SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Attorney-General (Qld) v Morris & Anor [2015] QCA 112
PARTIES:
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(applicant)v
ANTHONY JOHN HUNTER MORRIS
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(first respondent)(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 2632 of 2015
DC No 676 of 2015DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Case Stated
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 30 January 2015DELIVERED ON:
23 June 2015
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
3 June 2015
JUDGES:
Holmes and Gotterson and Morrison JJA
Judgment of the CourtORDER:
The question asked by the special case should be answered as follows:
Question: Is s 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) invalid on the ground that it infringes the principle identified in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51?
Answer: No.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – OTHER MATTERS – CASES STATED AND REFERENCE OF QUESTION OF LAW – where the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland applied for an order pursuant to s 61(5)(a) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 removing a proceeding into the Court of Appeal – where the proceeding to be removed is from the District Court of Queensland – where the proceeding is a special case stated for the opinion of the District Court by his Honour the Chief Magistrate – where the order for stating the special case was made in Brisbane in a proceeding between the second respondent and the first respondent – where the first respondent had given notice pursuant to s 72B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) that the proceeding involved a matter arising under the Commonwealth Constitution or involving its interpretation – where the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland notified the registrar of the Magistrates Court of an intention to intervene in the proceeding – where the first respondent received an Infringement Notice that indicated that a Volvo Wagon had been detected by a photographic detection device travelling at 57 km/h along Carmody Road, St Lucia, within a speed zone of 50 km/h – where the first respondent was the registered operator of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence – where the second respondent did not contend that the first respondent is the “actual offender” within the meaning of s 114(1) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) – where it was common ground that, as the registered operator of the Volvo Wagon the subject of the Infringement Notice, the first respondent was, at the date of the detected speeding, the person in charge of the vehicle as that term is defined in s 113 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) – where it was also common ground that, not having given a notice under s 114(3)(b) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), the first respondent has continued to be the person in charge of the vehicle at the date…
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- AGLC
- Attorney-General (Qld) v Morris [2015] QCA 112
- Case
- [2015] QCA 112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether s 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) infringed the principle identified in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW). This principle pertains to the constitutional validity of state laws that delegate judicial power to non-judicial bodies. The court had to determine if the section's delegation of judicial power to the Magistrates Court in the context of handling speeding offences was in breach of this principle. The second respondent argued that the provision did not infringe the principle, while the first respondent contended that it did. The court was also required to consider whether the special case should proceed to the Court of Appeal for further determination.
The court examined the nature of the judicial power delegated under s 114 of the Act and concluded that it did not infringe the principle identified in Kable. The court held that the section did not confer upon the Magistrates Court the power to determine the ultimate guilt or innocence of the offender, but rather, it provided a mechanism for the registered operator to challenge the infringement notice. The court found that this did not amount to a breach of the Kable principle. The court also noted that the first respondent had not challenged the validity of the Infringement Notice itself but rather the procedure under which it was issued and dealt with. The court answered the question asked by the special case in the negative, stating that s 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) was not invalid on the ground that it infringed the principle identified in Kable.
The court's decision concluded that the question asked by the special case should be answered as follows: "Is s 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) invalid on the ground that it infringes the principle identified in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51?" The answer provided by the court was "No." This decision effectively resolved the legal issue in favour of the second respondent and the State of Queensland.
Orders
Orders of the court
The question asked by the special case should be answered as follows:
Question: Is s 114 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) invalid on the ground that it infringes the principle identified in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51?
Answer: No.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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