IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane- No B2 of 2001
B e t w e e n -
WILLIAM JOHN MURRAY
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 2002, AT 2.01 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.J. RAFTER: If it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Dearden Lawyers)
MS L.J. CLARE: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by the instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))
MR RAFTER: Your Honours, this case requires an extension of time. The circumstances explaining the delay in filing the application are contained in the application book. There is an additional affidavit referred to in the affidavit contained in the book at pages 56 to 66 that is not actually contained in the book. It is an affidavit sworn 28 November. I have copies of that affidavit for your Honours.
GAUDRON J: No, we do not need to trouble you on the extension of time, Mr Rafter.
MR RAFTER: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours, the principal authority relied upon before the Court of Appeal, but not referred to in either the joint judgment or the dissenting judgment of Mr Justice McPherson was R v Guise 101 A Crim R 143. My submission is that the facts of this case and the principle underlying the point sought to be agitated, or the principle ‑ ‑ ‑
GAUDRON J: You say “the point sought to be agitated”. The draft notice of appeal contains many points.
MR RAFTER: Yes, but the material was prepared by the applicant himself from prison, as the material would tend to indicate. I have prepared an amended draft notice of appeal to reflect grounds that would include only the section 23(1)(a) point and the onus of proof point, which was the point upon which the court was divided. If it becomes necessary to do so, I can ‑ ‑ ‑
GAUDRON J: Are those points related? In a sense they are.
MR RAFTER: In a sense they are. In a sense they are, in my respectful submission. As I submitted earlier, the principal authority was Guise, which I submit is practically indistinguishable from the present case.
GAUDRON J: Do we have that?
MR RAFTER: I have provided that with the list of authorities. Can I just make these observations in respect of the reported decision in Guise. In the headnote it indicates that Mr Justice Pincus and Mr Justice Lee made certain findings. In fact the headnote is erroneous because, as one can see, if one looks to the final page, 151, Mr Justice Lee actually agreed with Mr Justice Ambrose. The significance of that is that, although all members of the court agreed in the result, Mr Justice Pincus and Mr Justice Ambrose arrived at the result by different means.…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Austin & Anor v Commonwealth of Aust and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2002] HCATrans 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the detention provisions of the *Migration Act* and associated regulations were constitutionally valid, specifically in light of Chapter III of the *Constitution*, which vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth exclusively in the courts. The applicants argued that the executive power to detain individuals indefinitely, without judicial oversight or a time limit, infringed upon this constitutional separation of powers.
The Court, by majority, held that the provisions of the *Migration Act* and regulations that permitted the indefinite detention of non-citizens were invalid. The majority reasoned that the power to detain a person is a fundamental aspect of the judicial power, and its exercise by the executive branch without clear statutory limits or judicial review amounted to an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power. The Court affirmed the principle that detention, as a deprivation of liberty, must be authorised by law and subject to constitutional constraints, particularly those relating to the separation of judicial and executive functions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.