Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Hamberger

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Hamberger
[2000] FCA 1197

WORKPLACE RELATIONS – no-disadvantage test – transitional provisions – agreement certified in 1992 still binding – agreement certified in 1992 not an award for the purposes of s 178(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Conciliation & Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth)
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth)

Telstra Corporation Limited v MacBean (2000) 171 ALR 357 followed
IRC v Metrolands (Property Finance) Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 166 referred to
Burwood Cinema Ltd v Australian Theatrical & Amusement Employees Association (1925) 35 CLR 528 referred to

Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed reissue Vol 44(1)

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION, GRAHAM BIRD AND PAUL DAVEY V JONATHON HAMBERGER AND G & K O’CONNOR PTY LTD

NO. V 28 OF 2000

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION AND BARRY DONALD DAVIDSON V G & K O’CONNOR PTY LTD

NO. V 489 OF 1999
NO. V 650 OF 1999

JUDGES:      BEAUMONT, LEE & GYLES JJ
DATE:           25 AUGUST 2000
PLACE:         MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 28 of 2000

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION
FIRST APPLICANT

GRAHAM BIRD
SECOND APPLICANT

PAUL DAVEY
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

JONATHON HAMBERGER
FIRST RESPONDENT

G & K O'CONNOR PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 489 of 1999
V 650 of 1999

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION
FIRST APPLICANT

BARRY DONALD DAVIDSON
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

G & K O'CONNOR PTY LTD
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT, LEE & GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

25 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.In V28 of 2000, the application is dismissed.

2.In V489 of 1999 and V650 of 1999, the questions referred are answered as follows:

Question:

“(c)Whether the G & K O’Connor Pty Ltd and Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union Victorian Meat Processing Agreement 1992 (‘the 1992 agreement’) was binding at any, and if so what, times between 19 August 1999 and 22 November 1999?”

Answer:Yes, at all such times.

Question:

“(d)If the answer to (c) is in the affirmative, whether the 1992 agreement was, at the time when it was in force, an award for the purpose of s 178(1)WRA?”

Answer:           No

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 28 of 2000

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION
FIRST APPLICANT

GRAHAM BIRD
SECOND APPLICANT

PAUL DAVEY
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

JONATHON HAMBERGER
FIRST RESPONDENT

G & K O'CONNOR PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 489 of 1999
V 650 of 1999

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION
FIRST APPLICANT

BARRY DONALD DAVIDSON
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

G & K…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1197
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Hamberger, the dispute involved the validity and enforceability of an industrial agreement between the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union and G&K O’Connor Pty Ltd. The key legal issues centered on whether the agreement was binding during certain periods and if it qualified as an award under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act). The case was referred to a Full Court to determine these questions.

The court examined the legislative history and the effect of amendments made to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (IR Act) by the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 and subsequent amendments by the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996. It considered the implications of these legislative changes on the enforcement and variation of certified agreements. The court referenced the Telstra case, which provided a precedent on the interpretation of transitional provisions in the context of certified agreements.

The Full Court concluded that the agreement in question, which was certified before the commencement of the Reform Act, remained binding but was not subject to variation under the new regime introduced by the Reform Act and subsequent amendments. The court found that the agreement was binding during the specified period but did not qualify as an award under the WR Act.

The court's orders dismissed the application and answered the referred questions, affirming that the 1992 agreement was binding during the relevant period but did not constitute an award under the WR Act. This decision highlighted the importance of transitional provisions in industrial relations legislation and their impact on the enforceability of pre-existing agreements.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. In V28 of 2000, the application is dismissed.

2. In V489 of 1999 and V650 of 1999, the questions referred are answered as follows:

Question:

“(c) Whether the G & K O’Connor Pty Ltd and Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union Victorian Meat Processing Agreement 1992 (‘the 1992 agreement’) was binding at any, and if so what, times between 19 August 1999 and 22 November 1999?”

Answer: Yes, at all such times.

Question:

“(d )If the answer to (c) is in the affirmative, whether the 1992 agreement was, at the time when it was in force, an award for the purpose of s 178(1)WRA?”

