SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v TOPIA
[2024] SASC 76
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Stanley
11 June 2024
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS – HIGH RISK OFFENDER - SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENDER
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS – ORDERS RELATING TO SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENDERS – CONTINUING DETENTION ORDERS
This is an application for a Continuing Detention Order (CDO) pursuant to s18(2) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (HRO Act). This application was heard together with the related application for an Extended Supervision Order (ESO) (SCCRM-23-008796).
On 15 March 2023, upon application by the Attorney-General of South Australia, the Court imposed an interim supervision order (ISO) upon the Respondent pending the ultimate determination of the Attorney’s application for a second ESO.
Shortly after being released from custody on the ISO the respondent absconded from South Australia. The respondent returned to South Australia in January 2024 and, upon his return, was taken into custody and held on a Parole Board warrant for suspected breaches of his ISO.
Following an interview on 12 March 2024, the Parole Board was satisfied the responded had breached a number of conditions of his ISO and, pursuant to s18(1) of the HRO Act referred to the Court the question of whether a CDO should be made.
The Respondent has repeatedly refused to participate in a medical assessment that would enable the preparation of a report in satisfaction of s7(3) of the HRO Act. The Court is unable to determine the application for an ESO without this report.
Held:
1. The Respondent be detained at a Correctional Services or training centre pursuant to s18(2) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) until 15 October 2024.
2. The Application for an Extended Supervision Order is adjourned to the HRO List on 9 October 2024 at 9:15am.
Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 ss 7(3), 18(1) 18(2)(a), 18(2)(b), 18(3)., referred to.
Police v Sullivan; Attorney-General v Sullivan [2018] SASC 11; Attorney-General v Grosser [2016] SASC 49; R v Kimmins [2016] SASC 176; Attorney-General (SA) v V, ZR [2019] SASC 1, applied.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v TOPIA
[2024] SASC 76Criminal
STANLEY J:
Introduction
On 7 May 2024 I granted a continuing detention order (CDO) under s18(2) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (HRO Act) in relation to Jerome Topia (the respondent). These are my reasons for doing so.
The respondent is subject to an interim supervision order (ISO), pending the determination of the application brought by the Attorney-General for an extended supervision order (ESO).[1] The two applications were heard together. Section 18(2) of the HRO Act confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to make a CDO. In determining whether to exercise the discretion the paramount consideration of the Court is the safety of the community.[2]
[1] SCCRM-23-008796.
[2] HRO Act s 18(3).
The Attorney-General submits that the…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether a CDO or an ESO should be imposed on the respondent, given his history of breaching post-custodial orders and his refusal to participate in the psychological assessment required for an ESO. The court noted that an ESO could not be made until the respondent submitted to the required assessment, but the respondent had indicated he would not participate in any such assessment. This left the court with the sole option of imposing a CDO for the protection of the community.
The court found that a CDO was necessary to protect the community and to provide the respondent with an opportunity to complete the Domestic and Family Violence Intervention Program (DFVIP) and undergo the required assessment. The court ordered the respondent to be detained at a correctional services institution or training centre until 15 October 2024, and adjourned the application for an ESO to 9 October 2024. The court emphasised the importance of the respondent recognising the need for intervention and completing the DFVIP.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent made submissions addressing what occurred before the Parole Board. He claimed he was in the parole office getting an appointment before the Parole Board when he made some comments in relation to having to travel around to find his child in the event that child welfare was to take custody of his child. He claimed that Francis Nelson KC, the Chair of the Parole Board, informed him that welfare would remove his child to which he responded that he would “have to travel around to get them”.[19] He denied that he had any intention of breaching any further ESO or that anything he said should have been understood as indicating he had such an intention. I do not accept the respondent’s explanation. It is contrary to the terms of the report of the Parole Board of 5 April 2024.[20] It is apparent that the respondent gave the Board the same intimation he gave me, namely, that he was not prepared to participate in any form of medical assessment, and he wanted the matter ended, so he would be released and travel where he wished. As he told the Parole Board on 12 March 2024, he absconded to New South Wales in breach of his ISO because, “I don’t care about it, I just want to go home and see my family”. He said the Court could do nothing, “because it’s expired and I’m not under it anymore”.[21] [19] T 10.30-36.[20] Exhibit ACM-9 to the affidavit of Angela Marsh sworn 23 April 2024.[21] Exhibit ACM-9 to the affidavit of Angela Marsh sworn 23 April 2024.Consideration I am satisfied that the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to s 18(2) has been invoked. The respondent has breached multiple conditions of his interim supervision order and poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not detained in custody. The respondent opposes the making of a CDO. However, he is prepared to submit to an ESO. Accordingly, the real issue is whether the Court should make a CDO or an ESO. An ESO cannot be made until a report pursuant to s 7(3) of the HRO Act is received from a prescribed health professional, in this instance Dr Jaywant. However, a catch-22 situation has developed. The respondent has told the Court he will not participate in any psychological assessment although he seemed to think that the assessment was for the purposes of a CDO rather than an ESO. So long as the respondent refuses to participate in the assessment process with Dr Jaywant or another prescribed health professional, the Court will not be in a position to make an ESO.[22] That leaves the Court in a position where the only option available to it for the protection of the community is to order a CDO. Even if the respondent submitted to an assessment interview with Dr Jaywant, which was scheduled for Wednesday, 8 May 2024, a s 7(3) report is unlikely to be received until September. [22] HRO Act s 7(3). The respondent told the Court what he had told the Parole Board, that he is doing everything to stay out of trouble; he has secured accommodation; he has his own business; that he would like to access drug and alcohol counselling in the community; and that he is studying for an MBA.[23] He told me that he wants to stay out of gaol and has not committed any further offence since he returned to South Australia. However, he continues to threaten to abscond again and he refuses to participate in programs to address his violent offending.[23] T 12.27-32.