SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v SYMONDS
[2021] SASC 145
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Peek
21 December 2021
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS
Application by Attorney-General for the State of South Australia for an extended supervision order pursuant to s 7 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015.
The respondent is now 70 years of age. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse contrary to s 49(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (the Index charges) and was convicted following a trial by jury. Later, on 27 June 2018, he was sentenced to three years and four months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
The Index charges were committed against a 14-year-old boy (referred to as “R”) in 1994, some 27 years ago. Count 1 involved the respondent performing an act of fellatio upon R. Count 2 occurred immediately after with R placing his penis in the respondent’s anus. Count 3 occurred on a later occasion in 1994, and involved the respondent performing an act of fellatio upon R.
The respondent has no history of other proven offending; he has been charged with other sexual offences but all have been discontinued or decided in his favour. A report prepared by a forensic psychiatrist concluded that there was a moderate likelihood of the respondent committing a further serious sexual offence if not placed on an extended supervision order and that that was her opinion even if the unproven allegations of other criminal conduct are put aside.
Held: Application granted.
1.The respondent is a high risk offender for the purposes of s 5 and s 7(4)(a) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015.
2.Putting aside the unproven allegations of other criminal conduct, the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community for the purpose of s 7(4)(b) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015.
3.It is appropriate that an extended supervision order with stated conditions be imposed pursuant to s 7(4) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 for a period of two years.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49(3); Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 5, 7, 10, 12; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) ss 23, 24, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49; Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2017] SASC 89; Attorney-General (SA) v Karpany [2020] SASC 219; Attorney-General (SA) v V, ZR [2019] SASC 1; Police v Sullivan; Attorney-General (SA) v Sullivan [2018] SASC 11; R v Kimmins [2016] SASC 176; R v Schuster [2016] SASCFC 86, discussed.
Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2017] SASC 149; State of NSW v John Owen Company [2011] NSWSC 976,…
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- AGLC
- Attorney-General (SA) v Symonds [2021] SASC 145
- Case
- [2021] SASC 145
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal framework for imposing an ESO, focusing on whether Symonds was a high-risk offender and whether he posed an appreciable risk to community safety. It noted that an appreciable risk is not speculative but founded on evidence providing a basis for apprehension of future risk. The court also highlighted the importance of balancing the respondent's rights and freedoms against the need to protect the community. In assessing the appropriateness of an ESO, the court had to give paramount consideration to public safety.
The court concluded that Symonds was a high-risk offender and posed an appreciable risk to the safety of the community. Despite the unproven allegations, the court found that Symonds's established risk factors were sufficient to warrant an ESO. The court imposed an ESO for two years with specified conditions, emphasizing the need to manage Symonds's risk of reoffending while protecting the community.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held: Application granted.
1. The respondent is a high risk offender for the purposes of s 5 and s 7(4)(a) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015.
2. Putting aside the unproven allegations of other criminal conduct, the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community for the purpose of s 7(4)(b) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015.
3. It is appropriate that an extended supervision order with stated conditions be imposed pursuant to s 7(4) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 for a period of two years.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to Dr Lim’ s evidence, I find her to be suitably qualified and to have been an honest and frank witness. Consideration as to the making of an Extended Supervision Order The process concerning the making of an ESO is delineated in s 7 of the HRO Act. It is to be observed that the Judge has essentially six questions to answer. First, is the respondent a high risk offender? (ss 7(1) and 7(4)(a)). Secondly, is the application within time? (s 7(2)). Thirdly, has the required report been compiled? (s 7(3)). Fourthly, is the Court satisfied that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order? (s 7(4)(b)). Fifthly, if the above conditions precedent are satisfied, is it appropriate to impose an ESO? Sixthly, if it is appropriate to impose an ESO, what conditions (if any) should be added to the mandatory conditions stipulated by s 10(1) of the HRO Act? The first three requirements are clearly satisfied here. As to the fourth question (appreciable risk), in Attorney-General v Grosser, Stanley J observed:[7]29. I consider that an appreciable risk is one that is capable of being estimated, perceptible and sensible. Necessarily, a risk must be anticipatory. An appreciable risk is a risk that is not purely speculative. It is founded in some evidence that provides a substantive basis for an apprehension that the respondent might conduct himself in future in a manner that poses a risk to the safety of the community. It is a question of degree. The extent of the appreciable risk is informed by the consideration that in determining whether to make an extended supervision order the safety of the community is paramount. I construe that requirement to mean that where a court considers that the question of whether to make an order is finely balanced, the protection of the community would favour making the order rather than declining to do so. I do not suggest that this consideration is exhaustive of the work to be performed by s 7(5) of the Act. The full extent of the operation of this provision falls to be considered on another occasion. [Citation omitted][7] [2016] SASC 49. As to the fifth question (appropriate to impose an ESO), in Attorney-General v Grosser (No 3), Stanley J further observed:[8]12. … The discretion to be exercised pursuant to s 7 demands a normative judgment which is quite different from traditional judicial discretion. The Court has been entrusted with a mandate to ensure public safety by interfering with the right to liberty of a person who is a high risk offender and poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised. The discretion is to be exercised having regard to both the interests of the community and the interests of the respondent, but by according the consideration of public safety paramountcy. Here there are two competing considerations. On the one hand, the respondent to an application by the Attorney-General has completed his or her sentence. There is a common law rule that his personal liberty and freedom of movement will not be infringed absent clear, unambiguous lawful authority. On the other hand, there is the need to protect the community from the risk of him reoffending. In construing the statute which infringes those rights and freedoms the Court will do so in a manner which limits the infringement to what is strictly required to effect the purpose of the statute. Given the terms of the Act, specifically the paramount consideration of public safety, in the exercise of this Court’s discretion relatively smaller degrees of risk will outweigh considerations which, even strongly, would militate against the making of an extended supervision order.[9] The same principles inform consideration of what are appropriate conditions to impose in making an extended supervision order and in determining the length of that order. The efficacy of the order is determined by the conditions it imposes. That warrants the same consideration applying to the conditions imposed as to the making of the order per se.[8] [2017] SASC 89.[9] Attorney-General v Kimmins [2016] SASC 176 at [38].