Answer: No

Background

Background to the litigation

On 6 April 2000, Marshall J ordered that Questions (c) and (d) be referred, pursuant to s 416(1)(a) of the WR Act, to a Full Court for hearing and determination, subject to any further order of the Full Court. (By s 416(1)(a) it is provided that at any stage of a proceeding in a matter arising under the WR Act, a single Judge exercising the jurisdiction of the Court may refer a question of law for the opinion of a Full Court. Section 416(2) provides that, on such a reference, the Full Court may have regard to any evidence given, or arguments advanced, in the proceeding before the Judge.)Background facts – the chronology of events All three matters now before us have proceeded, upon the acknowledged footing that, for present purposes, there is no dispute about the material background facts. In the circumstances, this course appears to us to be both convenient and appropriate. On behalf of O’Connor, it is said (and this was not disputed) that the chronology of the relevant background events which are a matter of record, or common ground, is as follows:“(a)On 24th December 1992 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’) certified, under s 134E of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (‘the IR Act’), the G & K O’Connor Pty Ltd and Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union Victorian Meat Processing Agreement 1992 (‘the 1992 agreement’). That agreement was made between the union applicant in these proceedings and … O’Connor …(b)The 1992 agreement was required by s 134E(1)(f) of the IR Act to specify its ‘period of operation’ and it did so, naming the period between the beginning of the first pay period commencing on or after 18th December 1992 and 30th September 1995. (Cl1.3(a))(c)On 30th March 1994 relevant provisions of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (‘the Reform Act’) came into operation. The Reform Act amended the IR Act in ways which included the introduction of a new regime for the certification of industrial agreements, but preserved the pre-existing law (‘pre-Reform Act law’) in relation to the effect of previously-certified agreements (s 35(2)(b) thereof).(The provisions of s 35(2)(b) are of central significance here. They are set out in para 20, below)(d)On 30th September 1995 the period of operation of the 1992 agreement came to an end in accordance with the terms of that agreement.(e)On 19th December 1996 the Commission made the Federal Meat Industry (Processing) Award 1996 (‘the industry award’). [O’Connor] was and is not a named respondent to the industry award.(f)An organisation of employers bound by the industry award was and is the National Meat Association of Australia (‘the NMAA’). The industry award binds the NMAA and its members … At the time when the industry award was made, [O’Connor] was not a member of the NMAA.(g)Save for the parties to it, the industry award dealt and deals with the same matters as were dealt with by the 1992 agreement (or at least did so insofar as issues in these proceedings are concerned).(h)On 31st December 1996 relevant provisions of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (‘the WROLA Act’) came into operation. The WROLA Act changed the name of the IR Act to the Workplace Relations Act 1966 (‘the IR Act’) and again introduced a new regime for the certification of industrial agreements. That regime was to apply to agreements made after the commencement of the relevant amendments.(i)On 17th January 1997 the Commission purportedly certified the G & K O’Connor Pty Ltd and Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union Victorian Meat Processing Agreement 1995 (‘the 1995 agreement’) under s 170MC of the IR Act, a provision which had been introduced by the Reform Act …. The parties thereafter observed the 1995 agreement.(j)In March 1999 [O’Connor], in support of claims for a different regime of terms and conditions of employment, locked out its employees under Part VIB of the WR Act.(k)On 3rd June 1999 the [O’Connor] became a member of the NMAA.(l)On 26th July 1999 the Commission set aside the certification of the 1995 agreement.(m)On 19th August 1999 [O’Connor] in support of demands for the making of AWAs, locked out its employees under Part VID of the WR Act. That lockout came to an end upon the operation of an order of the Commission that it should do so on 21st November 1999.(n)AWAs were made between [O’Connor] and some of its employees. On and since 2nd September 1999 these AWAs were filed with the Employment Advocate for approval and were approved.(o)As at 20th April 2000, 159 AWAs had been approved.