JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: AUSTIN -v- THE ELECTRICITY NETWORKS CORPORATION [2012] WADC 163
CORAM: DERRICK DCJ
HEARD: 16 NOVEMBER 2012
DELIVERED : 16 NOVEMBER 2012
FILE NO/S: CIV 1735 of 2008
BETWEEN: DALE AUSTIN
Plaintiff
AND
THE ELECTRICITY NETWORKS CORPORATION
First DefendantBORAL RESOURCES (WA)
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to extend time for the service of expert report - Principles to be applied in determining application for an extension of time to serve expert report - Whether admissibility of proposed expert evidence relevant to determination of application for extension of time
Legislation:
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA)
District Court Rules 2005 (WA)
Occupiers' Liability Act 1985 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Application allowed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr T Lampropoulos SC
First Defendant : Mr G R Hancy
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Simon Walters
First Defendant : DLA Piper Australia
Second Defendant : Not applicable
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Aon Risk Services Australia v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 381
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268
Swindale v Babic [No 2] [2007] WASCA 262
DERRICK DCJ:
[These reasons are an edited version of the reasons delivered extemporaneously on 16 November 2012.]
The first defendant applies for an extension of time within which to serve on the plaintiff the report of an expert witness.
Background to the application
The second defendant is the owner of a property in Toodyay. Prior to 1998 the second defendant used the property as a quarry. The second defendant closed the quarry in 1998. The property has not been used or occupied since 1998.
On 21 or 22 July 2002 the plaintiff entered on the property. Once on the property he entered a compound which contained electrical equipment. The compound and the electrical equipment were owned and maintained by the first defendant.
While in the compound the plaintiff received an electric shock. The electric shock caused the plaintiff to suffer severe injuries.
The plaintiff subsequently brought the present action against the first defendant and the second defendant alleging negligence and breach of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1985 (WA). He claims damages for the injuries that he suffered.
On 25 June 2012 a listing conference was held. At the listing conference orders were made listing the action for a directions hearing on 6 November 2012 and for a 10 day trial commencing on 4 February 2013. The following orders were also made at the listing conference:
1.The parties have leave to adduce expert evidence at the trial of the action; and
2.Within 28 days each party:
(1)serve on each other party a copy of the report of any expert witness, the substance of which the party intends to rely on at trial; or
(2)disclose in writing…
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- Case
- [2012] WADC 163
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine the principles governing the extension of time for serving an expert report and whether the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence should influence the decision to grant an extension. Specifically, the court considered whether the order made at the listing conference, which required the service of expert witness reports, implied a requirement that these reports must comply with common law rules regarding the admissibility of expert evidence. The court also had to weigh the reasons for non-compliance, the potential prejudice to both parties if the time limit was or was not extended, and the need to resolve the issues fairly and justly with minimal delay and expense.
The court held that Order 3 r 5 of the Rules confers a broad discretionary power on the court to extend time for compliance with court orders, but this power must be exercised cautiously with regard to the overarching purpose of the Rules to facilitate fair and just resolution of issues with minimum delay and expense. The court found that the plaintiff's opposition to the extension was not based on prejudice due to the late disclosure but on the alleged fundamental flaws in the expert report. However, the court did not find that the order for service of expert reports implied a requirement that the reports must comply with common law rules of admissibility. Consequently, the court granted the extension, noting that the alleged flaws in the report did not affect the application for an extension of time.
The final order of the court was to grant the defendant, The Electricity Networks Corporation, an extension of time for the service of the expert report, notwithstanding the plaintiff's objections regarding the report's compliance with common law rules of admissibility.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Order 3 r 5 confers on the court a broad discretionary power to extend time for compliance with orders made by the court in order to avoid injustice: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268, 283, 286; Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 381, 386, 387, 398 ‑ 399. Nonetheless, the power must be exercised with caution with due regard to the overriding purpose of the RSC and the DCR, namely to facilitate the fair and just resolution of real issues in civil proceedings with minimum delay and expense: RSC, O 1 r 4A and r 4B; DCR, r 24(1); FAI General Insurance v Southern Cross Exploration (283); Aon Risk Services Australia v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 [90]. It follows, as the decided cases reveal, that in determining whether to grant the requested extension of time under O 3 r 5 I should take into account the reasons for the first defendant's non‑compliance with the relevant time limit, the prejudice the first defendant will suffer if the time limit is not extended, the prejudice the plaintiff will suffer if the time limit is extended, and the need to facilitate the fair and just resolution of the issues between the parties with minimum delay and expense. It is not suggested by the first defendant that any inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant an extension of time within which to comply with orders made by the court, assuming that such a jurisdiction co-exists with O 3 r 5, is any wider in scope than the discretion given to the court by O 3 r 5. Therefore my above statements as to the manner in which the discretion given to the court by O 3 r 5 should be exercised apply equally to the exercise of any inherent jurisdiction of the court to extend time limits. It is convenient at this point to refer to the ground on which the plaintiff opposes the first defendant's application. The plaintiff does not oppose the application on the ground that he has been prejudiced by the late disclosure of the report. Rather the plaintiff opposes the application on the ground that the report, even when read in light of the second report, is so 'fundamentally flawed' that the service of the report on the plaintiff, ignoring the fact that it was served outside of the specified 28 day time limit, does not comply with the order for service of expert witness reports made at the listing conference. The plaintiff submits that the report and the second report, in order to comply with the order made at the listing conference, must themselves comply with the common law rules relating to expert evidence, that neither the report nor the second report complies with those common law rules, that the service of the report and the second report by the first defendant therefore does not comply with the order for service made at the listing conference, and that consequently the application for the extension of time should not be granted. The complaints made by the plaintiff about the report and the second report are, in essence, that they do not clearly disclose the extent of Mr Allen's expertise, do not disclose how Mr Allen's expertise is relevant to their subject matter, do not clearly relate to any issue on the pleadings, do not clearly answer the two questions asked by the first defendant's solicitors in their letter of instruction to Mr Allen, and do not clearly expose the process of reasoning which has lead to the opinions expressed in them. The plaintiff's counsel was not able to point me to any authority in support of the plaintiff's contention that an order of the type made at the listing conference, carries with it a requirement that any expert report served pursuant to the order must comply with the common law rules relating to the admissibility of expert evidence.