, now with regret as I sat down in the Full Court

and it has now loomed a little larger than that in

the judgments but, in our submission, the matters

that have been the subject of submissions before

the Court are where the answer to this case lies.

BRENNAN J: Yes, thank you, Mr Solicitor. Ms Trenorden.

MS TRENOROEN:  There is nothing I can add to the

submissions of Mr Solicitor, and I adopt his

submissions.

BRENNAN J:  Mr Hayes, the question of fact which I raised

with the solicitor, as to the comparative date on

which the lease was granted and the plan of

management amended, is that at any risk of being an

issue on which this matter would founder if special

leave were granted?

MR HAYES:  There is no risk of that not being agreed, I

would have thought. I cannot imagine that is in

Conservation 14 23/8/90

dispute. I just had a look at the agreed statement

of facts. This case went out on an agreed

statement of facts and all we were able to put in

there was some time in January the Minister adopted

the amendments to the Flinders Ranges National Park

plan of management. If that information is

available, the parties in this case did not dispute

any of the factual matters.

BRENNAN J: Well, the Court is minded, at present, to grant

you special leave but it should be understood that if that question was not resolved and if it should

emerge as some question of importance then whether

or not the grant of special leave would stand would

then be a matter for the Full Court to consider.

How long would you expect the argument to take in

this matter if special leave be granted?

MR HAYES:  I would expect the argument to take probably just

over a day.

BRENNAN J:  How does that accord with your estimate,

Mr Solicitor?

MR DOYLE:  With respect, I would have thought less than a

day, Your Honour. It is such a clear case,

Your Honours.

BRENNAN J:	Have you got anything to add to that?
MS TRENORDEN:	Somewhere in between.

BRENNAN J: Very well, there will be a grant of special

leave in this matter.

AT 12.00 NOON THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

Conservation 15 23/8/90