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second of the questions referred also directly raises an issue whether the agreement (assuming it to be in force at the times referred to in the first question) was an award for the purposes of s 178(1) of the WR Act. This raises a similar issue to that involved in the prerogative writ proceedings. No relevant distinction in principle has been suggested between the two. We shall consider this aspect first, on the assumption that the agreement remained binding at all material times, and then return to consider the status of that assumption.The decision in Telstra As mentioned, the judgment of the Full Court (Ryan, Marshall & Finkelstein JJ) in Telstra was a central feature of the arguments put before us. In order to understand what the case decides, and because the members of the Full Court differed somewhat in their respective approaches, reference will need to be made to what was decided by each member of the Court.Ryan J His Honour explained the background to the matter, and gave reasons for his conclusions as follows:· On 27 April 1993, the AIRC certified a redundancy agreement binding on predecessors of Telstra which had applied for prerogative relief, and various organisations of employees, including predecessors of some of the respondents to the application. The agreement was expressed to operate with effect from 4 March 1993, and to remain in force until 31 January 1995. The central question for determination was whether an agreement certified in 1993 under Div 3A of Pt VI of the IR Act continued to be regulated and, in particular, to be subject to variation, in accordance with the IR Act as amended from time to time, as though the subsequent amendments of the definition of “award” in the IR Act had never been made.· The definition of “award” provided by s 4 of the IR Act current in April 1993 was “an award or order that has been reduced to writing under s 143(1), and includes a certified agreement”. Section 4 defined a “certified agreement” as “an agreement certified under Div 3A of Pt VI”. Division 3A, which was inserted by Act No. 109 of 1992, commenced on 23 July 1992. It constituted a code governing the making, certifying, operation, effect, variation and termination of an agreement between parties to an industrial dispute for the settlement of all or any of the matters in dispute, or for the prevention of further industrial disputes between the parties to the agreement. Division 3A was repealed by the the Reform Act. However, s 35 of the Reform Act contained a relevant saving clause. By s 35(2)(b), it was provided that, despite the repeal, an agreement certified under that Division and in force immediately before the commencement day “has effect as if the Principal [i.e. IR] Act had not been amended by [the Reform] Act, but may be extended under section 170MI [scilicet s 170MJ – see above] of the amended Act”. (Emphasis added.)· The WROLA Act made far-reaching amendments to the IR Act. Schedule 5 of the WROLA Act inserted amendments dealing with the subject “Awards”. Schedule 11 dealt with the “Consequential amendments relating to certified agreements, AWAs and enterprise flexibility agreements”. Item I of Pt I of Sch 11 repealed the previous definition of “award” and (relevantly) substituted this:“award means an award…under section 143(1), but does not include an order made by the [AIRC] in a proceeding under Subdivision B of Division 3 of Part VIA.”· Subdivision B of Div 3 of Pt VIA deals with the AIRC’s power to grant relief in respect of the termination of employment. Section 143(1), which has not been amended, (relevantly) provides:“When the [AIRC] makes a determination that, in [its] opinion, is an award…, [it] shall promptly (a) reduce the determination to writing that (i) expresses it to be an award….”· However, the WROLA Act substituted a new s 143(1A) which (relevantly) provides:“(1A)For the purposes of sub-section (1), none of the following is an award…:(a)a decision to certify an agreement under Part VIB.”· Schedule 8 to the WROLA Act deals with the subject “Certified agreements”. Item 23 of Pt 2 of Sch 8 (relevantly) provides:“(1) Subject to this item, the amendments made by this Schedule apply to:(a)an agreement made after the commencement of this Schedule; and(b)a bargaining period, for a proposed agreement, initiated after [that] commencement.”· New termination provisions apply to pre-commencement certified agreements.“(2) If:(a)an agreement was entered into before the commencement of this Schedule and was covered by Division 2 of Part VIB of the [WR] Act 1996 as then in force; and(b)whether before or after the commencement of this Schedule:(i) the period of operation specified in the agreement; or(ii)if it has been extended …under section 170MJ … – that period as extended…;has ended;then, after the commencement of this Schedule, section 170MH of that Act as amended by this Schedule, instead of section 170MN of that Act as in force immediately before the commencement of this Schedule, applies to the agreement.” (emphasis added)· The emphasised words make it clear that Item 23 did not apply to pre-1996 certified agreements which antedated the Reform Act which inserted Div 2 of Pt VIB of the IR Act.· Pt 2 of Sch 5 contains transitional provisions in the case of awards. Item 49 deals with “Variation of awards during the interim period” (i.e. the period of eighteen months beginning on the day on which s 89A of the WR Act (dealing with the scope of industrial disputes) commences). Item 49 (relevantly) provides:“(1)If one or more of the parties to an award apply to the [AIRC] for a variation of the award under this item, the [AIRC] may, during the interim period, vary the award so that it only deals with allowable award matters.