FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Competition Tribunal [2017] FCAFC 150
File numbers: VID 751 of 2017
VID 762 of 2017Judges: BESANKO, PERRAM & ROBERTSON JJ Date of judgment: 20 September 2017 Catchwords: COMPETITION – merger clearances and authorisations – authorisation granted by Australian Competition Tribunal for merger – Tribunal satisfied that proposed acquisition would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to public that acquisition should be allowed to occur – proper construction of s 95AZH of Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) – consideration of relationship between test in s 95AZH and concept of ‘substantial lessening of competition’ in s 50
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied s 95AZH by importing test from s 50 – whether failure to take into account relevant considerations – whether Tribunal erred in law by failing to deal with a central issue raised by party to application – whether Tribunal required to compare likely future state of competition with and without proposed acquisition – whether Tribunal required to assign lesser weight to benefits flowing from proposed acquisition not likely to be widely shared – whether Tribunal made irrational and illogical findings
Legislation: Constitution s 92
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(c), 5(1)(d), 5(1)(e), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(j), 5(2)(b), 5(2)(g), 16(1)(a)
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 50, 95AT, 95AT(2), 95AZH, 95AZH(1)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: Application by Sea Swift Pty Ltd [2016] ACompT 9
Application by Tabcorp Holdings Ltd [2017] ACompT 1
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia [2008] HCA 11; (2008) 234 CLR 418
Chief Executive Officer of Customs v AMI Toyota Ltd [2000] FCA 1343; (2000) 102 FCR 578
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 322; (1993) 43 FCR 280
Industry Research and Development Board v Bridgestone Australia Ltd [2004] FCAFC 56; (2004) 136 FCR 47
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Re Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9
Re QIW Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 225
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481
Re Rural Traders Co-operative (WA) Ltd (1979) 37 FLR 244
Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584
Burchfield RW, Fowler’s Modern English Usage (Revised 3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 1998)
Date of hearing: 28-29 August 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 88 VID 751 of 2017 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A McClelland QC with Ms P Thiagarajan Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr C Moore SC with Mr N de Young, Mr A d’Arville…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 150
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had indeed misconstrued and misapplied the statutory provisions by improperly importing elements from another section of the Act. The court noted that the Tribunal should have compared the likely future state of competition with and without the merger, and should have given lesser weight to benefits not widely shared. The court found the Tribunal's decision to be irrational and illogical, as it failed to properly weigh the relevant factors and did not adequately consider the detriments of the merger. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable and should be set aside, and the matter should be referred back to the Tribunal for further consideration.
The court ordered that the Tribunal's decision be set aside and the matter referred back to it for reconsideration. Tabcorp and Tatts were ordered to pay the ACCC's costs, while the issue of costs for CrownBet was to be determined after further submissions and a hearing if necessary. The court also ordered that the parties confer to determine whether a similar substantive order should be made in relation to CrownBet's application. The court further ordered that the reasons for the decision be embargoed until the parties had an opportunity to review them for any confidential information.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties confer as soon as possible to see if agreement can be reached on the question of what substantive order should be made on the Applicant’s application.
2. The matter be listed before the Full Court by video-conference at 4.30 pm on Friday 22 September 2017 to determine the substantive order to be made unless the parties notify the Court beforehand that agreement has been reached on that issue.
3. The Applicant file and serve any written submissions on costs of no more than three pages by the end of Friday 29 September 2017.
4. The Second and Third Respondents file and serve their written submissions on costs of no more than three pages by the end of Friday 6 October 2017.
5. Until further order, the reasons of the Court be embargoed from release to the parties or the public.
6. As soon as is reasonably practicable and, in any event, within five business days, the solicitors for the Applicant inform the Court, following consultation with the other legal representatives for the parties, whether any part of the reasons requires redaction so as not to disclose material which is commercial in confidence.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In any event, we are sceptical of the ACCC’s submission, even on the favourable assumption that s 95AZH(1) does carry within it the modified total welfare standard, that it would require the Tribunal to give explicit weightings. Apart from showing how far the ACCC’s submission has wandered from the text of s 95AZH(1), the submission ignores the reality that much administrative decision making involves the weighing of imponderables or incommensurables. It would be unworkable to require the Tribunal explicitly to give a weight to each benefit and we would strain to avoid such a construction were it necessary. It is not, however, necessary so to strain. Section 95AZH(1) does not require what the ACCC suggests. The assessment of benefits and detriments must be complete and the Tribunal must, no doubt, weigh them. This is not necessarily, however, an arithmetical or accounting process. As we have said above, it may involve an instinctive synthesis of otherwise incommensurable factors.5. Irrationality (CrownBet Ground Four) CrownBet’s application for judicial review raised a rationality challenge having two limbs. First, it was said that the Tribunal’s decision to grant an authorisation was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have exercised the power in s 95AT of the Act in that way. So expressed, this was a challenge to the exercise of a discretionary power on the basis usually linked with the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. CrownBet identified its right to relief as resting upon ss 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(g) of the ADJR Act. These are available where a decision involves an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made (5(1)(e)) or is a decision which is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so have exercised the power (5(2)(g)). The second limb was that the decision involved the formation by the Tribunal of a state of satisfaction which was a jurisdictional fact for the exercise by it of its powers. As such it could be reviewed if it could be shown that the formation of the state of satisfaction was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds. In its written submissions, CrownBet clarified at [57] that its rationality challenge was that:(i)the decision the Tribunal had made was unreasonable in the sense discussed in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 (‘Li’) at 348-350 [23]-[26], 351 [29], 362 [63], 367 [76] and 370 [88]; and(ii)the decision of the Tribunal was based on findings or inferences of fact not supported by logical grounds and was thus illogical and irrational citing again, inter alia, Li at 365-366 [72]. It is tolerably clear that the ‘decision’ the subject of the challenge in (ii) is not the substantive decision under s 95AT but instead the formation of the state of satisfaction referred to in s 95AZH(1) (CrownBet’s submissions did not observe the difference with complete clarity). The state of satisfaction referred to in s 95AZH(1) is a jurisdictional fact. As such the relevant principle is set out at Li at [72]:‘72The more specific errors in decision-making, to which the courts often refer, may also be seen as encompassed by unreasonableness. This may be consistent with the observations of Lord Greene MR, that some decisions may be considered unreasonable in more than one sense and that "all these things run into one another”. Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable". Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense.’(Footnotes omitted)