Australia Machinery Engineering (AME) Pty Ltd v Moore Group Holdings Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   AUSTRALIA MACHINERY ENGINEERING (AME) PTY LTD -v- MOORE GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD [2017] WADC 124

CORAM:   PARRY DCJ

HEARD:   19 JUNE 2017 (FURTHER WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FILED ON 24, 25 & 31 AUGUST 2017)

DELIVERED          :   15 SEPTEMBER 2017

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2480 of 2016

BETWEEN:   AUSTRALIA MACHINERY ENGINEERING (AME) PTY LTD

First Appellant

HWEE GOH
Second Appellant

TIONG LIM
Third Appellant

AND

MOORE GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Respondent

Catchwords:

Appeal from registrar - Summary judgment - Landlord and tenant - Action by landlord against tenant and guarantors for liquidated damages for unpaid rent and unliquidated damages for other breaches of lease - Summary judgment entered for rent claim - Whether tenant and guarantors have an arguable defence to claim for rent - Tenant and guarantors plead by way of defence that landlord in breach of implied term to do all things necessary to enable tenant to have benefit of lease - Tenant and guarantors' counterclaim for damages for breach of implied term and damages, compensation, refusal to enforce lease or variation of lease under Australian Consumer Law for misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct - Suspension clause - Lease requires tenant to pay rent to landlord 'without demand, deduction or right of set-off' - Whether suspension clause precludes arguable defence to claim for rent - Whether execution of summary judgment should be stayed until after trial of counterclaim

Legislation:

City of Canning Town Planning Scheme No 40
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601AD(1)
District Court Rules 2005 r 6(1), r 15, r 15(1), r 15(6)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 14, O 14 r 1, O 14 r 2, O 14 r 3(1), O 14 r 3(2), O 16
The Australian Consumer Law (Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) s 18, s 21, s 236, s 237, s 237(1), s 243

Result:

Appeal dismissed
Decision of Registrar Kingsley affirmed

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellant             :     Mr C S Williams

Second Appellant         :     Mr C S Williams

Third Appellant           :     Mr C S Williams

Respondent:     Mr B D Campbell

Solicitors:

First Appellant             :     Solomon Bros

Second Appellant         :     Solomon Bros

Third Appellant           :     Solomon Bros

Respondent:     Hale Legal

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; [1983] HCA 25

Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 27

Hausman v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 288; (2009) 29 VR 213

Moore Group Holdings Pty Ltd v Australia Machinery Engineering (AME) Pty Ltd [2017] WADC 90

Morgan v Pallister [2004] WASC 188

O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 71

Oswal v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] WASCA 58

Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72

Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; [1993] HCA 57

Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan [2014] WASC 475

PARRY DCJ: 

Introduction

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Details
Case
[2017] WADC 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court involved Australia Machinery Engineering (AME) Pty Ltd, the appellant, against Moore Group Holdings Pty Ltd and others, the respondents. The dispute arose from a claim by AME, the landlord, against Moore Group, the tenant, and guarantors for unpaid rent and other breaches of the lease agreement. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issues in the case were whether the tenant and guarantors had an arguable defence to AME’s claim for unpaid rent and whether the execution of the summary judgment should be stayed until after the trial of the counterclaims.

The court examined the nature of the defences presented by the tenant and guarantors, who argued that AME had breached an implied term to do all things necessary to enable the tenant to have the benefit of the lease. The defence also included counterclaims for damages for breach of the implied term, as well as for misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. The lease included a suspension clause that required the tenant to pay rent without demand, deduction, or right of set-off. The court considered whether this clause precluded the tenant and guarantors from raising an arguable defence to the claim for rent.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the suspension clause did not prevent the tenant and guarantors from raising an arguable defence to the claim for rent. The court held that the suspension clause did not apply to defences that challenged the enforceability of the guarantee or the conduct of the landlord, which could potentially void or vary the contract. The court further held that the execution of the summary judgment should not proceed until the counterclaims were determined, as the counterclaims could impact the rights and obligations of the parties in the dispute.