…(6)If the [AIRC] varies the award under subitem (5), it must include in the award provisions that ensure that overall entitlements to pay provided by the award are not reduced by that variation, unless the [AIRC] considers that it would be in the public interest not to include such provisions.”· By subitem (7), the AIRC must, if it considers it appropriate, review the award to determine whether or not it meets certain criteria.· By subitem (8) the AIRC must also review the award to determine whether or not it meets certain other criteria.· Item 50(1) of Pt 2 of Sch 5 provides:“At the end of the interim period, each award ceases to have effect to the extent that it provides for matters other than allowable award matters.”· As noted, Sch 11 deals with consequential amendments relating to certified agreements. · Item 88 (in Pt 4 of Sch 11) provides:“Part 2 of Schedule 8 [which deals with transitional aspects in relation to certified agreements] applies to the amendments made by this Schedule, so far as they relate to certified agreements, in the same way as that Part applies to the amendments made by Part 1 of Schedule 8.”· In other words, the transitional provisions enacted by Item 23 of Pt 2 of Sch 8 were given the same operation in relation to the amendments in Sch 11 in their application to certified agreements, as they had been given in relation to the new code governing certified agreements embodied in Pt VIB of the WR Act inserted by Pt 1 of Sch 8 of the WROLA Act. As indicated, none of those provisions applied to agreements certified before 30 March 1994.· Telstra argued that since the redundancy agreement (“the Agreement”) had been certified at a time when the IR Act defined “award” so as to include a certified agreement, the Agreement continued to be an “award” for the purposes of that Act as subsequently amended and, so, was susceptible of variation pursuant to Item 49 of Sch 5 of the WROLA Act.· However, the difficulty with Telstra’s argument is that it preserves for certified agreements coming into force before 30 March 1994, the status of “awards” as then defined; but it subjects the same agreements to radically different requirements, imposed in an ambulatory way on “awards” which are quite differently defined. Yet that consequence could only follow if s 35(2) of the Reform Act were to be construed to mean that an agreement certified under Div 3A of Pt VI before 30 March 1994 should continue to be an “award” for the purposes of the IR Act, as amended by the Reform Act. This would be so on that approach, notwithstanding the repeal of Div 3A of Pt VI, certification under which had been essential if an agreement were to come within the extended meaning given to “award” by its definition in s 4.· The preferable construction of s 35(2) is this: except in relation to extension of the period of their operation, s 35(2) preserves the application to agreements coming into force before 30 March 1994 of the whole statutory regime embodied in the IR Act as in force immediately before 30 March 1994, as far as that regime was applicable to those certified agreements. Section 35(2)(b) is framed to take effect as a “savings” provision, preserving the effect of the IR Act, notwithstanding amendments, including repeals which would otherwise, subject to s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) obliterate the repealed provisions. (Section 8 deals with the effect of repeal by providing, inter alia, that where an Act repeals in the whole or in part a former Act, then unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the repealed Act or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed Act.) However a savings provision, without more, does not add to, or alter the reach of the saved enactment.· This view is supported by the explanation of s 35 in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill for the Reform Act, as follows:“The existing certified agreement provisions…Division 3A … are to be repealed…. This clause makes transitional provisions in relation to agreements which were certified, or made with the intention of an application being made for certification, under those provisions…paragraph 2(b) deals with agreements that were certified under Division 3A … prior to its repeal – such agreements will continue to operate as if Division 3A … had not been repealed, but will be able to be extended under the new s 170.”· As mentioned above, the reference to “the new s 170” was clearly to s 170MJ, which was inserted by the Reform Act. It is common ground that s 35(2) mistakenly referred to s 170MI. (this must have been a typographical error in the legislation – s 170MI, irrelevantly for these purposes, makes provision for the operation of certified agreements; whereas s 170MJ, appositely, deals with the IR extension.)· The express indication of the limited way in which the new regime was to apply to pre-Reform Act certified agreements, by making them susceptible to extension under s 170MJ, argues strongly for an interpretation which denies to the post-Reform Act legislation any other application to those agreements. Otherwise, s 35(2) only saved the regulation of those agreements by the IR Act as in force immediately before 30 March 1994.