Attorney-General v Phineasa

Case [2012] QCA 184


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Phineasa [2012] QCA 184

PARTIES:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)
v
HENRY SIMEON PHINEASA
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 3793 of 2012
SC No 1811 of 2012

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

10 July 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 June 2012

JUDGES:

Muir and White JJA and Philippides J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES – GENERALLY – where the respondent had previously been convicted of various sexual offences, including indecent acts, indecent assaults, and one charge of entering a dwelling with intent at night – where primary judge implicitly held that none of the offences were a “serious sexual offence” under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (‘the Act’) – where “serious sexual offence” is defined by the Act as “an offence of a sexual nature… involving violence” – where the appellant contended that “violence” included any assault falling under s 245 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) – whether “violence” as used in the Act ought to be defined in that way or given some other definition – whether the offences of which the respondent was convicted were “serious sexual offences” under the Act – whether the appeal ought to be upheld

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 245, s 349
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), division 3, s 3, s 5, s 8, s 13, schedule
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld)
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s 19

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; [2004] HCA 37, followed
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Qld v Tilbrook [2012] QSC 128, considered
Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2, followed
R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; [1986] VicRp 4, considered
R v Evans (1999) 8 Tas R 325; [1999] TASSC 25, considered
R v McCrossen (1991) Tas R 1; [1991] TASSC 1, considered
Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514; [1987] HCA 12, cited

COUNSEL:

J B Rolls for the appellant
J Allen for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Crown Law for the appellant
Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent

  1. MUIR JA:
    Introduction


    On 28 March 2012, the primary judge refused an application by the appellant Attorney-General pursuant to s 8 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (“the Act”) for an order that a date be set for the hearing of an application for an order under division 3 of the Act and for an order that the respondent undergo examination by two psychiatrists named by the court for the…

Continue reading Attorney-General v Phineasa

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Attorney-General v Phineasa [2012] QCA 184
Case
[2012] QCA 184
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was an appeal by the Attorney-General against a decision of the primary judge, who had found that the respondent, Phineasa, had not committed any "serious sexual offences" as defined in the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (the Act). Phineasa had previously been convicted of various sexual offences, including indecent acts, indecent assaults, and entering a dwelling with intent at night. The Attorney-General argued that these offences should be considered "serious sexual offences" under the Act, which defines such offences as those of a sexual nature involving violence. The central issue before the court was the interpretation of the term "violence" in the context of the Act and whether it should include any assault under section 245 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).

The court examined the definition of "serious sexual offence" as per the Act, which required an offence to be of a sexual nature and to involve violence. The Attorney-General contended that the term "violence" should be interpreted broadly to include any assault as defined in section 245 of the Criminal Code. However, the court considered the legislative intent and context of the Act and concluded that the term "violence" should not be interpreted so broadly. The court held that for an offence to be classified as a "serious sexual offence," it needed to involve a level of violence that was significant and distinct from the mere commission of a sexual act. The court found that the respondent's previous convictions did not meet this threshold.

As a result of the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed. The court confirmed that the respondent's previous convictions did not qualify as "serious sexual offences" under the Act. Consequently, the primary judge's decision that the respondent had not committed any "serious sexual offences" was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.