The final orders of the court included a stay of the execution of the summary judgment until after the trial of the counterclaims, allowing the tenant and guarantors to present their defences and counterclaims in full. This decision ensures that all relevant issues are addressed before any final judgment is entered in the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rules 1, 2 and 3 of O 14 RSC state as follows:1.When plaintiff may apply for summary judgment(1)Where in an action to which this Order applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance, the plaintiff may, on the ground that that defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed, within 21 days after appearance or at any later time by leave of the Court, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant.(2)This Order applies to every action begun by writ other than a probate or admiralty action. 2.Application under r. 1, how to make(1)An application under rule 1 shall be made by summons supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the claim or the part of the claim to which the application relates is based, and stating that in the deponent’s belief there is no defence to that claim or part thereof, as the case may be, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed.(2)Unless the Court otherwise directs, an affidavit for the purposes of this rule may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.(3)The summons and a copy of the affidavit in support and of any exhibits therein referred to shall be served on the defendant not less than 7 days before the return day of the summons. 3.Judgment may be given for plaintiff(1)On the hearing of an application under rule 1 unless the Court dismisses the application, or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of the claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried, or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant on that claim or part thereof as may be just, having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.(2)The Court may, by order and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be just, stay execution of any judgment given against a defendant under this rule until after the trial of any counterclaim made or raised by the defendant in the action. As the High Court of Australia held in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87, 99; [1983] HCA 25 (Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Deane & Dawson JJ):The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried. Moore Group's application for summary judgment under O 14 r 1 RSC was made in accordance with O 14 r 2(1) RSC by a summons supported by an affidavit of Mr Moore sworn on 10 November 2016 verifying the facts on which the claim is based and stating that in the deponent's belief there is no defence to the claim. In particular, Mr Moore refers in his affidavit to cl 3.1 of the lease which, as indicated earlier, states in par (a) as follows:The Tenant shall pay the Rent to the Landlord without demand, deduction or right of set‑off by equal monthly instalments in advance on the first day of each month …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation also involved an appeal by a guarantor against entry of summary judgment following non-payment of a debt. Both at first instance (Westpac Banking Corporation v Palaniappan [2014] WASC 475 (Sanderson M)) and on appeal, it was held that the guarantor had no arguable defence, because of a suspension clause in the guarantee. Clause 9 of the guarantee stated, in part, as follows:As long as any of the guaranteed money remains unpaid, you may not, without our consent:(a)reduce your liability under this guarantee and indemnity by claiming that you or the customer or any other person has a right of set-off or counterclaim against us; … Further, cl 13.1 of the guarantee provided that the guarantor was required to pay the guaranteed money 'in full without set‑off, counterclaim or deduction'. Corboy J (Martin CJ agreeing [1]) held [111] that cl 9(a) and cl 13.1 dealt with the same subject matter and were to be read together and as complimentary to one another. The guarantor pleaded a counterclaim in which he alleged that the bank had acted unconscionably and engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to s 21 of the ACL by giving instructions to the receivers of the borrower's property, including instructions to accept a purchaser's offer to purchase the borrower's land at below market value. The guarantor further alleged that he had suffered loss and damage as a result of the bank's conduct, as there was a shortfall in the amount owing under the loan following the sale of the land. The guarantor claimed equitable damages and set‑off, an equitable set‑off in any amount due under the counterclaim against any amount due on the bank's claim against him, and a declaration that the guarantee was a void and unenforceable pursuant to s 237 of the ACL. Corboy J (Martin CJ agreeing [1]) held in relation to suspension clauses as follows [130] and [133] – [135]:There is no ground of public policy that prevents the parties to a contract agreeing to exclude or suspend a defence of equitable set‑off: Derham on the Law of Set-off, 5.95; Coca-Cola Financial [Corporation v Finsat International Pty Ltd [1998] QB 43]; GE Capital [Australia v Davis [2002] NSWSC 1146; (2002) 180 FLR 250] [95] and following; Oswal [v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] WASC 58] [55] (Pullin JA; Newnes JA agreeing). As Bryson J observed in GE Capital, a suspension clause does not oust the court's jurisdiction: 'there is no limit on the right to resort to the courts if the guarantor first meets the obligation the protection of which is the primary purpose of the guarantee and indemnity, and pays the amount of the debt' [98]. The principle was explained by O'Donovan J and Phillips J, Modern Contract of Guarantee (2015, looseleaf) at [11.550]:The terms of the guarantee may not completely exclude the guarantor's right to raise any cross-claim or set-off available to the principal debtor. But the guarantee may prevent the guarantor from raising any cross‑claim or set‑off until after the creditor has been paid the guaranteed debt. In such a case the guarantor's cross-claim or set-off will not prevent the creditor from obtaining summary judgment in an action to enforce the guarantee. Hence, a clause excluding a guarantor's set-off or cross-claim does not oust the jurisdiction of the court to determine the set-off or cross‑claim; it merely defines and limits the parties' legal rights within the permissible scope of contractual obligations.…A suspension clause in a form such as cl 9 of the Guarantee will not apply where the guarantor alleges a defence that denies the debt or the enforceability of the guarantee (rather than asserting a claim that it would be unconscionable for the creditor to enforce an otherwise valid guarantee). So, for example, a guarantor will not be required to 'pay now and litigate later' where it alleges that the creditor was estopped from asserting that the debt was payable or from making a demand for payment. Nor will a suspension clause apply where the creditor has allegedly engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by making a demand for payment after representing that a loan facility would be extended and rolled over on the expiry date: O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 71.Relevant to the appellant's proposed ground of appeal, a suspension clause will also not apply where the creditor's dealings with the guarantor might result in the guarantee being discharged or set aside for invalidity - for example, where the creditor has engaged in misleading or unconscionable conduct in connection with the giving of the guarantee. Further, statutory relief for misleading or unconscionable conduct may operate to void or vary a contract retrospectively. Accordingly, there is a distinction between a defence that alleges that a guarantee should be set aside or varied and a defence that pleads an equitable set-off. The distinction is illustrated in the reasons of Holmes J (as her Honour then was) in Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Airstar Aviation Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 151; [2004] 1 Qd R 122.