· This construction is also reinforced by the presence in the Reform Act of s 35(3), which extended the facility to vary a certified agreement to accord with Div 2 of Part VIB of the IR Act, as amended, only in the case of those agreements to which s 35(2)(a) or s 35(2)(c)(ii) applied. (By s 35(3) it is provided that the AIRC may permit the parties to an agreement to which s 35(2)(a) or (2)(c)(i) applies, to vary its terms so as to accord with Div 2 of Pt VIB of the amended Act.) The clear implication is that certified agreements in force before 30 March 1994, to which s 35(2)(b) applied, were incapable of variation under Div 2 of Pt VIB.· This understanding of s 35(2) was shared by the Legislature when enacting Item 49 of Pt 2 of Sch 5 of the WROLA Act. For example, Item 49(7) would be almost unworkably circular if the reference it contains to “the award” were to be construed, as on Telstra’s argument it must, so as to include a certified agreement which came into force before 30 March 1994.Marshall J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is common ground, in the light of observations made in the Telstra case (see below), that the reference in s 35(2)(b) to s 170MI of the amended Act, should be treated as an intention to refer to s 170MJ, which was in the following terms:“170MJ (1) [Parties to agreement may extend its operation] Subject to this section, the parties to a certified agreement may extend the period of operation of the agreement.(2) [Conditions giving extension effect] An extension has no effect unless:(a)the parties agree to the extension; and(b)before the end of the period of operation of the agreement or that period as last extended under this section:(i)if the agreement applies only to a single business, part of a single business or a single place of work – one or more of the parties apply to the Commission to approve the extension; or(ii)otherwise – one or more of the parties notify the Commission in writing of the extension(3) [Single business] If an application is made in accordance with subparagraph (2)(b)(i), the extension has effect at least until the application is determined, even if that happens after the period referred to in paragraph (2)(b).(4) [Commission must approve extension] On an application, the Commission must approve the extension unless an organisation of employees that is entitled under section 170MB to be heard satisfies the Commission that the extension would not be in the interests of the employees covered by the agreement. If that happens, the Commission must refuse to approve the extension.” As noted above, these amendments introduced a new regime for certified agreements in Division 2 of Part VIB. That Part related to “Promoting Bargaining and Facilitating Agreements”. Division 3 related to a new species of agreement called “enterprise flexibility agreements”, which introduced a procedure where a majority of employees of an enterprise had agreed to be bound. One of the principal objects of the Reform Act was:“… encouraging and facilitating the making of agreements, between the parties involved in industrial relations, to determine matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees, particularly at the workplace or enterprise level; and …” (s 3(a)) The Reform Act also introduced a number of other new provisions relating to awards and other important industrial topics. The definition of award continued to include certified agreements, subject to contrary intention. The new regime for certified agreements had many similarities with the repealed provisions. On 31 December 1996 the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) (“the WROLA Act”) amendments introduced revision of the legislation which gave effect to policies of a new government, as the second reading speech makes clear. It is also clear from the Parliamentary Debates, however, that, to an extent, the will of Parliament represented a compromise of those policies. The drafting technique chosen was amendment by Schedule. Schedule 8 dealt with Certified Agreements. Part VIB was repealed, and a new part substituted which differed in many respects from the repealed provisions. The application and transitional provisions in relation to Sch 8 are contained in cl 23. With some exceptions, the new provisions only applied to new agreements. However s 23(2) provided:“If:(a)an agreement was entered into before the commencement of this Schedule and was covered by Division 2 of Part VIB of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 as then in force; and(b)whether before or after the commencement of this Schedule:(i)the period of operation specified in the agreement; or(ii)if it has been extended or further extended under section 170MJ of that Act as in force at the time – that period as extended or further extended;has ended;then, after the commencement of this Schedule, section 170MH of that Act as amended by this Schedule, instead of section 170MN of that Act as in force immediately before the commencement of this Schedule, applies to the agreement.”